Energy and Regional Power in Advanced Developing States: A Turkish Case Study

Mary Keogh

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D.

Department of International Politics

Aberystwyth University

August 2018

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Abstract

The first decades of the 21st century have witnessed a proliferation of academic literature on the economically ascendant, internationally engaged states of the global South like the BRICS, Mexico, and Turkey. IR literature on energy has accounted for the rise of these states in terms of the recalibration of global hydrocarbon geopolitics, but is limited in considering the ways in which these advanced developing states use energy to obtain and maintain power. Other sub-schools of IR on middle, emerging, and rising powers pay more attention to how these states accrue and exercise power. One of these literatures - that on regional powers - provides the framework for this project. This thesis argues that IR does not pay sufficient regard to how energy (a key material resource) either contributes to regional power or shapes the agendas of advanced developing states that are also regional powers. This thesis consequently explores the nexus between energy and regional power for advanced developing states.

Adopting a case-study approach, the thesis considers how energy and regional power were related for Turkey between 2002 and 2014 in the Caspian region. It argues that despite being disadvantaged by limited energy reserves in a region dominated by major energy states, the governing AKP party saw energy and regional status as intrinsically linked for Turkey. An examination of Ankara's relationships with Iran and Russia - two other advanced developing states enables a detailed analysis of the manifestation of the relationship between energy and regional power in the regional context for Turkey. Overall, the thesis contends that acknowledging the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states facilitates understanding of power relations between states in the global South and provides insight into the ways in which those states effect and affect power in regional politics.

Acknowledgements

My foremost thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Charalampos Efstathopoulos and Dr. Alistair Shepherd, for their support and motivation over the past four years. Their (very) detailed feedback on every aspect of this project was instrumental in its metamorphosis from a series of ideas to a thesis. That they approached supervision with unwavering good humour and enthusiasm was an added bonus.

My sincere gratitude to Ciara, Paul, Rosie, and Tom for proof-reading individual chapters of this thesis, and to Bleddyn and John for casting an eye over a couple of sections at the last minute. Special thanks to Prithvi for her advice on the first draft of the introduction. There are not quite as many pipeline puns in there as she would have liked, but I did try.

The InterPol community provided me with support and friendship beyond measure during my time in Aberystwyth. Above all, my thanks to my merched - to Christine, to Dani, and to Katarina - for being by my side from the beginning. To Adhemar and Nick, too, for providing ample back up support. As my comrades in office 0.06, Adhemar and Katarina also ensured that work was less of a chore than it otherwise might have been.

My thanks to Alex, Bleddyn, Catrin, Dyfan, Katja, Lydia, and Prithvi for their advice on navigating academic life; and for organising and participating in the many walks, cups of tea, castle trips, and board game nights that made the whole PhD process so much more enjoyable. To all the staff in the InterPol office and to the ever-friendly security guards in the Llyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru: diolch yn fawr! Elsewhere, Ciara, Jim, Zoe, all the Dirty Muckers, and the Arklow Vikings Special Olympians provided respite from life in Wales.

More than anything, I am grateful to my family. To my uncles, for refusing to ever take me seriously and yet never being more than a phone call away. To my grandparents - my Nanny Lillie, Nanny Eileen, Granda Matt, and Granda Noel - for something I cannot put into words in so short a space. To my brother, Peter, for being a generally sound human being (frog pictures notwithstanding). And to my parents: for everything

This thesis is dedicated to my granda,
Matt Lambert.

As always, it's all his fault.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFP - Agence France Press
AIOC - Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AKP - Justice and Development Party
AP - Associated Press
BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
bcm - billion cubic metres
bcm/a - billion cubic meters per annum
bll/d - Barrels per day
B - billion
BP - British Petroleum
BOTAS - Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
BSEC - Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BTC – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
BTE - Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline
CPC - Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organisation
Euratom - European Atomic Energy Community
EC - European Commission
ECT - Energy Charter Treaty
EIA - Energy Information Administration
EU - European Union
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
FSU - Former Soviet Union
G8 - Group of eight
G20 - Group of twenty
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GECF - Gas Exporting Countries Forum
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Association
IEA - International Energy Agency
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IMFA - Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs
IOC - International Oil Company
ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
IPAP - Individualised Partnership Action Plan
IPE - International Political Economy
ITGI - Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy
IR - International Relations
KRG - Kurdish Regional Government
LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas
m - million
mb/d - million barrels per day
mcm - million cubic metres
MENA - Middle East and North Africa
MENR - Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkey)
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding

mt - metric tonnes
mtoe - million tonnes of oil equivalent
P5+1 - permanent members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, UK, US) and Germany
PJC - Permanent Joint Council
NATO - North Atlantic Trading Organisation
NOC - National Oil Company
NPP - Nuclear Power Plant
NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC - NATO-Russia Council
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC - Organisation of Islamic Countries
OPEC - Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PfP - Partnership for Peace
PKK - Kurdistan Workers' Party
RMFA - Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
RSC - Regional security complex
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOCAR - State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic
TANAP - Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
TAP - Trans-Adriatic Pipeline
Tcm - Trillion cubic metres
TIKA - Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
Toe - Tonnes of oil equivalent
TPAO - Turkish Petroleum Corporation
TPES - total primary energy supply
UK - United Kingdom
UN -United Nations
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US - United States
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO - World Trade Organisation
ZPWN - Zero Problems with Neighbours

Glossary

Barrel of oil: 42 US gallons (159 litres) of crude oil. Standard means of measuring oil volumes

Conventional oil: Crude oil that can be produced using traditional techniques (i.e. via a well) without altering the natural state of the oil.

Crude oil: Oil in its unrefined form/unrefined petroleum composed of hydrocarbon and organic material in a liquid state

Downstream: The part of the oil industry concerned with transportation and refining of crude oil and oil products

Energy source: Renewable or finite substances such as fossil fuels, uranium, hydropower and waste that provides power or heat

Fourth corridor: Gas network planned to connect the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Middle East to Europe. BTE and BTC are part of the project; other proposed pipelines include TAP, ITGI, White Stream and Nabucco

Liquefied natural gas: Natural gas that has been transformed to a liquid state and can be transported via tankers

Nuclear fuel/material: Elements like uranium and plutonium that are capable of sustaining a nuclear fission chain reaction that produces heat and energy when placed enriched and placed in a nuclear reactor

Peak oil: Point at which extraction of petroleum reaches maximum volumes, after which production begins a terminal decline.

Petroleum: Liquid hydrocarbon mixtures such as crude oil, condensate, refined oil products

Petroleum products: Products such as unfinished oils, gasoline, aviation fuels, and asphalt that are a product of the processing of hydrocarbons

Primary energy supplies: Energy in its raw form (ie hydrocarbons or renewable material); secondary energy forms are those like electricity or heat that have been generated from primary forms

Reserves /demonstrated reserves: Energy source that is demonstrated to exist by geological and engineering data, though knowledge on the precise location, volume, and grade of probable/indicated reserves varies

Reserves (possible): Unproven reserves that geological surveying suggests are less likely to be commercially recoverable that probable reserves (certainty value of reserves generally 10%)

Reserves (probable): Unproven reserves that have a 50% chance of being commercially recoverable

Reserves (proved): Energy sources that geological and engineering surveys demonstrate are recoverable under current operational and economic conditions. Certainty value of 90%

Reserves (recoverable proved): Estimated volume of fuel that is deemed reasonably certain to be recoverable from known reserves under current conditions

Seven Sisters: Cartel of seven major oil companies that dominated oil trade – particularly in the Middle East and Iran – from the 1940s until the oil crises of the late 1970s: British Petroleum, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (later Exxon), Standard Oil Company of New York (later Mobil), Standard Oil Company of California (later Chevron), Royal Dutch Shell, Texaco, and Gulf

Spot price: Price paid for one-off energy transaction for immediate delivery of a product at market rates

Stockpiling: The practice of reserving a quantity of energy or fuel for future or emergency usage

Supply chain: Actors involved in transfer of energy through markets. Consists of at least a producer and consumer, and possibly transit states or international companies

Total primary energy supply: The total supply of primary energy available to a state; calculated by adding energy production and imports and subtracting energy exports

Unconventional hydrocarbons: sources of oil and gas that are not accessed via wells, or that are accessed through extraction methods that are not normally necessary in traditional oil and gas extraction

Introduction

International Relations (IR) has long differentiated between developing and developed countries. Since the early 2000s, a third category of states have become increasing prominent in international affairs: the advanced developing states of the global South. Representing an evolution of the international hierarchy beyond a binary North-South divide (Vieira and Alden, 2011), these are states that are experiencing significant economic growth, are pursuing influence within the international system, and that possess a preponderance of resources relative to other states in the global South. New acronyms were coined to categorise these states - the BRICS,[1] VISTA,[2] CIVETS,[3] MINT,[4] MIKTA,[5] and N11[6] - and IR developed new sub-schools to explain their motivations and strategies. Among these new research areas is that on regional powers. It is a field that incorporates states at all levels of development, but which focuses predominantly on those that are economically ascendant and internationally ambitious in the global South. Yet despite emphasising the role of material resources in determining and implementing regional power, there is no discussion within the regional powers literature on how energy - a key strategic resource since the early 20th century - affects regional power.

As advanced developing states were gaining increased attention, the reorientation of energy trade was becoming more prominent in IR debates on global energy affairs.[7] Energy scholarship increasingly emphasises a recalibration of energy geopolitics driven by the emergence of rapidly industrialising hydrocarbon-based advanced developing states. However, in focusing predominantly on the consequence of those states' energy policies for the developed world, and in failing to distinguish the energy requirements, ambitions, and opportunities of *advanced developing* states from those of *developing* states, many

[1] Brazil, Russia, India, China - expanded to BRICS in 2010 after South Africa became a member
[2] Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina (Reuters, 2007)
[3] Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa (Wall Street Journal, 2009)
[4] Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey (O' Neill, 2012)
[5] Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia (MIKTA, 2013)
[6] Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, Vietnam
[7] See Barnes et al (2006), Verrastro et al (2010), Pant (2016), Klare (2017)

scholars ignore the potential geostrategic motivations behind particular energy decisions for advanced developing states. This consequently limits understanding of the political and power dynamics of energy affairs within the global South.

The confluence between energy and regional power is one that is underexplored in IR. In order to address the limitations outlined above and to contribute to the debate on advanced developing states more broadly, this thesis is motivated by a central research question that asks

"what is the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states?".

It is an exploratory thesis (Yin, 1984) that questions how the two are mutually reinforcing or contradictory for a group of states with specific economic and political attributes and constraints. The equivalence attached to the two primary variables in the central research question generates two secondary questions that guide the thesis:

a) How does energy affect regional power for advanced developing states?
b) How does regional power affect the energy agendas of advanced developing states?

This thesis consequently challenges limitations in studies of advanced developing states in IR by employing the nexus between regional power and energy as a lens though which we can interpret how these states understand, acquire, and employ power in the regional context. In order to address the research question in detail, it conducts a case study of energy and regional power in Turkey between 2002 and 2014. It considers the ways in which energy trade, policy, and resources affected the regional power status and capacity of Turkey and, conversely, the ways in which regional power impacted Ankara's energy strategy.

The first part of this introduction explores two key terms in research question - "advanced developing states" and "regions" - and demarcates the wider Caspian region that is the focus of this thesis. The second section discusses the thesis' methodology, outlining the justifications for adopting a case study approach and highlighting the sources consulted for

this project. The third section situates the thesis within two schools of IR literature: those pertaining to energy and regional power. After highlighting limitations within these literatures, the final section outlines the thesis' structure and highlights the main arguments and conclusions of individual chapters.

Terminology

Advanced developing states

Despite the prominence afforded in recent IR literature to countries experiencing rapid growth and growing international presence, Hart and Jones (2010:65) and Mansfield (2014) note that there is neither a common accepted categorisation for or definition of these states. Drawing on the literatures on rising, emerging, middle, and regional powers, this thesis proposes a category of "advanced developing states" to delineate those countries that are economically ascendant and possess some form of presence in the international system. The term "advanced developing countries" is one that occurs infrequently in IR literature to refer to states like the BRICS, Mexico, or Turkey that are more economically advanced than others in the global South (see, for example, Yang, 2003; Castro, 2012; Garnaut, 2012; Starkl et al, 2013). Here, the word "state" replaces that of "country" in order to reflect the state level of analysis applied to the relationship between energy and regional power for these actors. It is an empirical category that can be examined through different analytical frameworks depending on specific issues or contexts examined. While, for example, a regional powers framework is applied here to explore the relationship between energy and regional power in Turkey, a middle powers framework might be employed in researching Turkey's participation in MIKTA.

Commonalities in the aforementioned literatures are used to differentiate advanced developing states from other developing actors. Foremost among these factors are:

1. That the state is experiencing economic growth (and influence in the international economic system) to a greater extent than that of other states in the global South
2. That the state posses a preponderance of other material resources (military, demographic, and geographic) relative to other states in the global South, and has the necessary internal cohesion to utilise those recourses

3. The state aspires to play a more influential role in regional and global affairs (Hurrell, 2006; Hart and Jones, 2010; Mansfield, 2014; Patience, 2014)

The term is not intended to imply homogeneity between all advanced developing states. Rather, like Stanley's analytical frameworks (2012:476), it can be understood as a tool for categorising and reducing the "inherent complexities" of the political world. Advanced developing states may be democracies, theocracies, dictatorships, or monarchies; economic production may be dominated by primary resources, manufacturing, the service industry, or be balanced across multiple sectors; and states may be revisionist, reformist, or support the international status quo. Countries in this category include Turkey, Iran, Russia, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Brazil, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

This list is not exhaustive, and is subject to change depending on temporal contexts. There is a notable exception from the list of states above that is subject to some contention in the regional powers literature. China, by virtue of its material capacity and global influence, is on the verge of becoming - if not already - a great power (Hurrell, 2006; Breslin, 2010). It is considered an advanced developing state in this thesis because of the frequency with which it manifests in the IR literature on rising and regional powers. However, frequent caveats will be made throughout to China's exceptionalism in a number of areas compared to other advanced developing states. Similar references will be made on occasion to Russia. While this thesis acknowledges that several of the countries listed above - including Turkey - are former imperial states that may have previously occupied a significant position in global affairs, Russia is the only advanced developing state in the category to have been a superpower in the post-imperial era. Consequently, differences in Russia's strategy and ambitions compared to other advanced developing states will be pointed out at various junctures.

Regions

The "region" is, at its simplest, a geographical concept (Nolte, 2010). It is a territorially fixed area. In international politics, regions are more complex. While geography maintains a role in the definition of a political region, other ideational and material factors play a role in demarcating specific geopolitical spaces. This thesis acknowledges that the concept is

widely debated and much contested in IR, and that despite attempts at definition retains an ambiguity that renders a common position on the constitution of a region difficult. Nonetheless, the definition of a geopolitical region in this thesis is informed by several features that recur in IR literature. Regions are frequently defined as two or more states that are in geographical proximity to one another; that share cultural and social similarities or a common history and heritage; that hold common membership of local or international multilateral organisations; and that engage in patterns of conflict and cooperation - or amity and enmity - with each other through trade, diplomacy, warfare, and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives (Buzan, 1991; Mansfield and Milner, 1999; Lemke, 2002; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Fawn, 2009; Prys, 2010). This thesis therefore considers political and economic interdependence between states and shared histories, cultures, or social norms to be integral to the transition of a geographical space into a geopolitical region.

Even where scholars agree on the region as a theoretical concept, the demarcation of particular regions can be affected by specific political, economic, and temporal contexts and agendas. Lemke (2002:82), for example, highlights the contested nature of the "Middle East" as a region in pointing out that term referred specifically to the Indian subcontinent when first coined, and that Winston Churchill "officially" designated the region between the Bosporus and east India as the "Middle East" in his capacity as British Colonial Secretary in 1920. Even accounting for the antiquated nature of those examples, there are notable discrepancies between contemporary understandings of what the "Middle East" is: scholars variously include or exclude the states of the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, the Maghreb, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan in region-based examinations of the Middle East (Schwarz, 2008; Jan, 2007; Fattah, 2009; and Coskun, 2010). The region can consist of anywhere between four and twenty three countries.

The difficulties in applying theoretical concepts of a region to empirical studies of regions - and, indeed, regional power - is further encumbered by the multi-regional location of some states. The most prominent example is Russia's situation between Europe and Asia, but smaller sub-regions offer equal - and often more complex difficulties. In their work on regional security complexes (RSCs), Buzan and Waever (2003) introduce the concepts of "buffer" and "insulator" states to define states that border different regions. However, the

concept allows for membership by a state of only one region. For those researching Turkey, this is more than a little problematic.

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, scholars and policy makers alike have had difficulty in locating Turkey. Geographically, it spans two continents (Europe and Asia) and two major seas (the Mediterranean and Black Sea). Geopolitically, it borders three major regions - Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and Central Asia - and smaller sub-regions such as the Levant, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Turkey's position as a state somewhat between regions therefore presents difficulty in locating it in any specific space: rather, it is conceptualised as a bridge between regions, a central state, or an insulator (Buzan and Waever, 2003: Bacik, 2006; Ozkececi-Taner, 2012; Ulgen, 2012).

Kardas (2014) contends that Buzan and Waever's RSCs are sufficiently inflexible as to inhibit empirical studies of specific states and regional security governance. Rather, he suggests, those states that are deeply embedded in multiple regional systems or affected by threats emanating from multiple regions to similar degrees can be justifiably categorised as partaking in multiple RSCs simultaneously. Thus, Turkey may equally be a member of Middle Eastern, European, or Caspian regional systems. On a similar theme, Diez (2012) argues that Turkey's RSCs are overlapping rather than insulating. This position is reflective of the AKP's own tendency to position Turkey as a "central country" that can exercise power in multiple regions simultaneously (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009; Ulgen, 2012). The focus on Turkey's regional power in the Caspian in this thesis does not, therefore, preclude its role as a major actor in other regions.

The decision to focus on the Caspian rather than the Middle East or Europe stems from the consistent emphasis on that region by the AKP during its first three terms in office. There is unanimity in the literature on Turkey's foreign policy that the strong affiliation Turkey held with Europe gradually diminished throughout the AKP era, and particularly from the party's second election victory in 2007 (Matthews, 2009; Robins, 2013). The lack of consensus on the demarcation of the Middle East as a geopolitical region renders studies of Turkey's role in that region more difficult. Turkey's interaction with the region was limited to a small number of other states and was restricted by the presence of other regional and external actors (particularly after the Arab Spring) (Onis, 2014; Ozcan et al,

2015). Rather, this thesis proposes to study a region comprising the states of the Caucasus and Caspian basin that it labels the "wider Caspian region".

A question arises regarding the delineation of a wider Caspian region for the thesis rather than the Caucasus and Central Asia more broadly. As with the Middle East, there is ambiguity in the literature over precisely which countries constitute the Caucasus and Central Asian region. Some scholars position Russia externally to the region despite its geographical proximity to and economic, social, and political ties to the region (Aydin, 2004; Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011), while others consider the "Caucasus" and "Central Asia" separately (Mankoff, 2013). Aras and Fidan's analysis of a "Eurasia" consisting of the Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, and Central Asia is closer to this thesis' definition of the wider Caspian region. However, in considering the characteristics that define a region this thesis argues that the Caucasus and Central Asia is sufficiently vast in geographic terms to cast doubt on the "geographically proximity" of the states at the far eastern and western reaches of its territory. Rather, it proposes a region around the Caspian Sea consisting of the Caspian littorals (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan), the non-littoral Caucasian states of Armenia and Georgia, and Turkey. These states fulfil the condition of geographic proximity, are integrated by means of political and economic agreements, and have shared histories and affinities congruent with the definition of region outlined earlier in this introduction. As chapters two and three will demonstrate, it is also an energy region by virtue of its extensive pipeline networks and regional energy trade.

Figure 1: The wider Caspian region

Methodology

The Turkish case study

This thesis adopts a case study approach to understanding the relationship between energy and regional powerhood in advanced developing states. Case studies are considered advantageous when research is being carried out on complex phenomena that involve significant variables (Gummesson, 2007). Energy – embedded as it is in economics, security, diplomacy, development and other sub-fields of IR – is undoubtedly a complex issue, while regional powerhood is comprised of a broad spectrum of variables ranging from ideational power to role recognition to military capacity. Lijphart (1971) similarly indicates that intensive research on a small number of cases can yield more promising

results than a superficial analysis of multiple cases. By focusing specifically on Turkey, this thesis provides a more detailed picture of the relationship between energy and regional powers for advanced developing states than would a less in-depth examination of pertinent issues for multiple states.

This thesis applies the central research question to Turkey during the first three administrations of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), or AKP. It focuses on the period between the AKP's first election victory in 2002 and the end of its third term in 2014. In contrast to previous administrations - which aligned Turkey with the West and viewed Turkey's eastern neighbours as a source of instability (Kirisci, 2006) - the AKP saw the Caspian as an area of opportunity (Guny and Mandaci, 2013) . Intensive bilateral and multilateral engagement on economic, energy, security, and cultural issues with other Caspian states saw Turkey become increasingly involved and integrated in the region during this period. The thesis therefore charts a period in which Turkey became more active in regional affairs at the same time as advanced developing states were gaining prominence in IR debates.

Several factors contributed to the decision to select Turkey as a case study for this project. Firstly, Turkey is an advanced developing state. Strong economic growth in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis led financial experts to include Turkey in a wide variety of groups of emerging states like VISTA (Reuters, 2007), MINT (O' Neill, 2012), MIKTA (2013) and CIVETS (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Including Turkey in those groups legitimised its claims to be a significant global actor. These claims were further bolstered by a proactive foreign policy that saw Turkey pursue closer economic and diplomatic ties with regional and other developing states, position itself as a mediator in regional and international conflicts, and become increasingly vocal in multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Davutoglu, 2010). Moreover, Turkey is generally accepted by IR scholars as an emerging or rising power (or, in this thesis' terminology, an advanced developing state) (Rubin and Kirisci, 2001; Ozkececi-Taner, 2012; Oguzlu and Parlar Dal, 2013; Onis and Kutlay, 2013).

Secondly, studies of Turkey as an advanced developing state are more limited than those of other actors. While the previous paragraph pointed to some academic works that position Turkey as an advanced developing state, this literature is nonetheless limited in

both volume and scope. In particular, little work has been carried out on Turkey and regional power partly, as the previous section of this introduction suggested, because Turkey spans multiple regions. Turkey's location between Europe and Asia, between the Middle East, the Caspian, and the Black Sea, renders debate on Turkey's power in a specific region difficult. The tendency of regional powers scholars to focus predominately on the BRICS in empirical explorations of regional power further detracted from research on Turkey. This thesis therefore addresses the question of Turkey as regional power.

Thirdly, the presence of two other advanced developing countries in Turkey's region expands the scope for exploring how these states interact with each other. This thesis dedicates two chapters to examining the relationship between energy and regional powers for Turkey within the context of Ankara's relationship with Iran and Russia. Two primary factors influenced the decision to examine Turkey's relationship with those states in more depth. The first was based on the research carried out for the conceptual chapters. The review of energy literature in chapter one indicates that energy affairs are inherently the remit of the state, and that energy cooperation and competition tends to manifest in bilateral, state-state relations more frequently and effectively than at the multilateral or institutional level. While the study of regional powers in chapter two acknowledges that multilateral institutions (themselves dominated by states) may play some role in the regional strategy of some countries, more direct relationship between states - in terms of relative balance of resources and bilateral state policies - are central to determining regional hierarchies and, therefore, regional power status. Given Bennet and Elman's suggestion (2007) that case studies are useful for accounting for how states extract, apply, and react to changes to power, and the predominance afforded to both power and state-level relationships in studies of energy and regional power, this thesis contends that a detailed examination of Turkey's relationships with specific states will engender a deeper understanding of how the two can be understood in the Turkish context.

Further justification emerges from the contribution of the thesis to the emerging literature on advanced developing states. Like Turkey, Russia and Iran are both advanced developing states, and - as chapters four and five will demonstrate - both can be considered aspiring or established regional powers. The selection of two further advanced developing countries through which to study the relationship between energy and regional powers will

contribute to a broader understanding of this relationship for a more varied group of advanced developing states. It also provides something of a bulwark against the potential for generalisation.[8] Moreover, there are few studies of the relationship between these actors in IR literature. These chapters therefore contribute to an understanding of how non-Western actors interact in the non-Western world and the factors that influence these relations. The Russian and Iranian case studies demonstrate how energy features in the relationship between three significant actors within the regional powers framework.

A potential flaw in the decision to examine Turkey's regional power-energy nexus within the context of its relations with Iran and Russia arises from the relative similarities between the cases. All three actors are former imperial powers that are significant players in regional politics and have nationalised energy systems. Each straddles multiple regions (Turkey the Middle East, Caspian, and Europe; Russia Europe, the Caspian, and Central Asia; and Iran Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Middle East). It could be argued that focusing on three states with high levels on similarity in some respects presents a skewed understanding on the relationship between energy and regional powers for advanced developing states. However, Lijphart (1971) contends that focusing on cases with relatively similar characteristics may be more beneficial than including substantially different cases because the research is more controlled. Focusing on three states with relatively similar historical trajectories, energy systems, and regional positions will contribute to a more nuanced examination of the relationship between energy and regional power than would a study of states with vastly differing characteristics. In addition, Linz and Miguel (1966) suggest that examining cases that have many characteristics in common while differing on some crucial elements may be more fruitful than a generalised study because it provides a more in-depth examination of particular criteria. Chapters three, four, and five highlight specific differences between both the constraints and opportunities afforded to each of Turkey, Iran, and Russia in terms of regional powerhood and energy. They therefore provide a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states. These chapters will provide insight not only into the relationship between energy and regional power *in* a specific

[8] That case studies limit the potential for generalisation is a common criticism raised in academic articles on the methodology of case studies (see Yin, 1984; Tellis, 1997).

advanced developing state (Turkey), but of the relationship between energy and regional power in relations *between* advanced developing states.

Considering that all three states are former imperial powers that competed for influence in similar regions in the past, a question arises as to the degree to which historical relationships condition current energy affairs between the actors. This thesis does not contest the notion that imperial legacy or the Cold War (and post-Cold War) trajectories influence interstate interaction, nor that it may colour the perception of states formerly affected by imperial policy or competition. The empirical chapters will pay particular attention to how the recalibration of global geopolitics at the end of the Cold War contributed to energy competition in the Caspian and the strategies of both Russia and Turkey within the Caspian region. What is important to note, however, is that regional power scholars consider history to be one of *many* variables useful to understanding contemporary international policy. Brief historiographies will be provided in chapters four and five in order to provide historical context, and it is accepted that historical patterns of cooperation and enmity have some bearing on contemporary regional geopolitical trajectories (Turkey and Russia's respective relations with Armenia are highlighted as a case in point). Yet to suggest interstate relations between the three Caspian powers are grounded in historical relations is overly deterministic. In the energy sphere in particular, the transnational nature of oil and gas pipelines and a shared desire to limit the influence of external powers like the US in regional energy affairs limits the replication of historical patterns of enmity between the states. This thesis therefore acknowledges that historical regional geopolitics affect contemporary relations in the wider Caspian region, but argues that their influence is limited in interstate energy relations between Turkey, Russia, and Iran.

This thesis uses two further analytical tools to assess the resources consulted for the case study chapters. The first is process tracing. George and Bennet (2005) suggest that process tracing is useful for identifying phenomena and assessing casual claims in within-case analysis. It is therefore particularly advantageous in examining the relationship between energy and regional power in the three case study chapters of this thesis. Collier (2011:823) defines process tracing as the "systemic examination of diagnostic evidence

selected and analysed in light of research questions…posed by the investigator". Evidence may be selected based on knowledge generated from

conceptual frameworks (Collier, 2011) and, thereafter, from identifying themes and patterns in the relationship between two or more phenomena that recur frequently (Waltz, 1979). In this thesis, the framework developed in chapters one and two provided a lens through which relevant source material was identified and consulted; the recurrence of key features in the relationship between energy and regional power provided the basis for analysing the material's relevance to addressing the central research question.

Mahoney (2010) suggests that that careful description is central to process training. This thesis consequently examines specific events (such as the 2008 war in South Ossetia) in detail in order to support analytical and causal claims made in the case study chapters. Given the centrality of quantitative sources - themselves discussed in more detail below - to this process, the second analytical tool this thesis utilises is that of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Breeze (2011) suggests that CDA is particularly useful when applied, as here, to a large corpus of sources. CDA combines the study of language in talk and texts (that is, rhetorical devices and words used) at the micro-level with macro-level examinations of the context in which that language was produced (Wetherall, 2001; van Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 2001). In this thesis, for example, analysis on the AKP's emphasis on Turkey's energy leadership is speeches and documents takes into consideration Turkey's position in the regional energy hierarchy. Van Dijk (2001) suggests that discourse can create, maintain, or reproduce political hegemony, while Fairclough (2001) emphasises the utility of discourse for legitimising consensual (rather than coercive) power. It therefore useful in understanding how Turkey propagates and maintains a particular *form* of regional power.

The assessment of discourse pays particular attention to the use of strategic narratives in Turkish policy and speech. Antoniades et al (2010:5) define strategic narratives as "representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through which political elites attest to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives". They enable states to justify policy objectives, to frame policy responses to global (or regional) events, and to form alliances (Antoniades et al, 2010). A key strategic narrative during the period examined in this thesis is the "strategic

depth" narrative propagated as part of Ahmet Davutoglu's foreign policy vision: emphasising Turkey's historical and geographical relations with the Caspian region served to justify increased political and economic activism in the region. Strategic narratives - Turkey as a "central state", the Turkish energy hub, Turkey as a security provider - will be highlighted throughout the thesis. Turkey's belief in the validity of these narratives was essential to generating the confidence (and occasionally the overconfidence) that this thesis suggests was essential to the self-conceptualisation of Turkish regional power.

Antoniades et al (2010) point out that strategic narratives require audiences. Fairclough (2001) and van Dijk (2001) similarly emphasis the importance of the perception and understanding of discourse by the intended audience in CDA. The receptiveness of audiences to discourse and narratives play a particularly important role in this thesis given the prominence afford to recognition and role perceptions in determining regional power. CDA therefore contributes not only to this thesis' understanding of how Turkey perceived, pursued, and maintained regional power, but on how it framed those practices to ensure for particular audiences. As the next section will highlight, the latter point is particularly important considering the focus in this thesis on English language documents.

Sources

Chapters one and two are based primarily on reviews of IR literatures on energy and regional power and form the basis of this thesis' analytical framework. The empirical chapters (chapters three, four, and five) draw extensively on primary sources such as policy papers, speeches, trading statistics, and newspaper reports. Yin (1984) notes that case study methodologies can incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data, therefore allowing for a varied approach to data collection. This thesis takes advantage of this variation to utilise both forms of sources, and quantitative and qualitative sources begin to become more prevalent from chapter two.

Qualitative sources were central to this thesis' research agenda, and that this thesis uses only English language resources has implications for the analytical scope of the research. Linguistic limitations restricted access to domestic policy debates and discourse. There are therefore no discussions within this thesis on internal contestations of Turkey's regional power or energy agenda; nor is any significant attention paid to the policy *process* beyond

a brief discussion in chapter three on key energy sector actors. Rather, this thesis focuses on discourse emanating form the *outcome* of domestic decision making. While this restriction may be problematic in research using other analytical frameworks or tools, it should be noted that regional powers frameworks tend to focus to a greater extent on external projections of power rather than internal political cohesion and organisation. This renders linguistic restrictions less problematic than they otherwise might be.

This thesis also takes into consideration that English language documents may be selectively translated, and that interviews in international news sources may have are trying to project a specific image of Turkey. In other words, the resources consulted for this thesis have been tailored for an English speaking audience to project a particular image of Turkey: one that positions Turkey as a significant regional actor and aims to engender recognition of Turkey's regional capabilities by other states. However, understanding how Turkey wants its regional power and energy strategies to be received- and why it seeks to be perceived in a certain way - is important in assessing Turkey's regional power. The study of English language resources provide insight into the image of Turkey as a regional power that the AKP had cultivated in order to project to regional and international audiences.

In any case, English language sources from within relevant state online archives proved plentiful. The websites of the ministries of foreign affairs, economics, energy, development, and natural resources of Turkey, Iran, and Russia provided access to the policy documents, interstate agreements, press releases, speeches, statements, and declarations in which the final three chapters are grounded. Linguistic variations within the wider Caspian region meant that interstate agreements and declarations were conducted and published primarily using English as a common language. The online archives of various multilateral institutions (like the United Nations) provide additional access to speeches, declarations, and resolutions relevant to this thesis. This thesis also draws on the online archives of the major newspapers of the individual states examined (such as the Tehran Times) well as international news sources (Reuters, Associated Press). News database services like Lexis-Nexis yielded further statements from and interviews with relevant actors. These sources provide insight into the agendas, attitudes, and behaviours

of particular actors and institutions relevant to the thesis, enabling a detailed analysis of the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states.

One of the issues this thesis is keen to address is the potential dissonance between rhetoric and practice in Turkey regarding, in particular, the AKP's claims to regional power and to regional trade and cooperation with other states. It examines a variety of statistical resources to determine the balance between rhetoric and practice in regional relations. Energy data collected by British Petroleum (BP) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) are particularly useful in determining energy trends and balances. Where information is not available from these sources, reports complied by the Energy Information Agency (EIA) provided useful. Trading data was gathered from the databases of the World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as from the Turkish Statistical Institute and other financial institutes in Turkey and Iran. Triangulating claims through both quantitative and qualitative sources contributes to a strengthening of the accuracy of analysis in the thesis.

The use of both quantitative material and extra-regional sources serves an additional purpose. This thesis acknowledges that the extent of state control over resources and media in Turkey, Iran, and Russia is problematic. Available information may be propagandised or heavily biased. In Turkey, this issue became more problematic in the aftermath of the attempted coup of 2015, after which opposition news sources - such as Today's Zaman - were taken over by the government, their archives destroyed, and opposition journalists arrested (Johnson, 2016). The personal website of Abdullah Gul - which had been a valuable source for speeches and other discourse from the former president, prime minister, and foreign minister - was also take offline during the course of this project. Nonetheless, substantial numbers of documents from Gul's archives had been downloaded by the time of the crackdown, and some content from Today's Zaman and other media sources remained accessible via online databases like LexisNexis.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that there is some contention regarding the accuracy of energy statistics. Known energy reserves and production levels are in some cases considered a state secret because of their strategic importance to the state, or are exaggerated to gain preferential energy trade deals for the producer (Bauen, 2006). In addition, some energy reserves may be underexplored due to internal instability or lack of

funds (Iraq, Turkmenistan). This thesis will utilise quantitative information available from the EIA and IEA as its primary source for statistical energy information (both agencies produce in-depth annual reports and cross-reference their statistical analysis with other groups and organisations), but will also consider that information in light of sources available from individual states and from other sources.

Situating the literature

This thesis draws on existing IR literature on energy and regional power. There is a large literature on energy in IR that encompasses broader IR themes like security, governance, and geopolitics. The tendency of this literature to bifurcate countries into "developed" and "developing" states (Mansson et al, 2014) is inconsistent with the acknowledgement in IR of advanced developing states in recent decades. Even those scholars that do address energy in *advanced developing states* tend to adopt similar frameworks to those examining energy in *developing states*: the global South is imagined as a homogenous block in which states face similar challenges and adopt similar strategies. Firstly, scholars emphasise the relationship between energy and economic growth and development. Energy is framed in international political economy (IPE) terms as an asset or objective that fuels economic growth and contributes to industrialisation. Secondly, the literature on energy in advanced developing states tends to be somewhat Western-centric. Even in states for which energy is acknowledged as a strategic or geopolitical asset (like Russia), emphasis is commonly placed on the implications of the energy strategies of advanced developing states for Western or developed states.

Considering the increasingly prominent role advanced developing states like India and Turkey play in determining global energy flows (Barnes et al, 2006), these limitations prohibit the emergence of a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the role energy plays in IR. While clearly important for understanding the role of energy in international politics, this thesis posits that both the failure to differentiate between different forms of developing states and the focus on relations between the global North and the global South is to the detriment on a more refined awareness of the way energy features in South-South relations. The focus on economic development within the energy literature on advanced developing states fails to acknowledge the ambition, capacity, and willingness of those states to integrate energy into diplomatic or strategic agendas; to utilise energy as a tool to

obtain leverage in affairs with other states; or to use energy to facilitate the state's strategic agenda. In short, it limits the scope for understanding the role energy plays in facilitating and constraining the international politics of and between advanced developing states. This thesis takes an empirical approach to understanding how energy politics are constructed in the non-Western world. A clearer understanding of the motivations and objectives of some of the key energy actors and the factors that inhibit and contribute to energy strategies will contribute to a more thorough assessment of the way in which energy manifests in international politics. At the same time, it expands both our knowledge of advanced developing states themselves and the way they influence international energy trends.

The second literature in which this thesis is situated is that of regional power. Regional power is a relatively new subfield of IR. Chapter two will highlight how most theoretical explorations of the concept concur that material power is a prerequisite of regional power, with economic, military, and demographic capacity frequently portrayed as central to differentiating regional powers from other states (Nolte, 2010). Despite its conceptualisation as a material asset and tool in IR literature, it is rare for regional power scholars to incorporate energy into frameworks for delineating or understanding regional powers.[9] There are no in-depth studies of the relationship between regional power and energy. This thesis therefore offers a new dimension to the study of regional power by emphasising the role energy plays in facilitating, constraining, and determining regional power. In addition, theoretical studies of regional power have differentiated between different forms of regional power (Destradi, 2010; Prys, 2010) but empirical studies of different forms of regional power are limited in the literature. By emphasising different forms of regional power adopted by each of Turkey, Russia, and Iran in the context of the states' energy and regional power relations, this thesis also contributes to the empirical literature on regional power typologies. Together, these contributions will lend insight into the motivations, agendas, and strategies of regional powers - and consequently advanced developing states - and limit the effects of generalisation.

Both of these literatures are ultimately concerned with power. Energy politics are hierarchical, with those states that control resources wielding power over those who need

[9] Harris' study (2006) of China's regional hegemony is an exception in explicitly studying the role played by energy in Beijing's regional strategy.

or desire them. The literature on emerging powers highlights consequences for the West: the rise of advanced developing states affects the balance of power in global affairs and forces a reconfiguration of the role western and developed states play in international politics. New global energy geopolitics are influenced by a combination of the unprecedented rise in energy demand in rapidly industrialising countries and the emergence of new regional powers in the post-Cold War era. Advanced developing states are increasingly moving into energy geographies that were traditionally the remit of Western powers. This changes not only energy flows, but the nature of relations between all states operating within the geopolitical system. It contributes to the balance of power between states in the region and between developed and advanced developing states. Energy is a means through which states can consolidate their power in the regional and international systems; a tool of foreign policy that, like economic or military power, can be manipulated or utilised by states. At the same time, regional power facilitates the acquisition and utilisation of energy as a strategic asset. In drawing energy and regional power together for these states, this thesis provides insight into the ways in which advanced developing states effect and affect power in international politics.

Thesis structure and main arguments

The purpose of chapter one is partly to survey the existing IR literature pertaining to energy and advanced developing states, and in part to create a framework for examining energy in those countries. It is structured around five dominant approaches to energy in the literature: energy governance, energy diversification, energy security, the geopolitics of energy, and energy and economics. Three issues of particular significance for this thesis are extrapolated from the energy literature review: firstly, that energy geopolitics are changing as advanced developing states become increasingly prominent in the global energy market; secondly, that the literature is limited in addressing energy as it pertains to advanced developing states; and thirdly, that energy is a strategic resource that influences the state's capacity to exert power in political and economic systems. It is argued that South-South cooperation on energy affairs and the pre-eminence afforded to regional natural gas trade in the energy strategies of advanced developing states necessitates a reconfiguration of the ways in which we understand the relationship between energy and international politics. The chapter concludes that energy's utility as a strategic asset - as a

tool for domestic development, alliance building, or power projection - is dependent on the agenda, capacity, and willingness of the state to incorporate energy into its broader strategy, and that that strategy in turn must facilitate the state's energy agenda.

The second chapter focuses on regional power. It first examines the literature on regional powers and regional power theory and develops a set of characteristics for identifying regional powers. Adhering to Destradi's division of regional powers into imperialist, hegemonic, and leadership forms of power, this second section highlights how regional powers are differentiated on the basis of the form of power they exert (material/ideational) and the extent to which their policies towards other regional states are considered coercive or cooperative. The third part of chapter two considers the relationship between regional powers and energy. It contends that regional powers literature fails to account for the role played by energy in determining the balance of power between states or the capacity of states to accumulate regional power. It is proposed that energy is both a tool and an objective for regional powers, and that energy can both contribute to and constrain regional power. The final part of this chapter outlines the case for Turkey as a regional power in the wider Caspian region. Chapters two and three together form the conceptual framework through which chapters three, four, and five examine the relationship between energy and regional power for Turkey.

Chapter three is the first empirical chapter. It examines Turkey's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 and, in applying the regional powers framework to the AKP's energy discourse, suggests that Turkey's energy strategy was congruent with regional hegemony. The chapter highlights how the AKP saw energy as means through which it could enhance its geostrategic significance and extend its regional influence despite Turkey's lack of domestic energy reserves. It is argued that ensuring domestic energy security by way of regional security initiatives was a way to both enhance Turkey's regional power credentials and ensure the economic growth that was essential to the state's regional power agenda. Pipeline projects were at the heart of this agenda because of their role in generating interdependencies and highlighting Turkey's geostrategic location between the energy rich Caspian region and global markets (particularly in Europe). The chapter suggests that the AKP saw pipeline trade as a means of contributing to regional security and strengthening perceptions of Turkey as a regional security provider. However, it

concludes that attempts to augment Turkey's regional status through energy cooperation were often undermined by a failure to acknowledge the geopolitical implications of supporting particular pipeline projects and an overestimation of Turkey's capacity to influence regional affairs.

The fourth chapter examines the relationship between energy and regional powers in Turkey in the context of the state's relationship with Iran. It contends that Ankara's approach to Iran was that of a benevolent regional hegemon, and suggests that bilateral relations had the potential to yield significant benefits in terms of both energy security and regional powerhood. It is argued that by engaging in extensive diplomacy and demonstrating a desire to facilitate reconciliation between Iran and the international system, Turkey generated goodwill with Iran that was conducive to advancing Turkey's energy agenda. It highlights how acting as an emissary for Iran - both with regards to Tehran's incorporation into regional energy projects and in terms of resolving the Iranian nuclear dispute - was necessary to ensure the realisation of Turkey's energy hub agenda and, consequently, for Turkey's regional power. It is also argued that the AKP's Iranian policy demonstrated to other regional actors that Turkey was a reliable partner. An examination of Tehran and Ankara's energy cooperation in the Caspian and Iran's own energy agenda in the region demonstrates limitations to Turkish-Iranian energy relationship, particularly with regards to Turkey's attempts to integrate Turkmenistan into the region by means of energy cooperation. The chapter concludes that Turkey, by virtue of its integration into regional energy and trade systems, ultimately occupied a higher position in the regional hierarchy than Iran despite the latter's extensive energy reserves.

Finally, chapter five looks at the ways in which Russia occupied a central role in Turkey's energy strategy and considers the ways in which Moscow's energy and regional strategy affected Ankara's capacity to fulfil its regional agenda. It asserts that Turkey's dependence on Russian energy resources limited the AKP's capacity to pursue a more assertive regional strategy that would have enhanced Turkey's regional power credentials in the Caspian. The chapter points out that Turkey's hub and diversification agendas were incompatible with Russia's regional agenda, and that Turkey's continued pursuit of Russian energy projects undermined Ankara's own energy agenda. It suggests that this incongruity between the hub agenda and growing energy cooperation with Russia was part

of Turkey's tendency to underestimate the geopolitical motivations of and consequences of particular pipeline projects in a manner that was detrimental to its regional power status. The chapter also contends that Turkey's dependence on Russian energy - both on a day-to-day basis and to make up for shortfalls when other supplies were impeded - skewered the balance of power between the two and acted as a constraint on Turkey's regional power projection. Similarly, it constrained Turkey's response to Russia's regional aggression. Finally, this chapter suggests that the type of regional power pursued by Turkey and Russia (benevolent hegemony and coercive hegemony/empire respectively) played a significant role in determining the states' responses to developments in the regional energy system. Overall, the thesis argues that there is a strong, clear overlap between energy and regional power for the advanced developing states of the Caspian. In order to develop these arguments, the next chapter will look at the first core concept of this thesis: energy.

1. Energy in IR: Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

Energy, Strange (1988:191) asserts, occupies a "disciplinary no man's land". It manifests in every field from physics to public policy. In IR, it features in literature on development, geopolitics, regime security, international political economy (IPE), and many more. Energy plays an important role for states at all levels of economic development: it facilitates industrialisation and development, shapes patterns of cooperation and conflict between states, and integrates states into the international economy. This chapter will survey IR literature in order to gain a clearer understanding of the ways in which energy manifests in the discipline. It therefore contributes to the development of a framework for conceptualising the ways in which energy features in the regional power strategies of advanced developing states. The chapter is organised around five dominant trends in the IR literature on energy: energy governance, energy type and diversification, energy security, the geopolitics of energy, and the IPE of energy.

The first section of this chapter looks at the literature on energy governance at the multilateral and state level and suggests that IR frames energy as a form of statecraft that can be utilised to gain advantages in international affairs. The second section examines the different types of energy that manifest in the literature. Noting the frequency with which diversification features in debates on energy type and policy, it considers the relationship between the benefits of pursuing specific fuels and achieving a diversified energy mix.

Energy security is a topic that recurs in a significant percentage of literature on energy in IR. The third part of this chapter therefore investigates the ways in which energy security is conceptualised and manifests in the literature. On a related theme, the fourth section concerns the geopolitics of energy. It focuses on three debates that manifest in IR literature: energy and geopolitical conflict, energy and geopolitical cooperation, and the regionalisation of energy geopolitics. Considering the focus on energy in Turkey's region throughout this thesis, this final discussion area in particular literature to a framework for understanding the constraints and opportunities affecting the realisation of the AKP's energy agenda.

The final section of this chapter explores IR literature that takes a political economic approach to energy. It looks first at the differences between neo-mercantilist and liberal IPE approaches to energy in the literature before considering the association between energy and development. It argues that the simple binary between developed and developing states in political economic literature on energy is insufficient to account for the energy requirements, motivations, and constraints of advanced developing states.

This chapter will refer to the "contextual" nature of energy, or to the abundance of issues that are debated in relation to the role played by in IR. Among the issues that influence energy debates are:

- fuel types;
- specific actors (states, international institutions, energy companies);
- the position of the actor in the energy chain (producer, consumer, transit state);
- transportation methods (pipelines, sea tankers, road tankers);
- energy uses (industrial output, electricity conversion, heat);
- and the specific political, economic, and social contexts in which energy is analysed.

While many of these contexts will be discussed in more detail throughout the chapter, it should be pointed out that the way in which they interact and are framed by scholars has a significant impact on the way in which energy is discussed. The next substanstantive part of this chapter look at the intersection between energy and politics by examining the literature on energy governance.

1.2 Energy governance

This section considers how energy governance manifests in IR literature at the multilateral and state levels. The majority of discussions on the former energy governance pertain to inter-governmental organisations like the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or inter-governmental groups like the Group of Eight (G8) that debate or

coordinate energy issues (Goldthau and Witte, 2009; Barrett Meredith, 2014). Scholars tend to stress the quintessential need for institutions to regulate global energy affairs while simultaneously pointing out the problematic nature of contemporary multilateral energy governance architecture. Lesage et al (2009), for example, argue that the "urgency and complexity" of international energy systems require multilateral governance and regulation. At the same time, they suggest that contemporary institutions are fragemented, weak, and fail to address contemporary energy concerns like climate change. While Florini (2011) insists that the complexities of energy trade and management is something that can only be governed at the global level, she also points out that global energy governance currently consists of "inadequate and uncoordinated" mechanisms attempting to achieve "fragmented and prioritised objectives". Similarily, Goldthau and Witte (2009) suggest that the rules governing energy need to be significantly strengthened if they are to be effective. In short, it is argued that multilateral energy governance is necessary, but that current mechanisms fail to deal with global energy issues in an effective or efficient manner.

Literature on energy affairs in the European Union (EU) illustrates both the benefits of and problems with multilateral energy governance. The EU features quite a bit in this project by virtue of its energy trade with Russia and interest in expanding energy trade with hydrocarbon rich states of the Caspian region. It also features strongly in Turkey's energy strategy both because of the necessity for Turkey to harmonise its own energy policy with that of the EU in adherence with accession criteria and because of the state's desire to become a major conduit for energy flowing from Asia to Europe. A brief discussion on the benefits and limitations of multilateral energy governance in the EU context will therefore contribute both to the debate on multilateral energy governance and to a more thorough understanding of Turkey's energy agenda later in this thesis.

The EU has its roots in energy cooperation. The establishment of the Eupopean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by six Euopean states in the aftermath of WWII paved the way for the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.[10] The EEC was ser up in conjunction with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) - an

[10] That organisation was subsumed into the EU following the adoption by EEC states of the Maastricht Treaty (1993)

organisation legally distinct from the EU today, but which continues to focus on developing nuclear energy specifically within EU states. In recent decades, the EU's drive to diversify its energy supply base has seen it engage at the institutional level with a wider range of energy producing states through initiatives like the INOGATE[11] programme (Cleutinx and Piper, 2008). As this thesis was being written, the European Commission adopted a new strategy aimed at building an "Energy Union" with the aim of connecting energy networks, enhancing the roles of renwables in the EU, decreasing import dependency, and diversifying energy sources (Euopean Commission, 2017b).

These final two aims are closely related to a central theme that drives attempts to institutionalise and standardise energy policy in the EU. Alongside sustainability and competitiveness, energy security a key part of what Youngs (2009) and Szulecki et al (2016:549) refer to as the EU's "energy policy triangle". Most scholars concur that the EU's dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia is at the heart of the institution's energy strategy (Claes, 2013; Kuzemko et al, 2016). IEA data shows that in 2012, the EU relied on Russia for a third of its oil and natural gas imports (IEA, 2014). Russia's alleged use of the "energy weapon" is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but it can be noted at this stage that scholars agree that Russia's utilisation of its energy leverage is detrimental to Europe's energy security (Umbach, 2009; Rutland, 2008; Roth, 2011; Schmidt-Felzmann, 2011). The EU consequently looks to diversify the sources and routes of energy imports. This is of pivotal importance to this thesis because, as chapter three contends, the EU's energy security and diversification agendas influenced the way in which Turkey viewed energy during the period under consideration. Turkey's geostrategic utility as a conduit for energy supplies from the Caspian region to Europe - bypassing Russia in the process - was a core theme of the AKP's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014, and was predicated on the EU's continued perception of Russia as detrimental to its energy security.

Maltby (2013) notes that the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 was instrumental in institutionalising EU-wide agendas on issues like energy security and a common energy market. Recent literature therefore acknowledges the contibution of

[11] An initiative focusing on energy cooperation between the EU and Caspian and Black Sea littorals that ran between 1996 and 2016

multilateral energy governance to the energy policies of individual member states (Andersen and Sitter, 2015). Nonetheless, there remains considerable divergence in the energy policies of individual states that restrict the implementation of a common energy agenda. Szulecki and Westphal (2014), for example, write of a clear divide between pro-nuclear states like France and the UK and those like Germany, which has plans to phase out its nuclear plants. Judge and Maltby (2017) claim that different methods and understandings of energy securitisation by individual EU members constrain the development of a effective common energy agenda. A particularly relevant example of internal EU policy divergence for this thesis was the decision by Germany and Finland in 2007 to construct with Russia the Nord Stream, a new gas pipeline to import Russia resources via the Black Sea, despite the pipeline being at odds with the EU's desire to limit reliance on Russian energy resources. Acknowledging both the EU's desire on an institutional level to diversify its sources away from Russia and the simultaneous continued pursuit of new Russian pipelines by individual member states is important in terms of recognising the difficulties Turkey faced in positioning itself as an conduit for non-Russian supplies to the EU. Overall, the EU case illustrates the struggle in governing and managing energy at the multilateral level. It demonstrates the difficulty in coordinating policy objectives even within a relatively homogeneous group of states, and illustrates how discrepancies between institutional objectives and national policy implementation can undermine a unified approach to energy issues. As such, it highlights the extent to which energy governance is limited at the multilateral level in a way that means the states reamins the primary actor in energy governance.

A final point to consider for this discussion on multilateral energy governance is the legitimacy issue that stems from the failure by multilateral insititutions to incorporate the policies and concerns of developing states into the governance agenda. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (2010), Goldthau and Witte (2009), and Florini (2011) note a clear divide between the global North and South on key issues like the future of hydrocarbon that limit the sucessful development of a truley global energy agenda within multilateral institutions. There have been some concessions to the agendas of developing states in these institutions: Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (2010) highlights how the ninth and fourteenth meetings of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) debated issues pertinent to developing states like energy poverty and nuclear power development. Overall, however, major and

Western powers continue to dominate multilateral enegry governance (Lesage et al, 2009; Florini, 2010). For advanced developing states like Turkey, energy governance - the rules and regulations that govern policy development and implementation - are best understood through state-level policy analysis.

Current energy literature is limited in its discussion of the energy policies of individual states in the global South. Section 1.6 will discuss in more detail the tendency to focus on the relationship between political economy and energy to the detriment of a more comprehensive debate on the factors that influence and affect energy governance in those states. In order to evaluate the themes that manifest in the literature on state-level energy governance, this section focuses on the literature on two states that are more prominent in the literature: the US and China. Those states have generated a significant volume of energy-related literature that can be examined in order to determine how energy is governed at the state level. This exploration does not indicate a equivalence between US and China - both major, and potentially great, powers - and advanced developing states in terms of energy governance; but rather shows how energy manifests in and interacts with different policy areas within the context of national governance. In addition, it provides context for the discussion on Turkey's regional energy agenda elsewhere in this thesis: both the US and China demonstrated an interest in Caspian energy affairs between 2002 and 2014. This section therefore demonstrates the ways in which energy strategy is incorporated into governance at the state level, and contributes to understanding and contextualising the factors facilitating and obstructing Turkey's energy policies in its region.

The introduction to this chapter pointed out that energy is multidimensional. Garrison (2009) indicates that China's energy strategy incorporates multiple needs and interests and crosses security and developmental lines which, Rosen and Houser (2007) argue, means that national energy policy must be coordinated with the state's broader agenda. Similarly, scholars suggest that issues like economic security (Kerschner et al, 2013), economic growth (Geri and McNabb, 2011), and national security (Lovins, 2005) influence how the US conceptualises energy. Most of the literature also acknowledges that the difficulty in balancing these factors contributes to inconsistencies in US and Chinese energy strategies (Andrews-Speed, 2003; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005; Deutch, 2011). Chapter three will

similarly argue that the AKP's inability to harmonise domestic and international energy agendas proved detrimental to maximising the benefits of energy for the Turkish state.

Considering the focus within this thesis on regional foreign policies, it is worth examining in more depth the amalgamation of energy and foreign policy in the US and China. Literature that incorporates energy and foreign policy generally utilises a geopolitical/security framework and focuses not only on energy as a foreign policy objective, but as a tool of foreign policy. Tsakiris (2004:309), for example, construes energy security policy as a "form of statecraft" that is a powerful foreign-policy making instrument. The relationship between energy as a tool for foreign policy - and particularly for the realisation of geopolitical objectives - is discussed in more depth in section on geopolitical approaches to energy.

Despite a focus by both on renewable energy in the past two decades, the literature highlights how both the US and China have continued to place oil, gas, and coal at the heart of energy policy because of its utility for economic growth, industrialisation, and military capacity (Byrne et al, 1996; Glaser, 2013; Raphael and Stokes, 2014). For Zweig and Jianhai (2005), growing energy needs have had "serious implications" for China's foreign policy because access to foreign resources is necessary for continued economic growth and social stability. Dannreuther (2011) points out that China began internationalising its national oil companies (NOCs) in the mid-1990s, but that efforts to source foreign resources were limited until after the 2008 financial crisis. Since the late 2000s, however, China's energy strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia has manifested in a multilateral policy aimed at engaging regional energy producers through initiatives like infrastructural investment in producer companies or energy diplomacy (Jaffe and Lewis, 2002; Liao, 2006). Yeti and Lu (2007) contend that such a level of diplomatically and economic engagement is highly beneficial to Beijing in terms of energy security and its geopolitical role in the regions: it helps generate regional goodwill towards China, create revenue for the Chinese economy, and offset any balance-of-payments deficit created by large oil purchases (Jaffe and Lewis, 2007). Leverett and Barrett (2005) indicate that the reciprocity of those states reluctant to engage with Western IOCs – like Turkmenistan- to Chinese NOCs is primarily due to China's policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The notion that interdependencies in non-energy

sectors create goodwill that can be used to leverage access to energy reserves is a key argument throughout this thesis. Drawing on the contention in chapter two that interdependence is central to regional power strategies, this thesis contends that the goodwill obtained by facilitating economic and political interdependencies was central to Turkey accruing leverage in Caspian energy equations.

While China's international energy policy has only gained prominence in the last couple of decades, the literature on the relationship between energy and foreign policy for the US is more expansive. The US' Middle Eastern strategy and its relationship to regional energy reserves is a dominant theme in the literature (Barnes and Jaffe, 2006; Stokes, 2007, Karim, 2011; Sovacool and Sidorstov, 2013). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the US' policies in the Caspian, Central Asia, and the Caucasus have also received attention from energy scholars (Raphael and Stokes, 2011, 2014). Bluth (2014), for example, cites energy resources as one of four major factors driving US interest in the Caucasus and Caspian region. He argues that the prominence affixed to energy by the US is predicated on the interaction between global energy security and geopolitics, and, similarly to Kardas (2011), contends that it is part of a grand strategy to counter Russian and Iranian influence in the regions. Tekin and Walterova (2007) and Winrow (2004) note the US has consistently promoted Turkey as a reliable energy conduit for Caspian and Central Asian resources as part of the fourth corridor project. Chapter three will argue that the propagation by the US of Turkey centrality to Central Asian-European energy transit systems was an important factor in the AKP's belief in Turkey's geostrategic importance in regional energy affairs.

The US and Chinese cases highlight several features that are relevant to this thesis. Firstly, energy is considered inherently connected to economic growth by policy makers in both states. Ensuring sufficient, secure supplies of energy is paramount. The focus on ensuring security of supply in the AKP's energy rhetoric (highlighted in chapter three) is illustrative of this point. In addition, those advanced developing states seeking to either export or import hydrocarbons must operate in an increasingly complicated "energeopolitical" (Barnes et al, 2006) environment. Rising powers like China are increasingly active in energy affairs in Western-aligned regions. This alters not only energy flows, but the nature of relations between all states operating within the geopolitical system. States must

therefore reconfigure their foreign policy agenda to new geopolitical realities if they are to successfully implement international energy strategies. It can also be deduced from this examination that states can perceive energy can be a tool of foreign policy; an element of statecraft like economic or military power to be manipulated and utilised by states to gain political or economic concessions. However, the extent to which energy is entangled with economic and foreign policy in particular forces states to make trade offs in energy policy formulation. Among the factors states must take into consideration is the extent to which they are dependent on particular sources and producers or consumers. The next section will discuss this diversification in more detail.

1.3 Energy sources and diversification policies

Within the IR literature on energy, diversification strategies are often considered the cornerstone of ensuring supply continuity for both producer and consumer states (Vivoda, 2009; Kiriyama and Kajikawa, 2014). Disruptions to supply can pose a threat to economic, political, and social stability. For energy producers, a diversified consumer base is necessary to ensure market stability in the event of instability in a consumer states (Yergin, 2006) and to limit the impact of oil price shocks (Bayramov and Orujova, 2017). For consumer states, diversification is considered essential in terms of fuel type (Kruyt et al, 2009), in the geographical source of resources (Sovacool and Saunders, 2014), and in the chain of transit (Verrasatro and Ladislaw, 2007) in order to ensure security of supply.[12] The latter is particular true for diversification of gas supplies, where alternative routes may be necessary to compensate for pipelines that transit through unstable third countries (Cohen et al, 2011). An overview of some of the forms of energy considered as part of diversification strategies is important for this thesis considering the centrality of diversification to the AKP's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 (Balat, 2010; Han, 2011). Chapter three will argue that diversification was a key theme in Turkey's energy strategy. Consequently, the aim of this brief literature review of energy sources is to discern the specific attributes of three prominent fuel types in the AKP's energy agenda in order to understand why they were incorporated into Turkey's diversification strategies.

[12] Security of supply will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter

1.3.1 Oil

Availability of supply is identified in section 1.4 of this chapter as a key feature in debates on energy security. The depletion of conventional oil deposits means that accessing reserves is becoming increasingly difficult. The decline of shallow oil supergiant fields in easily accessible locations necessitates the extraction of deeper or offshore deposits that require more technologically advanced and expensive equipment. Some authors suggest that fears over depleting oil resources can be tempered by technological advances that are enabling the development of unconventional, difficult to access energy resources (Klare, 2017). These unconventional resources have grown in importance for major energy consumers (Kim and Blank, 2014) but, in comparison to unconventional forms of gas like shale or liquefied natural gas (LNG), there is only limited debate on unconventional sources of oil like oil sands. Because they are restricted to only a few states, most scholars focus on states with the highest levels of proven unconventional oil reserves like Canada, or on those states that import high volumes of unconventional oil supplies like the US. Oil sands are not particularly important for this thesis because of their geographical distance from the wider Caspian region. Nonetheless, it is notable that tropes that dominate debates on conventional oil resources - such as policy trade offs, environmental impact, and energy dependence - also dominate the literature on oil sands (Clarke, 2009; Levi, 2009; Hoburg, 2013). It should be acknowledged in any case that there is a more limited focus on diversification of conventional sources of oil in the literature because the ways in which oil is transported makes it less susceptible to interruption. Oil can be transported via pipelines, by sea, or overland within tankers, and is easier to replace via spot deals or short term contracts than are other resources. Rather, the primary focus of energy diversification debates in on gas.

1.3.2 Gas

Gas is viewed as a viable alternative to oil and features strongly in literature on the changing trends in global energy trade. Bahgat (2015) points out that natural gas is the fastest growing fossil fuel in the 21st century. Bridge and Bradshaw (2017) highlight how gas consumption grew by 25% between 2007 and 2017 as a result of large discoveries of conventional gas, the “shale revolution” in the US, and major infrastructural investment. For Smil (2015:10), natural gas is an "exceptional source of primary energy for all modern

economies" because it is relatively cheap, plentiful, and less polluting than oil. That natural gas is a matter of international politics is reflected in Bahgat's assertion (2011) that the relationship between states at various stages of the supply chain determines the viability of gas trade. LNG trade notwithstanding, international gas trade is primarily dependent on integrated pipeline networks. Yegorov and Wirl (2008) and Gjetlen (2012) point out that differences in trading infrastructure means that gas is a more regional resource than the globalised oil. Chapter three will illustrate how natural gas gained a "special place" in Turkish energy strategy from the early 21st century that was maintained in the AKP era (MoD, 2000:165; MENR, 2009, 2014), and which necessitated Turkey engage with its Caspian neighbours to realise its energy ambitions.

For those states pursing gas trade, diversification of suppliers is considered an essential policy response to limit dependence on particular suppliers of gas (Vivoda, 2009). Cohen et al (2011) argue that diversification of sources can simultaneously reduce the market power of a supplier – thus lowering the risk of high prices bought on by market monopolisation – and reduce the vulnerability to supply disruptions from particular sources. As chapter three will argue, therefore, a significant aspect of Turkey's diversification strategy was based on limiting dependence on Russian gas (Tanchum, 2015). It should also be noted at this point that natural gas, which can only be transported via pipelines, is more difficult to transport than either oil or unconventional forms of gas (Winrow, 2004). Gas pipelines are costly and can be dependent on stability that is beyond the control of either the supplier or consumer when pipelines cross third party states. States contemplating a natural gas policy therefore need to balance the economic benefits of natural gas with potential political barriers (including embargoes or threats to suspend supplies) that could emerge from an evolving geopolitical context. Understanding the difficulties of natural gas trade is particularly important for this thesis considering the emphasis placed by the AKP on natural gas as a means to fulfil Turkey's own energy requirements and ambitions.

The decision by many states to pursue unconventional forms of gas is altering the way some scholars understand the role of energy in IR. Smil (2015) examines changing patterns in gas trade, looking at how LNG and shale gas - both of which have become increasingly important in the past decade - have impacted on natural gas trade. Stevens

(2010) points out that its cost-competitiveness and greater flexibility mean that LNG can contribute to the security of energy supplies. At the same time, Winrow (2004) notes that processes for the liquefaction of natural gas are relatively expensive and time consuming. For Turkey, it has contributed to a diversification of its energy supplies: as of 2015, LNG constituted 16% of Turkey's gas imports (EIA, 2017d). LNG storage capacity remains limited, however, and the majority of Turkey's gas supplies remain in the form of natural gas.

Literature on shale gas has also grown in recent years. Hulbert and Goldthau (2013) infer that shale is inherently political. In the European case, shale is often positioned as a geopolitical issue. Johnson and Boersma (2013), for example, suggest that developing European source of shale gas could reduce the region's reliance on Russian imports and hence its geopolitical vulnerability. However, Siddi (2006) notes that both the tendency to over-estimate shale reserves and the difficulty and expense of extracting shale gas has contributed to the slow pace of gas development in Europe. At the same time, concerns over the environmental impact of the hydraulic fracturing technique employed to extract gas from shale (LaBelle and Goldthau, 2013; Kuzemko et al, 2016) has led to European states including Germany and France to ban the process. Understanding the shale agenda in Europe is of particular relevance to this thesis considering the argument in chapter three that contributing to Europe's natural gas supplies was a major ambition of the AKP government. Development of European shale reserves would limit the necessity for the region to import additional natural gas supplies from Central Asia and the Caspian region. This, in turn, would restrict the capacity of Turkey to utilise its geostrategic location as a gas conduit which, chapter three argues, was essential to elevating Turkey's status in regional and global energy systems.

1.3.3 Nuclear power

While nuclear power has been the subject of academic research since the 1950s, there has been a proliferation of publications on the topic in recent years. This is, in part, attributable to the decline in conventional fossil fuels; as Macfarlane and Miller (2007) and Jewell (2011) point out, proven uranium reserves are both plentiful and underdeveloped. That nuclear power is also relatively low carbon has led scholars such as Sims et al (2007) and Pacala and Socalow (2004) to frame nuclear energy policies as a response to climate

change. Akcay (2009) also postulates that nuclear power is economical because electricity generated by nuclear power plants is cheaper than conventional power sources. It is unsurprising, then, that nuclear power has been proposed as a means through which advanced developing states can enhance their energy security. The nuclear power strategies of developing and advanced developing states Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil and Nigeria have increasingly become a focus of energy scholars in the past couple of decades.[13] Nuclear energy does play a small role in this thesis: Turkey has pursued nuclear power since the mid-1960s (Akcay, 2009), but it was only under the AKP that the state's nuclear ambitions began to make progress.

At the same time, Erdogdu (2007) notes that nuclear energy evokes a level of public concern that renders it unique among energy sources. Qualms over nuclear accidents, disposal of nuclear waste, and the weaponisation of nuclear technology are at the heart of these concerns (Bodansky, 2004). Fears over the weaponisation of nuclear material in Iran is a key topic of debate in chapter four. However, the literature omits debate on how dependence on external states for nuclear materialor technology contibutes to an imbalance in inter-state relations similar to that evident in other energy trade relations. Chapters four and five argue that Ankara and Tehran's dependence on Russia for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants in Turkey and Iran - and for the provision and disposal of nuclear material in Iran's case - created power imbalance between the states in Russia's favour. In Turkey's case, it is argued, the dependence reinforced Turkey's already significant dependency on Russia in the energy sector and undermined Turkey's regional power power status.Thus, this thesis argues that an accurate assessment of the consequences of incorporating nuclear power into a state's energy mix must take into account not only the economic and environmental benefits of nuclear production, but the geopolitical ramifications on reliance of external sources for the realistion of nuclear ambitions.

Most authors concur that diversification plays a major role in a state's energy strategy (Bahgat, 2007; Kalicki, 2007; Mansson et al, 2014). At the same time, several scholars warn against overplaying the role of diversification in a state's energy agenda. For Lesbirel

[13] See Su'ud (2003), de Carvahlo and Sauer, (2009), Jun et al (2009), and Jewell (2010) for case studies

(2004), diversification is constrained because it only addresses problems with regards to specific actors rather than general global or economic risks to security of supply. Vivoda (2009) points out that diversification policies can be restrained by geography, political relations between and within states, infrastructural availability, and resource capacity (that is, having the necessity political, institutional, economic, and potentially military capacity to carry out a diversification agenda). Based on the literature consulted for this chapter and for the discussion on Turkey's energy policy in chapter three, this thesis proposes that energy diversification is a major element of the energy strategies of advanced developing states. While diversification is often considered a means to ensure energy security, it is important to note that the two are not synonymous. In order to better understand why diverisification might feature as a means to mitigate insecurity in energy strategies, the next section of this literature review will look more broadly at the concept of energy security.

1.4 Energy security

Energy is an essential tool for states at every level of economic development. It facilitates economic growth and industrialisation; provides a level of comfort to societies in the form of heat and electricity; and enables state institutions like hospitals, universities, and public transport systems to function. It is unsurprising, therefore, that energy has increasingly come to be viewed as a security issue by states at every point of the supply chain. Disruptions to global energy trade during the 1973 oil embargo by the Gulf States and unprecedented high oil prices in 2008 illustrate the cost of an insecure energy supply to global economic and political systems. Energy security maintains significance on national and international agenda, and analysis of the broad concept of "energy security" has generated a significant volume of academic literature.

It is also a problematic concept because of the dynamism of both energy markets and international politics: understandings of what matters in energy security changes even within a subset of actors depending on the specific contexts. Vivoda (2009) postulates that variations in time frames and threats to energy security analysed mean definitions are highly contextual. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern specific trends in energy security literature over the past number of decades. In its earliest manifestations, the concept of energy security was sufficiently narrow to be considered synonymous with a secure supply

of oil (Kruyt et al, 2009). The framework for understanding energy security was rooted in realist interpretations of IR, thus ensuring that concepts like the geopolitics of scare resources and the relationship between energy and military preparedness dominated the literature (Deese, 1979). While some scholars (Willrich, 1975; Lieber, 1980; Deese and Nye, 1981) did adopt liberal approaches to energy security (institution building and interdependence foremost among them), realist conceptions of national security, conflict, and global economic security continued to define energy security into the 1980s. The narrow perception of energy security was compounded by a focus on Western developed importing states (Deese, 1979, 1981).

The broadening of the concept of security in the latter part of the 20th century, together with the receding threat of another oil crisis, has led to a reconfiguration of the term "energy security" in the past two decades. Orttung et al (2009) and Mansson et al (2014) suggest that energy security analysis has expanded to incorporate new threats (like climate change) and new actors, including rising powers like China and Russia. Moreover, energy security literature has expanded from a limited focus on oil to encompass gas (Mavrakis et al, 2005), renewables (Bauen, 2006), and nuclear power (Corner et al, 2011) as the global energy mix has become more varied. The broad nature of energy security is important to acknowledge considering its centrality to Turkey's energy strategy and, by extension, its economic, foreign, and geopolitical agendas. Chapter three argues that energy security was pivotal to sustaining the economic growth that contributed to Turkey's global and regional status, and in particular in enabling the state to adopt a trade-based foreign policy to integrate the state further into its region. Furthermore, the next section of this chapter - on energy and geopolitics - will argue that energy is vital to the economy of military operations. Considering the military conflict in three of Turkey's neighbours (Georgia, Iran, and Iraq) and the campaign by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey and its neighbours, military readiness was a necessity throughout the period under examination. While renewable and nuclear energy were both perceived as possible solutions to Turkish energy insecurity, the chapter positions hydrocarbon pipeline imports as the primary source of Turkey's energy security concerns. Consequently, IR literature on the security of oil and gas supplies will be at the centre of the remainder of this literature review.

While the myriad of contributions to IR literature on energy security fail to agree precisely on what energy security is or how it should be dealt with, a general conceptual framework incorporating more specific contextual nuances can be discerned in the energy security literature. Yergin (2006) defines energy security as the assurance of "adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardise major national values and objectives". Bahgat (2011) suggests that the term refers to "ensuring adequate and reliable supplies at reasonable prices in order to sustain economic growth". For Fattah (2009), energy insecurity emerges from the conjunction of import dependency and threats of interruption. Finally, Vivoda (2009) equates measures to ensure energy security to insurances against risks of harm or destruction, while Winzer (2012) suggests the concept should exclude economic agendas and strategies and focus exclusively on the continuity of supply relative to demand.

Several commonalities recur within this general framework of energy security theorisation. Firstly, there is a consensus that energy security is highly contextual. Definitions of what constitutes a security risk or threat for both governments and academics changes depending on the type of energy actor, timeframe, and issues considered, as well as the conceptual lens through which security is being examined (Sovacool and Saunders, 2014; Kruyt et al, 2009). Thus, Kiriyama and Kajikawa (2014) argue that indicators for energy security change or are manipulated depending on political context, while Pascual and Elkind (2010) contend that notions of energy security hinge on the perspective of particular governments in a specific timeframe. The contextual nature of the subject means that, even within IR, energy security is intertwined with a multitude of other disciplines and sub-disciplines like development studies, political economy, war studies, and sociology. Specific threats to energy security also span multiple disciplines, and various academic works have categorised those risks thematically. Winzer (2012) divides risks into human (deliberate or accidental sabotage), technical (system failure), and natural (earthquakes or other natural disasters) threats, while Bahgat (2011) suggests that threats to energy security are geological, geopolitical, economic, or environmental. In other words, anything from declining reserves to interstate war to recession to typhoons can be considered a threat to energy security. Specific threats will be discussed in more detail in the sections on energy and geopolitics and energy and economics later in this chapter.

Secondly, energy security in IR literature tends to be comprised of three primary components: availability, affordability, and continuity of supply. The first pertains to the physical availability of energy supply. This can refer to the ability of a state to access domestic energy supplies (through the acquisition of technical knowledge and economic capacity, for example), or via energy trade with another state (Cordesman and al-Rodham, 2006; Mansson et al, 2011). The second relates to the ability of the state to purchase energy resources at a reasonable, stable rate (Pascual and Zambetakis, 2010; Sovacool and Saunders, 2014). The third, to the guarantee of a reliable flow of energy from producer to consumer free from both long and short term interruption (Elkind, 2010; Toft, 2011). Yergin (2006) further notes that for energy exporters, stable energy demand is a significant security issue. However, the emphasis placed on each element - and the associated potential threats and mitigation strategies - varies between authors. While the entire supply chain is often the subject of energy security analysis, focusing exclusively on either the provider or the consumer will yield differing definitions, threats, and strategies. The ubiquitous nature of energy means that the variables adopted by scholars are so numerous as to prevent a concrete definition of energy security emerging. As Turkey is an importing state, this thesis will focus primarily on issues pertaining to affordability, availability, and continuity of supply. The first will be referenced in the section on energy and economics in the final part of this chapter, while availability and continuity of energy supply form part of the discussion on energy and geopolitics.

1.5 Energy and geopolitics

Global hydrocarbon reserves are territorially fixed, asymmetrically distributed, and traded across borders, regions, and seas (Aribogan and Bilgin, 2009). Consequently, Tekin and Williams (2011) argue, hydrocarbons are inherently geopolitical. Scholars debating the relationship between energy and geopolitics contend that states use economic and political strategies like diplomatic bargaining, strategic alliance formation, and military action to ensure access to secure supplies of energy. At the same time, energy is characterised as a strategic tool that can be deployed in the international system to fulfil economic or political agendas. Considering the emphasis on hydrocarbons - and particularly imported sources of gas and oil - in Turkey’s energy mix and the state’s desire to utilise energy to

advance its geostrategic agenda (see chapter three), a clear understanding of the relationship between energy and geopolitics is warranted for this thesis.

Two issues emerge repeatedly in geopolitical approaches to energy. The first is the relationship between energy and security that was discussed in the previous section. Because energy trade is inherently vulnerable to both deliberate and accidental interruption, the potential geopolitical threats to energy security are almost inexhaustible and encompass everything from regime change to transnational terrorism to interstate war (Florini and Sovacool, 2011:61). Secondly, the literature contends that constraints on the availability of energy supply have been amplified by an ever more crowded energy consumer market (Peters, 2004; Orttung and Wenger, 2009). Established powers and developing states have increasingly had to vie with advanced developing states for access to energy resources in the last number of decades (Hayes and Victor, 2006). Some scholars argue that the development of unconventional oil and gas reserves and the emergence of new producers (like those in the Caspian) mitigate the impact of competition for resources (Sen and Babali, 2007; Goldthau and Witte, 2009). Both this section and the remainder of this thesis contest this notion: the energy demands of new consumers far outstrips the pace of new resources development. The thesis therefore considers the myriad of consumers interested in and invested in Caspian resources as an example of the proliferation of energy competition in the 21st century.

These issues will be examined in the context of three trends in the literature on energy and geopolitics. The first characterises energy as inherently realist and mercantilist; as part of a zero-sum game controlled by the state that leads to or facilitates conflict. The second trend is more positive-sum, and focuses on the relationship between energy cooperation, interdependence, and stability. The final trend concerns the recalibration of energy geopolitics in the 21st centry as a response to the emergence of new actors and forms of energy in the international system.

1.5.1 Energy and conflict

In surveying the literature on the relationship between energy, geopolitics, and the "logic of war", Cuita (2009) identifies two distinct strands of analysis. The first investigates energy as an instrument of war, while the second considers energy to be a cause of war.

Because both strands frame energy as a strategic asset that facilitates the state's grand strategy, control over a secure supply of resource is considered necessary by any measures possible.

The concept of the "energy weapon" dominants the first strand. The concept is rarely studied in depth; instead, it tends to be a feature within broader discussions on energy security. It is almost exclusively studied from the point of view of the energy consumer (Yergin, 2006; Rutland, 2008). This is partly because of the focus on Western consumer states in the energy security literature, and partly because the primary energy security issue stemming from the invocation of the energy weapon is to the security of the consumer's supply. However, the energy weapon is generally perceived as a means through which energy producers use their control over energy supplies to manipulate or coerce political and/or economic concessions from consumers (Smith Stegen, 2010). It takes two primary forms in the literature: the suspension of supplies to energy suppliers and the blockade of energy trade routes. The latter form focuses on the security of major energy transit routes like the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004; Rodrigue, 2004; Moran and Russell, 2008), but is of limited relevance to this thesis because of its focus on pipelines and over-land forms of energy transit. The former is of greater relevance because of the extent to which Russia - a key actor in this thesis - features in the literature. US and EU perspectives dominate the literature on the purposeful suspension of energy supplies. Despite US energy policy and global energy markets evolving significantly since the oil crises of the 1970s, literature relating the energy weapon to US energy security tends to be retrospective and primarily grounded in the use of the oil weapon by OPEC in 1973 (Hirsch, 1987; Greene, 2010). EU-centric literature has always paid attention to the prospective uses of a gas weapon by Russia, but this has become much more pronounced since repeated disruptions to Russian-Ukrainian supplies in the mid-2000s (Yergin, 2006; Rutland, 2008).

Luft and Korin (2009) suggest that threats by states like Iran and Russia to interrupt energy supplies or increase energy prices to consumers to gain leverage in political situations are indicative that the energy weapon remains a threat to hydrocarbon consumers. Similarly, Rodrigue (2004) indicates that, as oil becomes increasing scarce, its strategic importance will encourage states to use the energy threat more frequently, while Aribogan and Bilgin

(2009) contend that the essentiality of energy to economic and military affairs means that it retains importance as a political weapon. However, in a comprehensive study of both academic literature on the topic and empirical instances of Russia's alleged use of the gas weapon – for example, in 1993 against Estonia and in 2006 and 2009 against Ukraine - Smith Stegen (2011) makes a clear distinction between "empty" and "real" threats, and concludes that attempts to wield the "energy weapon" have been largely ineffective. Other scholars suggest that the interdependence engendered by the interconnectedness of energy systems, new energy sources, and the flexibility of the oil market restricts both the application and effectiveness of the energy weapon (Perovic, 2009; Colgan, 2013). The ease with which Turkey accessed alternative energy supplies when it experienced suspensions of oil and gas supplies between 2002 and 2014 (see chapters four and five) appear to bear out this final point. However, the applicability of the energy weapon depends on the relative balance of power and extent of interdependency between consumer and producer states. As chapter five will argue, Russia was unlikely to utilise the energy weapon against Turkey in the way it did Ukraine because of Turkey's relative power in comparison to the latter's historical and contemporary dependency on Russia in energy and other spheres. This thesis therefore acknowledges that the energy weapon is a potential threat to the security of supply of consumer states, but reiterates that assessments of the extent of that threat must take into account the broader historical, political, and economic relationship between the consumer and producer.

In addition, this thesis argues that energy can, on occasion, be used by consumer states as leverage in interstate relations. Consumer states and international institutions can target energy production in producer companies via economic and political sanctions. The implementation of energy sanctions against Iran in response to its nuclear activities and against Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea - discussed in chapters four and five respectively - are relevant examples of this. However, Tsakiris (2004) contends that sanctions tend to be difficult to implement because of the difficulties in convincing other states to comply. It may be precisely because of a state's energy capacity that others are unwilling to impose sanctions: it is argued in this thesis that Turkey was reluctant to impose sanctions on Iran and refused to sanction Russia in part because of Turkey's energy relations with those states.

In the second strand of analysis on energy, geopolitics, and conflict, energy is perceived as a cause of war. Securing energy resources is considered a geostrategic imperative, and coercion and/or military responses are framed as acceptable strategies for ensuring access to energy resources. Energy war theorisation tends to be deeply rooted in traditional geopolitical understandings of international relations, referencing the struggle between major powers for control over resources to generate economic and military advantage (Klare, 2004). References to a new "great game" (Gokay, 2001:23) between the US, China, and Russia in Central Asia and the Caspian region dominate the literature on energy wars.[14] While this material is of interest to this thesis considering its focus on energy affairs in the wider Caspian region, it should be noted that energy wars literature tends to be predominantly speculative. It focuses on the possibility of future conflict, whereas this thesis is grounded primarily in recent history. During the period under examination, there were no conflicts that that could be classified as an energy war. Chapter five will argue that Georgian sources perceived energy competition to be a motivating factor for Russia during the 2008 South Ossetian war (Parfitt et al, 2008), but there is a lack of evidence to corroborate those claims.

In addition to direct war over resources, actual or potential military intervention in resource rich countries by external powers is often linked to access to energy. Deese (1979) writes of the relationship between global energy security, the oil crises, and the possibilities of US military intervention during the 1970s, but intervention in the Persian Gulf constitutes the most significant part of this literature. Williams (2007), for example, frames both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent US involvement in the Gulf War in terms of energy conflict. More recently, scholars have suggested that military posturing by states including China and the Philippines in the South China Sea is driven by the desire to control energy reserves in the region (Klare, 2001; Singh, 2012; Buszynski, 2012). However, the lack of a framework for establishing the extent to which conflict can be attributed to resource competition (Colgan, 2013) restricts scholarly assessment of the causal link between energy and military intervention. The Gulf War notwithstanding, therefore, energy conflict rarely manifests in the literature as full-scale traditional warfare; nor is energy ever depicted as the sole issue over which states go to war. Rather, the

[14] See, for example, Kleveman (2004), Jafar, (2004), and Kim and Blank (2015)

examples above suggest that conflict in which energy plays a role tends to be part of a wider geopolitical strategy for power.

These analyses directly conceptualise energy as a major aspect in warfare as a tool or a cause of war. Energy also plays a major, though less direct, role in war regardless of the *casus belli*. Firstly, energy is a necessary component of military readiness. Both Yergin (1991) and Kaldor et al (2007) pinpoint the evolution of internal combustion engines during World War I as intrinsic to the emergence of oil as a significant military and strategic commodity. According to Yergin (1991), the utilisation of combustion engines in tanks and combat aircraft changed "every dimension of warfare". The continued centrality of oil to military machinery is one of the primary factors linking energy to national defence: without sufficient volumes of oil to maintain a state's military, the state is left vulnerable to external attack. For states like Turkey that border unstable regions (Iraq, Syria, and Iran), sufficient supplies of oil products like aviation fluid are essential to national security.

Secondly, energy can be a target of warfare. If energy is a strategic resource, then targeting energy infrastructure can have a detrimental impact on the capacity of the producing state. Similarly, for countries that depend on energy income to fuel their economies, attacks on essential energy infrastructure can damage the national economic capacity. Attacks by Iran on Iraqi energy infrastructure during the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated the vulnerability of essential infrastructure during conflict (Bahgat, 2011). During the South Ossetian war, Georgia accused Russia of targeting essential energy infrastructure including the pipeline that brings natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey (AFP, 2008a). Even if energy infrastructure is not directly targeted, conflict can still have a major impact on energy security. Fattah (2009) argues that wars and conflict are more likely to have medium and long term impacts on energy trade as states lose the ability to produce and export oil and gas. Toft (2011) suggests internal conflict creates an unfavourable environment for external investment and exploration, which in turn limits post-conflict energy trade. In other words, even short-term conflicts can have long-term security implications for both producers and consumers. For this thesis, the susceptibility of energy infrastructure to attack during conflict and the impact of conflict on energy access are important to understanding the extent to which the AKP related regional stability to domestic energy

security. With the exception of those transiting the Blue Stream pipeline,[15] all of Turkey's energy imports either originate in or pass through regions that experienced conflict (Eissler, 2012). As a result, chapter three argues, pre-emptive efforts to mitigate conflict were essential to Turkey realising its energy ambitions. This thesis therefore argues that Turkey attempted to adopt a positive-sum approach to energy and geopolitics. This approach will be detailed in the next sub-section of this chapter.

1.5.2 Energy and cooperation

The literature on the interaction between energy security, geopolitics, and conflict is based on an inherently realist, zero-sum interpretation of the relationship between those states that produce energy and those that consume or require additional energy resources. A competing narrative in the literature adopts a more liberal approach to energy security, emphasising the role of cooperation in ensuring a secure global supply of energy with the assumption that global energy security will facilitate the energy security of the individual state. As with the first approach, energy is considered a strategic imperative for the state. It is the means adopted to ensure access to supplies that differs.

Barnes et al (2006) point out that consumers and producers of energy have an interest in each other's stability - instability in one is detrimental to the energy security of both. It is for this reason that Pascual and Zambetakis (2010) suggest that natural gas pipelines contribute to overall security: the financial and technological aspects of pipelines create long-term mutual dependencies that militate against confrontational acts. Sen and Babali (2007) emphasise the necessity for cooperation between all members of the supply chain to ensure security of supply. Addressing the potential for conflict between states operating in the same energy system, Hayes and Victor (2006) argue that a stable relationship between consumer, transit, and producer states is easier to maintain if the states have a broader, pre-existing relationship. Similarly, Correlje and van der Linde (2006) suggest that the risk of disruption to supplies is more likely if the cooperation between producers and importers is strained. Cuita (2009) suggest that this contributes to a subsistence approach to energy security that moves beyond realist conceptions of security. The multiplicity of issues and actors that define energy security mean that policy approaches to ensuring energy security

[15] The Blue Stream transports natural gas from Russia to Turkey through a pipeline under the Black Sea

are more varied. While war is not entirely dismissed as a means through which states can fulfil their energy objectives, it is considered a very final resort.

There are two issues pertinent to this thesis in this literature. The first is the notion that interdependence begets stable energy trade, while the second concerns the impact of energy on regional stability. It will be argued in this thesis that political goodwill arising from diplomatic engagement and the formation of economic interdependencies can play a role in the establishment and maintenance of energy relations. Both the relationship between interdependence and energy trade, and between energy trade and stability, are discussed at length in chapter three. Analysis of AKP discourse demonstrates the party's tendency to stress the benefits of pipelines for regional security and conflict mitigation and of integration and security initiatives as a means to develop energy cooperation. It ensures that the suppliers will be more likely to engage in mediation with Turkey in the event of any bilateral dispute as both states have an economic stake in maintaining positive relations – the pricing disputes between Turkey and Iran discussed in chapter four is a case in point. However, this thesis argues that Pascual and Zambetakis' claim (2010) that pipelines mitigate confrontational acts is an overstatement that fails to account for the broader geopolitical context in which pipelines are constructed. Chapter five will discuss Russia's military campaigns in Georgia and Ukraine: both are consumers of Russian energy and Ukraine is a major transit route for Russian supplies to Europe, but that did little to restrict Russia's military campaigns in those states. Based on the discussion in this chapter on energy and conflict and the discussions in chapters three, four, and five on energy relations between states, it is apparent that the ability of energy trade to mitigate conflict is dependent on a balance between a variance of factors including the role of energy in a state's geopolitical agenda, the relative balance of power between the states, and the extent of asymmetry in the states' interdependencies.

The competition that guides energy war logic also manifests as a major factor in this cooperative geopolitical approach to energy. Often, this competition is framed as a political-economic issue of supply and demand, but Verrastro et al (2010) suggests that the emergence of an increasingly crowded consumer base has tested the nature of existing energy geopolitics. He posits that rather than leading to conflict, competition for resources can contribute to the formation of new geopolitical alliances that challenge the status quo.

The challenge posed by China's increased energy activity in both Central Asia and the Middle East to Russia and the US' influence in the respective regions is cited as a core example of the reorientation of energy geopolitics.

1.5.3 The reorientation of energy geopolitics

This reorientation of energy geopolitics is at the centre of the final trend in the IR literature on geopolitical approaches to energy. This literature emphasises two contributory factors: the emergence of the advanced developing states that are at the heart of this thesis, and the growing relevance of gas in the international energy mix. For Carter (2014:42), there is "no other fuel more significant" to the future of geopolitics than national gas. Gjelten (2012:43) suggests that "fresh perspective on geopolitical trends" can be obtained by looking at the world "through the lens of natural gas trade", and that energy trade is a significant determinant of the global balance of power. Barnes et al (2006) similarly suggest that the proliferation of gas deals in the 2000s has contributed to a "geopolitical shift" in which new alliances are being formed both to facilitate and respond to new trade patterns. The natural gas policies of advanced developing states are central to this new trade and the "shift" in energy geopolitics. Energy data collected by the EIA (EIA, 2016e, 2015f) and IEA (2010, 2016, 2017) indicates that states such as Turkey, China, Indonesia and Argentina have all significantly increased the share of imported gas from states and regions that could be considered susceptible to geopolitical instability (such as Central Asia and the Caucasus) in the past decade. In contrast, the share of natural gas as total primary energy supply (TPES) has decreased in most developed states over the same period.

The emergence of natural gas as a significant competitor to oil in the international energy mix has also generated literature on the regionalisation of energy relations, particularly in those regions in which there are substantial supplies of gas. It was noted section 1.3 of this chapter that international gas trade is primarily dependent on integrated pipeline networks. Consequently, several scholars note that spatial aspects are more important in natural gas than for oil or other fuels because the distance over which gas can be transported is limited by the distances and geography (Yegorov and Wirl, 2008; Gjetlen, 2012). The same authors point out that differences in trading infrastructure means that gas is a more regional resource than the globalised oil. Understanding regional interstate interactions are

essential, therefore, to both understanding contemporary energy politics and for examining the relationship between regional power and energy for advanced developing states.

The "great game" for resources and influence in the wider Caspian region that is commonly referenced in the literature on energy conflict generally focuses on energy competition between China, Russia, the US, and Europe (Klare, 2001; Jafar, 2004; Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007; Raphael and Stokes, 2014). Considering the regional nature of energy trade in the natural gas era, this thesis contends that the literature overlooks the potential for competition between specifically *regional* powers. This is partly attributable to the tendency of IR literature to focus on major powers. Each of Russia, Iran, and Turkey have specific interests in regional energy affairs that relate to their foreign, economic, developmental, and military powers and which contribute to both cooperation and competition between the three (Gokay, 2001; Tanchum, 2015; Souleimanov and Kraus, 2012). Though there are exceptions (Flanagan, 2013), the competition between the three states for influence in regional energy affairs is usually discussed within the framework of competition between Russia and the US. Turkey, in particular, is considered either a pawn or balancing force in Russian-US competition rather than a strategic player in its own right (Iseri and Dilek, 2011). In exploring the ways in which energy featured in international politics for Turkey between 2002 and 2014, this thesis will assess the ways in which energy featured in bilateral relations with both Russia and Iran and therefore consider the relationship between energy and Turkey's regional influence. The nature of this regional influence - and, more specifically, Turkey's role as a regional power - will be discussed in more depth in chapter two.

The first geopolitical approach to energy in IR depicts energy as a zero-sum game. Obtaining access to secure energy sources is a national prerogative that forces states into a form of bilateral competition that can lead to military conflict. The second body of literature characterises the relationship between actors in the energy supply chain as less anarchic. Integration of energy systems, bilateral agreements to combat perceived security threats, the globalisation of the energy market, and producer-consumer interdependence are central to this perspective. It is more limited than the first body of literature. Considered in conjunction with the argument concerning the inefficiencies of multilateral energy governance in section 1.2 of this chapter, this thesis argues that cooperation on

energy affairs is limited outside of bilateral relationships that benefit specific states. Energy is used as a cooperative measure primarily in the self-interest of the state rather than as a means of contributing to regional development. The final part of this section highlighted how the emergence of new energy actors and the proclivity of these states towards natural gas is contributing to a recalibration of the nature of energy geopolitics.

The approaches to energy outlined in this section, while differing considerably on a number of matters, contain a number of commonalities. Each focuses almost exclusively on the state as the primary facilitator of energy policy, and each considers states to be rational actors that seek to maximise domestic energy security. Few states adhere stringently to either approach, and the complexity of the energy system as a whole – taking into account various fuel types, state and non-state actors, transit systems, and, most importantly, other political objectives – cannot be categorised according to one approach or the other. Of importance to this thesis is the recurrent indication that energy is a strategic asset. Energy can be deployed to political, military and economic advantage and thus affect the distribution of power in the international system, and can be used to foster cooperation between states. In that regard, it can be central to determining the balance of power between competing states at the global (oil) and regional (gas) levels. Based on the examination of literature both in this chapter and in chapter two on regional powers, it is argued that understading how energy may be framed and employed by a state with regards to its strategic utility is dependent on the political and economic needs and capacity of the state. In addition, the perception of the state's position within the energy system by both itself and other actors in that system is essential to the effective utilisation of energy as a tool. Thus, understanding the global and regional agendas of actors and those states' relationship with energy security and each other is essential to understanding power in IR. The limitations within the literature regarding South-South energy relations and the geopolitics of energy security among those states are to the detriment of a more holistic understanding of energy in IR.

1.6 Energy and economics

1.1.6 The IPE of energy: liberalism and neo-mercantilism

Energy and economics are intrinsically entwined. For Stoddard (2013), energy is one of the few sectors of a state's economy that has the capacity to fundamentally shape both political and economic systems. Energy is a commodity that can be traded bilaterally between states or in international markets. Energy trade is controlled by market-based forces of supply and demand, while the extent of that demand is based both on the essentiality of energy to economic growth and on the mismatch between energy resources production and consumption that stems from the asymmetrical global distribution of resources (Fantazzini et al, 2011). Considering the extent to which energy is traded at the international and regional levels, these market forces are not just domestic, but international: as Cordesman and al-Rodham (2006) note, energy trade is susceptible to macroeconomic fluctuations, and issues such as global economic health and the state's capacity to invest in energy technologies and exploration have an impact on the availability of energy supplies. Threats to domestic and international energy systems have potential security implications for the affordability of energy supply. Deese (1979) argues that sudden energy price increases can lead to energy insecurity, which may prompt national and international economic crises. Further emphasising the relationship between energy politics and energy economics, Pascual and Zambetakis (2010) posit that price shocks can lead to economic hardship, inflation and, potentially, political instability for energy producing states.

There is a consensus in the literature that these economic energy issues are closely related to IR themes such as the relationship between states (Willrich, 1975; Kuzemko at al, 2016), power distribution (Cohen, 2005; Stoddard, 2009), and policy formulation (Cordesman and al-Rodham, 2006). Economic themes in the literature on energy in IR adhere to two dominant frameworks adopted from international political economy (IPE) theory: liberalism and neo-mercantilism. The first espouses the benefits of free markets and international energy governance. Hence, the focus of research is broadened from a state-centric approach to incorporate markets, institutions, and private companies (Goldthau and Witte, 2009, Caiser, 2011). Liberal IPE theorists argue for greater market freedom and limited state intervention in economic affairs. Significant faith is placed in the

ability of markets to regulate energy trade. Neo-mercantalist approaches, on the other hand, frame the state as the primary actor in energy affairs and suggest a strong link between energy and national security. The first part of this section will focus on liberal approaches to energy in IR, and notes the emphasis on the role of markets and international oil companies (IOCs) in the literature on energy and economics in IR. After arguing that liberal approaches underplay the extent to which energy trade is interwoven with states' political agendas and the geopolitical context in which energy trade occurs, it discusses neo-mercantilist approaches to energy. The final part of this section looks at the relationship between energy and economic development. It notes that there is a dichotomy in the literature between the energy in developed and developing states, but argues that the advent of advanced developing states in the past two decades necessitates a new understanding of the ways in which energy and development are related for those states.

Market-based approaches to energy in the IR literature look beyond the state to explain patterns in energy affairs. Considering the transnational nature of energy trade and security, investment from commercial and political actors from multiple states is often considered integral to resource development (Florini and Sovacool, 2011). Central to these debates is the role of international oil companies (IOCs). Kuzemko et al (2016) argue that IOCs have fostered technological innovation and been the "backbone" of the oil industry for the best part of a century. From Standard Oil's pioneering petroleum development in the late 19th century through to the era of the Seven Sisters in the mid-20th century, IOCs were instrumental in the development of the energy industry (Yergin, 1991; Samson, 1991). In states in which energy is privatised – the US and UK, for example - IOCs continue to play a major role in resource development. Several sources point out that the role of IOCs in global energy management has been diluted by increasingly assertive producer states, two waves of resource nationalisation in the 1980s and 2000s, and a series of agreements in the 1970s and 1980s that recalibrated the balance between energy producers and IOCs (Sampson, 1991; Yergin, 1991; Claes, 2013). Nonetheless, it is important to note the continued role international market actors play even in nationalised energy markets. Bryce (2010) postulates that most new oil discoveries are made by international consortiums comprised of a multitude of IOCs, national oil companies (NOCs), and often with funding from interested national governments. Likosky (2009) notes that IOCs have re-entered exploration via contractual arrangements with states that

previously nationalised their resources, while Marcel (2006) points out that IOCs have formed alliances and exchange technical expertise with national oil companies (NOCs). The Kuwaiti government, for example, has legislated to allow the nationalised energy system enter into technical assistance contracts with IOCs (Le Leach, 2013).

As this thesis will demonstrate, IOCs play a more limited role in most of the states of the wider Caspian region[16]. Each of the three major regional actors examined (Turkey, Russia, and Iran) have nationalised energy systems, and attempts by Turkey and Russia to introduce energy liberalisation legislation led to only limited market diversification (Cetin and Oguz, 2007). Nonetheless, acknowledging the model introduced above is important considering the extent of Turkey's interactions with Azerbaijan, where major IOCs - and particularly BP- are heavily involved in energy development. Moreover, cooperation between IOCs and NOCs on technical matters and investment by international actors in the Turkish energy market were important to developing Turkey's limited energy market infrastructure in the period under examination (IEA, 2010; Ozturk et al, 2011). This thesis suggests that Turkey's situation is not unique, but can be applied to other advanced developing states. It is notable, for example, that both Mexico and Indonesia have opened domestic markets to limited IOC involvement in recent years, and that other advanced developing countries like Nigeria and South Korea have long permitted restricted IOC involvement in national energy management (EIA 2016k, 2015g, 2016j, 2017e). Considering that many emerging states lack the necessary technical expertise to develop energy reserves, this thesis therefore argues that cooperation with IOCs through varying degrees of collaboration (rather than the previous domination by IOCs) can be beneficial to the development of essential resources and energy infrastructure.

In addition to the focus on IOCs, liberal IPE frameworks also tend to emphasise markets and institutions as bulwarks against geopolitical threats to energy security. This assumption is generally founded on two tenets of international economic theory: Kant's economic peace theory (1795), which asserts that market participation reduces the incentive for international conflict and that trade is incompatible with war; and interdependence theory, which postulates that cooperation in one sector will lead to

[16] Azerbaijan is an exception - major IOCs like BP and Statoil have been heavily involved in energy development in Baku since the 1990s

cooperation in other sectors, thereby contributing to a convergence of interests and militating against conflict (Barbieri, 1996). Thus, Goldthau and Witte (2009) postulate that a more open global oil market has changed the nature of energy trade from a mercantilist, zero-sum game to a positive sum market that deters political conflict. Similarly, Caiser (2011) argues that energy markets present an opportunity to promote a common good that constrains destabilising geopolitical activity. This thesis contends that, for the most part, these arguments oversimplify the nature of international energy trade, attributing too much influence to international markets (particularly when it comes to states with nationalised energy systems) and underestimating the impact of the broader international and geopolitical context in which energy trade develops. The application of economic peace and interdependence theories to energy in IR underplays the extent to which states may use energy as a coercive tool for the accumulation of power. It is highlighted throughout this thesis that Russia, in particular, has engaged in military conflict with essential energy partners like Georgia and Ukraine. Nonetheless, the notion that cooperation in one (energy) sector can contribute to cooperation in other sectors is important for this thesis. Many authors argue that during the AKP era, energy was closely tied to economic cooperation in other sectors and was perceived as a means through which Turkey could create new interdependencies with other states (Kutlay, 2009, 2011; Kardas, 2012). Chapter three will argue that primary documentation shows a major focus on energy as a tool for regional integration and cooperation by the AKP. In contrast to liberal approaches to energy in the IR literature, however, these arguments are primarily based around the conception of the state - rather than markets, institutions, or private companies -as the dominant actor in energy affairs.

The second IPE framework utilised by energy security scholars adopts a neo-mercantilist approach. Neo-mercantilism is differentiated from traditional mercantilist and realist perspectives by the acknowledgement that non-state actors also play a role in economic matters (Gilpin, 2001). In comparison with liberal approaches, the state - rather than international markets or private companies - is considered the primary driver and controller of domestic and international economic matters. International trade is considered a zero-sum game of relative gains in which states rely on protectionism and relative powers to increase wealth and influence economic outcomes (Gilpin, 2001; Cohen, 2005).This thesis argues, however, that the liberalisation of some energy markets and the

necessity for cooperation between states in specific forms of energy trade – particularly those that use pipelines as the primary method of transportation – outlined in previous sections of this chapter, along with the willingness of some states to cooperate in international institutions means that the extent to which energy can be considered a wholly zero-sum game is limited.

Resource nationalisation is a recurring feature in neo-mercantalist approaches to energy in the IR literature. Many states at various levels of the political and economic spectrum have pursued resource nationalism to some extent. The decision to nationalise resources can be based on a number of factors. Gustafson (2012), for example, suggests that the tendency by some states to frame energy as a political or geopolitical resource can be a driving factor in the decision to nationalise resources. Stevens (2010) proposes that the ideological belief that undue IOC influence over resource management dilutes the sovereignty of the state encourages governments to limit the role of IOCs in order to reassert control over the national economy. Finally, the literature notes that close ties between the state and NOCs mean that NOC policy is guided by non-commercial objective like foreign policy and national wealth creation to a significantly greater extent than their privatised counterparts (Harris, 2007; Baker, 2007). Considering that most of the states discussed in this thesis - including Turkey, Iran, and Russia - have predominately nationalised energy systems and close ties between the state and energy companies, a brief discussion on the literature on resource nationalisation here will contribute to discussions on the topic in the empirical chapters.

Carbonnier and Brugger (2013) point out that the nationalisation policies can vary from a stronger role for state-owned companies in resource development to full-scale resource control by the state. The primary focus in the literature is on developing producer states in which full or partial nationalisation has been linked to political corruption, the asymmetrical development of national industry, and over reliance on energy income (for example, see Beblawi, 1990; Domjan and Stone, 2010; Wilson, 2015). This “resource curse” is a frequent theme in this literature, and is central to the almost universally critical approach scholars take to nationalised energy systems. Some authors argue that the unilateral development of energy resources at the expense of economic diversification can increase social tension between the small group of workers in the energy sector and the

rest of the population, (Muller-Kranner, 2007). Others point out that the lack of necessity for taxation in rentier states creates autonomy for the state from societal demands (Schwartz, 2008). Thus, various authors call attention to the relationship between rentier policies and political or economic issues like high corruption level (Dietz et al, 2007), human rights abuses (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004), autocratic governance (Franke et al, 2009) and government repression and placation of opposition via oil wealth (Sandbakken, 2006). Bad policy decisions - such as the failure of a developing government to manage resources adequately or underinvestment in infrastructure - lead to the failure of energy systems and increased energy prices for both producers and consumers (Elkind 2010). Consumer states must therefore account for potential political, economic, and societal security risks associated with the resource curse into their risk calculations when developing energy trade with rentier states. Acknowledging the potential negative aspects of resource nationalisation is particularly important for this thesis: not only does Turkey have a predominately nationalised energy system itself, but the majority of states from which it imports energy sources have nationalised energy systems. Among the major issues this thesis will focus on is how energy nationalisation facilitated an overlap between each of Turkey, Russia, and Iran between 2002 and how, in Russia's case at least, nationalised energy companies became agents though which the state could expand its regional power. Given the economic constraints on advanced developed states relative to their developed counterparts, a key prerogative of thesis nationalised energy sectors is to contribute to economic development. This development is the subject of the final part of this chapter.

1.6.3 Energy and development

There is a clear dichotomy between developed and developing states in the IR literature on energy because, as Mansson et al (2014) point out, developing and developed states have different energy priorities and opportunities. There is a consensus in the literature that, for consumer states, affordability of supply and the economic consequences of disruption to energy supplies are potentially severe (Smil and Knowland, 1980; Muller-Kranner, 2007). This is particularly true for states in the global South for whom energy is intrinsic to economic development and, by association, political and social stability. Kuik et al (2011) suggest that in developing countries, energy security extends beyond economic growth to

incorporate access by all sectors of society to energy supplies in order to ensure a basic standard of living. Van Groenendaal (1998) similarly argues that developing technically sound and economically efficient energy system is crucial for economic development. Energy is, therefore, intrinsically connected to developmental agendas. Pascual and Elkind (2010) stress that failure to access sufficient supplies of energy is detrimental to the development agenda of developing countries. On a similar theme, Muller-Kranner (2007) and Bauen (2006) are particularly adamant that energy poverty - the inability of a state to afford a secure supply of energy - is a major block to development. Deese (1981) adds that supply disruptions to those states can contribute to domestic economic down-turns that increase the possibility of political instability.

Despite the acknowledgement of the differences between energy in developed and developing countries in the IR literature, it would be remiss to suggest that there is a simple binary of states when it comes to energy policy. The rapid emergence over the past decade and a half of advanced developing states that are simultaneously amassing economic and political power demonstrates the necessity to expand the discussion of the IPE of energy policy in non-developed states beyond existing debates on rentier states, energy poverty, and IOCs. Advanced developing states have greater capacity than developing states to bargain in international energy affairs for access to supplies and with regards to price setting. By virtue of their ascendance in international affair, they may also possess the capacity to use energy not merely to alleviate energy poverty or to fund domestic development, but as a tool to elevate the states' status in the international system. It is for this reason that this thesis focuses on energy's role as not just a developmental objective for advanced developing states, but on its capacity as a tool through which power - both economic and political - is consolidated. At the same time, the thesis acknowledges that advanced emerging state may be more limited in carrying out its energy agenda than its developed counterparts because of restrictions to its economic capacity and technical expertise.

A core contention of this thesis is that the connection between development and energy is central to understanding energy in advanced developing states. Chapter two argues that continuous, stable economic development is crucial to advanced developing states in both maintaining and expanding their influence in regional and international politics. The role

played by energy in facilitating development in other economic sectors - particularly industry and electricity generation - is pivotal to ensuring domestic economic and political stability, and for enabling states to carry out foreign policy agendas. Understanding the connection between energy and development is crucial to understanding why, as chapter three argues, fulfilling Turkey's ever-expanding energy requirements was a priority during the AKP's first three terms in office.

1.7 Conclusions

A number of conclusions can be derived from the review of IR literature on energy. Firstly, energy governance remains the remit of the state. This is in part due to the centrality of energy to the political, economic, and security of the state, and partly on account of the inefficiencies of international energy governance. At the same time, markets, actors, and national and international energy agendas policy are increasingly intertwined and cannot be considered in isolation. Consequently, while the state remains the dominant actor in energy governance, domestic energy policy is embedded in the international context.

Secondly, energy is a key strategic good. It is a means through which power and wealth can be accumulated. Secure access to and effective utilisation of energy resources contributes to the state's capacity to exert power in energy, economic, and political systems. The continued centrality of energy to economic production and military manoeuvrability means that energy resources are necessary to generate economic and military advantages between competing states. To this end, energy can affect the relative balance of capabilities between states and therefore contribute to the distribution of power in the international system.

Finally, a new pattern of energy flows has emerged in recent years driven by the energy policies of advanced developing states like the BRICS, Turkey, Indonesia, and Mexico. These states, which have primarily nationalised energy systems (with some degree of liberalisation) have both actively pursued natural gas resources at a far more intense rate than their more developed counterparts and engaged in energy cooperation with other states in the global South. This has resulted in a reconfiguration of energy geopolitics wherein regional energy trade and South-South energy relations have increasingly

supplemented the North-South relations and global oil narratives that dominated energy in the twentieth century. Considering the ways in which energy geopolitics influence power distribution and patterns of cooperation and confrontation, these states are increasingly shaping not only energy systems, but geopolitical and international systems as a whole.

The final point is of particular importance to this thesis. The IR debate has, in previous decades, focused on major and Western powers at the expense of advanced developing states. While this has begun to change in recent years with the advent of emerging powers and developmental literature, non-Western actors remain underexplored in the energy literature despite a clear distinction in the constraints and opportunities facing advanced developing states in comparison to other actors. While the energy agendas of these groups of states may be relatively similar, a major differentiating factor is the capacity of advanced developing states to access and utilise energy resources in the international context.

This thesis hopes to contibute to bridging the gap deficit of literature on energy and emerging powers. Energy's utility as a strategic asset – as a tool for domestic economic development, regime security, alliance building, or power projection – is dependent on both the capacity of the state to obtain and utilise it, but also the *willingness* of the state to do so. Advanced developing states no longer play a secondary role to major powers in international energy, but are significant actors in their own rights. If energy is a strategic resource for states, and the utilisation of economic and political resources is integral to ensuring sufficient supplies of energy, then a clearer understanding of the relationship between power resources and advanced developing states is necessary to better understand the role of energy in the international politics of those states.

In addition, the acknowledgement in the literature of the increasing regionalisation of energy trade suggests that more emphasis on the regional aspect of energy systems is required than either global geopolitics or energy security explanations provide. Regional power theories form a major strand of new scholarly work on advanced developing states. While strongly evoking elements of geopolitical and security theory, regional power theory goes beyond those concepts in explaining the strategies and power resources of emerging powers in the regional context. The next chapter will examine the literature on

regional power theory before explaining its relevance to the relationship between energy and IR for advanced developing states.

2. Developing a Regional Powers Framework

2.1 Introduction

A major theme in debates on advanced developing states in IR in recent decades has pertained to the role of those states within specific regions (Pederson, 2002; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Hurrell, 2006). The concept of regional power was frequently employed to characterise the position advanced developing states held within specific regions, but until recently was rarely applied with analytical rigour.[17] Scholars conducted research without a concrete analytical framework either for differentiating regional powers from other actors, or for examining the strategies through which regional powers established their status and exercised their power. Theoretical approaches to regional powerhood have only begun to emerge in recent years, with scholars developing analytical tools for defining regional powers (Nolte, 2010) and understanding their foreign policy strategies (Destradi, 2010), role in regional security (Buzan and Waever, 2003), and in multilateral institutions (Nel, 2010). The purpose of devising these frameworks is not just to understand the regional powers themselves, but to facilitate scholarly understanding of the impact of those powers on traditional conceptualisations of regional systems and international order. As the introduction noted, the regional power concept is employed in this thesis both to denote states that possess a preponderance of power within a geopolitical system and as a framework through which the behaviour of states can be analysed.

In order to answer this thesis' central research question, this chapter will examine how regional power manifests in IR literature. It consists of four sections. The first explores key assumptions framing debates on regional power. It focuses on defining central terms like "region" and "power", and briefly outlines three elements that recur within the majority of the literature on regional powers: role perceptions, regional security, and multilateral

[17] See, for example, Onis (2001) and Erickson (2004) on Turkey, Lopez-Lucia (2015) on Nigeria and Brazil, and Furtig and Gratius (2010) on Venezuela. It will be demonstrated throughout this chapter that the majority of empirical research on regional powers pertains almost exclusively on advanced developing states and, within that broad categorisation, almost entirely on the BRICS: see De Lima and Hirst (2006) and Spektor (2010) on Brazil; Flemes (2007) on India; Harris (2006) on China; Bava (2010) on India; Alden and Viera (2011) on South Africa, Brazil, and India

institutions. Extrapolating the major themes from this examination of the literature on regional power, the final part of this section outlines key conditions determining regional powerhood and briefly highlights the ways in which scholars have adopted regional powers frameworks for empirical studies of advanced developing states.

This thesis acknowledges, however, that the criteria for defining and recognising regional powers are quite broad. They do not account for variances in the material and ideational power capacities of regional powers, or the different ways in which regional power may manifest. Consequently, the second section of this chapter focuses on regional power typologies. Paying particular attention to the work of Sandra Destradi (2010) and Miriam Prys (2010), this section will consider three potential forms of regional power: empire, hegemony, and leadership. The tendency to categorise regional powers is a relatively new phenomenon and scholarly literature on the topic is limited, but drawing on the wider IR literature on empire, hegemony, and leadership facilitates a clear understanding of the variances between different forms of regional power.

The third section of this chapter departs from theoretical conceptualisations in considering the overlap between regional powers and energy for advanced developing states. Chapter one argued that energy was a significant material resource and strategic asset for states at all levels of development. Yet despite the prominence affixed to material capabilities in the literature on regional powers, energy is not incorporated into empirical or theoretical studies of regional powerhood. Similarly, there is no literature that utilises a regional powers framework to understand energy policy. Considering that the purpose of this thesis is to examine how energy and regional powerhood interact for advanced developing states, the conclusions of this section are pivotal to the thesis' central argument. The fourth and final section of this chapter applies the regional power characteristics outlined in section 2.2 to Turkey and proposes that between 2002 and 2014, the state fitted the criteria of a regional power in the wider Caspian region.

2.2 Key contentions in the regional power literature

2.2.1 Underlying assumptions of regional power debates

Establishing an analytical framework for regional powers has proved difficult. Contestation of the terms "region" and "power" are major barriers to the clarification of the "regional power" concept. Nolte (2010:883) postulates that both "regions" and "power" are so debated in IR literature as to ensure a significant variability in the possible meaning of "regional power", and renders research on regional powers "complex and multifaceted". This thesis frames regions as two or more states that are in geographical proximity to one another and are shaped by social, political, economic, and historical constructs and interactions (Mansfield and Milner, 1999; Fawn, 2009; Prys, 2010). Having examined the conceptualisation of regions in IR in the introduction, this chapter focuses on the idea of power in the regional context.

While Barnett and Duvall (2005:67) argue that "no single concept can capture the forms of power in international relations", regional powers literature tends to adhere to Nye's definition of power as "the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want" (2008:27). Power is most tangible in its material form; as the state's demographic, military, and economic superiority relative to others (Nolte, 2010). However, factors like as a common history and shared values can also contribute to the power of a state (Beck, 2010). This ideational aspect – the projection through foreign policy of a common agenda, goal, or value that has a symbolic, psychological, or subjective dimension – also plays a role in defining power (Flemes and Nolte, 2010). For both strong and materially weaker states, ideational power can provide a means to influence the behaviour of other states.

The underlying premise of all conceptualisations of regional power is that the system level of analysis used to explore and explain power at the international level can be applied to the regional level (Hurrell, 2007; Destradi, 2010). Lemke (2010) argues that the hierarchical nature of the regional systems is structurally similar to that of the international system. Distributions of power and perceptions of regional status quo orientations are considered central to understanding how states view each other and why they favour particular foreign policy strategies in different contexts. Polarity - as determined in terms of the relative material capacity between states - is therefore a key feature in debates on

regional power (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). A region may not have a dominant unilateral power, but rather be a multilateral system where major and aspiring regional powers compete for regional predominance (Flemes, 2010; Hurrell, 2010). Nolte (2010) points out that balances of power within regional hierarchies are not stable, and that the state's regional power status may be subjected to challenges and contestation from other states in the regional hierarchy. Smaller emerging states may also have regional power ambitions that compete with larger regional powers for access to resources and influence. Turkey's energy ambitions in the Caspian are highlighted throughout this thesis as an example of the competition with Russia, a much larger regional power, for regional influence. Power shifts can contribute to instability - in the case of challenges to unipolar order in particular - or produce new patterns of cooperation and contestation and new hierarchies within the region. Acknowledging the fluid nature of regional hierarchies is important for this thesis considering the competition by Russia, Turkey, and Iran for regional powerhood in the Caspian: while the conclusion determines that Russia remained the preeminent regional power in the Caspian throughout the 2002-2014 period, it will be argued that both Turkey and Iran's regional policies had the potential to reshape the regional hierarchy

2.2.2 Role perceptions and engendering legitimacy: self-identification, followership, and external validation

The possession of resources does not in itself make a state a regional power: the state must also recognise and be willing to exercise its power, and its position in the regional hierarchy must be acknowledged by other actors. According to Lopez-Lucia (2015), a state's own understanding of its identity, resources (and capacity to utilise those resources effectively), and position in the regional system is essential to regional power. Similarly, Nolte (2010) suggests that the conceptualisation by elites like government officials or policy makers of the state's position in the regional hierarchy are essential to classifying a state as a regional power. Without acknowledgement by elites of the state's material and ideational superiority to other actors in the regional system, the self-belief or willingness of the state to implement regional power strategies is curtailed.

The classification of a state as a regional power is also dependent on the recognition of the state's role in the regional hierarchy by other regional states. In the regional powers

literature, recognition is closely related to debates on followership and legitimacy. Luke (1986) argues that power is most effective when *willing* compliance is secured from subordinate states by influencing "receptions, cognitions, and preferences" "in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things". The extent to which compliance is willing is essential to determining the legitimacy of the regional power and to differentiating between the forms of regional power outlined elsewhere in this chapter. For the imperial regional power, compliance is achieved through coercion and the state has limited legitimacy among its subordinates; conversely leadership models tend to employ ideational power to generate acceptance by subordinates of the regional power's superior position in the regional hierarchy and posses high levels of legitimacy (Schirm, 2009; Nabers, 2010). These arguments will be expanded upon in section 2.3.

Destradi (2010) suggests that in certain circumstances, followers may be instrumental in elevating the status of a state by proposing or promoting it as a regional power. Consequently, as Schirm (2009) points out, the limited capacity of coercion to engender support means that states must provide incentives to ensure acceptance by subordinate states. Adopting Schirm's hypothesis on conditions for the acceptance of emerging powers to conceptualisations of regional powers, it can therefore be determined that the "the incorporation of potential followers' interests and/or ideas" into the regional power strategy can be considered necessary in order to "neutralise potential resistance and simulate support" (2009:199). Thus the empirical chapters will argue that Turkey's rhetoric concerning the common energy security agenda of the Caspian states was crucial to its claim to energy leadership in the region.

In addition to common interests, regional powers may need to consider the impact of historical inter-state regional relations on contemporary receptiveness to regional powerhood, and frame those relations in such a way that they are palatable to subordinate states (Flemes and Wehner, 2012). Nabers (2010) argues that the necessity for the state to maintain legitimacy means that followers may place constraints on the actions of regional powers. At the same time, however, section 2.3 of this chapter indicates that the degree to which subordinate states rely on the regional power for the provision of public goods such as security may limit the capacity of subordinates to curtail the policies of the regional power. Chapter five, for example, notes that dependence by eastern European states on

Russian energy supplies limited the extent of the response to Russia's suspension of energy supplies to Ukraine in 2006, 2008, and 2009.

Finally, acceptance by global actors of the role played by regional powers is considered important both in its own right and as a means to legitimise the regional power to its subordinates. The integration of the regional power into interregional and international institutions where it articulates both its own interests and acts as a representative of regional interests can engender recognition for regional powers from international actors and legitimise the state among its subordinates (Nabers, 2010; Nabers, 2010). Sever and Oguz-Gok (2016) suggest that the UN is a particularly significant institution for regional powers looking for recognition of their status from extra-regional powers. Similarly, integration into a particular region through participation in regional governance mechanisms, strong relations with other regional actors, and contributions to regional security can be integral to acceptance by regional subordinates of the regional power's status. The next sub-section of this chapter will discuss the role of integration and institutions for regional powers in more depth.

2.2.3 Generating regional power: integration, security, and institutions

This thesis' introduction proposed that cultural, economic, and political integration was a key factor in differentiating a geographical region from a geopolitical one. Beck (2010) suggests that the quality of relations with regional neighbours is crucial to whether or not an aspiring regional power will develop into an actual one, and argues that regional integration is integral to maximising relations between states at every level of the regional hierarchy. Integration in the region is also important to legitimising the position of the regional power in two ways: firstly, in terms of regional membership – that is, being considered a constituent player in a specific region – and secondly, in terms of developing leverage or bargaining power in regional issues. Initiatives such as free trade agreements or joint security initiatives facilitate integration in a way that contributes to interdependence between states (Prys, 2010). Conceptualisations of integration in regional powers debates tend to reflect Keohane and Nye's characterisation of complex interdependence, highlighting a blurring of domestic and international (or, in this case, regional) policy and the declining use and effectiveness of military force (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Interdependence does not infer the absence of a hierarchy between states;

indeed, Keohane and Nye (1977:10) point out that asymmetrical interdependencies are "most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another". The role of the state in influencing regional security is a key example of both the overlap between domestic and regional policy for regional powers and integration processes.

Challenges to the regional status quo aside, geopolitical instability can have a detrimental effect on the regional power's domestic security. Nolte (2010) therefore argues that regional powers have a special responsibility for regional security. The regional power is perceived as a regional peacekeeper – as a facilitator, negotiator, or mediator. The premise for the role of regional powers in regional security stems from the concept of regional security complexes (RSC) (Buzan, 1988; Buzan and Waever, 2003). RSC theory hypothesises that security issues are increasingly region-based. Relations between states themselves are established and reinforced by patterns of amity and enmity resulting from close geographic proximity (Buzan and Waever, 2003). The interdependence between states and the transnational nature of some security threats means that insecurity can only be tackled through regional cooperation that is facilitated by dominant regional states. Both RSC and regional powers theory contend that a dominant power with a preponderance of material resources relative to other states in the system should play a central role in regional security. Nolte and Flemes (2010), for example, argue that regional powers must combine material capabilities and leadership in order to maintain the regional order.

Nolte (2010) and Frazier and Stewert-Ingersoll (2003) go beyond Buzan and Waever's inherently realist depiction of RSCs and incorporate a social constructivist perspective that emphasises role perception. Nolte (2010) claims the state's willingness to act as regional peacekeeper or peacemaker, along with the acceptance of the state's position in the regional security hierarchy, are central to defining a regional power's influence on regional security. Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2003) apply Wendt's (1987) understanding of the role of social processes in shaping state identity to RSCs. They consider the perception by a state of its role in the regional system as a regional security leader, a custodian of regional peace, or "protector" of the region from external forces to be instrumental in determining the effectiveness of a regional power in constructing and maintaining a

regional security order. The regional power is therefore tasked with both enabling and sustaining regional security cooperation.

For the most part, this thesis adopts the conceptualisation of the relationship between regional powers and regional security outlined above. However, the literature referenced above places too great an emphasis on the regional power as the benign facilitator of regional cooperation on security issues. The discussion on imperial and coercive hegemonic regional powers later in this chapter suggests that states may also have a negative effect on regional security: the projection of military or coercive power against other states can contribute to regional instability. Where the regional power is particularly dominant, it may define regional security by preventing subordinate states from cooperating on security issues that are not in its interest. This thesis therefore points out that regional powers may influence the delineation of the regional security system through coercion as well as cooperation depending on whether the state adopts a leadership, hegemonic, or imperial regional strategy. In discussing Turkey's role in regional mediation efforts and Russia's incursion into South Ossetia in 2008, chapter five will highlight the ways in in which states can both positively and negatively affect the delimitation of the regional security system.

One means of both facilitating regional security and integration more generally is through participation in regional governance and, particularly, through engagement with multilateral institutions. Institutions, Hurrell (2010:3) writes, are "sites of power" that reflect and entrench power hierarchies and the interests of powerful states. For Pederson (2002), an active role in regional institutions can enhance the state's influence over the affairs of subordinate states, thus enabling the state to maintain the regional status quo in its favour. As Lopez-Lucia (2015) points out, however, not all regional powers may support the development of regional governance structures: most empirical studies of Brazil's regional power ambitions indicate that it has little interest in leading or participating in regional institutionalisation (Banfeira, 2006; de Lima and Hirst, 2006; Flemes and Wehner, 2012; Lopez-Lucia, 2015).

For those studying regional powers, multilateralism extends beyond the region and into international institutions. Chapter one argued that major powers dominate multilateral energy governance. Scholars such as Nel and Nolte (2010) and Flemes (2010) contend that

Western and major powers retain predominance in international institutions more generally, but suggest that regional powers that can articulate both their own and their regions' interests are becoming more important in international forums. Nel and Nolte attribute this new-found significance to a dissatisfaction on the part of developing states regarding the omission of specific regional interests from the international decision making process. Flemes (2010) similarly argues the leaders of "southern" regions will play a pivotal role in transforming the international system into a multiregional order. Ilgit and Ozkececi-Taner (2013:31) suggest that regional powers adopt a "soft-balancing" approach in international institutions that calls for coalition building and the pursuit of common interests. The attempt by Turkey to negotiate a solution to Iran's nuclear agenda in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - discussed in depth in chapter four - is conceptualised by this thesis in terms of a regional power both pursuing a regional agenda and reform of the international status quo.

However, chapter four also points to several factors - including energy security and Turkey's territorial integrity - that highlight the significance of self-interest in determining the trajectory of Turkey's position on Iran's nuclear programme. Hyde-Price (2008) states that regional powers look to shape the international system to ensure that it is favourable to their economic and security interests. Consequently, the consequences of interdependence may not always be benign. Multilateral institutions may both enhance regional integration and provide a platform for the dominant regional actor to boost their power and reassert their dominance (Nabers, 2010; Kardas, 2013). Hurrell (2010) and Malanund (2011) both emphasise the overlap between regional and international agendas and suggest that regional powers may regard multilateral leadership as a means through which they can gain recognition at a global level. In short, participation in a multilateral structure can be beneficial both for the regional power itself and/or for the region as a whole depending on the agenda of the regional power. Yet Sever and Oguz Gok (2016) also contend that the inability of institutions to constrain the role and unilateral impulses of major states may limit regional power influence at the international level. Turkey and Brazil's failure to mediate the Iran nuclear crisis in the United Nations Security Council is cited in chapter four as an example of the limited capacity of some regional powers to influence decision making at the international level even when - as in Turkey's case - it is in the state's own and regional interest. Thus, this thesis suggests that regional powers may garner

recognition of their *regional* power or influence when participating in international organisations, but may remain constrained in their capacity to affect *international* change beneficial to the region in the context of those institutions.

2.2.4 Conditions determining regional powerhood

Based on these core assumptions and the debates on the central features of regional power in IR, it is possible to outline a set of criteria for recognising regional powers. Regional powers are states that:

1. Belong to a geographically, economically, and politically defined and socially constructed region
2. Are economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region
3. Possess superior material capabilities relative to other states in the region
4. Possess ideational assets that enable them to influence regional norms and values or to express a collective agenda for the region that is acceptable to other regional states
5. Define and influence regional security
6. Articulate a self-identification as a regional power and are accepted as such by other states both within and external to the region
7. Influence the geopolitical delineation of the region in a way that also reflects the national interest and maintains the regional hierarchy in favour of the regional power
8. Exert influence via regional and international governance structures in both its own and regional interest
9. Have the requisite organisational, political, and ideological capacity to mobilise resources and project power (Neumann, 1992; Schrim, 2009; Destradi, 2010; Flemes and Nolte, 2010; Nolte, 2010)

It should also be noted that although most authors develop theoretical frameworks with reference to states that are assumed to be regional powers, these criteria are equally applicable to states that aspire to become regional powers. Based on the literature, a key argument of this chapter is that regional power is not only dependent on the capacity and ambitions or intentions of the state, but also on the *willingness* of the state to act in a manner congruent with regional powerhood. In short, the state must not only actively

position itself or aim to be a regional power and have the material and ideational capacity to carry out its agenda. It must also possess the willingness to utilise those capabilities to fulfil its ambitions.

However, it would be erroneous to assume that all current or aspiring regional powers have identical ambitions or regional powerhood strategies. Regions are heterogeneous: they may, for example, consist of varying numbers of states and regional powers and experience different degrees of regionalisation or interference from states external to region. Thus the role, strategy, and legitimacy of the regional power may vary significantly. The applicability of the criteria outlined above is dependent on the individual regional power, the regional system, and specific policies and issues. Consequently, Destradi (2010) introduces three forms of regional power to account for variances in the strategies and degrees of legitimacy of specific regional powers: imperial regional powers, hegemonic regional powers, and regional leaders.

The use of these models is not without its limitations. Firstly, each typology is conceptualised based on existing debates on imperialism, hegemony, and leadership in the global context in the IR literature. Traditional understandings do not account for the specially *regional* context of power relations and, in particular, of the impact external actors like great global powers and multilateral institutions may have on determining the form of regional power the state adapts or pursues. Alliances with other major powers or a strong history of cooperation with other regions may compliment and facilitate the state's capacity to act as regional hegemon rather than a leader (as this thesis argues is the case for the AKP). Similarly, enmity between a state and external great power (Iran and the US in this thesis) can constrain the capacity of the state to become a regional hegemon. This thesis consequently takes care to consider the ways in which external influences affect the form of regional power adopted or pursued by Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Indeed, one of the thesis' central conclusions focuses on the necessity of understanding the interplay between the international and regional systems in assessing the relationship between energy and regional power.

Secondly, the extent of overlap between the three typologies renders it more challenging to ascribe a particular form of power to individual states. This same overlap hinders the categorisation of specific strategies within specific typologies. While foreign policy

analysis may be more useful in understanding the strategies of particular regional powers in other studies, this thesis' primary focus is energy: something that can be considered an element of foreign policy, but which is also deeply intertwined with other policy areas like development and defence. Foreign policy analysis is therefore somewhat limited in understanding the role energy, specifically, plays in regional power.

This thesis addresses typological overlaps in two ways. Firstly, it pinpoints definitive factors that distinguish between different forms of regional power (military force in the case of regional imperialism, for example). These differentiating factors are key to categorising states within the typologies. Secondly, it assumes that the typologies are not fixed. States may shift between typologies depending on specific geopolitical and temporal contexts. Thus, a state may fluctuate between regional hegemony and regional leadership. Finally, it should be pointed out at this point these models are ideal types: states are unlikely to adhere fully to specific criteria at all types. Nonetheless, the typologies are an appropriate analytical tool for categorising the strategies and agendas of regional powers and are a useful construct for assessing the balance of power and relative positions of competing regional powers within the regional hierarchy. The next section of this chapter will discuss each of these models in turn.

2.3 Forms of regional power: three typologies

2.3.1 Regional imperialism

Of the three forms Destradi (2010) suggests regional powers may adopt, that of empire is most limited in terms of applicability to this thesis. Nonetheless, a brief discussion on the relationship between empire and regional powers is warranted given the debates in chapter five on Russia's proclivity towards the use of military force against regional subordinates.

It is important to note from the offset the inherent overlaps between imperial and hegemonic forms of regional powers. The predominant objective of imperial strategy is the unilateral pursuit of the national interest, which does not in itself differentiate imperial regional powers from other forms of regional powers. Similarly, the tendency towards exceptionalism and coercive foreign policy strategies (Destradi, 2010) are not unique to imperial regional powers strategies: they also feature in debates on hegemonic regional

powers later. Rather, the distinguishing feature of imperial power strategies is the role played by the use or threat of military force to ensure compliance among subordinate states (Galtung, 1971; Doyle, 1986; Rapkin, 2005).

The imperial regional power described by Destradi has little legitimacy among other states in the region. The state derives a sense of exceptionalism from its dominance in terms of material capabilities over its neighbours, systematically rejecting rules and values that contravene its own and striving to impose its own agenda onto other states (Destradi, 2010). The perception of exceptionalism also encourages the state to act unilaterally, and often leads to the rejection of system rules or order that contravene the state's own interest. On the international level, Rapkin (2005:399) refers to the US' failure to participate in the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a form of unilateralism that "severed" the state from the provision of public goods that is associated with hegemonic forms of power. The illegitimacy of the imperial power, Destradi (2010) suggests, begets fear and resentment among subordinate states. This may lead to either resistance by subordinates or perpetual regional instability.

The contentious nature of "empire" in contemporary IR literature casts some doubt on the usefulness of the term in terms of conceptualising regional powers. Destradi (2010) asserts that the definition of "empire" has evolved beyond the occupation or subjugation of a sovereign peripheral state by a dominant central state through coercive military, political, and economic means. Rather, she advocates for "informal empires" (Destradi, 2010:910) based on "relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies" (Doyle, 1986:19). In many regards, Destradi's characterisation of imperial regional powers is closely aligned to Prys' concept of the "regional dominator": a form of regional power that "commands and extracts involuntary tributes from subordinate states under a constant threat of force" (Prys, 2010:489). Yet in a broad discussion on the notion of empire, Prys and Robel (2011:251) are dismissive of the reconceptualization of "empire". They suggest that extracting the necessity of territorial conquest from definitions of empire limits the concept to the extent that it becomes commensurate with hegemony. In that regard, Prys and Robel warn against confusing *empire* (as an existing state) with a foreign policy strategy that aims at *establishing* empire.

This final point is of significance to this thesis. Pederson (2002) associates regional imperial strategies with great powers - whether current like the US, or former great powers like the UK. Indeed, Pyrs and Robel's discussion on empire is founded on the debate that ignited in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq,[18] while Destradi's own work cites only the US in debating the nature of contemporary empire. The prominence afforded to material - and particularly military - capacity casts doubt on the applicability of "empire" model to advanced developing states given the constraints on military and economic capabilities in comparison with major powers. This thesis accepts that an advanced developing state may adopt an imperial regional strategy if it possesses sufficiently superior material resources to its neighbours, but contends that regional multipolarity and the variances in and fluctuations of regional powerhood discussed earlier in this chapter mean that imperial strategies are unlikely to be wholly successful. At the same time, this thesis is wary of confusing empire with hegemony. It should be reiterated that the use or threat of military force is the primary feature that differentiates imperial regional power strategies from hegemonic or leadership campaigns. Consequently, while the utilisation of the "energy weapon" discussed in chapter one could be framed as a policy to coerce subordinate states that are reliant on a regional power for essential resources, it cannot be considered an imperial regional power strategy unless accompanied by the threat or utilisation of military force. Russia's campaigns in South Ossetia and Crimea - discussed in chapter five- are, perhaps, the most plausible example of the implementation of an imperial regional powers strategy by an advanced developing state in the period under consideration. Considering the limitations both on the applicability of imperial strategies and on the material capabilities of advanced developing states relative to others in their region, it is necessary to consider alternative forms of regional powerhood.

2.3.2 Regional hegemony

Scholarly research on hegemony embraces a broad range of ideologies, strategies, and agendas whose analytical, empirical, and normative content is highly contested (Prys and Robel, 2011). The extent of this work renders a holistic examination of the various debates and perspectives on hegemony beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, this section offers a

[18] They focus primarily on the work of scholars like Cox (2003), Ikenberry (2004), and Neumann (2004), each of whom examines the notion of a US "empire"

brief discussion of salient themes in debates on hegemony in the context of regional powers. While Destradi (2010) proposes three forms of hegemony - hard, intermediate, and soft - in her work on regional power typologies, this thesis focuses on the two forms that dominate IR literature on hegemony: benevolent hegemony and coercive hegemony.

Three caveats need to be applied to this discussion on hegemonic regional powers. Firstly, as Prys (2010) notes, the majority of IR literature on hegemony pertains to that at the international level and does not account for external factors - such as international institutions or extra-regional states - that may exert influence or proffer constraints or opportunities for specifically regional hegemonies. These factors therefore need to be taken into consideration when assessing individual regional hegemons. Secondly, the extent to which a hegemon can be considered either coercive or benevolent is dependent on both context and the perspective of individual states: as Prys and Robel (2011:265) note, hegemony may appear "a blessing to some and a curse to others". In chapter five, for example, Russia's regional hegemony will be framed in coercive terms in relation to its hegemonic policies towards Georgia and benevolent in terms of its Armenian and Azerbaijani strategies. Thirdly, both forms of hegemony are ideal types: it is possible that states may conform more strongly to either coercive or benevolent hegemony, or oscillate between the two. This thesis will argue that Turkey pursued benevolent hegemony in the Caspian, but occasionally implemented coercive strategies.

Unlike imperial regional powers, hegemonic regional powers have no singular defining characteristic (Destradi, 2010; Flemes and Nolte, 2010). The hegemonic regional power may pursue a range of policy options from the provision of material incentives through the propagation of norms to the exertion of pressure via the imposition of sanctions. Nonetheless, there are several hegemonic characteristics on which there is a broad consensus in IR and which are present to varying degrees in both coercive and benevolent hegemony.[19] Firstly, the state must be dominant in terms of material resources relative to other regional states, and be willing and capable of employing material and ideational resources to maintain its position in the regional hierarchy. The utilisation of material resources takes the form of the provision of public goods within the hegemon's system:

[19] See Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1981; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Destradi, 2010; Prys, 2010

traditional understandings of hegemony focus on the provision of security, stability, and open trading systems that facilitate both the interests of the state and regional integration. Ideationally, the promotion of common norms, values, and goals can contribute to hegemonic power. Secondly, hegemonic powers are inherently self interested: the notion of the common regional good may be prominent in the state's rhetoric, but the state's agenda is guided to a greater extent by its own interests than by those of the region. This is the predominant feature distinguishing hegemony from leadership, and will be discussed in greater detail later in this section. Third, their position in the regional system is acknowledged and acceptance in a way that endows the state with some form of legitimacy: Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:95) suggest that "some degree" of consensus is necessary to ensure hegemony. The extent to which the hegemon adheres to each of these features, and the way particular power resources are employed, determines whether the state can be considered a coercive or benevolent hegemon.

Power is understood and exercised primarily via material means in coercive hegemonies, with the role of the hegemon determined by a significant asymmetry between the sum of the material resources of the power and those of its subordinates (Pederson, 2002; Prys and Robel, 2011). At its most extreme, the coercive hegemon dominates the region through coercion and the exploitation of regional subordinates (Cox, 1996). Coercion is more subtle than in imperial powers, with scholars suggesting that economic sanctions, the suspension of foreign aid or military cooperation, restrictions on trade, or the suspension of diplomatic cooperation can be employed to ensure the hegemon's regional dominance (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Lake, 1993). A central argument of this thesis is that energy can be added to these lists: as chapter one argued, producer states may suspend energy supplies or manipulate prices in order to generate political concessions from consumer states. Energy becomes a tool through which regional powers can develop, maintain, and assert their status among other regional states. Chapters four and five will argue that both Turkey and Russia have utilised such as strategy against transit or consumer states in the wider Caspian region.

The coercive nature of the hegemon and its focus on material power restricts its legitimacy among subordinate states: weaker states comply not because they accept the hegemon's position or values, but because they do not have the capacity to counter it. In some cases,

the hegemon may be sufficiently dominant and the dependence on the public goods provided by the hegemon - such as Turkey's dependence on Russian energy - sufficiently great that it restricts the capacity of subordinates or weaker regional powers to challenge the hegemon. In others, this lack of legitimacy, coupled with "quasi-automatic balancing behaviour of non-hegemonic states" (Prys and Robel, 2011:261) contributes to instability within the system and renders the hegemon's position unstable. The coercive hegemon's position is therefore volatile. In order to maintain pre-eminence within the system when challenged by subordinate states, the hegemon may either resort to force - thus adapting an imperial power strategy - or inject some form of legitimacy into its status through the provision of public goods or the propagation of collective ideas and interests.

Kindleberger (1973) proposes that system stability is determined by the ability of a hegemon with a preponderance of power to develop and enforce rules. This willingness of the hegemon to enforce rules conducive to stability stems from the hegemon's "sense of responsibility" towards its system (Prys and Robel, 2011:260): the perceived necessity for the hegemon to contribute to the system for the benefit of all regional actors. Even if the interests of the regional power and its subordinates are not fully compatible, the regional power's agenda is presented as part of a common good in order to generate acquiescence among subordinate states for the benefit of the regional power. A rhetorical commitment to the common regional good is evident in the strategies of both coercive and benevolent regional hegemons, but the discrepancy between rhetoric and policy that contributes to the common good is greater in coercive hegemons (Destradi, 2010) - the coercive hegemon continues to act unilaterally to ensure its position in the regional hierarchy despite framing initiatives as mutually beneficial for all regional states. The coercive hegemony may also oblige subordinates to contribute resources to projects it frames as part of the common good (membership fees for regional security organisations, for example) or risk being excluded from those projects (Gilpin, 1981).

When the hegemon focuses on the collective good and allows the subordinate states to take advantage of stability (Kindleberger, 1973) it may be considered benevolent. Rewards or incentives like institutional power sharing or preferential trade deals in return for compliance with the hegemon's agenda are central to power projection by benevolent hegemons (Pederson, 2002). Stability is maintained as the hegemon utilises its resources to

provide public goods within a system. As with coercive hegemons, the benevolent hegemon's primary goal is its own self-interest: even when providing public goods that it frames in terms of the regional interest, the hegemon's primary goal is to establish a stable environment for itself. As Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:57) note, the processes initiated by the hegemonic regional power are used to manipulate behaviour and "alter normative orientation and practices….without sanctions, inducements, or manipulation". In contrast to the coercive hegemon, however, there is a more limited discrepancy between the rhetoric of and polices implemented by the benevolent hegemon in terms of their contribution to the common good: initiatives may benefit the hegemon, but they also contribute to the region.

Benevolent hegemons places greater emphasis on utilising ideational power to alter the norms and values of other states in the regional system than do their coercive counterparts. Hegemony is established through socialisation, discursive, and cooperative practises, and the hegemon is often seen as an integrative power (Pederson, 2002; Hurrell, 2007; Prys and Robel, 2011). Wiener (1995) suggests these processes occur at two levels. The first, at the structural level, involves the creation of normative or cooperative organisations (such as cultural organisations, free trade areas, or joint working groups). Turkey's role in founding BLACKSEAFOR (a naval organisation involving Black sea states) and TURKSOY - a multilateral institution that promotes cooperation on the arts and culture in Turkic states - are examples of such initiatives. The second is behavioural leadership at the level of the state, where common values - like democratisation - are promoted in order for the hegemon to gain acceptance (Wiener, 1995). In both cases, the hegemonic state frames the initiatives or behaviour in terms of the common good. Both processes require the investment of resources by the hegemon. Power sharing in multilateral institutions may constrain the capacity of the hegemon to exert power, while the diplomatic and economic cooperation generate material costs for the state. Material losses accrued may be balanced by the consensual followership gained through these processes that legitimises the benevolent hegemon to a greater extent that coercive hegemons, solidifying and stabilising their position in the regional hierarchy. While regional subordinates may not be wholly supportive of the position of the hegemony, cost-benefit analyses that consider the contribution of the hegemon to the regional system limit non-compliance with the hegemon's agenda (Destradi, 2010).

The balance between coercion and benevolence in hegemonic strategies is not merely of concern for IR scholars but equally, according to Prys and Robels (2011), presents a difficulty for hegemonic states in maintaining their role: the greater the coercion, the closer the state aligns to imperial understandings of power; the more benevolent the state, the more it adheres to regional leadership. The *means* employed to obtain hegemony distinguish it from empire: the hegemon may employ coercive measures, but does not use military power. There is greater contestation in the literature regarding the overlap between hegemonic and leadership forms of power. Both forms of hegemony indicate that some form of leadership is essential to stable hegemony. Wiener (1995:237) suggests that hegemonic leadership involves a form of leadership that structures a system out of anarchy. The regional security systems discussed earlier in this chapter are an example of such a structure: Turkey's desire to lead to the energy-geopolitical delineation of Caspian - which will be discussed at length in chapter three - is another. This should not imply, however, that hegemony and leadership are synonymous. Leadership may be an element of hegemony, but leadership-style regional powers are not necessarily hegemons. Destradi argues that the "goals" of the regional power are the key feature distinguishing regional hegemony and regional leadership; that the hegemon "aims to realise its own self-interested goals by presenting them as common with those of subordinate states" leader (2010:921). The regional leader, in contrast, "guides…a group of states in order to realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objective" (Destradi, 2010:921). In other words, the extent of congruency between self-representation as an actor for the common (regional) good and the motivations of the actor are central to discerning between hegemonic and leadership styles of regional power. The next section will explore leadership in more detail.

2.3.3 Regional leadership

Similarly to conceptualisations of hegemony and empire, "leadership" is a contested term in IR. Several conceptualisations of leadership are useful for demarcating a state as a regional leader. While Narliker (2013:568) defines leadership as "the willingness to contribute to the provision of ... public goods", Cooper et al (1991:398) contend that leadership denotes the embodiment of some form of "greater good" that may or may not be contingent on the provision of public goods. Young (1991), in an in-depth analysis of

leadership in international institutions, proposes three forms of leadership: structural leadership (the application of power derived from material resources to obtain bargaining leverage in specific matters), intellectual leadership ("the power of ideas to shape the intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining" (1991:300)) and entrepreneurial leadership (the capacity of a state to set the agenda by overcoming stalemates or acting as a mediator and facilitator for deliberations). The leader therefore places a strong emphasis on ideational power to help a group "create and achieve shared goals" (Nye, 2008:5). Applying these definitions of leadership to regional power theory, leadership becomes a means through which a state utilises its ideational or material resources to influence regional norms, debates, and outcomes, or to represent the collective agenda of the region.

From this definition, three factors can be discerned that distinguish leadership from other forms of regional powerhood. The first concerns the goal of the state and, in particular, the role played by Cooper et al's "greater good" in motivating the state's actions. In contrast to hegemons, who mask self-interested goals and strategies with rhetoric concerning a collective need or agenda, leaders guide states "to realise or facilitate the rise of their common objectives" (Destradi, 2010:921). Destradi considers it "unimaginable" for states to act against either their self-interest or for wholly altruistic reasons (2010:925). Spektor (2010), for example, attributes Brazil's invocation of ideational leadership to a desire to promote the national economy and manage regional disagreement in order to shape regional politics and accumulate power. Therefore, it can be argued that the balance between self-interest and the common good - or the prominence afforded to one over the other - is crucial to distinguishing leadership from benevolent hegemony.

The pre-eminence afforded to ideational power is a second variable through which the two can be differentiated. Flemes and Nolte (2010) emphasise the role of ideational power in boosting the regional power's credibility. Thus, Destradi (2010) envisages the ideal leadership strategy of a regional power as the pursuit of common goals through a cooperative socialisation process. The emphasis on ideational power doesn't necessarily preclude a preponderance of material resources in the leader state. Rather, it indicates that the state has sufficient legitimacy to render the employment of material power - especially in a manner congruent with coercion and domination - unnecessary (Cooper et al, 1991).

A focus on joint gains and the provision of services to subordinates without exception of payment or reciprocity are thus of central importance to leadership (Young, 1991; Destradi, 2010). Flemes and Lemke (2010) cite South Africa and Brazil as states that have accrued regional power credentials through the propagation of ideational leadership; both, the authors argue, have exerted regional leadership by proposing ideas, guiding discussions, and pushing collective responses on issues like democracy, sustainable economic growth, and regional solutions to regional problems. In short, the promotion of common narratives enabled the states to solidify claims to regional leadership and enhance their candidacy for regional powerhood.

In contrast to imperialism or coercive hegemony, where followership may be founded on submission or acquiescence acquired through dominance and coercion, followership in leadership models is based on the extent to which followers accept the leader as legitimately warrantying support for its actions or values and trust the leader to act on their behalf (Cooper et al, 1991). In other words, the appearance of followership does not necessarily compute to leadership unless following states accept the propagation of a common interest or goal. Nabers (2010) refers to this strategy as the projection of power in its "unobservable form".

This legitimacy is the third factor that differentiates regional leaders from other regional power typologies. While the previous section indicated that followership was, to varying degrees, important to regional hegemons, there is a consensus in debates on leadership in IR as to the essentiality of followership for regional leaders (Destradi, 2010). Schrim (2012) argues that regional powers must define their regional role by articulating a claim for leadership, but that legitimisation of leadership is predicated on the incorporation of potential followers' interests and beliefs into the state's agenda. Consequently, cooperation is considered key to the role and agenda of regional powers. Chapter three highlights the AKP rhetoric that framed Turkey's desire to lead regional pipeline projects in terms of the advantages it had for regional integration and stability as an example of this.

2.4 Regional powers and energy

The discussion thus far in this chapter has focused primarily on the central themes in regional powers debates. It has highlighted how both developed and advanced developing

states may be considered regional powers based on their capacity relative to others in specific regional systems, and pointed out that the majority of scholarly research focuses on advanced developing states. Yet the analytical focus of empirical studies of regional powers focuses primarily on the BRICS at the expense of other potential regional powers with lesser material and ideational capabilities. Hence, considerations of the material resources of regional powers tends to emphasise economic - and in the case of imperial regional powers, military - capacity. Moreover, the discussion within the literature regarding the provision of public goods by the regional power also focuses primarily on monetary goods (in the form of free trade arrangements) and security initiatives. This thesis contends that a more expansive discussion that goes beyond the economic/military sphere is necessary in order to understand the motivations and role of regional powers in the global South. Chapter one argued that energy is a strategic resource and a material necessity for advanced developing states, yet it is rarely incorporated into debates on regional powerhood or regional power strategy. While this omission is largely congruent with the limitations in IR literature on energy and advanced developing states highlighted in chapter one, it is nonetheless puzzling considering the regionally focused, natural-gas driven energy policies of advanced developing states. This thesis therefore proposes an examination of the ways in which energy features in the regional power strategies of advanced emerging states. By doing so, it intends to both address the gap in the IR literature pertaining to energy in advanced developing states and to contribute to understanding the relationship between energy and regional powerhood for those states. This section will examine the relationship between regional powers and energy. It will explore how particular energy policies relate to the regional power typologies outlined above, and will consider how the position of the state in the energy chain (whether it is a producer, consumer, or transit state) affects its capacity to incorporate energy into a regional power strategy. The final part of the chapter considers the application of the characteristics of regional powerhood outlined in section 2.2.4 to Turkey, before the remainder of the thesis brings these three elements – Turkey, energy, and regional power – together.

Harris' 2005 examination of China notwithstanding, there are no comprehensive studies into the relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states. Similarly, despite the preponderance of geopolitical examinations of energy and the

growth of regionalised energy trade in the literature on energy, regional powers frameworks are not utilised to explain the energy decisions of states. Nevertheless, this thesis considers regional power literature to be particularly useful for understanding the uses and role of energy for rising powers in geographically delineated regions. Taking into consideration the conditions determining regional powerhood and the strategies adopted by states to consolidate regional power status, in conjunction with the increasing focus on regional patterns of energy trade in the energy literature, a clear case can be made for the integration of regional powers theory into a framework for understanding the relationship between energy and advanced developing states.

Energy can be a means to an end for those states seeking to achieve or consolidate regional power. Chapter one characterised energy as a strategic good through which a state could amass wealth and power and exert influence in political, economic, and security systems. Cuita (2010) points out that energy resources can alter the balance of capabilities between states and, therefore, affect the distribution of power. In the regional powers context, producer states can utilise energy resources to establish dominance in a region and compete with non-energy rich actors. Large domestic energy reserves may endow states with the means to exert political influence over smaller, importing states within the region.
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Considering the way in which energy is used by the producer in its relations with regional subordinates (and, indeed, with other regional powers) is useful in determining which regional power typology the state most closely adheres to. Energy producing states can use energy as a means to generate and maintain regional hegemony. Asymmetrical interdependence that results from overdependence on by a consumer state on a producer can facilitate the hegemonic regional agenda of the producer by endowing it with leverage over the consumer. The form that hegemony takes depends on the agenda of the regional power. If leverage is used to further the regional power's integration into regional economic and energy systems, or to influence the consumer to partake in new bilateral security or political ventures that benefit the producer, then it may be considered a form of *benevolent hegemony*. The application of the "energy weapon" described in chapter one - in the form of threats to suspend energy trade or increase prices - can be considered a coercive hegemonic strategy. . In more extreme cases, the literature on energy wars is

congruent with an imperial regional powers strategy: there is a focus in both on states seeking to enhance material capabilities through force or intervention, acting unilaterally and in the national interest.

Moreover, energy can be considered a tool for obtaining other forms of resources that can be deployed to fulfil regional power agendas. The previous chapter indicated that energy is a commodity and, as such, generates revenue for energy producers. While the economic benefits of energy production can in themself be considered a material asset within the regional powers framework, energy income can also be used to purchase other strategic assets - including military assets (Zhang, 2011, 2012) – that contribute to the accumulation of regional power. For producer states, then, energy is an asset that facilitates the developing of the necessary capacity to carry out assertive hegemonic or imperial strategies. At the same time, the review of energy literature highlighted how some major energy producers depended disproportionately on energy income to fund state activity. It pointed out that this also makes those states more vulnerable to energy security risks. If the regional power depends on energy income to fund assets that are essential to its regional states, then price shocks or the suspension of trade due to instability can have an impact on the regional power's resources. This may curtail the capacity of the state to carry out a hegemonic strategy, diluting its regional power or forcing it instead to adopt a more benevolent regional strategy. Farzanegan (2011), for example, determined that Iran's use of oil income to fund its military led to reduced military spending during price shocks.

At the same time, it should be recalled that the discussion on types of regional powers earlier in this chapter suggested that a combination of material resources (energy, in this case) and ideational power were necessary to generate followership and legitimise the role of a regional power within the system. Furtig and Gratius (2010:186) argue, for example, that while Venezuela under Hugo Chavez used its considerable oil reserves to generate some regional influence through policies like the provision of oil subsidies for consumer states, Chavez's revisionist ideological vision failed to attract support from "medium-sized" actors in South America and restricted the state's regional role. Energy resources must, therefore, be applied in conjunction with a more comprehensive regional strategy in order to successfully contribute to the state's regional power.

The adoption of energy as a tool to advance regional power ambitions is not only the remit of producer states. Should they possess sufficient other resources (particularly in economic terms), importing states can develop energy strategies that contribute to regional leadership or hegemony Turkey, for example, aspires to become a regional hub for the transit of gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe (Bilgin, 2010; Eissler, 2012). Chapter one referred to three distinct categories of energy states: producers, consumers, and transit states. As a transit state, Turkey has variously been referred to as an energy "corridor", "bridge", or "crossroads" (Han, 2011:614). Each of these concepts emphasise the transition of energy through a specific territory. The state may receive transit fees or tariffs from consumer and producer countries, and the consumer may be affected by any suspension of supplies due to a political disagreement between the transit state and producer, but its ability to benefit from or influence energy trade is limited (Roberts, 2010; Han, 2011). Becoming an energy transit state therefore has limited advantages in terms of advancing a regional powers agenda: it engenders neither leadership nor hegemony, and ensures the balance of power remains with the producer state.

The hub concept is significantly broader. It conflates the position of the transit state within the regional or international energy system with its geopolitical and geo-economical ambition. Roberts (2010:42) defines an energy hub as "a trading hub; an arena in which, ideally, multiple suppliers meet multiple customers in an open, transparent marketplace". Turkish energy analyst Kivanc Zaimler (in Roberts, 2010:42) expands on this, claiming that a hub offers consumers and producers a balance between "financial trading on one hand and physical trading on the other". Bilgin (2010) argues the "hub" concept implies not only an ability to influence transit terms (including tariffs), but also re-exportation conditions. It is centre not just for the physical transportation of energy, but an energy trading centre where "multiple (energy) suppliers meet multiple customers in an open, transparent marketplace" (Roberts, 2010:43). The hub must also have geographical proximity to both resources and a resource market, sufficient infrastructure to store energy, and must be capable of maintaining political relations with both parties to ensure the continued sale and purchase of supplies. The regional integration and diplomacy that are prerequisites to regional powerhood are also, therefore central to the development of an energy hub. In contrast to transit states, hub countries have additional control over energy infrastructure and prices that can be utilised as a foreign policy tool after the infrastructure

is built (Bilgin, 2010). Hubs are, therefore, closely tied to regional foreign policy and geopolitical agendas: regional cooperation is necessary to both develop and maintain the hub, while the extent of control exercised by the hub state over infrastructural security, re-export routes, price setting, and trading endows it with strategic advantages over other countries in the energy system. Each of these factors augments the regional power of the hub state. None of the literature suggests that hub states must have domestic energy reserves. The development of a Turkish energy hub would increase Ankara's status in the regional energy system, further integrate it – and therefore inflate its legitimacy – in the region, and would endow it with increased financial resources through transit and trading fees. Consequently, this thesis argues that energy hubs can be a means through which energy poor states utilise energy as a strategic asset and through which they may consolidate regional hegemony.

At the same time, energy's essentialness to economic and military systems and as a regional power tool can place constraints on consumer states that are - or seek to become - regional powers. Flemes and Wehner (2012) suggest that dependence on a regional power for key material resources can shape the responses of subordinate states to the power's regional strategies. Consequently, dependence by one regional power on another to fulfil essential energy needs can limit the independence of the former in implementing regional power strategies. Chapter five will argue that Turkey's capacity to enact a hegemonic regional strategy was constrained by its dependence on Russia resources: it restricted Turkey's ability to respond to Russian regional aggressions in a manner congruent with regional hegemony. It can similarly be argued that dependence by regional powers on resources in subordinate states can limit the ability of the former to enact a more coercive hegemonic or imperial strategy towards subordinate states because of the potential implications for the security and continuity of energy supplies. In addition, energy producing advanced developing states may depend on cooperation with external actors to develop or finance the development of reserves. That in turn may restrict its capacity to implement certain policies.

Chapter one argued that regional stability is integral to energy security. Ensuring secure relations between various actors in the supply chain is essential to security of supply, and, as Buzan and Waever (2003) suggest, cooperation between all actors is necessary to ensure

regional security. In this regard, the argument that regional powers should define and influence regional security is tied to the advanced developing state's own energy security strategies: to maximise domestic energy security and guarantee security of supply, the state must ensure regional stability. Taking into account the emphasis on natural gas by advanced developing states and the high risks associated with pipeline transit within specific geographic regions, this thesis contends that facilitating and shaping regional security is pivotal to the successful implementation of those states' energy agendas. Cooperative energy security initiatives- such as those between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey in relation to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline - also serve to integrate states into the region and enable them to contribute to defining and influencing regional security. Consequently, energy security can also be framed as a common goal by the regional power in order to enhance its regional leadership, further progress regional integration, and engender goodwill from other regional states that may be conducive to regional hegemony.

Finally, acknowledging the multipolar nature of most regions and the patterns of cooperation and contestation that emerge as states compete for regional power status is useful for understanding the energy agendas of and relations between states in specific geographic regions. The increasingly fraught competition highlighted in chapter one between China, Malaysia, and Japan in the South China Sea for that region's resources can be analysed in terms of both regional power and energy dynamics. In the Caspian, an established regional power – Russia – competes with aspiring regional powers – Turkey and Iran for access to the region's energy resources. For Russia and Iran, the legal status of the Caspian Sea is central to establishing control over its hydrocarbon resources. Russia and Turkey have both competed for access to Azerbaijan's substantial oil and gas resources, while Turkey and Iran have developed something of a mutual dependency in terms of energy trade. The empirical chapters will show how all three have significant resources in comparison to their neighbours, have articulated desires to play significant roles in the region, and have attempted to influence the region in a way that reflects their national interest. Considering that the remainder of this thesis will focus on the relationship of energy and regional powers for Turkey, the final section of this chapter will outline the argument for Turkey as a regional power.

2.5 Turkey and regional power

By virtue of its economic growth in the 21st century, regional and international activism, and participation in organisations such as the Group of 20 (G20) and MIKTA – the group composed of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia - Turkey's position as a rising economic power was repeatedly asserted during the first three AKP administrations. The introduction to this thesis highlighted how IR scholars recognise Turkey's regional credentials. There has also been an increasing tendency within the literature to refer to Turkey under the AKP as a "regional power" to contextualise Turkey's foreign policy strategy. Walker (2007), Hill and Taspinar (2006) and Larrabee (2007) consider Turkey to be either a regional power or emerging regional power on account of specific foreign policy strategies. In each of these analyses, the term regional power was used without conceptual or analytical rigour. Turkey was considered a regional power, but a regional powers framework was not utilised to explain Turkey's motivations, actions, or relative standing in the regional and international systems. There was little debate on whether or not Turkey was, indeed, a regional power, or how it was differentiated from other actors in the system that may or may not be considered regional powers. In other words, there was limited conceptual or systemic debate concerning Turkey's regional power credentials.

There are, however, some exceptions that do analyse Turkey's regional power through a regional powers framework. Kardas (2007) determines that Turkey can be considered a regional power in multiple regions - including the Middle East and the Caucasus - by virtue of its activism in regional and international affairs. Bank and Karadag (2012, 2013) argue that the AKP's domestic consolidation in the mid-2000s facilitated regional activism that contributed to Turkey becoming a regional power in the Middle East in the pre-Arab Spring era. Onis (2014) applies a regional power framework based on Fleme's (2007) definition of the concept in claiming that Turkey has been relatively ineffective as a regional power in the Middle East since the onset of the Arab spring. Despite the prominence affixed to energy in Turkish policy under the AKP (something that will be discussed in more detail in chapter three), little or no space is attributed to understanding energy in Turkey through a regional powers framework.

This thesis argues that the literature's focus on Turkey as a regional power in the Middle East demonstrates inconsistencies with the conceptual framework for regional powerhood outlined earlier in this chapter. Turkey's engagement with the Middle East under the AKP primarily focused on engagement with the Levant; its policies towards the southern Middle East (particularly the Arabian Peninsula) were comparatively limited. The continued influence by major and great external powers in the region, the role of those states in affecting the regional balance of power (particularly militarily), and the sheer number of potential regional powers in the region itself (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and prior to the Arab Spring, Egypt and Syria) limited Turkeys relative power and capacity to act in the region. The enmity that existed among Arabian states towards Turkey in the pre-AKP years[20] (Kirisci, 2006; Tocci, 2013) also limited the extent to which Turkey could be conceivably framed and accepted as a regional power. Rather, this thesis argues that the wider Caspian region - extending from the Caucasus through the western Central Asian states and incorporating Iran and Russia – is the region in which an examination of Turkey's regional power credentials is most pertinent based on both the degree to which Turkey is integrated in the region and the extent of its regional engagement with other regional actors between 2002 and 2014. The following paragraphs will apply the characteristics of regional powerhood outlined in section 2.2.6 of this chapter to Turkey under the AKP and position Turkey as a regional power in the wider Caspian region.

1. *Regional powers are states that belong to a geographically, economically, and politically defined and socially constructed region*

The delineation of a wider Caspian region (see figure 2 below) in which Turkey was affiliated was justified in this thesis' introduction. The geographic proximity of the states of the region, as well as the extent to which they were integrated and historically, culturally, and politically linked, was highlighted. The following points in this section will further expand on regional interdependencies and illustrate the extent to which Turkey is economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region.

[20] This enmity stemmed from Turkey's alliance with the West, support for Israel, historical Ottoman occupation of Arab states, and a national security outlook controlled by that viewed Turkey's Arab neighbours as a source of instability (Larrabee, 2007; Akcakoca, 2009; Altumsik, 2009)

Figure 2: The wider Caspian region

2. *Regional powers are economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region*:

Turkey shares "historic, linguistic, and religious ties with a wide range of countries along the ancient Silk Road"[21] (Davutoglu, 2013). Like Turkey, both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are ethnically and linguistically Turkic. Islam is the predominant religion in each of Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (Aydin, 2004). The Ottoman Empire's conquests of the Caspian states and competition with Russia and Iran for territory and power during the imperial era contribute to Turkey's shared history within the region

[21] The Silk Road was a network of trading routes connecting Asia to Europe; the primary land route passed through Central Asia and Iran before transiting Turkey

(Fuller, 2008; Fisher Oner, 2009). Bilgin and Bilgic (2011) theorise the extent of historical ties between Turkey and the region encouraged the AKP to purse relations with the former Soviet Union states of the Caucasus and Central Asia "to the highest level" from the early 2000s.

In contrast to their predecessors' characterisation of Turkey's neighbours as a source of chaos and instability (Aras and Fidan, 2009:197), the AKP viewed its neighbourhood as an area of opportunity (Guny and Mandaci, 2013). That Erdogan's first trip abroad after the AKP's 2002 general election victory was to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (Batuman, 2017) is indicative that the AKP sought to engage in the region from early in its first term. Politically, the AKP sought and achieved integration in the Caspian through two mechanisms: participation in and leadership of regional institutions (discussed in more detail below) and bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Thus, strategic partnerships with states like Azerbaijan (2011) and Russia (2011) and Iran (2014) and multilateral partnerships such as that between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (MFA, 2014a, 2014b) were pivotal in entrenching Turkey within its region. Turkey also engaged with Armenia in an attempt to develop diplomatic relations with that state (Larrabee, 2010).

Integration into the region was primarily established through economic policies (Kirisci, 2006, 2009; Kutlay, 2011; Onis and Kutlay, 2013). These will be discussed in greater detail in the empirical chapters, but it is important to note at this stage that the extensive bilateral trade deals pursued by the AKP were instrumental in facilitating Turkey's regional integration. In addition, the introduction of more liberal visa policies (Kirisci, 2006) that facilitated business, trade and tourism further integrated Turkey economically and socially into the region. Integration was also essential for creating the interdependencies that Davutoglu believed would resolve conflicts, mitigate regional tensions, and consequently contribute to regional "order" (Kirisci, 2011:42). Each of these integrative measures in the cultural, economic, and diplomatic spheres contained elements of ideational and material power projection by Turkey, and are congruent regional power.

Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that the provision of public goods was essential for regional power strategies. Turkey provided developmental funds to the region via the Turkish International Cooperation and Development agency (TIKA): Aras and Fidan (2009) note that in 2007, TIKA contributed $420 million to civil society, education, health,

and economic programmes in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Of more relevance for this thesis is the emphasis on the facilitation of regional infrastructural initiatives – and particularly regional energy and transport projects like the fourth (energy) corridor and the middle (transport) corridor (Erdogan, 2007; MFA, 2018b) – as a means to integrate Turkey into the Caspian region. Reflecting the debate on the integrative nature of pipelines in chapter one, this thesis argues that these initiatives enabled the state to form physical connections to other states in the region and encouraged cooperation between regional members. These pipeline projects will be the subject of significant discussion in chapter three, but it can be noted at this point that Turkey's participation in the projects was closely related to its ambition to enhance status in regional energy geopolitics (and thus its regional power).

3. *Regional powers possess superior material capabilities relative to other states in the region*

Turkey has possessed significant military and demographic capabilities relative to most of its neighbours since before the AKP's 2002 election victory. Turkey has a similar population size to that of Iran (82 and 80m respectively) but a far smaller population than that of Russia (142m) (World Bank, 2017*b*). In the Business Insider's comprehensive comparison of global military power - which takes into consideration numbers of active personnel, tanks, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines and nuclear warheads - Turkey ranks 8th, behind Russia in second but ahead of Iran in 22nd place (Bender, 2015).

While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s Military Expenditure database shows that both population growth and military expenditure and power have remained relatively steady throughout the AKP's three terms in office (SIPRI, 2017), the AKP's most substantial contribution to Turkey's material resources was in terms of economic growth. In 2014, Ankara's GDP was similar to that of Iran and greater than any state in the Caspian except for Russia (World Bank, 2017*c*). Ozkececi-Taner (2012:190) suggests that economic power was essential to Turkey because it enabled it to "buy" influence and become a regional power. After the domestic economic crisis in 2001, Turkey's economic capacity in its regions had been negatively affected by high domestic inflation, the devaluation of the lira and low economic growth that necessitated IMF intervention. Under the AKP, however, data shows that Turkey's GNP increased from

$240 billion (bn) in 2002 to $934 bn in 2014, reaching a high of $951 bn in 2013 (World Bank, 2017*a*). Foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from $1 bn in 2002 to a high of $22 bn in 2007, after which the global financial crisis saw a decline in FDI to $13 bn in 2014 (World Bank, 2017*a*). Considering that the majority of this increased trade was within its region (Kutlay, 2009), this thesis argues that the AKP's focus on economic growth not only increased its material capacity but also contributed to its integration in its locale. In other words, a regionalised trading focus augmented the regional power that Turkey held by virtue of its preponderance of material resources.

Finally, though it is not mentioned in the regional powers literature as a dominant material factor, Turkey's geostrategic location contributes to its regional power. Turkey lies on energy and trade routes between the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe. In terms of regional powers, Turkey's power lies in its capacity act as a conduit for the export of resources from the Caspian to Western markets. Its capacity to facilitate the flow of goods between the regions increases its importance in particular to land-locked states like Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan. A particular theme of the the era under examination in this thesis was the AKP's rhetoric concerning Turkey's capacity to facilitate energy trade between east and west. The remaining chapters of this thesis will argue that Turkey's geostrategic location is a significant asset in redressing its dependence on energy imports from Caspian states like Iran and Azerbaijan.

4. *Regional powers possess ideational assets that enable them to influence regional norms and values or to express a collective agenda that is acceptable to other regional actors*

The AKP's Islamic background and the Turkish state's balance between an Islamic society and secular democratic governance were ideational assets during the period under consideration. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a "Turkish Model" of secular democracy, economic liberalisation, and Islamic society was promoted to counter the theocratic Iranian model (Aydin, 2004; Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011:186). Between 2002 and 2014, the AKP placed additional focus on its religious ties with the Muslim world (Barysch, 2010) which, within the Caspian region, included Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. In addition, the effective merger of Islam and democracy in the AKP party itself was an asset in projecting Turkish power throughout its regions. Consequently, Onis and Yilmaz (2009:12) contend that the AKP adapted a "new

discourse" that highlighted a "moral/normative" aspect that transcended self-interest. They suggest that this is most evident in Turkey's participation in the multilateral institutions.

Common values aside, the AKP's pursuit of a foreign policy independent of Western influence (Duzgit and Tocci, 2009; Onis, 2011) was important to showcase Turkey as an autonomous actor rather than as a Western proxy. Previous administrations had closely aligned Turkey's foreign policy with that of its allies in the EU and US. In contrast, the AKP emphasised the expansion of Turkey's engagement with its eastern neighbours. Onis and Yilmaz (2009:13) refer to this access shift as a move from "Europeanism" to "soft-Euroasianism" - a process that Onis (2011) suggests accelerated after the AKP won its second term in office. Indeed, there is a strong consensus in the literature that Turkey's European project experienced something of a rupture around the start of its second term. On one hand, the decision by the EU to freeze eight central chapters of the *aquis communautaire* in 2006 contributed to a decline in Turkish interest in the EU project (Oner, 2013). On the other, the 2007 election victory and the defeat of a constitutional indictment the following year increased the AKP's self-confidence. This contributed to the increasing disinterest in the EU accession process and a strong belief in the state's ability to influence regional affairs (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009; Bank and Karadag, 2012; Ozpek, 2012). During this period, Turkey became increasing proactive in projecting its regional power (Aras, 2009; Burga Kanat, 2010; Robins, 2013). Yet Turkey's relationship with the West was also an important asset in demonstrating the country's normative power in bridging gaps between the developed and developing states, or between the non-Western world and the West (Aras, 2009). In that regard, relations with the EU, UN, or US were beneficial in projecting the image of a Turkey who could act and affect change in the interests of regional states. As chapter three will argue, Turkey's relationship with EU was particularly advantageous in the development of an east-west energy corridor between the Caspian and the West.

This thesis also suggests that the AKP's "visionary" (rather than crisis-orientated) approach to regional security issues (Davutoglu, 2010) can be construed as an ideational resource. Murnison (2006:953) indicates that Turkey's status was enhanced by attempts to position the state as a "just and impartial arbiter" in regional politics by virtue of the focus on meditation and pre-emptive security cooperation in the AKP's foreign policy. Overall,

however, this thesis concurs with Onis and Yilmaz's claim that pragmatic relations based on economic – rather than ideational – factors have been the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy in the region (2009). The propagation of democratic norms, for example, was a dominant feature of AKP rhetoric towards the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring (Ulgen, 2012) but was largely absent from Turkey's relations with the Caspian states. The empirical chapters will illustrate how Turkey's relationships with states in the wider Caspian region were primarily based on economic cooperation.

5. *Regional powers define and influence regional security*

The AKP was proactive in attempting to shape regional security patterns in its first three terms. A policy of "proactive and pre-emptive diplomacy" (Davutoglu, 2010) emphasised the necessity of dealing with potentially destabilising events before they emerged or reacting immediately to security threats. This policy placed significant emphasis on regional stability in Turkish foreign policy strategy and was instrumental in the formulation of several regional security institutions (Davutoglu, 2010, 2012, 2013). Turkey positioned itself as a mediator or problem solver in both the Iranian nuclear crisis and the South Ossetian War (Barysch, 2010). It also prioritised the resolution of frozen conflicts like that in Nagorno-Karabakh (Aras and Fidan, 2009). Focusing on regional conflict resolution had the potential to define the regional security order on Turkey's terms and projected the image of Turkey as a facilitator of regional security (thereby increasing its standing in regional and international communities). This thesis will show that many of these initiatives were not entirely successful. Nonetheless, this thesis considers the AKP's regional security strategy to be indicative of a self-perception of regional power. Its leadership in some regional security initiatives (BLACKSEAFOR) and in cultural and diplomatic programmes intended to pre-empt or limit regional antagonism can also be framed as contributing to regional stability in a manner congruent with regional power.

The extent of perceived threats to Turkey's domestic security facilitated what Snyder (1999:114) calls "co-operative security" on a regional level. The dilution of military influence in the policy making apparatus in comparison to previous decades enabled policy makers to frame neighbourhood security issues in a manner that was significantly different to the previous defensive, military-focused framework (Larrabee, 2010; Yesiltas, 2013). Rather, the new government sought to stabilise its neighbourhood through the creation of

economic and political interdependencies (Davutoglu, 2010). Kirisci (2010) argues that the AKP saw interdependence based on a series of interlocking economic and political processes as a functionalist tool for conflict resolution and peace building. By maintaining positive relations and creating interdependencies with all regional states, Turkey believed it could prevent the escalation of conflicts and pre-empt and contain emerging threats in a manner that increased its leverage in regional affairs. It should also be reiterated at this stage that Turkey's interest in security affairs in the Caspian did not preclude it from playing a similar role in other regions: throughout the first two AKP terms (between 2002 and 2011). Turkey also placed significant emphasis on de-escalating tensions and facilitating peace in the Middle East,[22] and focused particularly on instability in its Iraqi and Syrian neighbours in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

It would be erroneous to suggest that Turkey's regional security interests were based entirely on securing the interests of the region as a whole. Regional insecurity was detrimental to Turkey's territorial integrity and national security and posed a risk to its economic agenda (Barysch, 2010). As well as providing regional leadership in the security sphere, therefore, the policy was essential to ensuring domestic security and preventing the escalation of conflict in states with which Turkey had significant trade relations. This in turn contributed to the stability of Turkey's regional power. In addition, chapter one concluded that regional stability is particularly important for the transportation of natural gas. Turkey's policy of ensuring "zero problems with neighbours" (MFA, 2018c) therefore benefited its energy agenda. For example, had Turkey contributed to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict– a key objective of Turkey's regional foreign policy (MFA, 2015h) –Turkey's regional power credentials would have been enhanced and a new transit route opened for Azerbaijani gas supplies via Armenia.

6. *Regional powers articulate a self-identification as a regional power and are accepted as such by other states both within and external to the region*

The term "regional power" became increasingly prominent in the Turkish lexicography during the first three AKP administrations. Key government actors referred repeatedly to

[22] See, for example, Croft's report (2010) on mediation between Israel and Syria

Turkey's potential as a regional power (Babacan, 2008c; Davutoglu, 2009, 2013) or as a current regional power (MFA, 2013a). Turkey also emphasised its key role as a provider of regional security and public goods in its application to the UNSC, suggesting that it was in the process of realising a "vision of peace, stability, and economic prosperity for the region" (Erdogan, 2007). Thus the AKP had strong perceptions of the regional power role it believed Turkey should and could play (Kardas, 2012; Oguzlu and Parlar Dal, 2013). This thesis argues that the enhanced emphasis placed by the ruling party on foreign policy in Eurasia after the second election victory in 2007 and declining interest in adhering to Western - and particularly EU - foreign policy agendas (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009; Onis, 2011; Robins, 2013) is indicative of an increasing confidence by the AKP in its ability to influence regional geopolitical equations without external help.

There was recognition from within the region of Turkey's status as a regional power from both Russia (Lavrov, 2005; Putin, 2008, 2010) and Azerbaijan (Azerbaijani MFA, 2004, 2011). Officials from external states including Germany (MFA, 2015h) have also referred to Turkey as a "regional power". Emphasising regional issues like the Iranian nuclear programme in international institutions like the UNSC also facilitated a degree of acceptance by regional and global powers of Turkey's regional status (Kardas, 2013; Sever and Oguz Gok, 2016). Thus, as Walker (2007:30) argues, under the AKP Turkey became less a "bridge" or "barrier", and more a catalyst for regional change: in other words, a regional power.

Yet Turkey's role in the region was not entirely uncontested. Chapters four and five will show that, while outwardly recognising Turkey's major role in the region, both Iran and Russia repeatedly pursued policies that undermined Turkey's position in the regional hierarchy. In particular, Russia's regional and international energy objectives - with their emphasis on regaining predominance in former Soviet Union energy markets and controlling energy flows from the former Soviet sphere to Europe - were entirely at odds with Turkey's energy hub and regional power ambitions. As such, the implementation of the Moscow's energy agenda placed it in direct competition with Ankara. However, the ability to do so successfully was in some cases curtailed by the reluctance of Azerbaijan in particular to develop stronger bilateral ties with Russia. Iran, as chapter four will argue, was incapable of challenging Turkey's role in the region in any meaningful way because

of its limited regional integration and dependence on Turkey as a energy conduit to external markets.

The subordinate states of the Caspian were similarly restricted in challenge the positions of either Turkey or Russia in the regional hierarchy. The dependence by the Caucasian states on Ankara and/or Moscow for trade and security cooperation and as conduits to Europe limited their ability to contest Ankara and Moscow's roles in the region. Azerbaijan in particular was required to engage with one of the two states in order to export its substantial hydrocarbon resources to energy markets. The subordinates' agency lay primarily in bandwagoning: by engaging with Turkey, they contributed to the further dilution of Russia's influence in its backyard and elevated Turkey's strategic importance; in favouring Russia, they contributed to a Russian stranglehold over the region and limited Turkey's role in the region. It was to Turkey's benefit, therefore, that reducing Russian dependency was a key objective of most regional subordinates. While the 2002-2014 was not without challenges from regional subordinates , this thesis argues they were largely accepting of Turkey's role in the region.

Finally, recognition of the region itself should be taken into account when considering the acceptance or contestation of Turkey as a regional actor. For states in the Caspian, this contestation stems in large part to the multiregional location of key actors. Like Turkey, Iran and Russia border multiple regions: the former on the cusp of the Caspian and the Middle East, and the latter between the Caspian and Europe. Both also border Central Asia, with Russia maintaining a strong interest in the former Soviet states in the region and Iran an interest in the ethnically Persian, Shi'ite Tajikistan and its near neighbour, Afghanistan. The complexity of interplay between these regions for each of the three regional powers contribute to ambiguity in the definition of specific regions in national discourse; as chapter three will demonstrate, Turkey itself rarely explicitly defined the Caspian region outlined in this thesis. Rather, it is in the extent of cooperation and contestation of regional issues specific to the Caspian - particularly in terms of energy flows, frozen conflicts, and the demarcation of the Caspian Sea - that make the wider Caspian area a geopolitical region.

7. *Regional powers influence the geopolitical delineation of the region in a way that also reflects the national interest and maintains the regional hierarchy in favour of the regional power*

The influence of major and Western powers has been relatively limited in the wider Caspian region compared to that in Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbourhood. The AKP's emphasis on regional solutions to regional problems in its foreign policy meant that Turkey's foundation of groups such as the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP)[23] or Operation Black Sea Harmony[24] were intrinsic not only to demonstrating Turkey's power capacity, but to maintaining regional and Turkish security and the country's position in the regional system. The final point was particularly important in terms of Turkey's capacity to retain its regional power: in a discussion on Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East that is equally applicable to the wider Caspian region, Aras and Yorulmazlar (2014) argue that Turkey's regional agency is dependent on maintaining the regional status quo. In chapter five, it will be argued that maintaining the existing regional hierarchy was particularly important to Turkey in order to ensure the security of its energy supplies and to develop its energy hub ambition.

8. *Regional powers exert influence via regional and international governance structures in both its own and regional interest*

Turkey's "deep commitment to multilateralism" (Bayer and Keyman, 2012) was evident throughout its first three terms in office. Among the key features of the party's foreign policy between 2002 and 2014 was the concept of "rhythmic diplomacy" (Davutoglu, 2010, 2013, 2014). Defined by Ahmet Davutoglu, the "intellectual architect" of Turkish foreign policy (Aras, 2009:147), as active interaction with international institutions on matters of international importance (Davutoglu, 2010), rhythmic diplomacy saw Turkey pursue a more active role in regional and international institutions. Though participation in regional institutions such as Operation Black Sea Harmony, the Caucasus Cooperation Platform, and the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, Turkey sought to exert

[23] A regional stabilisation organisation proposed by Turkey in the aftermath of the South Ossetia War
[24] A naval cooperation organisation established in 2004 comprised of the Black Sea littorals

political, economic, and cultural influence in its region in a manner that corresponds to theoretical depictions of a regional power.

In addition, Turkey participated in and sought reform of multilateral organisations such as the UNSC and Organisation for Islamic Countries (OIC), and was successful in instigating some reform in the latter (Ozcan, 2007). The UNSC was an important arena in which Turkey could showcase its regional power credentials, and Turkey's election as an non-permanent representative in 2009-10 demonstrated the willingness of the state to take a leading role in multilateral institutions. In addition, the receptiveness of other states to Turkey's election bid[25] highlights the acceptance of Turkey's capacity to act in a multilateral institution. More specifically in terms of regional power, chapter four concludes that Turkey's decision to take a prominent position in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue demonstrated the state's willingness and capacity to represent and set the agenda on issues that affected its own region (Sever and Oguz Gok, 2016). However, Sever and Oguz Gok (2016) argue that while regional states accepted Turkey's role as an agenda setter in the UNSC, chapter five shows that it gained only minimal acceptance from global players and its overall influence was limited.

9. *Regional powers have the requisite organisational/political and ideological capacity to mobilise power resources and project power*

Relative domestic stability in comparison to the short-lived governments and frequent coups of previous decades and economic resurgence in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis enhanced the capacity of the AKP to mobilise its resources in the regional security, infrastructural, and governance projects discussed elsewhere in this chapter. In addition, the new foreign policy doctrine advocated by the AKP government was a key factor in Turkey developing the requisite ideological capacity to enhance its regional power credentials (Aras and Fidan, 2009). Here, the interaction between domestic and foreign policy in Turkey becomes evident: there is a consistent argument in the literature on Turkish foreign policy that the dilution of military-bureaucratic influence on policy formulation in the late 1990s had enabled the AKP to develop a foreign policy more

[25] 151 out of 192 voting members of the UN General Assembly voted for Turkey in the 2008 election for one of two "Western European and Others" seats on the UNSC (UN, 2008)

focused on regional cooperation and economic engagement rather than national security (Murnison, 2006; Barkey, 2010; Larrabee, 2010; Tur, 2013). Moreover, the AKP's emphasis on asserting an independent foreign policy endowed Turkey with more agency to carry out its regional foreign policy than under prior Western-allied administrations.

The organisational capacity of the AKP was also enhanced by the party's growing self-confidence following a consolidation of power in the 2007 general election victory (Keyman and Gumuscu, 2014). The literature on Turkish foreign policy provides a clear delineation between three political periods eras during the first twelve years of AKP rule: 2002-2007, when the AKP began to focus increasingly on its region; 2007-2011, when Turkey became increasingly assertive in its region; and 2011-2014, when Turkey's activism in the Middle East became constrained as a result of the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War, and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Burga Kanat, 2010; Robins, 2013). This last point does not apply to this thesis given that Turkey's policies in the Caspian remained relatively consistent between 2007 and 2014. Consequently, this thesis recognises two eras of Turkish regional power in the Caspian: one of increased regional engagement in the pre-2007 period, and one of self-assuredness and assertiveness after 2007.

Based on the discussion above, this thesis contends that Turkey was a regional power in the wider Caspian region between 2002 and 2014. However, it would be remiss to suggest that Turkey is the only regional power in the Caspian: both Russia and Iran also have considerable power and influence in the region, and the former's material resources dwarf those of Turkey. Ozkececi-Taner (2012:199) suggests that Turkey must maintain a "juggling act" with other powers that balances action, rhetoric, acquiescence and cooperation in order to retain its status. The empirical chapters will consider the forms of regional power adopted by Turkey first in its energy strategy and, consequently, in its engagements with Iran and Russia.Energy, as the next chapter will discuss, is one of the primary factors determining geopolitical trajectories and power in the Caspian region. Turkey's meagre domestic energy reserves pale in comparison with regional states like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; they are virtually non-existent in comparison with those of Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan. If energy and power are intrinsically linked and regional power can vary from issue to issue, then Turkey's energy strategy must necessarily

account for its relative lack of regional power with regards to that particular resource. Nonetheless, chapter three will argue that the AKP saw energy as a strategic tool. It postulates that the AKP's energy agenda between 2002 and 2014 was conflated with a foreign policy narrative that emphasised integration, regional security, and Turkish regional power. It is this convergence that facilitates this thesis' contention that the AKP considered energy not merely as an economic necessity, but as a tool for the accumulation of regional power.

2.6 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the concept of regional power. It determined that three primary conditions facilitate regional powerhood: the material and ideational capacity of the state; the willingness to utilise those resources in manner beneficial to the state's position in the regional hierarchy; and the perception that the state is a regional power. Nine further characteristics for identifying regional powers were extrapolated from an examination of the literature. It was acknowledged that not all regional powers have the same capacity, ambitions, or regional power strategy. Three regional power typologies based on the IR concepts of empire, hegemony, and leadership where then outlined. Each stressed specific characteristics and regional power strategies. It was argued that regional powers may oscillate between typologies depending on specific contexts.

After pointing out that empirical studies of regional powers were largely restricted to major advanced developing states like the BRICS, the chapter highlighted the failure of existing literature to incorporate energy as a significant material resource. It argued that energy was a tool and an objective for regional powers at every stage of the supply chain, and that energy could both constrain and contribute to broader regional strategies. At the same time, it suggested that specific energy policies – such as those to ensure energy security – can be understood though a regional powers framework when the centrality of energy to economic growth, military functionality, and regional integration was taken into account.

The final section of this chapter situated Turkey as a regional power in the wider Caspian region between 2002 and 2014. It indicated that Turkey's limited energy reserves meant that the state was at a disadvantage in a region in which other regional powers - like Iran

and Russia - compete with emerging energy providers like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan for access to and control over energy markets and systems. Examining the ways in which Turkey conflated its energy needs and ambitions with regional powerhood in a regional system dominated by energy affairs is the purpose of the remainder of this thesis. Chapters four and five will look specifically at this convergence in terms of Turkey's relations with Iran and Russia. First, however, chapter three will take a broader look at Turkey's energy strategy in the AKP era and determine the form of regional power adopted by the party in its energy strategy.

3. Turkey's Energy Strategy, 2002-2014

3.1 Introduction

Turkey's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 was shaped by the state's dependence on energy imports to fuel the domestic economy and the AKP's desire to play a more active role in the regional energy system. With its emphasis on bilateral cooperation, pipeline politics, and development, Turkey's energy strategy assumed geopolitical and economic importance. Energy become a priority not only for the Ministry for Energy and Natural Resources (MENR), but also for the Ministry of Development (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Explicit in energy discourse during this period was a desire to elevate Turkey's role in regional energy systems, and to manipulate these systems to encourage regional integration and stability. Consequently, this thesis argues that energy was not just a strategic necessity for Turkey in terms of fulfilling economic and societal energy requirements domestically: it was also conceptualised as a tool through which Turkey could advance a broader geopolitical agenda.

While a focus on energy security and diversification remained relatively consistent in Turkey's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014, this thesis demarcates three specific eras of energy policy and rhetoric. These periods overlap with the three foreign policy eras outlined in chapter two. The first, between 2002 and 2006, was founded on the necessity for Turkey to increase its energy imports to facilitate economic growth. This period highlighted the party's interest in engaging with its eastern neighbourhood in a manner that corresponds to regional power. The second began with the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2006 and lasted until 2012. It was argued in chapter two that self-confidence in the aftermath of the 2007 election victory strengthened the AKP's belief in its capacity to affect regional affairs, and this thesis contends that that confidence extended into the energy sphere. During this period, the government adopted a more hegemonic style of energy governance that emphasised Turkey's capacity to shape regional energy affairs and utilise energy as a power resource to augment the state's regional power status. Finally, this thesis asserts that geopolitical upheaval in the aftermath of the Arab Spring afforded the wider Caspian region a greater prominence in Turkey's energy strategy between 2012 and 2014. The Syrian Civil War, the rise of ISIS and

continued instability in Iraq rendered Turkey's plans to enhance its energy relations with its southern neighbours unrealistic. Engagement with energy rich Caspian states became a prerequisite to the realisation of Turkey's ambitions, and section 3.4.3 of this chapter will demonstrate that it was during this period that inter-regional energy negotiations reached an apex.

The first section of this chapter examines the energy situation in Turkey between 2002 and 2014. It explores Turkey's energy mix in terms of fuel type and source, and will look at the core actors involved in policy formation. Considering the extent to which regional energy imports contributed to the state's energy mix, this section will also consider the role geography played in determining Turkey's energy policy. In doing so, it will introduce the reader to the energy situation in the wider Caspian region.

The second section will focus on Turkey's energy agenda during the same period. Based on a study of documents from relevant Turkish ministries, it highlights three "themes" relevant to IR in the state's energy policy: energy security, energy diversification, and the development of a Turkish energy hub. This section also assesses these issues in relation to regional power, arguing that they had the potential to position Turkey as a key actor in the regional energy system. In stressing the benefit for Turkey of the AKP's regional energy agenda, it will argue that the state's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 is congruent with regional hegemony.

The final section of this chapter will examine two issues that both facilitated and impeded the Turkey's energy strategy. First, this section will examine the relationship between regional instability and energy strategy. It argues that while interstate and frozen conflicts in the Caucasus posed a threat to Turkey's energy security, the AKP believed it could position itself as a regional security provider by utilising its position as a regional energy power to encourage cooperation and integration. The second part of this chapter's final section looks at resource competition in the Caspian and argues that the extent of interference from other states in regional energy debates limited the application of the AKP's energy agenda. Instead, Turkey often became a secondary player in the energy ambitions of other states to the detriment of its regional power ambitions. It is argued that the AKP underestimated the geopolitical motivations behind the competition between other actors with regards to the construction of regional pipelines. The chapter therefore

asserts that Turkey's consequent support of *all* pipelines transiting Turkish territory regardless of source, route, or sponsor is emblematic of the inconsistencies that riddled Turkey's energy policy. These inconsistencies, it is argued, undermined the potential contribution of energy to Turkey's regional power.

3.2 Turkey's Energy Situation

Energy consumption in Turkey grew substantially between 2002 and 2014. This growth is generally attributed to a combination of demographic changes in Turkish society and rapid economic growth in the years following the 2001 economic crisis (MENR, 2009, 2014; IEA, 2016). The World Bank (2017a) indicates that Turkey's GDP increased in all but two years during the period under examination, with average growth of 6% reaching a high of 11.1% in 2011. During the same period, the population grew by 10% and the country experienced both rapid urbanisation and a significant migration from rural to urban areas (MoD, 2014b; IEA, 2016; World Bank, 2017a). These factors placed pressure on existing energy systems and ensured that energy was a priority for the new AKP government.

Turkey's low self-sufficiency in terms of energy provision placed an additional urgency on the need to implement of a comprehensive energy strategy. Domestic reserves of oil had been declining since reaching peak production in 1991 (EIA, 2005), and fulfilling Turkey's energy requirements had required successive governments to increase dependence on foreign imports. This section will explore the energy system in Turkey between 2002 and 2014. It looks firstly at the sources of Turkey's energy supplies and the routes through which imported fuel reaches the Turkish market. It then highlights the dominant actors involved in formulating and implementing the AKP's energy policy. The final part of this section focuses on geography: firstly, on the role Turkey's geostrategic location played in its energy strategy; and secondly, on the energy geography of Turkey's region.

3.2.1 Energy supplies and sources in Turkey

Turkey's energy usage increased substantially between 2002 and 2014. Energy data compiled by the IEA (2016:213) shows that Turkey's total primary energy supply (TPES) grew from 75.96 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 2000 - two years before the

AKP's first election victory - to 121.54 mtoe in 2014. Despite successive policy proposals stressing the necessity to invest in renewable energy resources (MoD, 2006; MENR, 2009, 2014b) fossil fuels continued to account for the majority of primary energy supply during the first three AKP administrations. Indeed, the share of fossil fuels in Turkey's TPES actually grew slightly from just over 86% in 2002 to 90% in 2014 (IEA, 2016). While the share of coal in TPES remained stable throughout the AKP era because of high levels of domestic production and supplemental imports from countries including China, Russia, and Australia (IEA, 2009, 2016), the biggest shifts in energy use during the period under consideration occurred in the oil and gas sectors.



Figure 3: Turkey's TPES, 2015 (IEA, 2016:23)

The majority of oil and gas consumed by Turkey during the AKP era was imported. The Oil and Gas Journal's annual survey of energy reserves showed that Turkey held 296 million barrels of oil (mb) in domestic reserves in 2014 (Oil and Gas Journal, 2014:32).[26] It produced 61,000 barrels of oil in 2014, but consumed over 83, 000 barrels. Exploration for new reserves off Turkey's Black Sea coast has proved unsuccessful (EIA, 2015b), and Turkey consequently imports over 90% of its oil supplies (EIA, 2017d). Iran and Iraq

[26] For comparison, Venezuela - which ranks first in terms of proven reserves of oil - holds 301 billion barrels and the UK (which ranks 30th) holds 2.6 billion. Turkey ranks 52nd in terms of global oil reserves (EIA, 2007)

combined supply just over 60% of Turkey's oil, with Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, and Colombia contributing an additional 26% (EIA, 2017d). Turkey maintained a relatively diversified oil supply mix in terms of both source country and route despite market dominance by its southern neighbours. Those oil supplies reached Turkey over land (Russia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan), and via sea tankers (Russia, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan), and - most pertinently for this thesis because of their association with regional politics - through pipelines.



Figure 4: Oil Supply by Source (IEA, 2016; EIA, 2017d)

As of May 2018, Turkey has three fully operational oil importing pipelines. The first, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, began transporting oil from Iraq to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in 1978 (IEA, 2016). It took 20 years to conclude negotiations for a second oil pipeline. In 1997, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan signed an intergovernmental agreement to transfer 1.2 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d) from Baku to Ceyhan via a new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (EIA, 2017d). Construction of the pipeline began in 2002 - after the AKP's first election victory - and the project became operational in 2006. According to the IEA (2009), the BTC began incorporating Kazakh oil from 2008. The pipeline was the first concrete manifestation of the fourth corridor, a US- and EU-supported initiative that will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. During

the AKP's second term, Turkey concluded an agreement with the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Northern Iraq to construct a pipeline linking oil-rich KRG territory to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line. The pipeline was completed in 2013, and began transporting oil to Turkey in 2014 (Swint, 2014).



Figure 5: Turkey's transnational pipelines. (EIA, 2017)

The AKP era coincided with an exponential increase in Turkey's gas usage and an accompanying marginal decrease in oil as a percentage of TPES. IEA data (2016) shows that in 2002, oil accounted for circa 42% of Turkey's primary energy supply. By 2015, that figure had decreased to 30.1%. Natural gas consumption in the same period rose by almost 400% from 12.58 billion cubic metres per annum (bcm/a) to 48.1bcm/a (IEA, 2016)as the AKP increasingly focused on natural gas in its energy strategy (this will be discussed in more detail later in this section). Turkey has only very limited domestic supplies of natural gas, and lack of domestic production meant that 99% of natural gas supplies were imported. The latest data from the EIA (2017d) shows that in 2015, Russia contributed 56% of Turkey's domestic supplies, Azerbaijan 11%, and Iran 16%. The remaining 16% of gas imports in the Turkish market consisted of LNG trade with Algeria, Qatar, Nigeria, Australia, and South Korea.



Figure 6: Natural gas supply by source (IEA, 2016; EIA, 2017d)

While LNG imports grew throughout the AKP era (IEA, 2016), technical and infrastructural limitations in the Turkish energy sector meant that gas was primarily transported to Turkey through four natural gas pipelines. Gas first began flowing to Turkey from Russia in 1987 via a Trans-Balkan pipeline that passed through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria (EIA, 2017d). In 1996, Turkey agreed to purchase 10bcm/a from Iran via a new Eastern Anatolian pipeline (MENR, 2017a). The pipeline was constructed relatively quickly, and operational in December 2001. In 1997, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to construct a natural gas pipeline beneath the Black Sea. Russia and Turkey have no shared borders and, according to Russia's national natural gas company, Gazprom (2017a), the decision to build the pipeline underneath the Black Sea was partly driven by a desire by the states to bypass third party transit countries.[27] While the Blue Stream agreement has never been made available publicly, each of the EIA (2017d) and Gazprom (2017a) have stated that the total capacity of the pipeline is 16 bcm/a, with the EIA (2015b) further suggesting that the pipeline was intentionally constructed with 138bcm

[27] Chapter five will argue that even though restricting Turkey's dependency on Russian imports was a priority for the AKP, the state's growing energy needs and the failure to develop any energy relations in the former Soviet regions in the 1990s had been major factors in encouraging previous administrations to increase energy trade with Russia

spare capacity. It is through this spare capacity that Russia was able to increase supplies to Turkey via the Blue Stream when supplies from other states were interrupted during the AKP era.[28] The pipeline became operational in 2003, and initial flows of 1.3bcm gradually increased to a high of 14.7bcm in 2014 (Socor, 2009b; Gazprom, 2017a). Finally, the discovery of the Shah Deniz giant gas field off Azerbaijan's Caspian coast in 1999 led to an intergovernmental agreement to carry Azerbaijani natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia in 2001. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE)[29] pipeline became operational in 2007, and has a total capacity of 8.4bcm (EIA, 2016*h*). Like the BTC, the BTE is part of the fourth corridor project and its construction received substantial political support from the EU and US.

The proliferation of natural gas pipeline agreements in the 1990s and their initiation in the early 2000s was a key factor in the rise of natural gas as the dominant energy source in Turkey during the AKP era. Other justifications for focusing on natural gas originated in the pre-AKP era but were readily adopted by the party after its 2002 election victory. In outlining the national developmental agenda in 2000, Mustafa Bulent Ecevit's coalition government had argued that natural gas had a "special place" in Turkey's energy strategy and, because of its "advantages regarding price, productivity and the environment", increasing the share of natural gas within overall energy consumption was a "priority" (MoD, 2000:165). These "advantages" were repeatedly brought up in discourse during the AKP era, with additional emphasis placed of the utility of natural gas supplies for generating the electricity necessary for maintaining economic growth and for ensuring energy security (MoD, 2006, 2014b; MENR, 2009, 2014). The discovery of new natural gas fields in the wider Caspian region in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s (EIA, 2013a) and growing prominence of natural gas in the international energy system more generally (see chapter one) also contributed to increased focus on natural gas supplies and agreements during the first three AKP administrations.

Both natural gas and oil took on an additional dimension in the AKP era as a tool for foreign policy. Energy was perceived not just as a material objective to ensure the

[28] Supplemental Blue Stream supplies were used to make up shortfalls after an explosion on the Eastern Anatolian pipeline interrupted Iranian supplies in 2012 (Soldatkin, 2012).
[29] The BTE is sometimes referred to as the South Caucasus Pipeline, and is marked as such on some of the maps used in this thesis

continued functioning of the state, but as a means to forge interdependencies with regional states and to enhance regional integration. This focus on energy as a tool for the realisation of Turkey's regional ambitions will be discussed in greater detail in the second section of this chapter. First, however, section 3.2.2 will examine the key actors involved in energy policy formulation in the AKP era in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of why particular policies or agendas were afforded prominence.

3.2.2 Domestic actors

The introduction of a natural gas market liberalisation law in 2001 created a complicated energy bureaucracy in Turkey (Natural Gas Law, 2001). Nonetheless, the Ministry for Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) remained the main body responsible for overseeing the formulation and implementation of the state's energy agenda between 2002 and 2014 (IEA, 2016). Several state-owned public companies were responsible for managing various aspects of energy under the auspices of MENR. Most relevant for this thesis are Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) (which is responsible for oil and natural gas transportation, natural gas trade, and LNG infrastructural operations) and Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), the body in charge of upstream activities in the domestic and international oil sectors. While Natural Gas Market Law No. 4646 (2001) obliged BOTAS to reduce its share of the natural gas market to 20%, the EIA (2017d) reports that BOTAS maintained its dominance throughout the AKP era. By 2014, it continued to account for 80% of natural gas production and almost all domestic distribution. Similarly, TPAO retained control of 72% oil production in 2014 (EIA, 2017d). The apparent reluctance of the AKP to fully implement liberalisation legislation meant that state interests maintained a stranglehold on technical aspects of energy policy - such as pipeline and transportation networks and energy reserve development - in Turkey throughout the AKP era.[30]

[30] The failure to fully implement the legislation can be attributed to legislative and bureaucratic weaknesses in Turkish energy governance. New distribution companies entering the market are obliged to purchase supplies from at least two different sources (Natural Gas Market Law No. 4646), but limited domestic supplies and BOTAS' market domination restrict the opportunities available to interested parties. Moreover, the lack of repercussions for BOTAS' failure to adhere to unbundling legislation is indicative of weaknesses within both the legislation and the bureaucratic structure of the national energy apparatus. The EIA (2017) points out that timelines for BOTAS unbundling were not binding and were repeatedly extended. Without

The discussion on resource nationalisation in chapter one indicated that greater state ownership over resources often endows the state with more control over the national economy, and increases the extent to which energy policy is determined by or used to facilitate other national agendas. This thesis consequently argues that continued state ownership of resources and pipeline and distribution networks during the AKP era enhanced Turkey's capacity to merge energy strategy with other policies. Most prominent among the ministries for which energy was a concern under the AKP were the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of Development (MoD). The latter two departments are of most relevance to this thesis because the former focuses primarily on the implementation of domestic climate change and renewable energy policy. Considering the strong relationship between energy and development highlighted in chapter one, it is unsurprising that energy was a recurrent feature in the MoD's discourse. The MoD is responsible for planning Turkey's development policies and coordinating between various ministries, actors, and groups to "spur Turkey's economic and social development and achieve stable and sustainable development" (MoD, 2014a:5). Forecasts for continued economic growth in Turkey in the 2002-2014 period indicated that that pressures on existing energy supplies and infrastructure needed to be addressed with supplemental energy sources (IEA, 2010). That the majority of new energy supplies were expected to benefit power plants and industrial users (EIA, 2015c) was indicative of the core link between economic growth and energy demand. Throughout the AKP era, a strong economy was at the centre of Turkey's broader strategic goals (MoD, 2006, 2014b): it would endow Turkey with the material resources to enact its foreign policy and to elevate its global status. Consequently, energy was a core developmental goal for Turkey.

However, it was the MFA that became most involved with energy policy process during the AKP's tenure. The extent of cooperation between the the MFA and MENR led Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to declare in 2011 that Turkey's energy strategy had been "integrated" with its foreign policy strategy (Davutoglu, 2011). Discourse emanating from both departments highlights an overlap between the themes and terminology evoked by the two. The emphasis on geography and Turkey's geostrategic position that had traditionally

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reprimand for failure to adhere to the National Gas Market Law, BOTAS has little incentive to unbundle and open up the domestic market to competition.

dominated foreign policy rhetoric manifested in MENR's five-yearly Strategic Plans. Those documents pointed to the "advantages brought by [Turkey's] geostrategic position" (2009:29) and the role of the state's "geopolitical position" in enabling Turkey to become an "active actor" in regional energy markets (2014:74). Similarly, Energy Minister Taner Yildiz (2010:16) stressed Turkey's "indispensable geopolitical position" in global energy markets". Equally significant, however, was the focus in both MENR and MFA discourse on the development of pipeline infrastructure. Drawing on the regional power debates in chapter two, the next section of this chapter argues that new pipelines would simultaneously encourage regional integration and stability and elevate both Turkey's credentials in the regional energy system and its geostrategic significance more generally. Pipelines were therefore not only crucial to Turkey's energy policy, but were perceived as a means through which the AKP could advance a foreign policy agenda correspondent to regional hegemony. The prioritisation of energy by the AKP and the incorporation of energy into the foreign policy narrative was evident from the first foreign trip by the AKP hierarchy after its 2002 election victory: the incoming Turkish president not only bought the energy and foreign ministers with him on a trip to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, but media reports from the trip show that the president repeatedly referred to energy matters in discussions with reporters (Lowe, 2003).

The following sections draw on a wide range of sources but focus primarily on documents and discourse from the MENR, MFA, and MoD to provide an in-depth understanding of the factors that shaped Turkey's energy agenda during this period between 2002 and 2014. MENR's Strategic Plans - detailed policy proposals published every five years outlining the development of Turkey's national and international energy agenda - are central to analysis in this chapter. Two of these Strategic Plans (2009, 2014) will be consulted in depth; the third - published in 2004 - was found to be unattainable. Statements from Hilmi Guler and Taner Yildiz, ministers for energy and natural resources from 2002-2009 and 2009-2015 respectively, will also be included. The MFA publishes less detailed documents on energy, but its Energy Strategy (MFA, 2015b) and other relevant publications will be referenced. Of more significance from a foreign affairs perspective is the discourse of the three foreign ministers of the period: Abdullah Gul (2002-2007), Ali Babacan (2007-2009), and Ahmet Davutoglu (2009-2014). All were vocal on energy issues during their tenures, and each also held other positions during the period under consideration that are

relevant to energy policy. Gul, for example, was president of Turkey between 2007 and 2014, Babacan served as minister for economic affairs between 2002 and 2007, and both Gul and Davutoglu served as prime minister. Finally, the MoD is responsible for the formulation and publication of Turkey's five-year development plans, of which the eighth, ninth, and tenth bear relevance for this thesis. The following sections of this chapter will, therefore, consult these three National Development Plans (2001, 2006, 2014b) in assessing energy strategy in the AKP era.

3.2.3 Turkey's energy geography

Before moving on to discuss Turkey's energy strategy in more depth, it is important to highlight the central role Turkey's geography played in energy policy formulation. Bilgin (2007:742) argues that in Turkey,

> "the discourses of seemingly diverse actors collude with one another to produce one assumption: that Turkey's geographic location is more unique than others are, and that it has more deterministic power over Turkey's policies than in some other countries".

While the legitimacy of that assertion may vary in other policy areas, primary sources demonstrate that the uniqueness of Turkey's geopolitical location was an omnipresent feature in energy discourse throughout AKP era. In a 2009 interview, Gul stated that Turkey lay "in a unique and strategic location in-between the countries that hold two thirds of the world's proven natural gas reserves and major Western energy markets" (2009). Thus, MENR highlighted the "advantages offered by the geostrategic position of [Turkey] as a major opportunity for the realisation of Turkey's energy agenda" (MENR, 2009:9). In the same way, the MFA suggested that Turkey's "privileged natural bridge position" provided the state with "both opportunities and responsibilities" with regards to energy security, and that it intended to "strengthen [that] unique role given by its geostrategic location" (MFA, 2017c). The MoD (2006:83) suggested that making "efficient" use of Turkey's geostrategic location within the parameters of the state's energy agenda would strengthen that geostrategic position "even more". Similarly, Yildiz (2010:17) wrote that Turkey had an "indispensable geopolitical position" in terms of transporting energy.

Each of these quotes emphasise that Turkey's geostrategic position is derived from its location between the energy rich east and resource poor Europe, though there is a lack of consistency in terms of referring to particular regions. The MoD (2007:20) referred broadly to Turkey's strategic location in international energy markets in "both east-west and north-south directions", and more specifically to Turkey's capacity to transport oil and gas to Turkey from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan, MENR (2009) highlighted the state's proximity to the Middle East and the Caspian Basin on one hand and Europe on the other.

The introduction to this thesis outlined a "wider Caspian region" stretching between the Caspian and Black seas. Both the extent of energy reserves in this region and the geographical and geopolitical realities of the region played a major role in the AKP's tendency to stress Turkey's geographic position during the period under examination. Geopolitical issues affecting the implementation of Turkey's energy agenda will be debated in section 3.4 of this chapter. In order to illustrate why the wider Caspian region played such a key role in Turkey's energy agenda - particularly in relation to the continued emphasis on Turkey's geostrategic position - the following paragraphs will briefly outline the energy situation in the Caspian with regards to reserves and Turkey's proximity to them.

Figure 7: The wider Caspian region.

The wider Caspian region consists of eight states: Turkey, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Of the eight, Turkey, Armenia, and Georgia have negligible reserves of fossil fuels and import a significant percentage of their energy requirements (EIA, 2013b, 2017c, 2017d). The Caspian region's energy riches lie in its riparian states. Total oil reserves of the five Caspian littorals stand at 276 billions barrels, while total proven gas reserves are 93.9 trillion cubic metres (tcm) (see figure 8 below). Russia and Iran have the largest reserves of natural gas in the world, are among the top ten states globally in terms of oil reserves, and have been producing oil and gas for decades (EIA, 2015d, 2016*g*). While the other littorals also have significant energy reserves, the focus by the central Soviet government on developing north western Siberian oil and gas fields meant that energy resources in the former Soviet republics went largely unexplored until relatively recently (EIA, 2013a). Similarly, international sanctions on Iran and the state's economic difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war limited the financial or technical capacity of Tehran to develop its considerable oil and gas reserves throughout the 1990s and 2000s (see chapter four). When the AKP came to power, then,

there were significant untapped energy reserves in the region that the energy hungry Turkey could exploit.

	Oil (billion barrels)	Gas (trillion cubic metres)
Russia	102	32
Azerbaijan	7	1.1
Kazakhstan	30	1
Iran	158	34
Turkmenistan	0.6	17.5
Littoral Total	275.6	93.9

Figure 8: Energy reserves in the Caspian (BP, 2017c)

The most significant impediment to bringing the energy reserves of the Caspian littorals to international energy markets was the states' geographical location. Of the five littorals, only Russia - through its European borders and maritime routes in the Baltic and north Pacific - has any significant access to energy markets. Each of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are landlocked, effectively ruling out the transportation of oil or LNG resources by sea tanker. Their geographic remoteness from significant energy markets in south and east Asia and Europe makes pipeline construction expensive and, because of regional instabilities, often insecure. Further difficulty arose from the reluctance of former Soviet states to engage in energy relations with Russia: as chapter two pointed out, many of the former Soviet states were eager to limit dependency on Russian infrastructure, trade, and technical expertise in order to assert their economic and political independence. In the energy sphere, Babali (2010) writes, former Soviet states sought to bypass Russian energy systems and routes when exporting energy. As chapter four will argue in more depth, Iran's failure to realise its proposal to construct a natural gas pipeline to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan and its limited LNG facilities restricted its capacity to export natural gas to global markets. Thus Turkey, with its apparent geostrategic exceptionalism

and access to European markets, was primed to offer those states an outlet for the transportation of their resources to international markets. This geographic advantage was central to the regional power ambition that that will be examined in the next section. It contributed to the formulation of an energy strategy that utilised geography as a means to address the role of energy as both a strategic necessity and a geostrategic tool. Yet it will also be argued that overconfidence regarding the extent of Turkey's geostrategic significance almost undermined the implementation of the energy agenda. The next section considers this agenda in more detail.

3.3 Turkey's energy agenda, 2002-2014

3.3.1 Key themes

While geography played a significant role in the AKP's energy rhetoric, MENR's energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 was broad. It incorporated issues as diverse as corporate responsibility in the energy sector and the introduction of new research and design initiatives in the renewable sector (MENR, 2009, 2014). Overall, however, three themes dominated Turkey's energy agenda. The first was driven by the necessity to ensure domestic energy security. Related to the energy security agenda, and the second dominant theme in the AKP's energy strategy, was the drive to diversify Turkey's domestic energy market and ensure a more varied selection of sources and routes for Turkey's energy imports. The diversification agenda was necessary for the realisation of another major energy ambition: the creation of a Turkish energy hub where oil and gas could be imported, traded, and exported. The three themes were closely related. A secure supply of energy through a diversified energy system was necessary to fulfil the hub agenda, and the energy hub was often espoused by key actors as a means through which security could be maximised. This section will first briefly examine the ways in which energy security dominated energy discourse exploring the diversification and hub agendas. It will then look at the ways in which Turkey's energy strategy can be understood through a regional powers framework.

Energy security was a core issue that guided Turkey's strategy between 2002 and 2014. The energy minister's statement in the introduction to the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan that the main target of Turkey's energy agenda was "to provide the energy resources to all

consumers adequately, with high quality, at low costs, securely, and in consideration of the sensitivities about the environmental matters" (MENR, 2009:1) is largely congruent with the definition of energy security developed in chapter one. The MoD similarly argued that energy security was the "main objective" in terms of energy policy because of the necessity to "supply the energy required for economic and social development in a continuous and secure manner at minimum cost" (MoD, 2006:82), while the MFA explicitly stated that Turkey's " primary aim" was "to realise its own energy security" (MFA, 2015b). Security was evidently a dominant factor underlying energy policy in this period, and understanding the perceived threat to energy security is, therefore, essential to any assessment of Turkey's energy policy. Section 3.3 of this chapter will look in depth at four of those security issues that played a significant role in Turkish energy policy between 2002 and 2014: affordability of supply, geopolitical threats, external influences in regional energy systems, and competition for access to supplies and control of pipeline routes in Turkey's neighbourhood. It is argued that these "threats" are all founded on the dependence on external sources of energy to fulfil Turkey's energy agenda.

The first section of this chapter drew attention to the central role played by energy in sustaining Turkey's economic growth. It also noted the extent to which Turkey was reliant on external supplies of oil and gas to fulfil those energy requirements. Throughout the AKP's first three administrations, dependence on external hydrocarbon resources to fulfil the state's energy requirements was often cited as a key concern in policy documents (MoD, 2001, 2006; MENR, 2009, 2014). Consequently, a significant proportion of each of MENR's Strategic Plans (2009, 2014), MoD's Development Plans (2000, 2006, 2014b) and the MFA's Energy Strategies (2015a, 2017d) focused on the necessity to alleviate perceived risks of energy dependency in order to maximise energy security. Common policies advocated by all three departments to enhance energy security included the development of domestic resources (both renewable and finite), a reduction in energy intensity, energy market competitiveness, and increased energy efficiency.

Most pertinent for this thesis, however, was the persistent emphasis on energy diversification and the necessity to diversify energy resources and routes. Chapter one argued that diversification, though not synonymous with energy security, is a prominent strategy for importing states seeking energy security. During the period under examination,

the AKP pursed diversification both domestically and in terms of imported resources. As the first section of this chapter noted, the AKP were successful in diversifying Turkey's renewable base between 2002 and 2004: IEA statistics show that each of wind, hydro, geothermal, and solar energy increased during the AKP's first three terms (IEA, 2016:214). At the same time, however, it was noted early in this chapter that Turkey's hydrocarbon consumption also increased in this period. Chapter one argued that natural gas and oil are irreplaceable in terms of transportation and industrial development, particularly in advanced developing countries that may be industrialising rapidly and be without existing renewable energy infrastructure. Finding new sources of natural gas and oil were therefore central to the AKP's energy security strategy.

Each of MENR, the MFA, and the MoD demonstrated an awareness of limitations of domestic resources development and the inevitability of continued reliance on hydrocarbon imports. Each advocated the diversification of external energy sources and routes. The acknowledgement of " the relative insufficiency of the domestic resources [of Turkey] especially in terms of oil and natural gas in proportion to the rising energy demand" (2009:13) by MENR in its 2010-2014 Strategic Plan indicates that while domestic exploration was a priority, obtaining new and diversified external sources of oil and gas was the department's primary objective. The Strategic Plan (2009:16) therefore focused extensively on diversifying "resources, routes, and technologies" "for the purpose of increasing the energy supply security". The MoD's ninth Development Plan (2006:82) suggested that in order to enhance security of supply, "a balanced resource diversification on the basis of primary energy resources and country of origin" should be guaranteed, while the tenth Development Plan emphasised "a more balanced resource diversification on the basis of primary energy resources and differentiation of origin countries" (MoD, 2014b:104). Similarly, Gul's statement that the main objectives of Turkey's energy policy were "to strengthen national supply security, and ultimately, help diversify our own...routes and resources" (Gul, 2009) drew attention to the connection between security and diversification.

Aside from contributing to Turkey's energy security, developing new energy links with regional actors would further integrate Turkey in the region and create new interdependencies that, chapter two argued, were essential to regional powerhood. As the

instigator of that integration, Turkey would also elevate its regional power status. Simultaneously, drawing on the discussion of regional power in the previous chapter indicates that providing an outlet for energy resources from those former Soviet states that sought to dilute Russia's influence in their national economies would enhance Turkey's utility to, and leverage over, those states. Moreover, creating new energy relationships with states like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan - which, it was argued earlier in this chapter, had plentiful natural resources as a result of underdevelopment in domestic energy systems - had the potential to reduce Turkey's reliance on competing regional powers like Russia and Iran for essential energy supplies. Chapter two argued that dependence by one regional power on another for essential services - like energy - weakened the claim to regional powerhood, and rendered the state more susceptible to attempts by supplier states to utilise the service to wield political or economic influence. Section 3.4 of this chapter will discuss these points in more depth with reference to relevant literature.

The success of the diversification agenda was dependent on Turkey utilising its geostrategic significance to develop energy trade with a varied selection of energy producing countries. This geostrategic significance was also essential to the perception that Turkey was a strategic energy conduit between east and west. Despite this thesis' focus on the Caspian region, the introduction pointed out that Turkey belonged to or participated in multiple regions. Turkey's geostrategic importance in the energy sphere was predicated on the state's multi-regionalism and, particularly, the intersection of its energy policies in the energy rich Caspian and Middle East and the energy-hungry Europe. This section postulates that the energy hub agenda, Turkey's geostrategic position between energy markets and suppliers, and the acceptance by EU actors of Turkey's utility to Europe's energy strategy elevated the state's regional status in the Caspian. To better understand why this was the case, a brief deviation into Turkish-EU energy relations is necessary.

Chapter one pointed out that the EU – and particularly states located in the geographic centre and east of the union - is dependent on gas imports from Russia, and that the diversification of gas sources and routes were central to the EU's gas strategy. Turkey had been earmarked by the US as a strategic player in the EU's energy security as early as 1999 (Bryza, 2007) and was portrayed as playing a "pivotal role in diversifying resources and routes for oil and gas transit from neighbouring countries to the EU" (EU

Commission, 2004:117). In part founded on the EU's increasing interest in energy security in the 21st century, cooperation between the EU and Turkey on energy projects in the AKP era were also prompted by the necessity for Turkey to comply with common energy standards as part of its EU accession bid[31].

Erdogan highlighted Turkey's commitment to energy projects between east and west in his first foreign trip as President of Turkey in 2003, telling reporters during a visit to Baku that Azerbaijani gas would "be delivered through Turkey to Europe" (Lowe, 2003). With the inauguration of the BTC - the first Caspian-European pipeline to transit Turkey - in 2006, rhetoric regarding Turkey's role as a conduit for supplies to Europe intensified and became more geopolitical. Then-president Ahmet Necdat Sezer suggested that that the BTC highlighted Turkey's geographic position at the centre of the world's "new strategic oil and gas transport corridors" (BBC, 2006). From an EU perspective, EU Commissioner for Energy Andreas Piebalgs (2007) argued that the project had "decisive geopolitical importance" and stated that Turkey was the "link, the corridor, the bridge to those regions". The proposal by the EU in its Second Strategic Energy Review (European Commission, 2008c:4-5) to construct a "southern energy corridor" to transport resources from the Caspian and Middle East and ensure the union's energy security further emphasised the EU's necessity to engage in energy dialogue with Turkey.

Despite the rupture that chapter two suggested had occurred in Turkey's Europeanisation project after the AKP's second election victory in 2007, the party continued to emphasise Turkey's importance as an energy bridge between Europe and Asia. The MFA wrote in 2009 that becoming a corridor for the transfer of gas to Europe constituted one of the "substantial elements" of Turkey's energy strategy (MFA, 2009b). Rhetoric also increasingly emphasised the role Turkey could play not just as an energy transit route, but as a provider of energy security. Thus Babacan argued that Turkey would "contribute more and more to the energy policy of the European Union" (Babacan, 2008), and that Turkey had "a lot to do" with ensuring the EU's energy supply security" (Babacan, 2009). Similarly, the MFA's energy strategy prioritised Turkey's "contribution to Europe's

[31] Energy markets aside, Turkey's relationship with Europe and its EU membership application lies primarily outside of the remit of this thesis. For an overview of Turkish-EU affairs, see Onis (2003, 2008), Kutuk (2006), Zucconi (2009), Morozov and Rumelili (2012), Yesilda (2013), or Robins (2013)

energy security" (2015). The Nabucco project in particular was perceived as a means through which Turkey could contribute to Europe's energy agenda because, according to the MFA, it would "vastly contribute to the strengthening of...energy security through route and source diversification" (MFA, 2009b). While Turkey's self-conceived role as a provider of energy security to Europe does not have significant bearing on the classification of the state as a regional power in the Caspian, it is nonetheless reflective of the augmented self-confidence of the AKP in the post-2007 era.

The perceived centrality of Turkey to European energy security and Ankara's involvement in EU-sponsored projects like Nabucco[32] had the potential to lend legitimacy to Turkey's claims of geostrategic significance. Indeed, in 2014 Kenan Yavuz - the president of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) - attributed Turkey's growing role in regional stability to Turkey's position as "the bridge between the Caspian region and Europe" (Badalova, 2014). Throughout the period under examination, actors including the European Commission (2004a, 2004b), foreign ministers of Sweden and Italy (Bildt and D'Alema, 2007), and Luxembourg's head of state (Hurriyet, 2013c) referred to Turkey as a key actor in the EU's energy security agenda. The validation of Turkey's claims to be a key stable energy partner for Europe demonstrated to consumer states that Turkey had the capacity to forge energy relations with those states to which Caspian countries wished to export energy. By providing gas-rich states with a route to energy markets, Turkey enhanced its significance to Caspian states. This thesis argues that this was congruent with the assertion in chapter two that validation of claims of significance by relevant external actors can boost the perception of (aspiring) regional powers by subordinate states, and thus contribute to the state's regional status. Moreover, it posits that the necessity for Caspian states to engage with a reliable transit state with access to energy markets endowed Turkey with some leverage over those states. This was particularly the case for landlocked states that are highly dependent on energy revenue to fund their domestic economies. The International Monetary Fund, for example, reports that oil activity accounted for three-quarters of Azerbaijan's GDP and 90% of exports during parts of the 2000s (IMF, 2016). Ensuring access to markets was therefore crucial for Azerbaijan to maintain its domestic economic growth and ensure economic stability. This thesis

[32] A proposed pipeline project that would bring natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe via Turkey, Nabucco will be discussed in more depth in section 3.4

contends, therefore, that Turkey's relations with external actors were essential to its capacity to utilise energy as a strategic tool and to augment its regional power; and, more specifically, to contribute to its status as a benevolent regional hegemon. Considering that Turkey's lack of energy reserves placed it at a significant disadvantage in a region in which energy was a key factor in determining regional polarity and interstate relations, external validation proved beneficial in asserting Turkey's position in the regional energy system.

Emphasising its geographic location enabled the AKP to impress on other regional and external actors Turkey's preferential position in the regional energy system. By repeatedly referring to Turkey's geography, the state was drawing attention to Turkey's access to the resource-poor European markets and the international shipping lanes of the Mediterranean. This emphasised Turkey's strategic utility as both an energy consumer and transit state to its landlocked neighbours. The party was consequently positioning Turkey as an indispensable state in regional energy equations. By doing so, it was simultaneously integrating itself into the region and enhancing its status as a central actor in the region, both of which chapter two suggested were traits associated with and essential to regional powers. The most discernable policy manifestation of the AKP's understanding of the geopolitical possibilities of Turkey's geostrategic location and energy relations with both the Caspian states and the EU was in the propagation of the energy hub agenda.

Throughout its first three administrations, key actors repeatedly asserted the AKP's intention to develop the southern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan into one of the most important energy terminals in the world. Both of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan and BTC pipelines terminate in Ceyhan, and the port possesses facilities for processing and exporting of the Russian, Iraqi, and Central Asian oil supplies that transit Turkey by road. In announcing a plan to "make Ceyhan an analogue of Rotterdam" (RIA Novosti, 2005), Guler effectively stated the government's intention to expand Ceyhan into one of the busiest energy terminals in the world. The MoD suggested in 2007 that the port would be "targeted to be one of the main distribution points in international markets and one of the main important places in setting oil prices" (MoD, 2006:83), while a key target of MENR's Strategic Plan was the transformation of Ceyhan into "an integrated energy terminal, where...crude oil may be offered for international markets" (MENR, 2009:31). Gas, as well as oil, would

flow to and through Ceyhan: Yildiz, then Minister for Energy, specified in 2010 that the intention was to route "about three to four percent of global natural gas supply, and about five to six present of global oil supply" through the port. (Yildiz, 2010:17). The development of Ceyhan was closely linked to Turkey's continuous pursuit of new pipeline projects. The MFA, for example, suggested that oil pipeline projects would make Ceyhan "a major energy hub" and "the largest oil outlet terminal in the Eastern Mediterranean" (2015b). A key motivation behind the Ceyhan development was the expansion of Turkey's influence in not only regional, but global energy systems: according to Gul (2009), the infrastructure to be built in Ceyhan would "help Turkey play a much more important role in access to the world markets". As this section will illustrate, the Ceyhan hub was demonstrative of the AKP's intention to utilise energy as a strategic asset to enhance both its energy and geopolitical influence regionally and its role in global energy systems.



Figure 9: Current oil infrastructure, Ceyhan (IEA, 2016:80)

In chapter two, this thesis argued that Turkey's lack of domestic resources was highly disadvantageous given the extent to which energy determined geopolitical trends in the wider Caspian region. At the same time, however, section 3.2.3 of this chapter has already highlighted the extent to which Turkey's geographic location was considered a strategic asset for the realisation of the country's energy agenda. The AKP's agenda extended

beyond the notion of Turkey as a consumer or transit state or as a *facilitator* of regional oil and gas projects, envisioning instead the state's "leading role" (MENR, 2009:29) in determining energy routes and prices in the wider Caspian region. As this section will demonstrate, the conceptualisation of Turkey as an energy "leader" (MENR, 2014) was primarily predicated on the realisation of Turkey's energy hub ambitions. The advantages of this policy for Turkey in terms of enhanced regional status and material (particularly financial) benefits leads this thesis to argue that regardless of the AKP's specific use of "leadership" discourse, Ankara's energy agenda reflected a hegemonic regional powers strategy.

Chapter two argued that energy hubs - as differentiated from transit states or energy corridors - can endow resource-poor consumer states with a strategic capacity in energy relations more usually associated with producer states. Hub states can operate energy markets in which they control re-exportation conditions and collect fees and tariffs beyond those that transit states may impose. They also adopt an additional geostrategic significance in energy supply chains. In outlining a desire to turn Turkey "into an energy hub and terminal by using [Turkey's] geo-strategic position effectively within the framework of the regional cooperation processes" (2009:29), MENR's Strategic Plan for 2010-2014 both directly stated Turkey's hub agenda and used language that reflected the definition of energy hub outlined in chapter two. The MFA employed similar rhetoric in its foreign policy synopsis, suggesting that Turkey was "an emerging energy terminal and transit country" (2017*a*). While the MoD made no reference to an energy hub in its eighth development plan and only referred to Turkey's geostrategic potential as a transit hub in the ninth, the suggestion in the tenth plan (MoD, 2014b:105) that Turkey should "be brought into the position of a transit *and terminal country* between energy producing and consuming countries through effective utilisation of its existing geostrategic location" (emphasis added) adhered more closely to the concept of the energy hub.

The discourse emanating from various political actors in Turkey was less consistent in referring to Turkey's hub ambitions. Rhetoric tended to evoke the notion of an energy hub interchangeably with that of a corridor or bridge. During an energy summit in 2013, for example, Turkey's trade and customs minister Hayati Yazici referred to Turkey as both a "corridor" and a "bridge" despite the the summit focusing specifically on Turkey's hub

ambitions (Aydogan, 2013). At other times, actors alluded to the concept of a hub despite not explicitly using the term. Yildiz (2010:17) wrote in 2010 that Turkey aimed to be a "terminal country", which he described as the state "attaining the position of transporting and ensuring secondary supply resources in energy geopolitics". Nonetheless, the word "hub" was increasingly visible in the party's energy discourse from the second AKP administration onwards. Former Turkish ambassador to the UN, Baki Ilkan spoke of the Turkey's role as both a "transit country and an energy hub" because of its "unique geographical location between the Middle East and the Caspian regions on one hand and the energy consuming markets on the other" (Ilkan, 2006*b*). Foreign Minister Ali Babacan referred in 2008 to Turkey's transformation into a "major global energy hub" and to "increasing Turkey's role as an important energy hub in the region" (Babacan, 2008b), while then-president Gul suggested in 2013 that Turkey was an "important hub in transporting and marketing" gas (Jones, 2014). Both the increasing prominence of the hub agenda in non-energy specific documents and the proliferation of energy agreements from 2009 highlighted throughout this thesis indicate that mid-way through the AKP's second term, Turkey's energy strategy effectively shifted from a focus on becoming an east-west energy corridor to becoming a hub. Such a shift is not only indicative of the growing overlap between foreign, development, and energy policy, but of an increasingly self-confident AKP that believed it could attract and manage regional pipeline projects. It also suggests that the party believed that energy rich states would accept Turkey as a major player in regional energy systems despite its deficit of natural resources. This increased confidence manifested in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan with the introduction of a "key theme" that emphasised Turkey's regional and global influence in the field of energy" (MENR, 2009:29-31). In short, it indicated a growing perception that Turkey could be a regional energy power and utilise energy to elevate the state's status to that of a hegemonic regional power.

3.3.2 Turkey's energy agenda: a regional powers perspective

Both the diversification and hub agendas have implications for this thesis' examination of the relationship between regional powers and energy in advanced developing states. The increase in energy hub rhetoric coincided with the announcement in MENR's 2010-2014 Strategic Plan of Turkey's energy "leadership" ambitions. It stressed that the utilisation of

Turkey's geostrategic position "within the framework of the regional cooperation process" would turn Turkey into an "energy hub and terminal", thus increasing the state's influence in regional and international energy affairs (MENR, 2009:29). The Strategic Plan outlined how MENR had been "taking the leading role in significant oil and gas projects " (2009:29). Moreover, it stressed, Turkey was "giving importance to interconnections within the neighbouring countries bilaterally and as multi-parties (*i.e. through regional multilateral mechanisms*)" in order to contribute to the "supply of adequate energy without any interruption of adequate energy and at high quality" to other states (2009:29). Consequently, Turkey was

> "aiming at playing a significant role in the…development *(of)* the global energy sector and, within the framework of the advantages bought by its own private geostrategic condition, in the provision of the supplier countries for its own energy security, as well as leading a significant role in the transfer of the rich hydrocarbon resources to the growing market and especially the EU market" (2009:29).

Implicit in these extracts from the Strategic Plan are several components that are relevant to regional power. It was argued in chapter two that regional powers had a special role in shaping regional security complexes and in facilitating regional security. In its references to energy security, Turkey was positioning itself as a regional security provider both explicitly in terms of energy and implicitly in terms of geopolitical security. This second aspect will be discussed in further detail of the next section of this chapter. The hub ambition was closely related to this energy supply security agenda. On one hand, energy security was necessary to ensure Turkey would obtain sufficient supplies to fulfil its energy needs. On the other, chapter two suggested that energy hubs were conducive to engendering regional hegemony. Positioning itself as a secure transit hub and recognition by energy producing states of Turkey's role in regional energy systems would enhance Turkey's legitimacy as an energy hub to supplier and consumer states and, therefore, elevate its position in the regional hierarchy. Thus, Guler outlined Turkey's intention to provide "a safe route for the transmission of the oil and gas resources to the western markets". It was suggested that contributing to supply security "in the region and in the world" (MENR, 2009:29) and facilitating the "supply of adequate energy" to other states (MENR, 2009:29) would augment Turkey's position in regional energy systems.

Moreover, the emphasis by MENR (2009, 201) and MFA (2015b) on Turkey as a "reliable" transit state highlighted Turkey's ability to contribute to security of supply endowed it with advantages in comparison to other, less stable, transit states.

Secondly, "giving importance to the interactions" (MENR, 2009:9) with neighbouring countries both bilaterally and within multilateral regional frameworks implied that Turkey could use energy as a means to strengthen regional integration and interdependencies. The construction of new pipelines was integral to this outcome. Based on the frameworks developed in chapters one and two, it can be asserted that the bilateral cooperation necessary to conduct pipeline agreements would facilitate the political and economic interdependencies essential to regional power. The pipeline itself would create a tangible connection between states. In a 2013 speech, Davutoglu emphasised that pipelines could provide opportunities for "furthering regional integration" (Davutoglu, 2013). The focus on pipeline projects by the MFA (for example, Davutoglu, 2008; MFA, 2015b) highlights the extent to which this aspect of energy policies was seen as particularly congruent with the AKP's foreign policy strategy. Turkey, as a central actor facilitating these pipelines through "interactions" with regional states, would simultaneously further integrate itself in its region and contribute to the region's geopolitical delineation. Chapter two suggested both were integral to regional power. Considering the extent to which Turkey was presenting these projects as mutually beneficial for the region (i.e. through enhancing regional integration and stability) and to which its own energy security and geostrategic importance were dependent on the pipelines' success (invoking a high level of self interest), this thesis argues that the AKP's agenda can be framed as a hegemonic regional powers strategy.

Finally, and of significant relevance to this thesis, was the explicit and repeated reference to "leadership" in the Strategic Plan. MENR's 2010-2014 Strategic Plan was detailed and outlined a comprehensive energy strategy that incorporated energy types and source, domestic bureaucratic structures, and infrastructural projects at home and abroad. The plan was constructed around one central "vision": to make Turkey "the leader of its region in energy and natural resources" (MENR, 2009:10). That Turkey intended to take a "leading role" (MENR, 2009:29) in regional energy projects implied a desire to shape the trajectory of regional energy flows. The notion that Turkey could be an energy "leader" was largely

absent from discourse during the AKP's first term between 2002 and 2007. However, both policy documents and political rhetoric indicate a growing confidence from the second term that insinuated that Turkey would not just participate in regional pipeline projects, but that it could shape the region's energy agenda. In a speech following the inauguration of the BTC pipeline, Ilkin (2006*b*) postulated that Turkey stood as a "key country" in ensuring energy flow and security. Babacan's comment that Turkey was "destined to play an important role in the diversification and security of world energy supplies" (2008c) demonstrates the extent to which Turkish elites saw the state as a fundamental actor in determining global energy trends. For Guler, Turkey had a "special mission" in the region in terms of facilitating energy trade both politically and financially. Guler's assertion that "what Turkey does in the field of energy is of interest to the whole world" (Anadolu Agency, 2009) denoted a new form of exceptionalism in the AKP's rhetoric. Considering that this new self-perception manifested at the same time as the hub agenda became more prominent in the state's energy agenda, it can be argued that the period from 2007 onwards marks a recognition by the AKP that even states with limited domestic resources could utilise energy as a strategic asset to elevate its status in the regional, and consequently, international, systems. The AKP therefore began to perceive itself as a pivotal actor not only as a major player in regional energy equations, but in those at the global level. Later, this thesis will argue that this confidence was misplaced and represented an overestimation of Turkey's place in regional - never mind global - energy affairs.

Chapter two argued that the recognition of a state's status by others within the region and by relevant states outside the region is central to determining regional power; that the state's claim to regional powerhood must be considered legitimate by other relevant actors. For Turkey to legitimise its claims to regional power and successfully leverage energy as a resource in a way reflected regional power, it needed to ensure energy security, to be able to compete financially and politically with other states for access to supplies, to attract and contribute to the financing of new pipeline projects through its territory, and to influence other states in the supply chain. Each of these conditions was determined not just by Turkey's role in regional energy systems, but in the regional system more generally. The realisation of Turkey's regional power was tied up with its capacity to meld energy diplomacy with bilateral and regional relations and to compete with other regional and external powers for influence. In other words, Turkey would have to mitigate a raft of

geopolitical and security issues both directly and indirectly related to energy to realise its energy ambitions. Conversely, the implementation of the energy "leadership" agenda would enhance Turkey's legitimacy in the region, endowing it with the necessary capacity to further influence regional affairs. In that regard, energy "leadership" and regional powerhood were intrinsically connected. Yet despite rhetoric explicitly promoting Turkey's "*leadership"* in regional energy relations, this thesis argues that the extent to which self-interest and material concerns and policies drove the AKP's energy strategy meant that it was more congruent with a *hegemonic* form of regional power.

The final section of this chapter will bring together the key energy strategies discussed in this section in the regional context. It will explore how three specific issues - geopolitical instability, the demarcation of the Caspian Sea, and resource competition - affected the implementation of the energy strategy. In doing so, it will focus on empirical examples of Turkey's attempts to diversify its sources and realise its energy hub agenda, and assess the relationship between the energy strategy and Turkey's regional power.

3.4 Key issues in Turkey's energy region

3.4.1 Geopolitical instability

Turkey is situated in region beset with geopolitical issues. Between 2002 and 2014, the majority of its energy imports originated in or transited through states that experienced conflict or domestic instability. The frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Iranian nuclear crisis, the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia, Russian-Ukrainian tensions between 2006 and 2009, and Russia's annexation of the Crimea in 2014 all involved states that were either suppliers of energy to Turkey or located on major transit routes. Dependence on energy imports from neighbouring states meant that geopolitical instabilities had the potential to negatively impact Turkey's energy agenda and, during the period under examination Turkey suffered disruptions to its energy supplies because of geopolitical conflict on multiple occasions. Media reports show how during the South Ossetian war (discussed in chapter five), for example, the BTC and BTE were closed for several days (Fineren, 2008). Supplies were also suspended several times through the BTC, Kirkuk-Ceyhan, and Eastern Anatolian pipelines on account of PKK attacks on essential infrastructure both within and outside

Turkish territory (Irish Times, 2006; Hurriyet, 2008a; Trend Daily News, 2011; Al-Jazeera, 2012).

There was a clear acknowledgement by the government that these threats were closely related to Turkey's energy security. For Ilkin (2006b), guaranteeing "secure and uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbon resources from the Greater Caspian Region" was a key "challenge". The MFA (2015b) noted that "any faults in the source countries or countries en-route... [could] lead to periodic imbalances between supply and demand" in Turkey. Pipeline closures not only interrupted secure supplies to the Turkish energy market - thus threatening the state's economic productivity and the effective functioning of the state - but required Turkey to purchase additional energy supplies from Russia to compensate for lost supplies. Following an explosion on the Eastern Anatolian pipeline in 2012, for example, Russia increased gas flows through the Blue Stream to make up for short falls in Turkey's domestic system (Soldatkin, 2012). This had multiple implications for Turkey's energy and regional power agendas. Firstly, the requirement to purchase additional oil from Russia added to Turkey's energy bill, therefore negatively impacting on the state's ability to use those funds to pursue other projects beneficial to increasing Turkey's regional power status. Secondly, that Turkey had to request additional supplies specifically from Russia reinforced the notion introduced in chapter two that Turkey relied on Russia to ensure its own energy security and, consequently, skewered the balance of power between the two in Russia's favour (both the reliance by Turkey on Russia energy supplies and the regional balance of power will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five). Early in the first AKP administration, Turkey had stated a desire to limit its reliance on Russian imports, with Guler reported as suggesting Russia should account for no more that 30% of Turkey's total energy supply (Lelyveld, 2003). The diversification agenda in particular indicated a desire to limit Russian influence on new sources. However, reliance on Russia to supplement energy shortages undermined the intention to restrict Russia's role in Turkey's energy system and reinforced the asymmetry between the states in the energy sphere.

Geopolitical instability threatened not only the continuity of existing supplies, but the development of new energy projects and, consequently, the realisation of Turkey's energy hub ambitions and its status within the region. Chapter one argued that geopolitical

instability was detrimental to energy security and deterred investment in regional energy systems. In the Strategic Plan, MENR (2009:9) highlighted the threat posed by "political instabilities in [Turkey's] region" to the realisation of the state's energy agenda. The notion of an energy hub, it was argued in chapter two, is predicated not only on the ability of the hub state to construct the necessary physical and financial infrastructure, but to guarantee the security of supplies transiting through its territory. By extension, then, the state must also ensure that supplies to the hub are secure. Consequently, Turkey had a vested interest in ensuring stability in both existing and potential source and transit states on account of its domestic and international energy polies.

The necessity to ensure sufficient levels of regional stability and cooperation to realise pipeline projects required Turkey to pursue the regional security provider role discussed in chapter two. Gul's 2008 statement on regional security and regional energy transportation demonstrates the way in which regional (in)stability, energy trade, and geostrategic location necessitate that Turkey facilitate regional conflict resolution:

> "To our west we have the Balkans. To our east, we have the Caucasus. Both of these regions and their stability are important for us because if you have stability in the Caucasus, and added to that if you have trust and confidence, then you have the right climate for economic cooperation. And the Caucasus are key as far as energy resources and the safe transportation of energy from the east to the west. That transportation goes through Turkey. That is why we are very active in trying to achieve an atmosphere of dialogue, so there is the right climate to resolve the problems. If there is instability in the Caucasus, it would be sort of like a wall between the East and West; if you have stability in the region, it could be a gate" (Gul, 2008).

Gul therefore explicitly links the "safe transportation of energy" (inherently related to domestic security and the hub ambition) to Turkey's facilitation of the "right climate" in which to resolve regional problems. Chapter two argued that defining and influencing regional security was a key attribute of regional powers. Without "stability in the region" and "the right climate for economic cooperation", Turkey could not realise its energy agenda. By facilitating regional stabilisation through mediation and rapprochement efforts - as it attempted to do between Georgia and Russia in 2008 over the South Ossetian

conflict (see chapter five), between itself and Armenia in 2009 (Tait, 2008), and with Iran in 2010 during the nuclear crisis (as discussed in chapter four) - Turkey was simultaneously enhancing its regional power credentials and contributing to the viability of its own energy agenda. In addition, playing a central role in regional stabilisation projects had the potential to open new routes for the transportation of energy supplies to Turkey. Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – a key objective of Turkey's regional foreign policy (MFA 2017e) – would simultaneously enhance Turkey's credentials as a mediator and potentially open up a new transit route for Azerbaijani gas supplies via Armenia. Regional foreign policy and particularly regional security initiatives were therefore perceived as a means to facilitate Turkey's energy ambitions. MENR's 2010-2014 Strategic Plan (2009:9) cited the "rise of regional cooperation opportunities" as a key asset for the realisation of Turkey's energy agenda. The congruency between collective regional security interests and the realisation of Turkey's energy agenda is indicative of a hegemonic regional powers strategy.

Conversely, however, it should also be noted that energy was framed as a tool that could contribute to regional integration and security in a way that contributed to Turkish regional hegemony. In the discussion on cooperative geopolitics and energy in chapter one, it was suggested that pipeline projects in particular could contribute not only to regional security, but could enhance regional integration and interdependence. Using energy to facilitate interdependence predates the AKP in Turkey - the Eighth Development Plan (2000:56) describes energy as a "core principle" of Turkey's economic engagement with other states - but became increasingly prominent in policy and rhetoric throughout the AKP era. The AKP repeatedly stressed the benefits of energy projects for regional integration and prosperity and simultaneously acknowledged the role regional integration played in facilitating Turkey's energy agenda. Then-Minister for Energy Hilmi Guler suggested that Turkey would contribute to strengthening economic cooperation among regional countries as part of its regional energy strategy (Guler, 2005). The focus on cooperation broadened beyond the economic sector during the AKP's second term in office to encompass other areas: Erdogan, for example, expressed his belief that pipeline projects would "bring prosperity to the area" and contribute to the creation of "a new silk road in the energy sector" (AFP, 2007c). Chapter one pointed out that energy infrastructure projects like pipelines require significant political and economic cooperation between participating

states to mitigate security risks and ensure successful integration, and the AKP placed particular emphasis on the role that pipeline negotiations could play in facilitating regional stability. Gul (2009) suggested that energy pipeline projects could be "cooperative processes [that bought] together regional powers, big companies, and players". For Davutoglu (2013), transnational pipeline projects were an "opportunity" for "enhancing energy security and furthering regional cooperation".

The dual approach to regional integration and energy project development was closely tied to what Yildiz (2010) refers to as Turkey's "proactive energy diplomacy".[33] In other words, Turkey sought to encourage regional cooperation to the pipeline construction that, policy makers believed, would enhance regional integration. Again, the simultaneous emphasis on regional integration and self-interest is indicative of hegemonic regional power. Both the facilitation of regional energy security and further integration of and into the region would solidify Turkey's position as a major regional actor. If, as the AKP suggested, Turkey intended on playing a "leading role" (MENR, 2009:29) in regional energy equations, then the policies used to attain that status - particularly in terms of pipeline diplomacy and regional stabilisation - would enhance its position in the regional hierarchy. The review of regional powers literature suggested that recognition by states external to the region could enhance the status of the regional power by subordinates, and an enhanced status in region would increase global status. By increasing its influence in the region, Turkey would increase its global status; enhanced legitimacy at the international level would elevate Turkey's position regionally, enabling it to enhance its geopolitical influence and affirming its position as an energy power.

Rhetoric on energy as a means to enhance regional stability is particularly evident in discourse from the MFA, suggesting that the department saw energy trade not merely as an objective in itself, but as a tool of Turkish foreign policy. Gul, for example, stated in 2008 that he "strongly believe[d]" that "regional cooperation in the field of energy, beyond addressing the energy supply security, [would] make significant contributions to the regional stability, peace and prosperity" (Gul, 2008). Consequently, by aspiring to lead pipeline projects, Turkey was also positioning itself as a facilitator of regional stability and

[33] Ulugag et al (2013) describe energy diplomacy as the process of encouraging regional and bilateral through diplomatic methods like high-level state visits that facilitate the state's energy agenda

security. This, chapter two argued, was key characteristic associated with hegemonic regional powers.

There were no large scale or prolonged security issues in the period under examination in the wider Caspian region, but constant tension and short conflicts nonetheless constituted a security concern. Externally to the Caspian region, the failure to develop a planned Syrian-Turkish extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline[34] on account of instability in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (EIA, 2017d) demonstrates the extent to which transnational pipelines are determined by regional insecurities. However, regional instabilities were not the only detriment to the realisation of Turkey's energy ambition: competition from other advanced developing and developed states for access to and control over resources and the continued interference by external powers in regional geopolitics also proved problematic. These issues will be the topic of discussion of the final part of this chapter

First, however, it is important to outline the ways in which the failure to delineate the Caspian Sea impeded Turkey's energy agenda. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been significant disagreement between the Caspian littorals over ownership of natural resources. This dispute stems primarily from a lack of legal clarity as to whether the Caspian was a sea or lake (Bahgat, 2007).[35] Without clarification, the allocation and exploitation of offshore Caspian resources were limited (EIA, 2013a). If classified as a "sea", then under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) each littoral would obtain sovereign rights over an exclusive economic zone based on a median line that is equidistant from the neighbouring state's shore. Due to their relatively short Caspian coastlines, however, such a division would severely limit Russia and Iran's claims to offshore resources. Iran in particular has been more supportive of classifying the Caspian as a lake. Under international law, this would mean that the Caspian would be delineated and governed based on international or bilateral agreements (such as by a median line) (EIA, 2013a). Ziyadzade (2015) notes that while the position of individual states did not remain entirely consistent - a variety of bilateral deals on the governance of some areas of the Caspian sea in the 1990s and 2000s encouraged slight amendments, for

[34] Built to export gas from Egypt to Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, the Arab Gas Pipeline is currently suspended
[35] The deliniation and legal status of the Caspian remain unresolved at the time of writing (May 2018)

example, to the Russian and Kazakh positions - each state has generally supported the solution that endows it with the greatest portion of off-shore natural resources. Thus Iran (which would have extremely limited access to hydrocarbons under an equidistant solution) has supported the construction of a median line that would endow each littoral with a 20% share of the Caspian and its resources, while Kazakhstan - the Caspian state with the longest riparian border - has favoured an equidistant solution (Bahgat, 2007; EIA, 2013a; Ziyadzade, 2013). Because of the lack of unanimity on the Caspian's status, development of particular areas of the Caspian have been dependent on a mixture of unilateral actions and bilateral deals between the littorals based on economic and political differences (EIA, 2013a).

Turkey has not taken a specific position on the demarcation of the Caspian. It supports the resolution of the dispute because of the belief that legislating for the sea's status would facilitate the construction of an offshore trans-Caspian pipeline that would provide additional energy supplies to both Turkey and Europe. Officials including Guler and Erdogan also consistently courted Turkmenistan in order to secure Turkmen gas supplies for pipeline projects like Nabucco and TANAP that would necessitate the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline (Neff, 2007; Gurt, 2014). News reports throughout the period under examination suggest that Caspian littorals retained an intention to construct a trans-Caspian pipeline as part of the fourth corridor project (see, for example, Alexander, 2008; UPI, 2012; Trend Daily News, 2013). Ilkin (2006*b*) saw the BTE as the "first leg" of the development of a trans-Caspian pipeline that would transport Kazakh and Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. Gul stated in 2008 that he hoped that "one day" it would be possible to transport natural gas from the East shore of the Caspian Sea to its West shore the same way the Kazakh oil has been carried through BTC"(Gul, 2008; Hurriyet, 2012*b*). Creating an export route for Turkmen supplies would integrate Turkmenistan into regional energy systems and create a new interdependency between the state and Turkey, and arguably position Turkey as a regional energy power.

The failure to delineate the Caspian therefore had an adverse affect on Turkey's regional power aspirations. In restricting Turkey's capacity to access additional energy sources, it negatively affected Turkey's energy security, diversification, and hub agendas. However, the delineation of the Caspian was not the only factor complicating Turkey's intention to

incorporate the former Soviet states of the Caspian region into east-west energy equations. The struggle to introduce a legal regime to the sea can be partly understood in terms of the broader competition for Caspian resources highlighted in chapter one. Primary sources show that Russia repeatedly stated its opposition to any trans-Caspian project, while the US and EU simultaneously reiterated support for the same (Blagov, 2006; Alexander, 2008; Badalova, 2011). The final section of this chapter will demonstrate how competition for control of the region's resources provided an impediment to both the AKP's energy agenda and its regional power.

3.4.2 The competition for Caspian resources

Chapter one argued that growing competition for energy resources posed a threat to the ability of advanced developing states to access the oil and gas reserves necessary to fuel economic growth. In the Caspian region, Turkey competed for access to essential resources not just with regional powers like Russia, but with external advanced developing states like China and developed states in Europe. Russia's interest in the region lay partly in a desire to ensure that new Caspian energy resources did not compete with Russia's own energy agenda (this point will be explored in significantly more detail in chapter five). Chapter one pointed out that China's own energy reserves were insufficient in the face of significant economic growth, and it looked to its neighbours in Central Asia to fulfil its energy requirements. The EU sought to enhance its own energy relations with Caspian states in order to reduce its reliance on Russian resources and to enhance its energy security (Tekin and Williams, 2009). In addition, the US - while not interested in accessing Caspian supplies for its own energy market - had actively supported the construction of pipeline projects between the Central Asia and Europe since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the hopes of diluting Russia's influence in the region, while increasing its own presence in former Soviet states, and contributing to the security of energy supplies for its European allies. Consequently, there were a significant number of actors with which Turkey had to engage in cooperation or competition with in order to realise its regional agenda.

The MoD's tenth development plan acknowledged the geopolitical competition for energy resources. It suggested that significant changes in global energy production and consumption behaviour were leading to a "redefinition of global economic and

geostrategic balances that necessitated a recalibration of energy security policies in the regional and global systems" (MoD, 2014b:14). MENR (2009:9) considered resource competition to be a security issue, highlighting the "foreign influences in the use of trans-boundary resources" and the "contradiction" of other states' energy agendas with that of Turkey in its list of "threats" to the realisation of the state's energy agenda. This section will highlight how Turkey - as part of its diversification and hub agendas - sought to participate in *all* regional pipeline projects, regardless of source countries, potential transit states, or project sponsors. It will be argued while that this policy could have contributed to Turkish energy security and its continued integration into the region, the AKP's refusal to acknowledge the geopolitical motivations and ramifications of contradictory pipeline projects undermined the state's hub agenda and its ability to influence regional pipeline trajectories. It also draws attention to the contradictions between Turkey's energy rhetoric and the policies it actively pursued. Consequently, this thesis argues that while Turkey's support for competing pipeline politics could have contributed to domestic energy system, the same competition restricted Turkey's capacity to influence the trajectory of regional energy systems.

The US and Russia's competing pipeline ambitions are the primary focus of this section. However, it would be remiss to discuss regional energy competition without a brief word on China considering that state's gradual encroachment into the region. Chapter one determined that the eastern Caspian littorals were among those states with which China sought energy trade in order to facilitate Beijing's economic growth. During the period under consideration, Beijing significantly expanded its energy relations with the Caspian states of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and demonstrated particular interest in new pipeline projects linking Central Asia to China. In 2006, a new pipeline began transporting oil from Kazakhstan to China (EIA, 2015f). With the initiation of the Central Asia-China pipeline in 2009, natural gas began pumping to China from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan for the first time (EIA, 2015*f)*. The construction of two parallel pipelines in 2010 and 2014 increased the volumes of natural gas transiting east from Central Asia. Consequently, Babali (2010) notes, energy reserves earmarked by Turkey for trans-Caspian projects were diverted to China. This restricted Turkey's capacity to fulfil its energy agenda and limited its opportunities to integrate the eastern littorals into the regional system via pipeline systems. While China has no geographical advantage over

Turkey in terms of proximity to Central Asian resources, its financial resources were a considerable asset that Turkey was simply incapable of matching. Thus, for example, China was able to invest in Turkmenistan's limited upstream energy system in exchange for access to energy supplies (EIA, 2015*f*), and rail and road infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Farchy and Kynge, 2016). Chapter two suggested that the ability to invest in and develop interdependent relationships with resource rich countries could generate goodwill for the investing state and grant it leverage in energy negotiations. Turkey was unable to match the extent of China's financial endeavours in the eastern Caspian states. Consequently, this thesis argues that China's economic capacity endowed it with an advantage over Turkey in regional energy negotiations that was realised with the initiation of the trans-Central Asian pipeline in 2009. At the same time as that pipeline was realised, however, a significant battle was on-going between the West and Russia for the control of energy flows in the western Caspian region.

4.4.3a Regional pipeline competition, 2007-2014

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US-supported fourth corridor project has been the main root of competition between the US and Russia in the Caspian and Central Asian regions. Its aim was to carry oil and gas via new pipelines from the former Soviet states of the Caspian region and Central Asian to Europe while circumventing Russian infrastructure and excluding Iran, thus limiting both states' roles in the region (Bolukbasi, 1998; Kardas, 2012). Turkey supported the project from the outset, and because of its geographical location and long-standing strategic alliance with the West, was considered the most likely conduit for supplies transitioning from east to west. The BTC and BTE were the first tangible manifestations of the fourth corridor. Throughout the first three AKP administrations, the party continued to pursue all gas pipelines related to the project that passed through Turkish territory (MFA, 2015b). The project highlighted Turkey's viability as a transit state for the exportation of regional energy resources to Western markets, and consequently reinforced the concept that Turkey was an essential actor in regional energy equations.



Figure 10: Proposed South Stream and Nabucco routes (Eke, 2009)

With the BTC recently operational, the BTE under construction, and new pipeline projects stalling, the AKP's first term witnessed little new pipeline activity in the Caspian region. That changed in the early years of the second term. Both the announcement of the Russia-EU South Stream project in 2007 and the suspension by Russia of natural gas supplies to Ukraine and Belarus - key transit countries between Russia and Europe - on several occasions between 2006 and 2009 contributed to a new intensity in regional energy negotiations and competition between 2008 and 2014. Rather than undermining Turkey's energy strategy, however, the competition for routes to Europe had the potential to benefit Turkey's hub agenda, and the AKP had no qualms about engaging with both sides. Despite its desire to diversify its imports and reduce its reliance on Russia (MENR, 2009), Turkey continued to support all east-west energy projects passing through its territory throughout the AKP era. Both Russian and non-Russian projects sought to utilise Turkey's geostrategic position in new pipeline equations. Even while the Nabucco bill was passing through Turkey's parliament in 2010, Russia and Turkey signed a comprehensive energy deal that included the re-routing of the South Stream through Turkish territorial waters and the construction of a new Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline to carry Russian oil from northern Turkey to Ceyhan (Anadolu Agency, 2010; Russia Today, 2010). As waning EU interest was making the Nabucco project look increasingly unviable, Turkey and Azerbaijan

signed an agreement in 2011 to construct a Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) to "feed" from the South Caucasus line and carry gas to the Turkish-Greek border (Hurriyet, 2015). Months later, Turkey and Russia agreed to construct a "TurkStream" pipeline that effectively rerouted the South Stream through Turkish territory.



Figure 11: Turkey's transnational pipelines (EIA, 2017d)

Turkey's policy towards regional energy projects is summed up by the MFA's statement that Turkey was "ready to positively consider any energy project in its region that is economically feasible" (MFA, 2017c). There were several advantages to adopting such a policy. Firstly, it maximised the number of energy pipelines running through Turkey, thereby contributing to the energy security and diversification agendas that this chapter has ascertained were necessary for the realisation of the hub agenda. It was argued earlier in section 3.3.3 of this chapter that the development of a hub had multiple advantages in terms of Turkey's integration into the region, its role as a regional security provider, and its role in regional energy equations. Consequently, participating in all energy projects in the wider Caspian region had the potential to augment Turkey's position as a major regional actor, and endow it with additional legitimacy that could facilitate the state in

carrying out a hegemonic regional agenda. Even without the development of the hub, Turkey would benefit financially from transit fees for the transportation of energy through its territory.

This thesis does not therefore argue that resource competition was wholly detrimental to Turkey's energy agenda. Russia and the US and its European allies, because of other geopolitical agendas, attempted to utilise Turkey's geostrategic location to route essential supplies to the energy hungry markets of Europe. Russia, because of growing tensions with Ukraine, saw Turkey as an alternative route to southern and Eastern Europe, while for the US engaging with Turkey was essential to reduce Russia's influence in both the Caspian region and European energy systems. This competition had the potential to be advantageous to Turkey's hub and diversification agendas, and thus facilitate Turkish regional hegemony. At the same time, it partially legitimised Turkey's claims to geostrategic exceptionalism and as an indispensable actor in regional energy systems. However, this thesis argues that the extent of interference from both sides in regional energy affairs limited Turkey's capacity to act as a regional energy power. Turkey had neither the financial nor political capacity to influence regional energy affairs to the same extent as did the US and Russia. It did not have sufficient infrastructural capacity to support the pipelines that it intended to transit through its territory. Even if the projects had been realised, the failure to enact successive market liberalisation bills ensured that Turkey also failed to develop the necessary market conditions to evolve from an energy transit route to a hub.

The notion that Turkey's support for all economically viable projects transiting its territory offered a "win-win approach for all parties" (MFA, 2017c) was indicative of a refusal to acknowledge the geopolitical motivations behind contradictory pipeline projects and the zero-sum nature of international pipeline politics (see chapter one). In particular, Yildiz' attempt to encourage the EU to make the South Stream part of the Southern Corridor project (Hurriyet, 2012*c*) ignored the fact that the Corridor's primary goal was to reduce EU reliance on Russian gas. The benefits of the amalgamation of the South Stream and Southern Corridor for Turkey in terms of transit fees and its role in regional energy systems indicate that the policy was congruent with a hegemonic regional powers strategy; the focus on a "win-win" outcome for all partners and insistence that South Stream and

Nabucco were not political (Erdogan, in Vucheva, 2009) or rival projects (Yildiz, in Hurriyet, 2012c) despite arguments to the contrary is reflective of the hegemony outlined in chapter two. Yet Turkey's capacity to influence regional energy flows in a manner congruent with regional hegemonic power was limited. Chapter two indicated that the AKP grew increasingly self-confident in the aftermath of its 2007 election victory. This contributed to an increasingly assertive foreign policy that emphasised Turkey's capacity to affect regional change. regional foreign policy. This confidence also manifested in the energy sphere, but was somewhat misplaced: Turkey lacked the necessary capacity to influence regional energeopolitical trends in its favour. At the same time, pipeline competition between Russia, China and the West was not the only arena in which Turkey tried - and failed - to implement an energy strategy congruent with hegemony.

3.4.3b Azerbaijan: Cooperation and Competition

Competition between external powers aside, Turkey's position in the regional energy system was challenged by the growing assertiveness of smaller energy producing states in the region. The extent to which energy, competition, and regional relations overlap in the wider Caspian region can be illustrated by the 2009 natural gas pricing dispute between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is integral to Turkey's energy security and hub ambitions. Two of the three new import pipelines completed in the AKP era carry Azerbaijani oil and gas, and a 2012 intergovernmental agreement saw construction begin on a third in 2015. Azerbaijan was also one of Turkey's most consistent allies in the Caspian region: Turkey was the first county to recognise Azerbaijani independence in 1991 (MFA, 2015*g*), and since the 1994 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan has consistently sided with Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The inauguration of the BTC pipeline in 2006 strengthened the relationship between the two states further and increased their respective roles in the regional energy system. Aliyev commented that the BTE would bring Turkey and Azerbaijan "ever closer" and "increase the importance of both...countries" (BBC, 2006). However, attempts to translate Turkey's increased self-confidence in its second term to regional policy came close to jeopardising energy and strategic affairs between Ankara and Baku. Two other regional states - Armenia and Russia - played passive roles in events that demonstrated the limitations to power projection by importing regional powers in a region dominated by pipeline politics.

As part of the MFA's "zero problems with neighbours programme" referenced in chapter two, Turkey began to seek rapprochement with Armenia - a state with which it had never had diplomatic relations. In October 2009, following a year of diplomatic initiatives that included the first ever visit of a Turkish head of state to Armenia in September 2008, Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols on the formation of diplomatic relations (MFA, 2015c). Continued animosity between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Azerbaijani dissatisfaction surrounding rapprochement between its closest regional ally and a state with which it was technically at war proved to be a challenge for Turkey's zero problems with neighbours agenda (Robinson and Villelabeitia, 2009). Despite Erdogan's insistence that it was "out of the question" that Turkey would "take any steps that *[would]* harm our Azeri brothers" (AFP, 2009), tensions escalated between Baku and Ankara. This manifested in a deterioration of diplomatic relations, most noticeably in a move that "hurt" Turkey (Erdogan, in AFP, 2009) when a Turkish flag was removed from a graveyard in Baku where Turkish soldiers who had died defending Baku in World War One from Bolshevik and Armenian forces were buried.

Energy relations began to suffer at the same time. The original BTE agreement had proposed a review of the price Turkey paid for Azerbaijan gas – as well as tariffs for the transportation of gas through Turkey – one year after the BTE became operational (South Caucasus Gas Pipeline Sale and Purchases Agreement, 2001). Azerbaijan attributed the dispute that emerged over tariffs in October 2009 to Turkey proposing a new pricing system that Baku believed requested too high a transit fees and offered too low a payment for Azerbaijani natural gas. It should be noted that Azerbaijan's objection to Turkish tariff proposals were first articulated in October 2009 - just as the Armenian-Turkish protocol was publicised - despite Turkey submitting its proposal in July of that year. In the interim, the two states signed gas deals to bring Azerbaijani gas through Turkey to both the Azeri enclave of Nakhchivan[36] and to Syria. In a statement that clearly indicates the contributions of gas trade to the broader foreign policy agenda, the former was declared to by Yildiz to "spell the merging of two peoples...*(and)* be a declaration of the will to strengthen the understanding of 'one nation, two states" (UPI, 2009).

[36] An autonomous region of Armenia separated from the main state and located between the borders of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Nakhchivan will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four in relation to energy swaps between Azerbaijan and Iran

Despite the continued development of gas trade between the countries after the tariff submission by Turkey, Aliyev argued that the dispute had been a long-term problem for Azerbaijan:

> We have tried not to highlight this *[the negotiations with Turkey on gas transit to Europe]* and resolve everything through negotiations over the past two years. But our resources have been exhausted, and we will never accept the proposals given to us. We need to explore alternatives. There are countries in need of energy resources all around us (Aliyev, in Ukraine General Newswire, 2009).

Again, it is important to note that Baku failed to articulate strong concerns about price negotiations until after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols, implying a connection between the political rapprochement and the deterioration in energy relations. The statement by Vafa Guluzade, who was a foreign affairs advisor under Haydar Aliyev (Azerbaijan's previous president) that Azerbaijan was "looking at the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border as a betrayal" by their "main partner" in the region (Schliefer, 2009) exemplifies the position of the Azerbaijani political elite regarding the rapprochement. However, the inference in Aliyev's statement that Azerbaijan could pursue alternative transit routes also suggested that Turkey was not indispensable to Azerbaijan's energy ambitions. Aliyev later suggested that Azerbaijan could transport gas through alternative Black Sea ports, indicating that Baku had had "serious discussions" with Romania and that talks with Bulgaria were also a possibility (Russia and CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, 2009). That Turkey appears to have considered neither the potential impact of its rapprochement on relations with Azerbaijan nor the prospect of an alternative route for Azerbaijani exports is indicative of the overconfidence of the second AKP administration.

While it was eventually resolved,[37] the 2009 dispute illustrates how deeply intertwined political and energy relations are in the region. In addition, it suggests a failure by foreign policy makers in Turkey to recognise that "zero problems with neighbours", while

[37] Armenia suspended the ratification of the protocols in April 2010, effectively ending the rapprochement; Turkey and Azerbaijan subsequently signed a MoU on gas supply and transit on 7th June 2010 (Mehtiyeva, 2010; MFA, 2018d)

laudable in theory, presupposes reciprocity of intention by Turkey's neighbours. It failed to acknowledge the diverging interests and agendas of other states and overestimated its role and power in respect to regional energy relations. Furthermore, Yildiz's statement that Turkey's "Azeri brothers" shouldn't charge Turkey market prices for gas because Turkey had always supported Azerbaijan in times of trouble (Russian Oil and Gas Report, 2009) suggests that the AKP assumed a special position for or leverage over Azerbaijani gas trade based on historic relations.

It was suggested earlier in this chapter that Turkey adopted an increasingly assertive hegemonic regional powers strategy during its second term. However, the failure to renegotiate tariffs and the willingness of Azerbaijan to seek alternative transit routes was indicative of overconfidence on the part of the AKP as to Turkey's regional influence and leverage. Furthermore, despite clear indications that foreign policy and energy policies had become much more closely associated in this period within Turkey, the lack of insight by the AKP into Azerbaijan's own energy ambitions and interests was clearly evidenced during the pricing dispute. This, in conjunction with the failure to pre-empt Azerbaijan's less than amicable response to rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, was indicative of a naivety on Turkey's behalf in relation to both its influence in and the impact of geopolitical enmity on regional energy equations.

Turkey's policy on competing pipeline projects can be understood as an attempt to bridge continued energy cooperation with the West with the maintenance of strong relations with Russia, and to manipulate both in a way that would be beneficial to its own energy agenda and regional hegemony. However, events in 2009 indicate that Turkey simultaneously underestimated the strength of the Azerbaijani-Turkish relationship and overestimated Turkey's own capacity to use its geostrategic position as leverage in negotiation. In both the Azerbaijani case and in respect to its position on competing regional projects, Turkey failed to accurately assess the geopolitical importance attached to pipelines by other actors and overestimated its own strategic significance as a transit state. It did not have the capacity to pursue a wholly hegemonic energy strategy in the region because of the constraints placed on its capacity to maximise its position in regional energy systems by other regional actors. Additionally, in supporting infrastructural projects like the South Stream and Turk Stream that reaffirmed Russia's role as a leading energy contributor to

Europe, Turkey undermined both the agenda of its European partners and its own claims to be a provider of energy security for Europe. Similarly, chapter five will argue that attempts by Turkey to negotiate Nabucco or any Russian pipeline in a way that would be congruent with an energy hub (that is, by ensuring re-exportation rights) consistently failed. These policies were representative of an energy strategy replete with contradictions and inconsistencies that undermined rather that strengthened Turkey's regional power. Indeed, leader of the opposition Kemal Kilicdaroglu stated that Turkey had "shot [itself] in the foot" with regards to the hub ambition after a 2010 energy agreement with Russia because it simultaneously sounded the death knell for Nabucco and increased Turkey's dependence on Russian gas (Hurriyet, 2011*b*). This, along with Turkey's tendency to underestimate the relationship between geopolitical events and energy negotiations, the dominance of regional pipeline projects by other actors, and Turkey's failure to manipulate regional energy equations to its advantage, both highlights limitations to Turkish hegemony and suggests that Turkey was far from the energy "leader" the AKP's discourse suggests that it sought to become.

3.5 Conclusions

Energy policy in the first three AKP administrations wedded economic, developmental, and foreign policy narratives in a way that placed energy security and geostrategic ambition at the heart of Turkish energy strategy. Obtaining secure supplies of energy to fulfil economic and social requirements was a priority; those same supplies were perceived as an instrument through which Turkey could enhance its geostrategic significance and, consequently, its regional influence. Simultaneous economic and population growth and regional energy ambitions forced policy makers to balance domestic security and demand with geopolitical issues such as regional security and integration. This contributed to a regional energy strategy that revolved around three themes: energy security, diversification, and development of a Turkish energy hub. Through the implementation of policies related to these themes, the AKP aspired to assume a "leadership" role for Turkey in regional energy equations - one that corresponded to the definition of regional hegemony outlined in chapter two.

It was argued that this agenda had the potential to generate significant benefits for Turkey. From a regional powers perspective, it offered an opportunity for Turkey to encourage

regional integration and cooperation in a way that would augment the state's regional status. By positioning Turkey as a regional security provider and highlighting the state's geostrategic significance as an outlet for regional energy supplies to global consumer markets, the AKP were attempting to highlight Turkey's indispensable role in regional energy equations. The party successfully melded regional geopolitical issues including frozen conflicts to energy policy, arguing that energy development could facilitate regional stability and development and, conversely, that Turkey could mediate regional conflicts to enable energy development.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that Turkey simultaneously overestimated its regional influence and failed to understand regional energy geopolitics. This was made particularly clear in the final section of this chapter. It was argued that Turkey's tendency to hedge its bets by supporting all economically viable east-west pipelines was counterproductive in terms of the state's energy agenda. Not only did it undermine the hub agenda, but it failed to account for the contradictory geopolitical motivations behind and ramifications of specific pipeline projects. Attempts to manipulate pipeline equations in Turkey's favour tended to have little impact. This thesis contends, therefore, that while Turkey's energy strategy did account for the role of energy as both a strategic objective and an tool through which Turkey could realise other agendas (particularly in terms of development and foreign policy), inadequacies in policy implementation and insufficient acknowledgement of the ways in which geopolitical competition influenced pipeline politics in the region restricted Turkey from the potential benefits from the AKP's energy strategy. Turkey's energy policy emphasised regional energy "leadership" and its policies and rhetoric corresponded to regional hegemony. Regardless, the state was limited in its capacity to affect change within the regional system. Finally, this chapter demonstrated that while energy may be both an objective and tool for even energy poor advanced developing states, limitations in terms of economic capacity and regional geopolitical assessment can undermine the state's agenda. Nonetheless, energy and regional power were undoubtedly interrelated for Turkey during this period. The remainder of this thesis will look at the ways in which relations with each of Iran and Russia affected Turkey's regional and energy strategies. In doing so, it will also consider the forms of hegemony - benevolent and coercive - adopted by the AKP during this period.

4. Energy in Turkish-Iranian Relations

4.1 Introduction

The relationship between Iran and Turkey in the AKP era was characterised by the triumph of pragmatism in the economic and energy spheres over competing ideological agendas. Bilateral diplomacy and economic cooperation were facilitated in the early years of the AKP's first term by Turkey's ambition to exert its strategic autonomy from the West and Iran's bid to counterbalance US-induced international isolation. Common threat perceptions in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and a shared desire to incorporate Iranian gas into the fourth corridor project meant that security and energy rhetoric dominated cooperative efforts. Claims of competing agendas and contesting ideologies between the states rarely manifested in the Caspian region in the way they did in the Middle East in part because Iran's capacity to exercise its power in the Caspian was more constrained than in other regions. This chapter will argue that Turkey's energy cooperation with Iran contributed to its regional power status. While bilateral agreements and cooperation rhetoric rarely metamorphosised into tangible projects, attempts to integrate Iran into regional and international systems - particularly during the 2010 nuclear negotiations - nonetheless demonstrated Turkey's willingness to act as an regional representative and integrative force.

Chapter three argued that energy and regional powerhood were interrelated for Turkey. This chapter expands on the role played by energy in Turkish-Iranian relations, and considers the ways in which Iran affected Turkey's regional and energy strategies. That energy played a significant role in bilateral relations is unsurprising given Turkey's energy requirements and Iran's substantial energy reserves. It is argued that limitations to the willingness of other Caspian states to engage in substantial energy trade with Iran, Turkey's pivotal geostrategic role in the fourth corridor project, and Tehran's desire to export natural gas to Europe endowed Turkey with greater significance in regional energy systems than its energy producing partner. Building on the previous chapter, Turkey is framed as a *benevolent regional hegemon*: energy and political engagement with Iran was grounded in self-interest but framed by Turkish officials in terms of common bilateral or regional interests.

Both Iranian and external factors constrained the implementation of Turkey's energy agenda to the detriment of its regional status. Iran's position on Caspian delineation and the erratic nature of Turkmen-Iranian energy relations impeded the integration of Turkmenistan natural gas reserves into regional energy projects. Beyond the restrictions placed on Turkey's diversification agenda, Iran's position undermined attempts by Turkey to demonstrate its significance in regional energy equations and restricted the integration that chapter two suggested was essential for regional powerhood. In addition, Iran's anti-status quo agenda and nuclear policies contributed to Tehran's ever increasing isolation from the international community during the third AKP term in particular. The imposition of EU sanctions in 2012 effectively curtailed Turkey's aim of supplementing Azerbaijani natural gas supplies to Europe with Iranian gas and demonstrated a failure by Turkey to assess to accurately assess both the geopolitical climate of the time and Turkey's own ability to influence it. While this chapter ultimately concludes that Turkey possessed a more significant status in the Caspian region than Iran, it acknowledges that Iran's actions had a detrimental effect on Turkey's energy ambitions and, consequently, Turkey's status within the Caspian region.

The first section of this chapter briefly examines historical relations between Turkey and Iran. It illustrates how the 1996 agreement to construct a natural gas pipeline between Tabriz and Ankara constituted the highpoint of bilateral energy cooperation in the pre-AKP era. The second section of this chapter focuses on Turkish-Iranian relations between 2002 and 2014. It focuses in particular on the failure to translate rhetorical commitments into increased bilateral cooperation. The third section of this chapter examines bilateral energy interactions in more depth. It notes that despite competing for regional power, the states recognised that cooperation was necessary to ensure the realisation of their respective energy ambitions. However, this section also points out that energy rhetoric rarely translated into practice. Among the factors constricting concrete new cooperation was the response of the international community to Iran's nuclear programme. The nuclear issue is examined in some detail in this section.

The final section of the chapter looks at energy cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and other regional actors. Based on examinations of Iran's energy engagement with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, it argues that Turkey and Russia remained the

dominant powers in the Caspian by virtue of their relations with other regional states during the period under examination. It also considers the role Turkmenistan's significant natural gas resources played in the regional agendas of both Turkey and Iran. The chapter concludes that Turkey's energy relationship with Iran had the *potential* to contribute to the AKP's energy security, hub, and diversification strategies and, consequently, to its regional power status. However, the effective merger for Ankara of Iranian energy and Turkish regional power was constrained by a significant discrepancy between rhetoric and outcomes in bilateral relations and Iran's strained relationship with the international community. This limited Turkey's capacity to assert a benevolent hegemonic regional agenda, and illustrates the inconsistencies that plagued Turkey's energy strategy. Finally, it asserts that Turkey occupied a higher position in the regional hierarchy than did Iran by virtue of its integration with regional subordinates and its geostrategic utility for the energy producing states of the Caspian.

4.2 Turkish-Iranian Relations in Historical Context

4.2.1 Bilateral relations in the pre-AKP era

Historical relations between Turkey and Iran were characterised by animosity and conflict. While the Turkish-Iranian border remained more or less constant following its demarcation in the 17th century (MFA, 2018), the imperial period was defined by competition for territory and religious influence in the Caucasus and Iraq. The advent of Russian and Western imperial forces into the region in the 18th and 19th centuries hastened the decline of the Persian and Ottoman empires. However, it was the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the modernising reforms implemented by Kamal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran in the aftermath of World War One that signalled the end of the imperialist era for both states. The assimilation of the Caucasus and Central Asia into the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s both solidified Russia's position as the unilateral regional power in the Caspian and severely limited Turkish and Iranian influence in the region. Both aligned with the West during the early years of the Cold War, with Iran's considerable energy reserves and Turkey's geostrategic location endowing the states with strategic significance for the West.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution was a catalyst for geopolitical change in the region. Turkey became the West's preeminent ally in west Asia, while US sanctions and aggressive rhetoric concerning the exportation of the Islamic revolution from (Shi'ite) Iran to the (Sunni) Middle East saw Iran become increasingly isolated (Ozel and Ozcan, 2011). Nonetheless, there is a consensus in the academic literature that Ankara quickly realised the benefits of maintaining relations with both the West and Iran (Walker, 2007; Jenkins, 2012; Robins, 2013). While Turkey's military bureaucratic elite feared a campaign to export the Iranian revolution to Turkey (Aras and Polat, 2008), pragmatic considerations generally overrode any potential ideological dispute (Ayman, 2012). The next part of this chapter will highlight, for example, how Ankara's decision to remain neutral during the Iran-Iraq war rather than siding with its Western allies and Iraq enabled Turkey to become an indispensable trading partner for both Iran and Iraq.

A new source of competition arose in the 1990s with the collapse of the USSR. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left a vacuum in Turkey and Iran's imperial heartland that both sought to fill. The move by Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian former Soviet republics to join the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) signalled the states' willingness to engage in regional integration initiatives with Turkey and Iran.[38] As chapter two noted, however, political and ethnic unrest and limited reciprocity in the newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia undermined Turkish and Iranian attempts to supplant Russia's dominance in the region. At the same time, bilateral relations continued to be unstable. Turkish elites frequently accused Iran of providing logistical support to the PKK (Xinhua General News Services, 2005a). While the states reconciled somewhat during the brief tenure of the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey in the mid-1990s, tensions grew in the final years of the 20th century: Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish prime minister, accused Iran of "continuing its efforts to export its revolution and of supporting the PKK" as late as 1999 (Ecevit, in Olson, 2000:876). Iran also overtly condemned Turkey's commitment to the separation of

[38] Established as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan and suspended in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the ECO in 1991 expanded to incorporate Afghanistan and the former Soviet states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (ECO, 2018). Its primary objective is to "pave the way to a territory of integrated and sustainable economies as well as free trade area achieved by highly educated societies and improved governance through enhanced cooperation" (ECO, 2017:1). Among the organisation's primary interests are trade, transport, and energy.

state and religion, with Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi stating that Iran "did not like Turkey's secular policies" (Kharrazi, in Olson, 2000:876). The final decade of the 20th century was therefore characterised primarily by bilateral tensions and limited cooperation. The energy sphere proved an exception to this rule.

4.2.2 Energy relations in the pre-AKP era

Coksun (2009) notes that Iran's substantial oil resources have been a source of international interest since at least the early years of the 20th century. Between 1908 and 1951, the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) effectively controlled oil development in Iran (Samson, 1991). Oil nationalisation in 1951 meant that Iran's oil resources were explored and developed by Tehran from the mid-20th century, but the West remained Iran's primary energy consumers until 1979. The dominance by Western states of Iran's oil market and lingering mistrust between Iran and Turkey limited bilateral energy trade prior to the Islamic Revolution, but energy proved a means of bilateral cooperation during the geopolitical upheaval that followed the revolution. Turkey's neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 enabled it to become an essential trading partner to the otherwise besieged Iran. Jenkins (2012) notes that in both April 1981 and March 1982, Turkey and Iran signed agreements under which Iranian oil was exported to Turkey in return for foodstuff and manufactured products. In ensuring that transit routes remained operational, Turkey also demonstrated that it was a stable transit state and viable option for further pipelines and tanker routes. Three years after the end of the war, the states signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a view to conducting feasibility studies for the construction of a pipeline that would carry Iranian natural gas through Anatolia to Europe (Jenkins, 2012). Both the MoU and Turkish-Iranian relations during the Iran-Iraq war indicate that bilateral relations were underscored by Turkey's geostrategic location between the isolated Iran and global markets. The relationship between Turkey's geography and Iran's international confinement is a theme that will recur throughout this chapter.

Despite competition for influence in Central Asia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was a recognition by both Turkey and Iran of the role the energy-rich states of the region could play in contributing to trans-Caspian and Eurasian pipeline projects. In the early 1990s, therefore, both states consulted with Turkmenistan in particular with

regards to Ashgabat's participation in a Caspian-European pipeline project (Kalicki, 2001). While the government of Tansu Ciller had signed an outline agreement for a natural gas pipeline in 1995 (Robins, 1997), it was under the short-lived Erbakan administration that the first concrete pipeline agreement was struck between the countries. During a trip to Tehran in 1998, Erbakan signed a 25-year agreement valued at $30 billion (bn) to import 230bcm natural gas from Iran (EIA, 2005). The construction of the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline was a turning point in energy relations, representing as it did a departure from the traditional focus on oil trade and bringing to the fore the possibility of integrating Iran into regional energy systems.

While engaging Iran in energy affairs contravened the US and its allies' efforts to isolate Iran through initiatives like the fourth corridor project, it nonetheless made strategic sense for Turkey. In 1996, Turkey had a rapidly growing economy that required supplemental energy resources and was which highly dependent on Russian energy supplies. As chapter three pointed out, both undermined Turkey's energy security and contributed to efforts to acquire new sources of energy. With the development of fourth corridor projects stymied by Russian opposition and unrest in the former Soviet states (see chapters three and five), the proposed Tabriz-Ankara pipeline offered an opportunity for bolstering both domestic energy security and relations with one of Turkey's most powerful neighbours. The pipeline, originally due to be completed in 1999, was initiated in 2001. [39] It signalled the beginning of an era of bilateral cooperation - particularly in the economic sphere - that would be the focal point of the AKP government in the formative years of the 21st century.

4.3 Turkish-Iranian relations, 2002-2014

4.3.1 Bilateral diplomacy in the AKP era

Iran's transformation from monarchy to theocracy in the post-revolution era was in stark contrast to Turkey's strictly secular form of government. While the brief historiography above indicated that Turkey's approach to Iran was predicated on pragmatism rather than ideology, diverging opinions on the separation on governance and religion - along with

[39]The EIA (2005) cites a number of reasons given by Turkish and Iranian officials for the delayed initiation of the pipeline, including economic recession in Turkey, financing issues, and US sanctions

Turkey's pro-Western stance and the state's highly securitised foreign policy[40] - contributed to tensions between the two. As the previous section noted, Turkey's military-bureaucratic elite harboured suspicions about Iran's intentions to export the Islamic Revolution to Turkey. By 2007, however, Abdullah Gul was clear in stating that tensions over accusations that Iran was seeking to undermine Turkey's secular system were "a thing of the past" (AFP, 2007b). This section will outline how proactive diplomacy, the changing security situation in the Middle East, and increased economic cooperation were central to the reconfiguration of Turkey's foreign policy approach to Iran. It will also stress how the regional power typology Turkey adhered to oscillated in its relationship with Iran but ultimately conformed to benevolent hegemony.

The AKP's 2002 electoral victory coincided with the designation of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil" (Bush, 2002) by the US, Turkey's long-standing strategic partner. Chapter two outlined how foreign policy in the AKP's first term was concerned with demonstrating strategic autonomy from the West. The extent of rapprochement with Iran was in stark contrast to the US' containment policies, and demonstrated the willingness of the AKP to prioritise regional relations that were beneficial to Turkey over compliance with Western agendas. Analysed through a regional powers/energy framework, there are two clear benefits to this strategy. Firstly, it created the necessary independence and stability to advance Turkey's energy strategy. As section 4.4 will argue, diplomatic engagement was essential to engendering goodwill and leverage in energy engagement with Iran. Secondly, it demonstrated to all Caspian states Turkey's commitment to prioritising regional engagement over long-standing alliances with great or developed powers. Considering that the former in particular was driven by self interest considering the advantages for Turkey's energy domestic energy security and geostrategic significance, this thesis considers Turkey's rapprochement with Iran to be part of a hegemonic regional powers strategy. The emphasis on diplomacy and cooperation in order to enhance Turkey's role in the region corresponds more specifically to benevolent hegemony.

[40]There is a large literature on the securitisation of Turkey's foreign policy in the late 1990s and 2000s, but this thesis lacks both the scope and space to discuss it. Kirisci (2006) and Aras and Polet (2008) are among those who debate the topic at length

A new era of high-level engagement was evident from early in the AKP's first term. Cagaptay (2004) notes that in 2003 alone, four high-level visits took place from Turkey to Iran and six between Iran and Turkey. Diplomatic relations reached their apex during the AKP's second term. Government press releases showing almost twenty high-level ministerial meetings were held between the states between 2008 and 2009. Despite condemnation from the West over the severity of the post-election crackdown on protesters, Erdogan and Gul were among the first to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his re-election victory in 2009 (Tait, 2009b). In an interview with the Guardian in the aftermath of the election, Erdogan declared that there was "no doubt" that Ahmadinejad was a "friend" with whom Turkey had "good relations" (Tait, 2009b). More indicative of Turkey's policy towards Iran, however, was Erdogan's statement in the same interview that he would not raise the matter of post-election protests with Tehran because it would represent "interference" in Iran's domestic affairs. A policy of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other states was a theme of Turkey's policy in the Caspian throughout the period under examination, and its application to Iran was important to cultivating both bilateral relations and the image of Turkey as a fair and impartial adjudicator of regional affairs. This, chapter two asserted, was integral to Turkey's legitimacy in the region. It propagated the image of Turkey as a benevolent regional hegemon.

Diplomatic cooperation was also spurred by growing international concern over Iran's nuclear programme. Turkey's role in negotiating between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Iran will be debated later in this chapter, but it should be acknowledged that Ankara's diplomatic engagement with Iran placed significant emphasis on the nuclear issue from the mid-2000s. Turkey was insistent from the outset that dialogue was pivotal to resolving international concerns. In January 2006, a spokesperson for the MFA stressed that Iran should ensure that it "rapidly enter[ed] full and transparent cooperation with the EU ... and the IAEA" (AP, 2006). A month later, Turkey's Minister for Justice Cemil Cicek called on Iran to be "more transparent for the sake of the region, the *(sic)* humanity, and Iran itself" (AP, 2006c). In doing so, Cicek positioned Turkey as an envoy for each of Iran, the region, and the international community ("humanity") in a manner indicative of the increased self-confidence that chapter two suggested was a hallmark of Turkish foreign policy from the mid-2000s. Iran was quite receptive to

Turkish diplomacy on the issue. In June 2006, Iran's Foreign Minister Hamid-Reza Asefi highlighted how, even though the AKP had yet to approach Iran directly about the nuclear issue, Turkey was a country with a "friendly approach" to Iran (IMFA, 2006). He noted that Iran's nuclear programme would be a topic of discussion during a visit by Abdullah Gul (IMFA, 2006). That Iran's nuclear negotiators travelled to Turkey immediately after two rounds of negotiations with the P5+1 (AP, 2006d; AP, 2008) also indicates a keenness on Iran's behalf to involve Turkey in the negotiations.

From mid-2006, Turkey also began promoting itself as a possible mediator in the dispute. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul travelled to Tehran in August of that year to offer himself as a "facilitator" in resolving tensions over Iran's nuclear programme (AFP, 2006e). In 2008, Gul again repeated in a joint press conference with Ahmadinejad that Turkey could help solve the problem and end sanctions (UPI, 2008). The willingness to act as a representative on issues important to other regional states (in this case Iran) was conceptualised as a form of leadership in chapter two. However, given the extent of self-interest involved in the issue for Turkey regarding its domestic security, place in the region, and status on the international stage, this thesis considers Turkey's position to be more congruent with benevolent regional hegemony.

As tensions over the nuclear issue continued to escalate, Turkey became more involved in international dialogue on the issue. In an interview in 2009, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan pointed out that the nuclear issue had received significant attention in meetings between both Erdogan and Babacan and Ahmadinejad and with Susan Rice and Sergi Lavrov in 2008 (Babacan, 2009). Babacan also alleged that Iran had requested Turkey play a role in negations, and Erdogan similarly stated in a 2009 interview with the Guardian that Iran had requested Turkish participation in negotiations (Babacan, 2009; Tait, 2009a). If Babacan and Erdogan's statements are to be believed, then calls by Iran for Ankara's involvement in negotiations represents an acceptance by Tehran of Turkey's mediatory capabilities within the international system and its role as a regional envoy. Chapter two suggested that acceptance by other regional states- and particularly other regional powers - was a key attribute of regional powers.

Turkey's role in mediating the conflict climaxed with its joint appointment with Brazil by the UNSC to negotiate a deal with Iran in 2009 (which will be discussed in greater detail in

section 4.4.6). Based on the prominence afforded to the nuclear issues in bilateral discourse, this thesis contends that both the intensive diplomacy between Turkey and Iran in years preceding the negotiations and Turkey's policy of non-interference in Iranian affairs - and particularly the refusal to condemn the violent crackdown on anti-Ahmadinejad protesters in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian general election - were instrumental in creating a relatively amicable relationship between the states that contributed to Iran's reciprocity to Turkish involvement in UNSC negotiations on the nuclear issue. In other words, it engendered the legitimacy that chapter two suggested was the trademark of non-imperial forms of regional power.

A convergence on geopolitical threat perceptions also spurred bilateral diplomacy. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was an early litmus test of the AKP's commitment to finding regional solutions to regional problems, but it also provided a context in which Turkey and Iran could highlight the necessity of bilateral cooperation within the region.[41] Both Turkey and Iran share a border with Iraq. News reports show that from early in the AKP's first term, shared concerns about Iraq featured frequently in bilateral discussions (Xinhua General News services, 2003a; AFP, 2003b; IMFA, 2004b). The states shared a fear that the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region of northern Iraq would declare independence in the upheaval that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein. Erdogan's declaration that the "territorial integrity and political unity" of Iraq had to be preserved (AFP, 2003b) is representative of the position taken on Iraq. The prospect of Kurdish independence fuelled fears that the PKK would resume the armed struggle for independence in both Turkey and Iran. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the group were reimagined as a common enemy. Yet it was not until 2017 when they began sharing military intelligence (Daily Sabah, 2017b) that Turkey and Iran actually implemented a joint campaign against the PKK.

Both Turkey and Iran were consistent in claiming that joint cooperation could prevent destabilisation and solve regional crises throughout the period under consideration. Resentment of external interference in regional affairs - and particularly in regional

[41]There is insufficient space here to debate the impact of the 2003 invasion on the regional hierarchy in the Middle East or its impact on Turkey and Iran's respective regional power ambitions in that region; scholars such as Ayman (2012) discuss these issues in more detail

security issues - was a major driver of this rhetoric. External - and particularly Western - interference in the region undermined Turkey's attempts to demonstrate strategic autonomy and regional hegemony. Iranian rhetoric repeatedly portrayed regional involvement by external powers as having a destabilising effect on regional stability (see, for example, Larijani in BBC (2005) and Asefi in IMFA (2006)). Of relevance to this thesis is former Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharrazi's suggestion that the "presence of foreign powers" in Central Asia and the Caucasus is not "in the best interests of regional security" (IMFA, 2004a). Accusations of regional competition between Iran and Turkey were also attributed to external interference (Salehi, 2012). Despite proactive diplomacy and rhetoric on bilateral security cooperation, the states were repeatedly forced to deny that they were competitors in the Middle East. In 2009, Iran's ambassador to Turkey Bahman Hosseinpour stated that Iran and Turkey were "not rivals" and that they "complete[d] each other" in a way that enabled them to "act in parallel on regional issues" (Hurriyet, 2009). These rebuttals became more frequent in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the onset of the Syrian civil war.[42] The benefits of cooperation for regional stability were again frequently evoked as a means of renouncing competition. Davutoglu, for example, suggested in 2013 that bilateral cooperation was the "backbone of regional stability (Browder, 2013). Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Sarif similarly suggested that cooperation would "contribute to regional stability and peace" (Today's Zaman, 2014). Cooperation on regional stability - a key indicator of regional power and one essential to realising Ankara's energy agenda - through dialogue and in its own interest is indicative of Turkey's pursuit of benevolent regional hegemony.

Chapter two argued that a state's ability to shape regional security complexes is a feature of regional power, while interference by external powers in regional affairs can limit the capacity of states to implement a regional powers agenda. It was proposed that in Turkey's case, external interference affected the state's ability to demonstrate strategic autonomy and regional hegemony in both its own interests and those of subordinate regional actors. While Turkish-Iranian cooperation did not directly affect either states' position in the regional hierarchy in the Caspian region, joint efforts within the Middle East set precedence for bilateral cooperation with other states: it demonstrated Turkey's

[42]Aras and Yorulmazlar (2014) and Halehsar (2013) consider the respective roles and interests of Turkey and Iran in Syria and the MENA region more broadly post-2011 in more detail

willingness to work with regional partners to resolve regional conflict. As chapter two pointed out, cooperation in and control of on security matters was a prerequisite for regional power.

Despite these claims, however, there is little evidence that Iran and Turkey developed any form of concrete cooperative policy on regional security initiatives outside of those related to the PKK. This is representative of the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice that this thesis argues plagued Turkish-Iranian relations. Regardless of the extent to which Iran articulated a desire for regional integration and increased cooperation with Turkey, internal distrust of external actors prohibited any extensive integration. This was particularly evident during the Ahmadinejad administration, where a return to the securitised and resolutely anti-status quo rhetoric that had characterised the Khomeini era became more prominent again.[43] Yet at the same time, if - as chapter two argued - influence in regional security affairs is a prerequisite to regional power, then it made little strategic sense for Turkey to exclude Iran from its security equations (even if cooperation was limited to rhetoric). Minimising competition and problems with Iran was necessary for the successful application of the "zero problems with neighbours" policy and regional power ambitions. The next section will examine how cooperation in the economic sphere further contributed to the strengthening of relations between Turkey and Iran.

4.3.2 Economic cooperation

It was in the area of trade that the most substantial progress was made in Turkish-Iranian relations during the AKP's first three terms in office. World Bank data shows that total bilateral trade increased from $1.2 bn in 2002 - the year the AKP took power - to $13.8 bn in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a). Bilateral trade reached a high of $22 billion dollars in 2012, but subsequently contracted as Turkey implemented UN sanctions against Iran. This decline notwithstanding, the rise in bilateral trade and trade agreements between the states indicates that economic relations were at the heart of the Turkish-Iranian relationship between 2002 and 2014. The AKP era also witnessed significant private sector investment

[43] See, for example, Ahmadinejad's comments regarding Israel on 2005 (MacAskill and McGreal, 2005), or his speech to the UN General Assembly the following year (Ahmadinejad, 2006)

by Turkish companies in Iran, especially in the ethnically Turkish East Azerbaijan region of northern Iran (Iranian Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs (MEFA), 2014).

Bolstering bilateral trade was a prerogative for the new AKP government from its earliest years in power. During the AKP's first meeting of the Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission (JEC) in April 2003, Erdogan and Iranian First Vice President Rezza Aref agreed to commence negotiations on a preferential trade and tariff system (Xinhua General News, 2003b). Even at the height of international tensions around Iran's nuclear programme, Turkish officials were both consistent and unequivocal about the desire to increase trade with Iran: in 2006, Iran's First Vice-President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi suggested that the states had agreed to increase trade threefold to $30b within five years (Xinhua General News Service, 2009). Similarly, in 2010 an AP journalist quoted Erdogan's intention to triple Iranian trade volumes within the following five years (Hacaoglu, 2010). The extent of Erdogan's ambition was revealed in his declaration that he envisioned an "unimpeded trade mechanism" with Iran akin to that that Turkey had with Europe (Hacoglu, 2010). Yet the similarities between the 2006 and 2010 statements and the fact that trade did not increase by any significant in the interim is again indicative of the chasm between rhetoric and practice in Turkish-Iranian relations.

It was in terms of the exportation of Turkish products to Iran that Turkey made the greatest inroads in economic cooperation in the period under consideration. In 2002, Turkey's exports to Iran were worth $338m (World Bank, 2017b). Turkey was Iran's 17th largest import market and represented less than 2% of Iran's total imports (OEC, 2017a). The implementation of EU sanctions on Iran and Turkey's pursuit of Iranian markets meant that by 2014, Turkey was Iran's fourth largest import market, with Turkish exports to Iran worth $3.8b (World Bank, 2017). OEC data shows that Turkey's primary exports to Iran were textiles, metals, and machinery (OEC, 2017a). From 2012, however, precious metals became Turkey's predominant export to Iran, with gold trade in particular experiencing an exponential increase: gold exports jumped from 53m - or 1.4% of total exports - in 2011 to $6.53b in 2012, accounting for 67% of exports. Various reports indicate that the implementation of international sanctions that restricted trading with Iran in dollars or euros led Turkey to pay for energy imports in gold (Dombey, 2013; Kandemir, 2013).

Oil dominates Iran's global exports. It accounted for 81% (or $25.4bn) of total Iranian exports in 2002 and 73% ($37.2bn) in 2014 (OEC, 2017a). Given Turkey's significant energy requirements and its geographic proximity to Iran, as well as the limited diversification of Iran's export markets beyond energy (OEC, 2017a), it is unsurprising that oil was also the number one export from Iran to Turkey for most of period under consideration. At its peak in 2005, oil represented 90% of Turkey's Iranian imports. Total mineral products (including natural gas and refined products) accounted for $2.2bn (or 93%) of imports from Iran. The implementation of strict sanctions saw this figure plummet to 15% in 2014, with minerals (particularly copper and aluminium) and petroleum by-products like ethylene polymers occupying a growing role in imports (OEC, 2017a). OEC data shows that this represents a decrease in the value of mineral trade from $2.2bn in 2005 to $250m in 2014 - a decline of almost 90%. (OEC, 2017a) Nevertheless, Turkey remained Iran's fifth largest export market.

Bilateral trade had significant implications for both states. Economically isolated as a result of US sanctions, Turkey was a conduit for Iranian goods and services to the rest of the world prior to the implementation of EU and UN sanctions. Chapter two claimed that the formation of economic interdependencies that contribute to wider regional economic structures is important to regional power. The extent to which Iran was dependent on Turkey as a conduit skewered the balance of power between the states in Turkey's favour despite the bilateral trade balance favouring Iran (this will be discussed in more depth in the next section of this chapter). The remainder of this chapter will highlight how it was also essential for the realisation of Turkey's energy hub ambitions. The significance of energy in Turkey-Iranian trade cannot therefore be understated. The next section will examine in depth the trajectory of bilateral energy relations between Turkey and Iran between 2002 and 2014. To provide context for these relations, it will first highlight key features of Iran's energy situation.

4.4 Energy relations between Turkey and Iran, 2002-2014

4.4.1 Iran: an energy superpower?

Based on its hydrocarbon reserves, Iran should be one of the most significant actors in global energy markets. British Petroleum's (BP) annual survey of global energy supplies

shows that Iran holds 158 billion barrels (bbl) of oil and 33.5 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of natural gas (BP, 2017c). Its proven oil reserves are the fourth largest in the world and account for 10% of the global total, while its natural gas reserves are second only to those of Russia (BP, 2017c). The 3.8 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d) produced in 2014 (2.8mb/d of which was crude oil) made Iran the seventh largest oil producer in the world (EIA, 2015d; BP, 2017c). China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounted for 98% of the 1.4mb/d crude oil exported by Iran in 2014 (EIA, 2015d; OEC, 2017). BP data shows that natural gas production amounted to 186bcm in 2014, the majority of which was consumed domestically (BP, 2017c). Turkey is Iran's largest gas export market, and purchased 92% of the 8.4 bcm of gas exported in 2016 (BP, 2017c). Armenia and Azerbaijan purchased the remaining 0.7 bcm (BP, 2017c; EIA, 2018). Iran also imported 6.7 bcm from Turkmenistan and 0.2bcm from Azerbaijan (EIA, 2015d); the former in order to meet peak seasonal demands, and the latter as part of a natural gas swap deal that will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.5.2 of this chapter. Iran is also highly dependent on energy income: oil exports accounted for 75% of Iran's total export income of $51 bn in 2016 (OEC, 2017). The extent to which Iran is financially dependent on international energy income meant that energy was intertwined with economic, foreign, military, and national security policy.



Figure 12: Iranian oil export destinations, 2017 (data from BP, 2017c; OEC, 2017)

There is a clear discrepancy between Iran's substantial hydrocarbon reserves and its position in the global energy hierarchy. Despite holding the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, Iran accounts for less than 1% of global supplies (EIA, 2015d). While its oil sector fares better, it too is underdeveloped (IEA, 2010). There are several potential explanatory factors for this discrepancy. That Iran reached peak production in 1979 indicates a correlation between the Iranian revolution and oil production trends: sanctions and political and economic uncertainty affected the state's capacity to develop oil reserves. A protectionist energy market and concerns about domestic and regional instability restricted foreign direct investment further limited energy development in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution.[44] Significant subsidies for domestic energy consumers placed limitations of the profitability of energy production and, therefore on the financial resources available for reinvestment in energy exploration and development. [45]

It is, however, impossible to evaluate Iran's failure to realise its energy potential without considering the effect of international sanctions. Sanctions were originally imposed on Iran by the US in the aftermath of the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis and were extended on several occasions. The EU and US began implementing sanctions on Iranian trade, financial assets, and personnel during the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme (World Bank 2015). Energy proved a target for successive sanction regimes: the US' Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (1996) threatened to penalise private companies that invested more than $20 million in the Iranian energy sector, while the UN and EU froze the assets of individuals involved in energy (UNSC Resolution 1747; UNSC Resolution 1929; European Council, 2012).

The implementation of multilateral UN sanctions in 2010 -which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter - and the consequent EU embargo on Iranian oil had a particularly detrimental effect on Iran's energy trade. IMF (2014) and OEC (2017) data

[44] Iran's energy sector is fully nationalised, and domestic energy and investment policies played a large role in limiting its successful development. While international oil companies (IOCs) can participate in downstream activities in the energy sector, constitutional limitations on foreign ownership of natural resources prohibit involvement in downstream management. The inclusion of buy-back clauses in energy contracts as a result of these restrictions offer an uncompetitive rate of return for foreign investors and, consequently, contribute to an uncompetitive energy market.

[45] Subsidies in 2007/8 cost the Iranian government around $100bn, or the equivalent of 27% of GDP - far higher than any other OPEC state (IMF, 2008). An extensive subsidy reform programme implemented in 2013 did, however, reduce subsidies to about 4% of GDP in 2014 (IMF, 2015)

shows that Iran's oil and gas revenue declined from $118bn at the end of the 2011/12 fiscal year to $41bn at the end of 2014. Total oil exports declined by almost 50% from 2.6mb/d in 2011 to 1.4mb/d in 2014 (EIA, 2015e). The direction of exports was also significantly altered by the EU oil trade embargo. In 2011, Europe purchased 29% of Iran's crude petroleum exports. By 2014, 99.4% of Iran's exports were destined for Asia (BP, 2017c). Considering the contention in section 4.4.4 of this chapter that the AKP sought to incorporate Iranian hydrocarbons into east-west energy projects in order to enhance the viability of a Turkish energy hub, this thesis asserts that that reorientation was detrimental to the party's energy strategy. Before expanding on that issue, however, the next sections will look more generally at energy relations between 2002 and 2014 in order to gain a clearer perspective of the factors influencing bilateral energy trade.

4.4.2 Bilateral energy trade

Section 4.3.2 of this chapter outlined the prevalence afforded to oil in trade relations between Turkey and Iran. Aside from constituting the bulk of exports to Turkey, Iranian hydrocarbons also occupied a predominant position in Turkey's energy mix. As chapter three pointed out, Iran is a major supplier of oil to Turkey, and accounted for 27% of Turkish oil imports in 2014 (EIA, 2015b). Iran's share in Turkey's oil import market remained high throughout the 2002-2014 period, with Iran surpassing Russia to become Turkey's single largest supplier of crude oil in 2010 (BP, 2017c). Energy data shows that Iran maintained a consistent overall share in Turkey's oil market throughout the AKP's first three terms (BP, 2017c; OEC, 2017a).

Iranian natural gas was pivotal to Turkey's energy mix. Iran was Turkey's second largest supplier of natural gas in 2014 after Russia, providing 20% of Turkey's total gas requirements through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline (EIA, 2015b). The previous section of this chapter highlighted how 90% of Iran's gas exports were destined for Turkey during the period under examination. The volume of Iranian gas exports increased year on year during the AKP's first three terms in office (IEA, 2013; BP, 2017c). [46] Trade statistics show that the volume of gas traded between Iran and Turkey did not fall after the

[46] It should be acknowledged that there were slight decreases in 2011 and 2013 before growth resumed in subsequent years

implementation of UN sanctions (BP, 2017c). Consistency in natural gas imports and continued - if significantly reduced - oil imports despite the sanction regime can be attributed to exemptions from some sanctions for Turkey in return for limiting oil imports and the circumvention of others by paying for oil and gas in gold (Tatersall, 2012).[47]

Turkey and Iran's desire to increase bilateral energy trade made sense politically, economically, and geographically, and had the potential to be mutually beneficial. Chapter one suggested that multidimensional bilateral relations are beneficial to successful energy diplomacy. In this regard, the extensive diplomacy carried out between the states and the long-standing nature of bilateral relations were a facilitating factor in energy trade negotiations. That Turkey and Iran share a border negated the need to engage a transit state in any pipeline project, which in turn limited potential security threats emanating from third party actors. The geographic proximity of the two states provided economic benefits, too: chapter one pointed out that gas pipelines tend to be costly projects, so those projects that cover shorter distances can be more viable than longer-distanced pipelines. For Turkey, obtaining access to new Iranian supplies would both alleviate the pressure on domestic energy markets that were increasingly strained as a result of continued economic growth and would aid the diversification of energy imports away from Russia. Iran would benefit from energy income from Turkey and, importantly, Turkey could facilitate the transportation of Iranian gas to Europe. Turkey, therefore, had a strategic value for Iran in terms of transit routes to European markets that contributed to redressing the imbalance caused by asymmetrical trade imports with Iran. Finally, integrating Iran successfully into regional energy systems would not only increase the perception of Turkey as a regional power, but it would do so in an area (energy) in which Turkey is at a significant disadvantage in terms of relative capacity in the region. More importantly, it would demonstrate to other energy rich states that Turkey had both the capacity and willingness to facilitate the transportation of energy resources to European markets. This, then, would substantiate the perception of Turkey as a benevolent regional hegemon. However, this section will demonstrate how Turkish-Iranian energy relations were replete with inconsistencies. In particular, it will illustrate how the disconnection between rhetoric and

[47] Payment for services in lira or dollars was banned under the sanction regime.

practice when it came to energy cooperation undermined the development of tangible new connections between the states.

It became apparent in the AKP's first term that energy relations with Iran would not be without issue. The price agreed for natural gas through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline proved to be a topic of contention for the AKP almost immediately. In rushing through negotiations for the pipeline in 1996, and in light of projected economic growth, the Erbakan government agreed to pay above the market price for Iranian gas. Chapter three pointed out that the revision of Turkey's energy requirements in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crash meant that the state was contracted to purchase more energy that its economy required: financial analysts estimated that the disparity between Turkey's contracted gas imports and gas demands would reach "disproportionate levels" by 2004 (Oil and Gas Journal, 2003). Complicating the matter further was the inclusion of a "take-or-pay" clause in the 1996 agreement that committed Turkey to buying at least 87% of the contracted volume of gas (Middle East Economic Survey, 2002). If Turkish purchases fell below that level then the state would be liable to pay the remainder of the gas costs.

The AKP consequently set out to renegotiate energy trade deals with Turkey's major gas suppliers. Negotiations with Russia will be discussed in chapter five, but it can be noted at this stage that Turkey suspended flows of natural gas through the Blue Stream pipeline - itself only initiated in early 2003 - for several months before renegotiating a new price and take-or-pay contracts. In June 2002, Turkey suspended supplies of Iranian gas imports, alleging that the quality of gas received was of a low quality (EIA, 2005). However, low demand and the desire for lower prices are more likely explanatory factors for the supply suspension. The renegotiation of both gas prices and take or pay criteria in November 2002 without alterations to the quality of natural gas (Natural Gas World, January 2012) suggests that economic considerations were a central motivation. Further substantiation for that claim comes from Turkey's decision to seek arbitration from the International Chamber of Commerce in 2004 for Iran's perceived overcharging for natural gas exports (UPI, 2009b).[48] Chapter one argued that energy consumers face substantial difficulties in substituting natural gas supplies during suspensions due to the fixed nature of natural gas

[48] The court found in Turkey's favour in 2009, and ordered an immediate price reduction of 18% and for Tehran to pay $800m for previously refusing to lower prices (Reuters, 2012a; UPI, 2009b).

trade with regards to both transport (that is, pipelines) and the long-term nature of pricing contracts. That Turkey was willing to suspend natural gas trade with Iran indicates that it either had access to alternative supplies or - more likely, given the state's economic downturn at the time - it was unlikely to suffer energy security issues as a result of any Iranian shortfall. At the same time, the contentions in energy trade were at odds with the cooperative rhetoric that the pervious section of this chapter suggested dominated the new AKP era.

This thesis therefore considers Turkey's pertinacity on the pricing issue to be indicative of the AKP's perception of its strength in energy negotiations with a major energy supplier and, accordingly, of its regional power status. Of the regional power typologies outlined in chapter two, Turkey's actions in 2002 are most congruent with coercive hegemony: the suspension of both payments and gas flows can be conceptualised as a form of coercion facilitated by a high degree of self-interest. It should be pointed out at this stage that this was the only example this thesis found that is identified as coercive hegemony in Turkish-Iranian relations. It does not, therefore, invalidate the argument that Turkey's Iranian strategy corresponded on the whole to benevolent hegemony. Nonetheless, the episode contradicts the recurrent argument in the "energy in IR literature" (see chapter one) that the manipulation of energy projects is primarily the remit of producer states. This, it was argued, was particularly the case for natural gas agreements because of the difficulty faced by producers in finding substitutes for suspended supplies. The eventual renegotiation of the contract in Turkey's favour in November 2002 indicates that Turkey's policy was a successful one: so much so that, as chapter five will highlight, Turkey implemented a similar strategy in 2003 to force the renegotiation of natural gas supplies from Russia. The reasons for the success of the policy are less clear, but this chapter demonstrates how Turkey's utility as a transit state for Iranian energy to international markets, for reducing Iran's international economic and political isolation, and as Iran's predominant gas export market, tilted the balance of power between the states in Ankara's favour. It should be recalled at this stage that chapter two suggested that a preferential position in bilateral relations could endow energy poor states with leverage over energy rich states. That leverage would augment Turkey's regional status. However, the next sections will show how the main threat to Turkey's Iranian energy strategy stemmed from Iran's relations

with other states. Those relations were crucial in preventing Turkey from incorporating Iranian energy into its strategy for benevolent regional hegemony.

4.4.3 Iran in Turkey's energy equations: the 2007 MoU and Nabucco

Throughout the 2002-2014 period, Turkey and Iran repeatedly called for increased cooperation on energy projects. At one point, the Turkish environment minister alluded to the shared importance of Turkey and Iran in energy affairs by referring to the states as "an important axis for natural gas" (Anadolou Agency, 2003). Newspaper reports from 2003 highlight Turkey's interest in utilising existing pipeline infrastructure to transport Iranian gas to Europe (AFP, 2003a). In 2007 - the year in which, chapter two suggests, Turkey reached new levels of confidence in its ability to influence regional energy equations - the states signed a deal that looked set to cement energy cooperation and contribute to Turkey's regional power.

The 2007 Memorandum of Association (MoU) on cooperation in the natural gas sector endowed TPAO, Turkey's national petroleum company, with the rights to develop three phases of Iran's South Pars supergiant gas field and created a framework for the construction of a pipeline to carry gas from Iran to Turkey and on into Europe (UPI, 2007, Reuters, 2007). The MoU also planned to incorporate Turkmen gas into the new pipeline to be exported to Europe: Iranian Oil Minister Seyed Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh stated that the MoU would "allow the transit of Iran's gas to Europe via Turkey and will let Turkmenistan's gas be exported to Europe through Iran's soil" (Reuters, 2007). Hamaneh also made clear in an interview with Iranian media that Iran more specifically intended the new pipeline to become part of the Nabucco project (UPI, 2007).

Increased energy cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and Turkmenistan would contribute to the regional integration that chapter two suggested was important for regional powers. The use of Turkish territory to transport natural gas to Europe had the potential to increase Ankara's geostrategic significance to Iran and Turkmenistan. However, the most important contribution of the 2007 MoU to Turkey's potential regional hegemony was the inclusion of a clause that would enable Turkey to re-export Iranian and Turkmen gas to Europe (Sholeri, 2013). Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler's statement that Turkey needed the money it could gain "from buying and selling (the) project" (Tehran Times, 2008)

indicates that the AKP considered the deal to be a step towards the foundation of a Turkish energy hub. As chapter two noted, transit states or energy corridors do not have the right to export (or, in Guler's terms, sell) energy products to third parties. Energy hubs, on the other hand, have the capacity to re-export energy, to set prices, and to determine the final destination of the energy project. The inclusion of a re-export clause in the MoU therefore had several important repercussions for Turkey's energy and regional power agendas. Economically, the capacity to set prices and collect transit tariffs would reap the financial benefits that chapter two suggested were important in determining regional powerhood. Along with the ability to determine prices, engaging in energy bargaining with other importers and determining the trajectory of regional energy resources would endow Turkey with power more akin to an energy producer rather than an importing state. It was argued in chapter two that Turkey's deficit of domestic energy reserves was detrimental to its regional powers agenda and status in a region dominated by energy affairs. The capacity to sell and direct energy supplies would not only emphasise Turkey's geostrategic importance in regional energy flows, but it endow it with increased legitimacy as a regional power and regional energy "leader". The incorporation of other regional states into the project in a way that facilitated both Turkey's self-interest and regional integration is congruent with the benevolent hegemony depicted in chapter two.

Yet as chapter three noted, the competing energy and geopolitical agendas of other states involved in the fourth corridor had the potential to stymie the realisation of Turkey's energy agenda. The incorporation of Iran into any east-west pipeline was predicated on the willingness of European energy markets to accept Iranian natural gas. The situation was further complicated by the US' vocal opposition to Iran's role in regional energy projects (Pannier, 2008; UPI, 2009a) and by the growing international tension around the Iranian nuclear programme. Chapter two pointed out that the fourth corridor programme sought to exclude Iran from new east-west energy projects. According to various sources in the Turkish media, US officials objected to the 2007 MoU because of growing tensions between Iran and the US over the nuclear programme, arguing that it was "not the right time" for Turkey to be investing in Iranian energy (Jenkins, 2007).

Regardless, Turkey continued to highlight the importance of Iranian supplies for the Nabucco project. At the height of the nuclear crisis in 2009, Erdogan insisted that the

exclusion of Iran from the project would mean that "Nabucco [would] come to a dead end" (Charbonneau, 2009). Iranian officials also enunciated the central role Iran could play in the project. Iran's ambassador to Turkey, Bahman Hosseinpour, told Hurriyet Daily News in an interview that excluding Iran from the Nabucco project on account of "temporary political considerations" made the pipeline "impossible". He pointed out that the "mutual interests and economic potential" of the pipeline for both the EU and Iran meant that "sooner or later, Iran (would) be part of Nabucco" (Hurriyet, 2009).

European states appeared to be increasingly susceptible to growing US pressure to find alternatives to Iranian gas. The EU's openness to Iranian participation in any east-west energy project varied quite significantly throughout the AKP's first three terms in office. In the early 2000s, the EU Commission placed a similar emphasis on incorporating Iranian gas into the EU energy agenda as it did with other Caspian and Middle Eastern States. A 2004 report by the EU's Energy Directorate-General mapped potential pipeline routes for "priority projects" that clearly extend into Iran (European Commission, 2004b). By 2007, as US pressure to isolate Iran increased, EU officials were referring to Iran only briefly or not at all in speeches and policy documents (see, for example, Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, 2007; Piebalgs, 2007). An exception was the EU's Second Strategic Energy Review, which suggested Iran might joint the Southern Corridor at a future point "when political conditions permit" (European Commission, 2008c:4). In 2012, the EU not only fully implemented UN sanctions but imposed an oil embargo on Iran. Nonetheless, Turkey continued to press for the inclusion of Iranian resources in east-west energy projects. The attempt by Turkey to involve Iran in Nabucco at the height of nuclear tensions is representative of the AKP's tendency to underestimate the broader geopolitical motivations behind pipeline projects that was highlighted in chapter three.

These inconsistencies manifested elsewhere in bilateral energy relations. Section 4.4.3 of this chapter highlighted how the 2002 pricing dispute between Turkey and Iran was indicative of an early attempt by Turkey to influence the hierarchy of relations between the states. The episode was also a symptom of wider issues that plagued Turkish-Iranian energy affairs during the 2002-2014 period. This section highlighted a rhetorical commitment by each of Turkey and Iran to increased energy cooperation, yet no concrete new energy deals were concluded between 2002 and 2014. Though it was elaborated upon

and extended on several occasions, the 2007 MoU was never implemented. In 2010 the rights for phases 22, 23, and 24 of South Pars - those earmarked for TPAO under the MoU - were reallocated to a local Iranian consortium.

Security and technical issues further affected bilateral energy affairs and contributed to multiple interruptions to natural gas trade. Chapter one noted that energy infrastructure could be the targeted by separatist and terrorist groups. The Tabriz-Ankara pipeline was closed on at least seven occasions - including twice in 2006, once in each of 2007 and 2008, and twice in 2011 - after attacks by the PKK on essential infrastructure (BBC Monitoring, 2006; World Gas Intelligence, 2006; Shiraevskaya, 2007; Al-Jazeera, 2011). Iran's mismanagement of its energy system and domestic shortfalls following the suspension of Turkmen natural gas to Iran also led to the suspension of gas exports to Turkey in each of January 2006, January 2007, and January 2008 (AFP, 2007a; Neft Compass, 2008).Suspensions aside, commercial problems continued to manifest in bilateral energy trade. After Iran refused a second request to reduce gas prices in 2012, Turkey referred Tehran to the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). Yildiz stated that the two governments "did not share the same view" on gas pricing, and that the decision to bring the case to arbitration was based on "just reasoning" (Reuters, 2012). The Iranian government remained resolute in its refusal to reduce gas prices, with NIOC spokesman Majid Boujarzadeh insisting that "both sides should remain committed to the (1996) contract" (Reuters, 2012). In 2016, however, the ICA ruled that Iran had been overcharging Turkey for natural gas and ordered it to reimburse Turkey with $1.9bn (Financial Tribune, 2017a).

Iran's unreliability during domestic surges and Turkey's continuous contestation of contractually agreed prices added an element of contention to an otherwise amicable energy relationship. In addition, it highlighted again the dissonance between cooperative rhetoric and actual bilateral relations. Regardless of the commercial issues that plagued Turkish-Iranian energy affairs during the AKP's first three terms in office, the two continued to refer to energy as a major source of cooperation. Despite the latest arbitration, for example, Ali Majedi, Deputy Oil Minister of Iran, stated in 2014 that Iranian-Turkish negotiations on increasing Iran's gas supplies were on-going. This, he suggested, showed "that the current negotiations (were) not related to the two countries' row" (Fars News

Agency, 2014). A similar case occurred in 2009 when Iran threatened to refer Turkey to the ICC for failure to adhere to buy-back conditions for failing to purchase the agreed volume of gas. Three weeks later, an agreement was made to extend the timescale for the implementation of the MoU for three months.

Claims of cooperation on energy issues in spite of commercial dispute are reflective of the lack of consistency that plagued Iranian-Turkish energy relations and bilateral relations more generally. The AKP's Iranian policy as a whole attempted to maintain an open and strategic dialogue despite dissatisfaction with Iran's regional policies and frustration with existing energy engagement. Consequently, there was a significant disparity between Turkish-Iranian energy rhetoric and a tangible expansion of bilateral relations that predates the sanction era. While the lack of new energy projects was indicative of a lack of commitment by both states to expanding energy relations, there are several indications that that energy-related rhetoric served a purpose for Iran and Turkey. For Iran, the benefits of energy trade rhetoric were more obvious: it undermined the US' containment policies, demonstrated the possibility of constructing a regional order that extends beyond the influence or remit of the status quo, and suggested to other potential consumers that Iranian energy was a desirable commodity.

For Turkey, the benefits are less immediately obvious: there was a genuine necessity to diversify energy trade, and rhetorical posturing did little to reduce the influence of Russia in the Turkish gas sector. However, employing a regional powers framework sheds lights on the advantages of Turkey's energy discourse with Iran. For Turkey, access to Iran's oil and gas reserves was integral to realising its domestic energy security - and therefore ensuring continued economic growth - and the energy hub ambition that chapter two argued was part of Turkey's regional power agenda. The focus on expanding gas (rather than oil) trade indicates a recognition by the AKP of the geostrategic advantages and limitations Turkey had in terms of energy transit systems. Iran has multiple routes and means through which it can transport oil. It is not reliant on the Turkish route to export oil to Europe and could find alternative consumers if relations between the states deteriorated. However, it is rather more reliant on Turkey when it comes to natural gas. Lack of LNG processing facilities and internal conflict in neighbouring states like Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan limited Iran's gas export options and positioned Turkey as

Tehran's most viable gas export partner and route. Consistent energy engagement would, therefore, ensure Turkey maintained at least a rhetorical energy relationship with Iran to generate goodwill that chapter one suggested was beneficial to energy relations. It would also benefit regional stability and, more importantly, Turkey's status and power capacity in the region in a manner correspondent to benevolent regional hegemony.

Furthermore, engaging Iran in energy debates was important for augmenting Turkey's role in energy markets more broadly. Section 4.5 will discuss the inclusion of Turkmen gas supplies in east-west energy projects like Nabucco and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). With the failure to demarcate the Caspian Sea prohibiting the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline, the only viable route through which Turkmen supplies could reach Turkey was via Iran. Energy rhetoric with Iran therefore reasserted Turkey's commitment to finding a route for Turkmen supplies, which in turn demonstrated Turkey's desire to become a significant actor in regional energy equations. First, the next section will examine the Iranian nuclear issue because of its significance for Iran for most of the 21st century so far and its implications for Turkey's energy agenda

4.4.4 Turkey, Iran, and the nuclear issue

Chapter one highlighted how advanced developing states are increasingly pursing nuclear power because it is relatively clean, reliable, and cheap in comparison to other finite energy sources. It asserted that while the weaponisation of nuclear fuel remained a concern, the right to nuclear development endowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (NPT, 1970: Article IV) and the economic and energy security advantages of nuclear development saw many advanced developing states embark on nuclear programmes. Most states did so with little contention from the international community. Each of the three states studied in detail in this thesis pursued nuclear development to some degree during the period under examination: Turkey and Iran in working to construct their first nuclear power stations, and Russia as an established nuclear state and a preeminent actor in global nuclear power development (this last point will be discussed in more detail in chapter five). While Turkey and Russia freely developed nuclear energy strategies within the auspices of the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran's nuclear programme became the subject of significant debate and controversy from the early 2000s.

International concerns originally rose because of the failure of the Iranian government to declare to the IAEA that it had begun enriching and processing domestic uranium resources (IAEA, 2003).[49] Early IAEA reports admitted that there was no evidence to suggest that Iran was weaponising or intended to weaponise uranium (IAEA 2006, 2007), and Iranian officials including Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader of Iran Seyed Ali Khamenei repeatedly restated Iran's opposition to nuclear weapons (Xinhua General News Service, 2003; Dareini , 2004; Khamenei, 2006; UN, 2010a). International concerns surrounding Iran's nuclear agenda grew, however, and in 2006 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment programme (UNSC Resolution 1696). The continuation of the programme led to the imposition of sanctions on individuals, companies, and trade related to Iran's nuclear programme in late 2006 (UNSC Resolution 1737). Tensions escalated again following the publication of an IAEA report in February 2009 that highlighted several outstanding "concerns" regarding the programme that needed to be clarified in order to "exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme" (IAEA, 2009:4).

Tensions reached their apex just as Turkey was successful in its bid to be elected by the UN General Assembly to the UNSC for the 2009-2010 term. Erdogan had suggested that the extent to which Turkey was supported its bid for a non-permanent UNSC seat[50] was "a reflection of [Turkey's] increasing weight in international politics" and of the" confidence" that the international community had in the state (Hurriyet, 2008b). It was noted earlier in this chapter that the nuclear issue had become increasingly prominent in Turkish-Iranian dialogue as the first decade of the 21st century wore on, with Turkey promoting itself as a potential mediator between the West and Iran. As tensions heightened, and Turkish self-confidence grew, foreign leaders began suggesting there might be a role for Turkey in negotiations: US President Barack Obama suggested, for example, that Turkey could play an "important player" in ensuring Iran pursued nuclear power for peaceful means (Reuters, 2009). Brazil, another advanced developing state that had also been elected to the UNSC

[49] Iran did not have sufficient technical knowledge to build its first nuclear power station at Bushehr. Russia agreed to construct the Bushehr reactor and, as part of the deal (and to make Russia's nuclear engagement with Iran more palatable to West), Iran agreed to purchase enriched uranium from Russia and return spent fuel rods to Russia for disposal (Kraemer, 2014). This limited the opportunity for Iran to use spent fuel rods or enrich uranium to the level necessary for weaponisation and thus led to concern when Iran began enriching uranium in secret.

[50] 151 out of 192 UN members voted in Turkey's favour

for the 2009-2010 session, was making overtures to both Iran and the status quo over the nuclear issue at the same time (Vieira de Jesus, 2011). When the UNSC began contemplating new actions against Iran in late 2009, Turkey and Brazil embarked on a series of high level negotiations with Tehran to resolve the issue (Barrionuevo and Arsu, 2010; Charbonneau, 2010; Hafezi, 2010). The announcement by the states of an agreement on the nuclear issue in May 2010 appeared to indicate that the negotiations had been successful. For Iran - which rejected international hierarchies and repeatedly called for the global South to solve its own problems (Asefi, 2006; Ahmadinejad, 2006, 2009) - negotiations with other advanced developing states were preferable to continued negotiations with the P5+1. Regional powers theory suggests that representations of regional issues in international institutions and the recognition by other states in those institutions of the role of the state are two criteria that determine whether or not a state is a regional power. Turkey's involvement in the mediation process, therefore, can be framed in terms of recognition by other states of Turkey's regional power and - given the ideational nature of the process and the extent of self-interest on Turkey's behalf - of its benevolent regional hegemony.

Examining the Iranian nuclear programme through a regional powers prism highlights several implications for the delineation of the regional hierarchy in the Caspian. Weaponisation aside, the domestic enrichment programme had the potential to reduce Iran's dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel. Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant runs on Russian-supplied fuel rods, and spent rods are returned to Russia for disposal. Chapter two argued that reliance on other regional powers for public goods - such as primary energy supplies - diluted the capacity of the state to implement its regional agenda. Domestic production would not only limit economic expenditure on importing enriched uranium and exporting used fuel rods, but it would decrease Iran's dependence on a competing regional power. The production of domestic nuclear fuel would also help free up natural gas supplies being used in the domestic market, thereby increasing Iran's export capacity and its role in regional energy markets. It would therefore augment Iran's capacity to use energy as a tool through which it could accrue regional power. In addition, if Iran was embarking on a weaponisation programme - and it is worth repeating here that there was no concrete evidence in the 2000s that this was the case - then it would have significant repercussions for the balance of power in the wider Caspian region. Russia is currently the

only nuclear power in the region; the successful weaponisation of uranium by Iran would create a second - and more unstable - nuclear power. In both cases, Turkey would be disadvantaged in terms of its position in the regional hierarchy.

It is evident that the AKP's agenda's was prompted more by self-interest rather than a common regional good. This following paragraphs will outline some of the major issues contributing to Turkey's eagerness to participate with respect to three conditions of regional powerhood outlined in chapter two: recognition, security, and material capacity. While looking briefly at military balances, the final aspect will focus predominately on the repercussion of any new sanctions or military action for Turkey's energy agenda. Overall, it is argued that Turkey adopted a strategy towards the Iranian nuclear issue that was largely congruent with benevolent regional hegemonic power.

Participation in the negotiation process offered the AKP an opportunity to demonstrate Turkey's ideational power through mediation. Turkey's position as a "central country" that had amicable relations with both the West and Iran was integral to the case for Turkish involvement in mediation. Gul noted that Turkey had the "capacity to help" because "on the one side" "they (Turkey) were members of NATO and had very good, strong relation[s] with America", while "on the other side, Iran is our neighbour" (Gul, 2010). Applying the regional powers framework to these comments, this thesis argues that the extensive diplomacy towards Iran generated goodwill towards Turkish participation in negotiations. Similarly, chapter two illustrated how regional mediation initiatives were a central part of the AKP's strategy to strengthen Turkey's regional role. The UNSC negotiations can be framed as an extension of those mediatory efforts to the international sphere (albeit while simultaneously retaining a regional focus). Regional powers arguments suggest that by ensuring Iran could maintain its nuclear programme in line with the demands of IAEA and UNSC Turkey would improve its status among both its neighbours and the international community. Chapter two maintained that legitimacy in the international system engenders legitimacy among subordinate states in the regional system. An elevated status among international actors as the result of successful negotiations would, therefore, strengthen Turkey's legitimacy within its region.

Central to the conceptualisation of benevolent hegemony depicted in chapter two was the utilisation of ideational resources to solve or circumvent regional problems through

bargaining and representation of the region within international institutions and the framing of self-interested motivating factors as part of a common good. In this regard, the examples highlighted in this chapter of Turkey's willingness to participate in negotiations (bargaining) under the auspices of the UNSC (international institution) with a high level of self interest (security, energy) to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue can be considered a benevolent hegemonic regional power strategy at the international level. It should also be noted at this point that the weaponisation of uranium by Iran would be detrimental to Turkey's ideational agenda. Turkey has been a particularly strong advocate of the NPT since the treaty entered force in 1970, and it repeatedly restated its opposition to nuclear proliferation in its region (Gul, 2010). Consequently, this thesis suggests that the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon development would undermine Turkey's ideational power on regional non-proliferation.

There were also serious concerns among the AKP regarding the ramifications of a further escalation of tensions for stability throughout Turkey's neighbourhood. The weaponisation of uranium posed a serious threat to Turkey's security agenda in the region, and the AKP's 2005 National Security Policy Document referred to the Iranian nuclear issue as a "hot button topic" (Gurzel and Ersoy, 2001:40). The potential for a nuclear arms race between Iran, Israel, and possibly Syria risked instability in Turkey's southern neighbourhood. Even within the Caspian region, a nuclear Iran would have consequences for Turkey's position in the regional hierarchy. Chapter two noted that military capacity is a factor in determining regional powerhood. In the event that Iran did embark on a weaponisation programme. a more asymmetrical power relationship would emerge between the states and the regional balance of power would swing in Iran's favour. Ultimately, a nuclear Iran would be detrimental to Turkey's regional power. Russia's possession of nuclear weapons similarly contributes to a military imbalance between Moscow and Ankara. A deal on the nuclear issue, then, would eliminate a major security concern for Turkey and ensure the balance of power remained - however slightly - in Turkey's favour.

Regardless of whether or not Iran did weaponise uranium, this thesis argues that possible external intervention in Iran as a result of *suspected* weaponisation presented a serious risk to Turkey's stability. The invasion of Iraq on the basis of claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction set a precedent for international intervention

without a UN mandate. It has been stressed at various points in this thesis that that intervention created significant security concerns in Turkey. In the event of conflict in Iran, the collapse of Iranian state infrastructure or a prolonged military engagement would risk spilling over into Turkey and reigniting the Kurdish issue. Western military intervention in Iran would also undermine several of Turkey's key foreign policies, including the zero problems with neighbours agenda and Ankara's propagation of regional solutions to regional problems. Turkey's attempt to engender a solution to the nuclear issue can therefore be framed as an effort by the state to ensure regional - and hence domestic - security in a manner congruent with benevolent regional hegemony. In addition, this thesis has highlighted how Turkey's independent foreign policy and interest in limiting the influence of external powers in regional affairs were central to its regional power ambition in terms of asserting its power and engendering legitimacy among subordinate states. International intervention would therefore not only pose a security risk to Turkey, but would constrain its capacity to implement a foreign policy strategy that was crucial to its regional power.

Applying the conclusions of the literature review on energy and conflict to the potential action against Iran - whether military or in the form of sanctions - illuminates the potential threats faced by Turkey's energy agenda from new sanctions or military action. Turkey had previously experienced economic and energy security problems after the imposition of UN sanctions on Iraqi oil in the 1990s.[51] Similarly, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the internal instability that followed had had a significant impact on resources available to Turkey.[52] In a statement that indicates the AKP was was eager to avoid a repeat of the impact of Iraqi sanctions on Turkey, the MFA pointed out in 2010 that Turkey had "suffered immensely" from the implementation of sanctions in the region in the past and "could well incur the biggest damage as a result of the sanctions or through the use of force" (MFA, 2010). A repeat of the Iraqi sanctions could both challenge Turkey's energy security and would further limit the diversity of resources available to Turkey, thereby threatening the state's energy security. By extension, it would impact on Turkey's energy

[51] A report in the New York Times suggests that sanctions on Iraq cost the Turkish economy between $35 and $40 billion (Frantz, 2001)
[52] As the EIA (2005) notes, supplies through the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline became increasingly sporadic after 2003

hub ambitions: as chapter three argued, secure access to energy supplies and a stable neighbourhood were essential to the realisation of the hub agenda.

The breakdown of P5+1 negotiations and the failure of the 2006 sanctions to have any meaningful impact on the Iranian nuclear programme meant that new measures against Iran were not only a significant possibility, but that any new measures were likely to be more comprehensive than previous rounds of sanctions. Chapter one pointed out that states and institutions place sanctions on energy producers to gain political concessions. Considering the extent to which hydrocarbons dominate the Iranian economy, targeting the energy system - either through further limitations on investment in Iran or a comprehensive embargo on Iranian energy trade - would maximise the impact of sanctions. Such sanctions also posed a risk to Turkey's energy security. Even restrictions on cooperation with the Iranian energy sector would have an impact on Turkey's energy agenda. Adherence to sanctions would further limit much-needed foreign investment in Iran's energy sector, which would have a detrimental effect on the development of resources available to export. On one hand, then, Turkey would be more limited in sourcing Iranian resources for the domestic market. On the other, restricting Turkish investments in Iran would undermine the formulation of the interdependencies in the energy sector that, chapter two argued, are essential if Turkey wants to become a regional power.

A total embargo when Iran supplied over 20% of Turkey's energy imports would put serious strain on Turkey's energy systems. Taking into account both the argument in chapter one that energy importers can more easily replace oil supplies than natural gas imports and Turkey's relatively diversified oil import base in contrast to the limited diversification of its gas suppliers, this thesis argues that an embargo on natural gas posed a significantly greater threat to Turkey's energy security than would an oil embargo. Based on the energy geography of the region and the discussion on energy forms and security in chapter one, this thesis proposes that Turkey would have several options in the event of a natural gas embargo. Firstly, it could make up the gas shortfall by importing LNG from other states. However, chapter one pointed out that LNG contracts are more short term and, therefore, less secure than traditional pipeline supplier. Furthermore, IEA reports suggest that in 2010 Turkey did not have sufficient infrastructure for storing or processing

large volumes of LNG (IEA, 2013), so the total volumes of LNG Turkey could be limited. Alternatively - or in addition to LNG imports - Turkey could request that Russia increase the flow of gas through the Blue Stream pipeline (both this chapter and chapter five highlight how Russia's was frequently willing to supplement Blue Stream supplies when Turkey experienced shortages). Considering, however, that chapter three asserted that diversification of energy imports away from Russia was a major feature of the AKP's energy strategy because of the perceived risks of over-reliance on a particular source, increasing Blue Stream flows would both contravene the energy strategy and heighten Turkey's energy insecurity. In addition, regional powers theory indicates that increased Russian dominance of Turkey's energy imports would heighten power asymmetry between the two, which would undermine Turkey's capacity to enact an assertive, hegemonic regional powers strategy. In this regard, compliance with sanctions would have been incompatible with Turkey's energy security strategy and would have harmed Turkey's economic agenda and geostrategic position relative to that of Russia.

When considered in conjunction with the conclusions of chapter three, it is clear that both forms of sanctions would also have longer-term implications for Turkey's energy strategy and, particularly, the hub agenda. As section 4.2 pointed out, Turkey repeatedly stressed that the participation of Iran in east-west energy projects was important to the formation of a Turkish energy hub. Chapter three argued that the energy hub is an important element of Turkey's regional power strategy in terms of the state's incorporation into regional energy systems, in terms of the economic benefits associated with an energy trading hub, and with regards to Turkey's geostrategic importance to both regional and external actors. The IEA has repeatedly pointed out that the impact of sanctions on Iran's oil and gas sectors meant it would take considerable time to rebuild production and export capacity (IEA, 2006, 2014, 2016). In other words, sanctions would restrict the development of the Iranian energy sector. The potential for Iranian participation in major east-west energy projects would therefore be limited. Sanctions would also reduce the competitive leverage Turkey had built up in Iran through intense diplomacy with its Iranian counterparts.

Finally, chapter five will outline how Turkey was finalising plans with Russia to build Turkey's first nuclear power station while Iran's relationships with the UNSC and IAEA were deteriorating. While Turkey's energy strategies did not include references to uranium

enrichment, the AKP made clear its intentions to develop nuclear power facilities and capabilities as part of its energy diversification agenda (MENR, 2009). The use of sanctions or military action against Iran without substantial proof of a weaponisation programme would set a precedent for Western and UNSC interference in the nuclear programmes of other developing nations, including Turkey. This, then, posed a potential threat to Turkey's attempts to diversify its energy sources to ensure its energy security. Overall, this thesis argues that the implementation of sanctions by Turkey would be detrimental both to Turkey's energy ambitions and its regional power credentials. It also highlights the degree to which energy and regional power - through resource accumulation, security, and regional balances of power in the Caspian - were connected for Turkey. In that way, it reaffirms the necessity to incorporate energy into the literature on regional power. Participation in the negotiation process not only had the potential to help avoid energy sanctions that would constrain Turkey's regional power, but to create goodwill between Iran and Turkey that could be beneficial to Turkey in future energy negotiations.

4.4.4a The failure of UNSC negotiations

Despite concluding an agreement on Iran's nuclear programme, Turkey and Brazil's negotiation efforts ultimately failed. The Tehran Declaration (2010) was hailed as triumph by Turkey and Brazil, but rejected by the P5+1 and the UNSC. Two aspects of the agreement caused particular concern. Both were related to the stipulation that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms (kg) of enriched nuclear material to Turkey in exchange for 120 kg of fuel rods for use in medical research (Tehran Declaration, 2010). Both the BBC (2010b) and Washington Post (2010) point out that the quantity of enriched uranium in Iran's possession was far greater than 1,200 kg. That the deal therefore left a quantity of enriched uranium in Iran did little to ally fears that Iran could construct a nuclear weapon. The agreement also enabled Tehran to demand the return of exchanged material if it felt the terms of the agreement were not being adhered to (Tehran Declaration, 2010). Additionally, Iran failed to agree to suspend uranium enrichment (BBC, 2010b), which was effectively a red line for the P5+1.

In June 2010, the UN voted to impose new sanctions on Iran. Resolution 1929 comprehensively expanded the 2006 and 2007 UN-implemented arms embargoes, and tightened restrictions on investment and financial activities related to "proliferation-

sensitive activities" (UNSC, 2010a). The resolution also called upon the P5+1 to continue negotiations "with a view to seeking a comprehensive solution" to the nuclear issue that would "allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran" (UNSC, 2010a). Of the thirteen members of the Security Council only Turkey and Brazil voted against sanctions (Lebanon abstained from the vote) (UN, 2010b). Subsequent EU sanctions imposed in 2011 and 2012 banned EU states from exporting equipment and technology needed for natural gas and oil production to Iran, excluded the Iranian banking system from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunications (thus limiting the capacity of Iran to accept payment for goods) and banned the purchase and transport of Iranian crude oil (World Bank, 2015).

There was universal praise from other UNSC member states for Turkey and Brazil's negotiation efforts. Susan Rice, the US representative, said that Turkey and Brazil's hard work "reflect(ed) their leaders' good intentions to address the Iranian people's humanitarian needs while building more international confidence" (UNSC, 2010b). Mark Lyall Grant, on behalf of the UK, acknowledged the "good faith" efforts of Turkey and Brazil, while France "welcome(d) the commitment of the two eminent leaders" (UNSC, 2010b). The dismissal of the Tehran declaration and the exclusion of both Turkey and Brazil from subsequent negotiations indicates, however, that the platitudes extended to the states in UNSC were merely rhetorical and did not translate into enhanced legitimacy in the international sphere for either actor. It implied that neither had the capacity to influence international negotiations in its favour, and that major powers did not believe that they had the capacity to do so. Both, chapter two asserted, were hallmarks of regional powers. This episode therefore highlights the AKP's overconfidence in its capacity to affect change and in the reciprocity of other states to Ankara's self-conceived power. In this case, Turkey's power to was restricted by limitations on its political capacity as an advanced developing state and non-permanent UNSC member attempting to implement change amid reluctance from major powers and permanent UNSC members to do so. Furthermore, the substantial decrease in oil trade between Iran and Turkey discussed in section 4.4.2 of this chapter confirms that sanctions did have a negative impact on Turkey's energy resources. The EU ban on Iranian imports further restricted the possibility of Iranian involvement in east-west energy projects.

The necessity to find alternatives to the EU market forced Iran to turn to eastern energy markets. Chapter one suggested that an increasingly crowded consumer market was an impediment to the energy security of states at all levels of economic development. For advanced developing states, more limited financial and political capital restrained the capacity of states to access energy supplies. In Iran, Turkey faced competition for access to resources to advanced developing states like China, South Korea, and India, as well as from developing states like Pakistan. Those states were not only markets for Iran, but after the imposition of EU sanctions, represented major sources of revenue for the underdeveloped Iranian energy sector. Projections of sustained economic growth and increasing energy usage led to China and India in particular pursuing Iranian oil (Middle East Economic Survey, 2007; EIA, 2015f; EIA, 2016f). Energy diplomacy between China and Iran was particularly intense between 2002 and 2014. Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) and financial institutions negotiated multiple multi-million pound deals with Iran for upstream development and natural gas sector development with a view to increasing Chinese imports of Iranian gas. The extent to which negotiations translated into successful bilateral trade is open to some debate, however, and infrastructural projects fell by the wayside after the implementation of UN sanctions in 2010 (Aizhu and Buckley, 2011).

While the commercial success of the Iranian-Chinese energy relationship may have been exaggerated, the political benefits for Iran were manifold. If the intention of both US and UN sanctions was to isolate Iran commercially and politically, then energy agreements with China - regardless of whether or not they are fully implemented - not only undermines that agenda but reaffirms the Iranian belief that it needs neither Western financial support nor European export markets to be a successful energy exporting country. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2011 sanctions Ahmadinejad was particularly vocal in insisting that the withdrawal of EU cooperation on energy issues would usher in a “new era” for Iranian gas, underlining that Iran “did not need the financial support of these (Western) countries” (Traynor, 2010).

Iran’s cooperation with China on energy issues had repercussions for Turkish-Iranian energy relations. It demonstrated to Iran that it had alternative energy hungry markets to which it could sell its oil should relations with Turkey continue to be restrained by sanctions. This simultaneously removed any leverage Turkey may have had as a

significant potential market for Iranian oil, undermined Turkey's claims to geostrategic significance in regional energy markets, and cast doubt on the construction of an oil hub in Ceyhan (see chapter three) that would incorporate Iranian oil. Each of these factors was inimical to Turkey's regional status. However, the final section of this chapter will demonstrate how Turkey and Iran's respective relationships with other regional actors skewered the regional balance of power firmly in Turkey's favour.

4.5 Iran and Turkey in the Caspian region

4.5.1 Iran in the Caspian region

The focus within Iranian foreign policy on exporting the Islamic Revolution was highlighted earlier in this chapter as an important ideational aspect of Iran's Middle Eastern strategy. Tehran's policies in Caspian region were rather more pragmatic. While the propagation of a common identity based on religious and historical affinities tended to be emphasised in diplomatic rhetoric, economic and infrastructural initiatives constituted the most comprehensive part of Iran's regional strategy. This thesis has repeatedly drawn attention to how the former Soviet states of the Caspian region proved unreceptive to cultural overtures from potential regional powers in the immediate collapse of Soviet Union. During the 2002-2014 period, economic integration - whether bilateral in the form of energy trade or through multilateral forums like the ECO or proposed Caspian Sea Economic Organisation (Shana, 2007) - was at the forefront of Iran's regional strategy. This section will argue that Iran pursued a strategy congruent with the benevolent hegemony conceptualised in chapter two, and that the limitations of that strategy benefitted Turkey's position in the regional hierarchy.

Just as chapter five argues that Turkey's dependency on Russian energy imports constrained Ankara's capacity to enact a more assertive foreign policy in the region, this chapter proposes that Iran's agenda in the Caspian was constrained by its relationship with Russia in the military and energy sectors. In particular, Russia's position as one of the largest supplier of arms to Iran (along with China) (SIPRI 2018a) endowed Moscow with a degree of leverage over Iran. Various reports and data indicate that bilateral military trade reached an apex between 2005 and 2007 with the sale of $700m of Russian-manufactured

missile defence equipment to Iran (CFR, 2006; Harding, 2007; SIPRI, 2018b). [53] In addition, it was noted earlier in this chapter that Russia played a significant role in the construction of Iran's nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Iran was therefore reliant on Russia for two material resources: military arms and nuclear power. Based on the assertion in chapter two that dependence on other regional powers restricts the capacity of a state to impose a regional power agenda, this thesis contends that the asymmetrical nature of Russian-Iranian relations confined the latter's capacity to adopt a more assertive or multidimensional regional policy. Given Russia's continued interest in influencing former Soviet states (see chapter five), Iran had to balance its agenda in the Caspian region with the necessity to maintain good relations with Russia. In this way, both Iran and Turkey were subordinate actors to Russia within the Caspian regional system.

However, a difference arises between the opportunities available to and the willingness of Ankara and Tehran to reduce their dependence on Russia and therefore limit constraints on regional power projection. Chapter three noted that diversifying energy dependency away from Russia was a major tenet of the AKP's energy strategy and suggested that cooperation with a host of other states in the Caspian region had the potential to limit Turkey's Russian energy dependence. In contrast, Iran's international isolation and antagonism towards large military powers like the US or UK limited Tehran's potential to diversify its military sources. A similar divergence is evident in the nuclear power sector: while Russia is building Turkey's first nuclear power plant, its second will be constructed by a Japanese-French consortium (Hurriyet, 2013b) and its third will be constructed by a Chinese-US partnership (Westinghouse.com, 2014). Russia, however, continued to be the only facilitator of Iran's nuclear power ambitions between 2002 and 2014: Rosatom - Russia's state nuclear agency - agreed to build a second reactor in Bushehr in 2013 (Press TV, 2016; World Nuclear Association, 2018).[54] Iran therefore lacked Turkey's capacity, opportunities, and willingness to counteract its dependency on Russia in a way that enabled it to enact a more proactive regional strategy in the Caspian region. At the same

[53] The failure of both Russia and Iran to disclose all arms trade makes it impossible to definitively determine the total extent of bilateral arms trade (Borshchevskaya, 2017)

[54] Though it is outside of the timeline of this thesis, it is worth noting that Iran has pursued a closer nuclear relationship with China since 2015. That year, Salehi announced that Tehran and Beijing had agreed to build two small nuclear plants on Iran's southern coast (Fars News, 2018; ISNA, 2015). No further detail has yet emerged on the construction of the plants.

time, the limitations on Iranian power projection by virtue of Tehran's Russian dependencies opened up a further space for Turkey to expand its influence in the region.

World Bank (2017b, 2017c) and OEC (2017a) data shows that Iranian trade with the former Soviet republics of the Caspian failed to gain any significant traction during the period under examination. Nonetheless, infrastructural programmes like the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway project that was inaugurated in 2014 (Gurt, 2014b) represented progress in regional integration. This section will argue that energy was one of the key features of Iran's engagement with the Caspian region between 2002 and 2014. Tehran's policies in the region variously complemented and contradicted Turkey's energy strategy, but this section will show how a deterioration of Iran's energy relations with most of the Caspian littorals drew attention to Turkey's geostrategic importance in regional energy trade. The final part of this chapter will discuss Turkish-Iranian relations in the context of Iran's energy engagement with the Caspian region and the implications for the regional power agendas of both states.

4.5.2 The competition for Caspian resources

The dissolution of the Soviet Union heralded a new era of competition for access to the resources of the energy-rich republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Chapter one highlighted how the majority of academic literature on energy competition in the region has focused predominately on that between Russia and the West (and, latterly, China). Iran tends to feature in the literature primarily as secondary or even tertiary actor; one to be avoided (see the fourth corridor) or as an impediment to the legal demarcation of the Caspian Sea. Yet chapters three and four demonstrated Ankara's eagerness to involve Iran in regional energy equations, and Tehran itself was proactive in engaging in energy dialogue and trade with its Caspian neighbours. Like Turkey, Iran is located at a geostrategic junction between the landlocked states of the Caspian and global markets. Its overtures to other Caspian littorals regarding Iran's validity as an energy trading partner had the potential to derail Turkey's energy ambitions. However, this section will argue that constraints on the extent of energy engagement with other regional states - bought on by similarities in the market structures of Iran and the energy rich littorals, Russia's influence in the region, and Turkey's own preferential position in Iran's export market - reinforced Ankara's significance as the dominant export partner for Caspian littorals. In doing so, it

affirmed Turkey's status above Iran in the regional hierarchy despite its lack of domestic energy resources.

A key factor in endowing Turkey with a superior position in regional energy systems was the extent to which Iran engaged with its neighbours. Iran's regional energy policy was both more limited than the ambitious fourth corridor programme promoted by Turkey, and primarily took the form of fuel swaps that failed to increase Iran's leverage over its neighbours. Azerbaijani, Kazakh, and Turkmen oil was transferred to northern Iranian refineries in exchange for the delivery of Iranian oil of the same value to Caspian clients in the Persian Gulf. These oil swap deals were initiated in 1997 and suspended in 2010 because of a dispute over the token price the littorals paid Iran as part of the swap. Energy was also an important tenet of bilateral cooperation between Iran and Armenia, with agreements signed between the states on cross-border cooperation in electricity (2003) and hydroelectricity (2009, 2011). [55] Of greater relevance for this thesis, however, was the 2004 Treaty on the Construction of the Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline (Armenian MFA, 2017). The pipeline was inaugurated in 2008 (Tehran Times, 2008) and became operational in 2009 under a 20 year contract (Financial Tribune, 2017b). The natural gas pipeline is also part of a swap deal that means Iran receives Armenian electricity in return for Iranian gas (Financial Tribune, 2017b).

Given Turkey's non-existent relationship with Armenia, energy cooperation between Yerevan and Tehran represented an avenue through which Iran could extend its regional influence outside of Turkey's sphere of influence. Yet there is little evidence that Iran's preferential relationship with Armenia or its oil swaps with other Caspian states was a constraint on Turkey's pursuit of regional hegemony. The swap deals did not generate a significant volume of income for Iran[56] and, in many cases - including the Armenian one - Tehran remained reliant on its trading partners for the provision of essential services like electricity as part of the swap. The reciprocal nature of the swap deals also prevents Iran generating any leverage over its trading partners in the same way chapter three suggested

[55] Iran and Armenia forged relatively strong relations after the fall of the USSR. The Armenian Ministry for Foreign Affairs lists 45 high-level diplomatic visits between the states between 1991 and 2011 and over sixty agreements, MoUs, and bilateral protocols covering economic, environmental, cultural, and legal cooperation (AMFA, 2017)

[56] Iran charged $1 per barrel as part of the oil swaps, generating an income of $880m between 1997 and 2010 (Aliyeva, 2017)

Turkey did in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In other words, Turkey was more successful than Iran in using its geostrategic location and energy trade with the Caspian states to enhance its power in the region. Moreover, Iranian gas exports to Armenia and Azerbaijan are dwarfed by those to Turkey: BP statistics show that in 2016, Iran's natural gas exports to Azerbaijan and Armenia combined were less than 10% of those to Turkey (BP, 2017c). Turkey, rather than one of the Caucasian states, remained Iran's preferential gas partner.

In addition, Russia again proved to be an impediment to Iran developing its regional power through its energy strategy. Chapter five will outline how, in the post-Cold War era, Russia created a strong bilateral relationship with Armenia in the military and energy spheres. Until the initiation of the Iran-Armenian natural gas pipeline, Russia was the sole provider of natural gas to Armenia (Socor, 2007). While the Iranian pipeline broke Russia's monopoly over the Armenian energy import market, it did not represent any meaningful advance of Iran's regional energy influence. A subsidiary of Russia's Gazprom owns and operates the Armenian part of the pipeline (Stratfor, 2009), leaving Iran dependent on cooperation with Russia for the continued functioning of the pipeline. More importantly, Socor (2007) notes that Russia insisted on halving the pipeline's diameter from 1,420 millimetres to 700 millimetres, thereby precluding any opportunity to expand the pipeline to third countries in the future. [57] In any case, Armenia's own geographical remoteness from European markets would necessitate the construction of either LNG refinement facilities in Armenia from which Iranian gas would be transported to Europe or the construction of a pipeline through Turkey to the Mediterranean. Given the continued antagonism between Armenia and Turkey, the latter was highly unlikely. Rather than undermine Turkey's position, then, this thesis argues that the Iran-Armenia pipeline reaffirmed Turkey's strategic utility as the only viable route for the exportation of Iranian gas to European markets. In doing so, it highlight how Turkey maintained the balance of power in bilateral energy relations despite its own hydrocarbon limitations.

4.5.3 Cooperation and competition in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan

Chapter three noted that Turkey's most substantial energy projects in the Caspian region involved cooperation with Azerbaijan and appealed to potential cooperation with

[57] 1,420 millimetres is the standard diameter of major exporting pipelines (Socor, 2007).

Turkmenistan. Both were important actors if Turkey's energy diversification and hub agendas were to come to fruition. Both were also natural gas import and export partners for Iran. Playing particular attention to the TANAP pipeline, the final part of this chapter will highlight the role Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan played in the competition between Turkey and Iran in the regional energy system.

Chapter two argued that regional integration was a key indicator of regional powerhood. Section 4.5.1 highlighted how Iran's economic and cultural integration in the Caspian region was limited, but contended that infrastructural and energy projects did provide a measure of integration. Interdependence with Armenia by virtue of natural gas trade was highlighted in the last section, and this section indicates that small volumes of natural gas trade with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also facilitated limited Iranian integration into regional gas markets between 2002 and 2014. Iran is the sole supplier of natural gas to Nakhchivan, an autonomous region of Azerbaijan that is separated from the rest of the state by Armenia and which shares a border with Iran (EIA, 2016h). In return for Iran supplying gas to Azerbaijanis in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan transports gas to Iran via the Soviet-era Hajqabut-Astata pipeline (EIA, 2016h). Gas began flowing through the pipeline in 2006 for the first time since Islamic Revolution. Considering that currently it uses only 1 - 1.8bcm of its 9bcm capacity (EIA, 2016h), the pipeline has significant potential. While the construction of TANAP suggests Ankara is likely to remain Baku's preferred energy partner for the foreseeable future, the spare capacity of the Hajqabut-Astata pipelines indicates that Azerbaijan does have alternative energy trading partners in Iran.

Figure 13: Azerbaijani energy infrastructure, including Iran-Nakhchivan pipeline (NIOC, 2018)

Energy relation between Iran and Azerbaijan almost proved detrimental to Turkey's regional ambitions during the 2009-10 natural gas pricing dispute between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Chapter three outlined how Azerbaijan threatened to find alternative consumer markets for its substantial energy supplies in response to Turkey's request for lower gas prices and Ankara's attempted rapprochement with Armenia. At the height of the crisis, Iran and Azerbaijan signed a MoU to transport at least an additional 500mcm/y to Iran. (Xinhua General News, 2010). In 2010, the states also signed an agreement to construct a new bilateral pipeline through which Azerbaijani gas could be exported to Iran (Stratfor, 2010). While the pipeline did not come to fruition, the willingness of Baku and Tehran to cooperate on natural gas trade highlighted Turkey's precarious position in the regional energy system. It demonstrated not only that Azerbaijan had alternatives to Turkish export markets (thus reducing Turkey's leverage over Baku), but that Iran was willing to exploit the Turkish-Azerbaijani dispute in a manner that was incongruent with Turkey's regional energy strategy. In other words, it highlighted how Iran - despite its strong relations with Turkey - could undermine Turkey's regional power ambitions.

Turkmenistan is Iran's longest-standing energy partner in the Caspian. Iran began importing 8bcm natural gas per annum from Turkmenistan in 1997 through the Korpeje-

Kurtkui pipeline, and in 2009 agreed to construct a second pipeline with a capacity of 14 bcm (Fars News Agency, 2010a; EIA, 2015d). Ahmadinejad stated that the pipeline would be a "good stimulus for energy cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran, as well as for delivery of Turkmen gas to the Persian Gulf and the world market" (BBC, 2010a). He also suggested that it would "pave the way for new energy equations in the region and the world", and would play a key role in energy exchange with Europe and the Persian Gulf region (Fars News Agency, 2010a; Fars News Agency, 2010b). The implication that Turkmenistan and Iran, would, together, transport energy to Europe was substantiated by the attendance of Turkish Minister for Energy and Natural Resources Tanner Yildiz at the pipeline's inauguration (World Bulletin, 2010). However, several issues restricted the incorporation of Turkmen and Iranian gas into east-west energy pipelines. Two of these issues - the imposition of international sanctions on Iran and the frequency with which pre-existing supplies from Iran to Turkey were subject to disruption - are discussed elsewhere in this chapter. The following discussion on the TANAP pipeline highlights how Iran's position regarding the delineation of the Caspian Sea and its relationships with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan played an additional role in growing energy cooperation in the Caspian region.

By 2012, Iran's energy markets were beginning to suffer the effects of international sanctions. The EU oil embargo and the ban on financial transactions to the Iranian government not only restricted Iran's resource development, but effectively curtailed the state's capacity to participate in regional oil and gas projects in the Caspian. The sanctions were an impediment to attempts to forge energy trade and infrastructural relations with other Caspian states, and thus limited Iran's regional integration and energy hub rhetoric in a manner that was detrimental to Iran's status in the region. Yet at the same time, Turkey was succeeding in further embedding itself in regional energy equations. In 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a MoU to extend the BTE pipeline. Contrary to the other MoUs - including those with Iran - pipeline rhetoric became reality when the states signed an intergovernmental agreement to begin construction of TANAP in 2012.[58]

[58]Pipeline construction began in 2015 and it is anticipated that the project will be initiated in 2018 (Daily Sabah, 2017a)

Figure 14: BTE, TANAP, and TAP routes (Offshore Energy Today, 2016)

TANAP endows Turkey with several advantages over Iran in regards to the states' relative positions in the regional hierarchy. Firstly, the pipeline strengthens Turkey's integration with Azerbaijan and Georgia and embeds Turkey in the regional energy system in a manner congruent with regional power. That the deal was conducted without Iranian input highlights Tehran's limited role in regional energy systems. Azerbaijan's disinterest in engaging in energy affairs with Iran far predates the TANAP project: the 1994 "contract of the century"[59] demonstrated that Azerbaijan's energy interests lay to the west rather than to the south. That, this thesis argues, is Turkey's primary advantage over Iran in the region: Nakhchivan aside, Azerbaijan simply does not need Iran. Given Azerbaijan's own extensive energy reserves (EIA, 2016h), the limitations to Azerbaijani-Iranian trade are unsurprising. The states' economies are competing rather than complementary. The small volume of energy trade between them can be attributed to the geographical isolation of Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan. Conversely, Turkey plays an essential role in the realisation of Azerbaijan's ambitions by virtue of the access it provides to European markets.

[59] In 1994, a consortium of IOCs signed an agreement with Azerbaijan for the production of 511 million tonnes (mt) of oil over a 30 year period. Turkey's TPAO was part of the consortium that signed what was called the "contract of the century" (AP, 1994; AFP, 1994).

Secondly, it is imperative to note that the scope of the TANAP pipeline goes far beyond that of the BTE. The project is related to the EU's Southern Gas Corridor project and, when completed, will be linked to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)[60] to deliver Azerbaijani gas to Europe for the first time. Turkey will thus become a key player in the transfer of natural gas from east to west, thereby increasing its geostrategic role between Europe and the Caspian region. Considering the argument in chapter two that Turkey's geostrategic location was a strategic asset with regards to determining the state's status in the Caspian, the realisation of TAP can be construed as a boost to Turkey's regional status. It should be noted that the TANAP agreements were signed while strict sanctions were being imposed that would inhibit Iran from joining any pipeline aimed at the European market. TANAP, therefore, signified to Iran that Turkey has alternatives to Iran's natural gas.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the TANAP project with regards to Turkey and Iran's positions in the Caspian region was that it demonstrated to the Caspian littorals that Turkey was a viable energy partner. Chapters one and three pointed out that Turkmenistan's substantial energy reserves - which were both underdeveloped and unexplored - were of substantial interest to advanced developing states both within and outside of the Caspian region, including Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. China, in particular, pursed unprecedented energy cooperation with Turkmenistan during the period in the late 2000s.

Turkmenistan's energy reserves garnered significant international attention in 2012. Months before the TANAP agreement was signed, BP's annual statistical review of world energy revealed that Turkmenistan's proven gas reserves had been revised up from 13.4tcm in 2010 to 24.3tcm in June 2012 (Peixe, 2012). More specifically, it proved to be the catalyst for the resumption of attempts by Turkey to integrate Turkmenistan into regional energy projects. At a meeting between representatives from Turkey, the EU, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan in 2012, Yildiz stated that Ashgabat could not stay outside the "regional gas movements" (Hurriyet, 2012b). Erdogan underscored TANAP's significance to Turkmenistan when signing the intergovernmental agreement for the

[60] As of January 2018, TAP was two thirds completed and scheduled for completion in 2020 (Jewkes, 2017).

pipeline, noting that TANAP would enable Turkmenistan to export its gas to Europe via Azerbaijan and Turkey (Socor, 2012). Overtures to Turkmenistan were reciprocated, and Ashgabat signalled a willingness to engage with states to the west of the Caspian. In 2014, Baku hosted the first ever trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (MFA, 2014b). A month later, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov signed an order for the establishment of an embassy in Tbilisi, and Turkey and Turkmenistan subsequently signed an agreement for the latter's participation in TANAP (Gurt, 2014a). If, as chapter one argued, energy relations engender integration and closer regional relations, then TANAP was integral to strengthening relations between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Georgia. In terms of regional powerhood it was, on one hand, be considered demonstrative of Turkey's regional leadership; of its capacity to integrate peripheral regional states and to augment regional integration and (energy) security. Given the benefits of increased cooperation to Turkey, however, in terms of the recognition of its regional role, in facilitating Turkey's hub and diversification agendas, and in potentially contributing to Turkey's international reputation as a regional power, this thesis considers Turkey's interest in Turkmenistan to be consistent with a benevolent hegemonic strategy.

However, Turkmenistan shares borders with none of the states involved in TANAP. Examining the region's geography indicates that there are three options for ensuring the inclusion of Turkmen gas in the project. The first is the construction of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan via Kazakhstan and Russia. Aside from geographical distance rendering the construction of such a pipeline prohibitively costly, there are also geopolitical barriers to such a route: the reluctance of each of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the EU to involve Russia in fourth corridor projects (see chapters three and five) and Turkmenistan's deteriorating energy relations with Russia (Pannier, 2008a, 2009; The Moscow Times, 2014) rules out a northern route. The second option, therefore, would be to transport Turkmen gas through Iran to Turkey. The EIA (2015d) notes, however, that infrastructure in the northern regions of Iran (through which a Turkmen-Iran-Turkey pipeline would be contracted) were limited. Of further concern was the occasionally contentious relationship between Turkmenistan and Iran. Turkmen-Iranian energy relations have not been without issue, and bilateral disagreements have negatively affected Turkey's energy security. Turkmen gas supplies to Iran were suspended on several occasions due to

financial disputes (Pannier, 2008a). Iran subsequently reduced gas flows to Turkey to make up for domestic shortfalls (Pannier, 2008a). These disputes cast doubt on the ability of Iran to act as a conduit for Turkmen gas to Turkey and on the capacity of Iran to participate in east-west energy projects.

The third option is the revival of the trans-Caspian project that was discussed in chapter three. It was noted that while Turkey repeatedly expressed its support for the trans-Caspian project, the failure to delineate the Caspian meant that such a project was not feasible. Iran's insistence on dividing the sea into five equal sectors was in contrast to the sectorial division approach favoured by other littorals, and was a factor impeding the finalising of the sea's legal status (PBS, 2010; EIA, 2013a). Based on the understanding in chapter one that transit states benefit from tariffs collected from the transportation of energy between producer and consumer states, and the assertion in chapter three that the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline would omit the necessity for Turkmenistan to transport supplies to western markets through Iran, this thesis suggests that the construction of such a pipeline would deprive Iran of transit income. It would therefore have a negative economic impact on Iran and, at the same time, exclude Iran from a major regional energy project. Turkey's desire to access Turkmen gas was therefore stymied on two accounts: firstly because of the limitations of Iran's domestic market and pipeline system; and secondly, because of its opposition to the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline. The importance that chapter three suggested Turkmen supplies held in Turkey's energy agenda and the centrality of integration (including through infrastructural projects) to regional power, this thesis concludes hat Iran's domestic and regional policies impeded the realisation of Turkey's regional power agenda.

4.6 Conclusion

Examining Turkish-Iranian relations between 2002 and 2014 illustrates the shifting nature of Turkey's regional power from a rare glimpse of coercive hegemony in the 2002 pricing dispute to a benevolent hegemony for much of the 2000s. Each was - perhaps inadvertently - facilitated by Iran's regional and international politics. This thesis argues that constraints on Iran's regional power offered an opportunity for Turkey to elevate its regional status. Acting as an emissary for Iran to the international community enabled Turkey to demonstrate its meditative power to major powers in the UN and EU, while recognition by

those powers - even if it was purely rhetorical - was important to elevating Turkey's position among regional subordinates. Both those effects, chapter two argued, were essential to generating the legitimacy that facilitated regional powerhood. In addition, Turkey's attempts to incorporate Iran into regional energy projects like Nabucco demonstrated Ankara's integrative ambitions to other regional states that were seeking outlets to global markets. In other words, it highlighted both Turkey's commitment to regional states and its geostrategic significance to regional energy producers. Chapter three argued that both these factors would elevate Turkey's regional status.

Nonetheless, Iran also played a role in constricting the AKP's energy agendas in a manner that was inimical to the Turkey's regional power status. Iran's deteriorating relations with Europe on account of Tehran's nuclear programme and the subsequent implementation of sanctions limited the viability of Turkey's ambition to incorporate Iranian oil or gas into its energy hub agenda. This reinforced Turkey's reliance on Azerbaijani resources, thereby limiting the leverage Turkey could assert over its Caucasian neighbours. Oil embargo aside, that the sanctions targeted investment in Iran's energy sector limited the financial capacity available to develop Iran's limited energy infrastructure and cast doubt on the construction of a Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline that could both enhance Turkey's energy diversity and contribute to the AKP's hub agenda. In any case, frequent disagreements between Turkmenistan and Iran over energy pricing mechanisms generated doubt over the reliability of supplies transiting through Iran. In effect, Iran's relationship with other regional and international actors restricted Turkey's energy agenda to the Caucasus region and thus reduced regional integration efforts - a key regional power strategy according to chapter two - to the western shores of the Caspian.

In addition, Iran's own energy agenda highlighted insecurities in Turkey's regional strategy and demonstrated Iran's willingness to undermine Turkey's energy agenda. The most notable manifestation of this was with regards to the failure to delineate the Caspian Sea. Tehran's willingness to pursue Azerbaijani gas during the 2009-10 dispute between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a clear example of Turkey's vulnerability to Iran's energy endeavours in the Caspian. This chapter argues, however, that these episodes did not impact on Turkey's position in the regional hierarchy relative to Iran. It notes that Turkey's attempts to assert itself as a regional hegemon in the context of its relations with

Iran failed primarily on account of the disparity between rhetoric and tangible energy cooperation between the states and Turkey's underestimation of the extent of the discontent between Iran and the international community. However, it also suggests that attempts to act as an emissary on Iran's behalf in the UNSC and Ankara's conciliatory rhetoric with Iran were beneficial to Turkey's benevolent regional hegemony. It concludes that relations with Iran had a mixed impact on Turkey's regional and energy agendas but, ultimately, the extent of Turkey's relationship with other regional subordinates and strong rhetoric regarding energy cooperation with Iran overrode the negative implications of Iran's own international and energy strategy for Turkey and contributed to a Turkey's benevolent regional hegemony.

5. Energy in Turkish-Russian Relations

5.1 Introduction

The relationship between Turkey and Russia during the AKP era was characterised first by rapprochement and consequently by unprecedented levels of bilateral cooperation. Both countries experienced economic growth and relative stability in comparison to previous decades. This facilitated a convergence of domestic and foreign policy and generated increased confidence in the states' respective abilities to influence the trajectory of global and regional politics. Disillusionment with the international status quo and a desire to limit external - and particularly American - influence in the states' shared region engendered cooperation on regional security and political initiatives, while the search for non-Western allies led to a raft of bilateral agreements on everything from currency to naval cooperation to visas. At the same time, the states remained diametrically opposed on a number of regional issues, most notably regarding protracted conflicts in the Southern Caucasus.

This chapter will argue that both the convergence on regional geopolitical issues and the flourishing mutual relationship between Turkey and Russia were to a large extent attributable to the central role allocated to energy in bilateral relations and in the states' respective regional power ambitions. Chapter three highlighted the relationship between energy and regional powers for Turkish administrators between 2002 and 2014. This chapter will expand on the central role occupied by Russia in Turkey's energy strategy, and consider the ways in which Russia's energy and regional strategies affected Turkey's capacity to fulfil its regional agenda. While Turkey's regional power ambitions undoubtedly clashed with Russia's geopolitical ambitions, its energy strategy was entirely incongruous with Russia's regional and strategic interests. Russia is an energy superpower: it is the second largest producer of oil and gas in the world, and is deeply embedded in energy systems in Europe, Central Asia, and the Caspian. Re-establishing control over energy resources in the former Soviet Union and maintaining dominance in European energy markets were pivotal to Russia's strategy to reassert itself as both a regional and global power. During this period, therefore, it was impossible to extricate Russia's energy policy from its geopolitical agenda and regional power strategy. Complicating matters further for the AKP was Turkey's reliance on Russia as its dominant source of

hydrocarbon imports and Russia's creeping influence in the development of Turkey's domestic energy infrastructure.

A central contention of this chapter is that the over-reliance on and continued pursuit of Russian resources contributed to an energy strategy that was replete with contradictions and detrimental to Turkey's regional power ambitions. Detaching Turkey from its dependency on Russian energy resources was a core aim of the AKP's energy strategy from at least 2003. Yet faced with a rapidly expanding economy and in light of the limitations in expanding energy relations with Iran that were highlighted in the previous chapter, successive AKP governments actively pursued energy cooperation with Russia in the oil, gas, and nuclear sectors. The incorporation of new Russian supplies into Turkey's energy system was logical considering Turkey's growing energy needs and the slow pace at which alternative projects - such as the Nabucco pipeline - were developing. Nonetheless, this strategy constrained the implementation of Turkey's benevolent hegemonic regional strategy in four ways. Firstly, Turkey's reliance on a competing regional power for essential resources hindered the implementation of a more assertive regional foreign policy that would have enhanced Turkey's regional power credentials. Secondly, Turkey's willingness to pursue Russia resources simultaneously to other non-Russian east-west projects was counterproductive to attempts to act as a facilitator in integrating Caspian and Central Asian states into regional energy systems (which, chapter two argued, was instrumental if Turkey was to be perceived as a regional power in a region dominated by energy trade and politics). Thirdly, if Turkey's status within the Caspian was to some extent predicated on its relations with Europe, then the adoption of an energy strategy that was incongruent with the EU's energy diversification agenda was damaging to attempts to augment Turkey's regional status. Finally, Russia's desire to control energy export routes as part of its own regional power strategy was incompatible with a Turkish hub agenda that necessitated Turkish control over the re-exportation of resources that passed through its territory.

As a final point, it should be noted that the *form* of the states' respective regional strategies played a role in determining Turkey's response to regional developments in the energy sphere. Turkey's strategy conformed with benevolent hegemonic approaches to regional power projection. Russia, however, adopted an increasing coercive hegemonic

strategy as the 2000s progressed and veered towards an imperial strategy on two occasions between 2008 and 2014. The variance in the two states' strategies can partly be attributed to contrasting understandings of the purpose of regional powerhood: for Russia, regional hegemony was a stepping stone to regaining great power status at the global level. Chapters two and three contended that Turkey saw regional power in an end in itself. Considering the proposition in the introduction that regional power can be a means through which states accrue middle power credentials, and the assertion that Turkey sought to increase its influence in international forums, it can also be argued that the AKP perceived regional powerhood was a means through which Turkey could strengthen its middle power credentials. Russia's more aggressive regional power approach, in conjunction with Russia's economic and military superiority over Turkey and the latter's dependence on Russian energy resources, must be taken into consideration in the analysis of the relationship between energy and regional powerhood for advanced developing states.

This chapter will explore the above arguments in depth by examining the trajectory of Turkish-Russian relations between 2002 and 2014 as they relate to the wider Caspian region. The first section of this chapter will briefly examine bilateral and energy relations between Turkey and Russia in the pre-AKP years. The second section will focus on Turkish-Russian relations in the AKP era. It will argue that a closer alignment between the states' regional and international geopolitical views drove increased cooperation in the economic sphere in particular. Considering Russia's emphasis on energy as a means to regain its global status and Turkey's desire to increase domestic imports and become an energy hub, it is unsurprising that energy was at the heart of bilateral cooperation in this era. To underline the overlap between energy and regional power strategies for both states in bilateral relations, the third section of this chapter will examine the trajectory of bilateral energy relations between 2002 and 2014. Cooperation on regional issues and competition in terms of access to regional energy reserves are the focus of the fourth section. After first considering the impact of Turkey and Russia's respective alliances with Azerbaijan and Armenia, the final part of this chapter focuses on the 2008 South Ossetian war and its implications for Turkey's energy and regional power strategy. This chapter, then, addresses the central research question in considering the role of energy for advanced emerging states within a regional powers framework.

5.2 Turkish-Russian relations in historical context

Turkey's historical engagement with Russia revolved around imperial competition for territory and influence in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Balkan regions. Russia's forays into the Caucasus in the 1800s were instrumental to the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Turkish War of Independence of 1919-1922 saw both states experience first political turmoil and then the emergence of new political, social, and economic systems. The establishment of the USSR in 1922 cemented Russia's control in Turkey's neighbourhood as the Caucasus and Central Asia were subsumed into the Soviet Union. While Turkey remained neutral during WWII, its alignment with the West during the Cold War was central to the hostility that defined the relationship between the two former imperial powers for most of the 20th century. However, the USSR began to develop energy relations with the West independently of geopolitical tensions from the mid-1960s, and in 1984 Turkey and the USSR signed an agreement for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Russia to north-west Turkey. Known alternatively as the "Western Pipeline" and the "Trans-Balkan pipeline", the project transports gas to Turkey via Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. Natural gas deliveries began in 1987, and as of 2016 continues to deliver 14 billion cubic meters per annum (bcm/a) to Turkey (Gazprom Export, 2016).

The separation of energy trade and geopolitical antagonism by Turkey and Russia continued into the post-Cold War era. While the states signed a treaty setting out new principles of bilateral cooperation in 1992 (MFA, 2017b), relations remained tense through much of the 1990s. The 1992 agreement committed the states to non-interference in the other's internal affairs and to respect the other's territorial integrity (MFA, 2017b). The early 1990s, however, were characterised by repeated accusations of indirect support by Russia for the PKK and for Chechen militants by Turkey (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). In addition, chapter two pointed out that during this period Turkey actively pursued closer relations with and influence over the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus with which it had historical, cultural, and geographic ties (Aydin, 2004). Turkey's policies in the region contributed to a zero-sum game in which both states attempted to implement competing visions of regional order in the former Soviet sphere. The implementation of the pan-Turkic strategy in the former Soviet Republics effectively

positioned Turkey against Russia just as a new great energy game was beginning in the Caspian region.

Despite preliminary explorations providing evidence of extensive oil and gas reserves in Central Asia and the Caucasus, energy policy in the Soviet era had focused almost exclusively on the development of resources in Siberia and the far east of the country (EIA, 2013a). Post-Cold War, the extent of oil and gas reserves in former Soviet Union (FSU) states gradually became an important issue defining the geopolitical trajectory of the region (Kubicek, 2013). While Russia maintained sole ownership of existing pipeline infrastructure in what had been the USSR, cooperation between the West and the newly independent states on energy affairs offered an opportunity for external and local actors to delineate a new geopolitical reality in the region. Chapter two highlighted how energy cooperation with the West afforded the former Soviet states a chance to assert political and economic independence from Moscow and to reduce reliance on Russian energy supplies, systems, and expertise. As chapter three pointed out, engagement with energy rich Caucasian and Central Asian states was essential to developing a diversified stream of oil and gas supplies for the increasingly hungry European energy market. The US saw energy cooperation as a means to ensure energy security for its European allies and to assert its presence and dilute Russia's influence in the former Soviet sphere (Kubicek, 2013). Turkey's desire to prove its strategic utility to the West, boost its status in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and to diversify and increase its energy imports led to cooperation with Europe and the US on energy projects in the FSU (Winrow, 2014). Central to the West's energy strategy in the region was the provision of support for regional governments and IOCs to develop Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field for the transportation of oil and gas to Europe (Kubicek, 2013). Turkey, strategically situated between the energy producing and energy consuming regions, was an indispensable partner in what became known as the fourth corridor project.

The fourth corridor project was detrimental to Russia's desire to maintain control over regional energy systems and, in turn, ensure a continuation of the hegemony had wielded in the region during the Soviet era. Consequently, Moscow repeatedly objected to and sought to hinder - often successfully - Western-sponsored regional energy initiatives. In 1994, a consortium of IOCs including BP and Statoil signed the $4.7billion "contract of

the century" with Azerbaijan for the production of 511 million tonnes (mt) of oil over a 30 year period (AP, 1994; AFP, 1994). Both Turkey and Russia had stakes in the contract by way of TPAO and Lukoil's participation in the project.[61] However, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RMFA) objected to the pipeline and refused to recognise the 1994 contract (Mursaliyev, 1994). Lukoil's withdrawal from the consortium in 1996 slowed the development of new infrastructural projects in Azerbaijan and meant that it was not until 1998 that the contract for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project - the first east-west pipeline not to transit through Russian territory - was drawn up. Russia also sought to frustrate the realisation of other regional energy projects that would encourage regional integration at the expense of Russian dominance. In addition to raising concerns over the disputed status of the Caspian Sea (see chapter three), Russia reinvigorated the previously dormant Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) with Kazakhstan in 1999 and proceeded to buy up Kazakh oil that had been provisionally earmarked by the West for the trans-Caspian pipeline. In any case, political disinterest among Caspian littorals regarding an off-shore pipeline, lack of investor interest, and disagreement on the delineation of the Caspian Sea meant that the trans-Caspian project remained a pipe dream.

Turkey continued to engage in energy bargaining with Russia even as it actively advocated for the realisation of new east-west energy project. In 1997, as the fourth corridor continued to stall, the two countries signed an agreement to construct a 1,213 kilometre natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea. The contact was opposed by the US because it dealt a blow to the fourth corridor project. Yet the pipeline made strategic sense for Turkey at the time. Strong economic growth and rapid industrialisation was putting pressure on domestic energy systems and undermining Turkey's energy security. With the development of any of the fourth corridor projects not immediately forthcoming, Turkey was forced to look elsewhere for new energy supplies. Russia, with its extensive oil and gas reserves and history of reliability in the delivery of supplies, was a natural option.

[61] Lukoil is Russia's second largest energy company after Gazprom

Figure 15: The Blue Stream (Caspian Barrel, 2014)

The proposal to build a natural gas pipeline through the Black Sea was not without issues: the technicalities of constructing an underwater pipeline at a depth of two kilometres presented significant engineering obstacles and costs beyond those of conventional pipeline projects. These complications were arguably outweighed by the long-term security benefits of removing third party transit countries from the equation. To mitigate the technical difficulties of the project, Russia's Gazprom entered into a joint venture with Italian IOC ENI for the construction of the offshore section of the pipeline (ENI, 2014). Construction began in 1999, and the Blue Stream became operational in February 2003. The pipeline has a capacity of 16bcm, and initial flows of 1.3bcm gradually increased to a high of 14.7bcm in 2014 (Socor, 2009b; Gazprom, 2017a). At $3 billion, the pipeline had proved expensive to build (Stratfor, 2003); and, as the incoming AKP government would discover, had translated into high costs for Turkish consumers. While Turkish disquiet at

gas prices through the Blue Stream will be discussed in more detail in section 5.4.2, this chapter will first consider the conditions under which tensions over natural gas prices manifested. For between the initial Blue Stream agreement and its inauguration, both Turkey and Russia had elected new administrations that prioritised regional power and energy: in Moscow, Vladimir Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin as president, while in Turkey, the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan were elected to parliament for the first time.

5.3 Turkey-Russian relations in the AKP era

5.3.1 Bilateral relations under the AKP

Rapprochement between Russia and Turkey in the early 2000s contributed to a normalisation of relations during the AKP's first term. The willingness of the states to cooperate can be attributed to domestic and geopolitical changes that generated increased cooperation in political, regional and economic affairs. Domestically, the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 and of the AKP as Turkey's ruling party in 2002 ushered in an era of strong and stable leadership in domestic politics. The relative political security that followed contrasted sharply with the tumultuous period both states had experienced in the 1990s. That stability enabled the states to focus on regional and international strategy to a greater extent than in previous years, which, in turn, facilitated increased bilateral cooperation. Regionally, a strong domestic economy in Turkey in the late 1990s coincided with a period of political and economic chaos in Russia. Kardas (2011) suggests, therefore, that Turkey both saw Russia as less of an existential threat than it had in previous decades and no longer felt that it needed Western support to deal with Russia. This not only facilitated the AKP's more autonomous foreign policy agenda, but also led to a slight recalibration in the states' balance of power to Turkey's benefit. As chapter three highlighted, the AKP embraced a foreign policy that focused on regional solutions to regional problems. This policy was instrumental in encouraging cooperation with - and occasionally concessions to - Russia. The simultaneous cessation of support in 2002 by Russia and Turkey for PKK and Chechen separatists in each other's territory and Turkey's ban on known Chechen separatists entering the country - declared an "important and responsible step" by Russian officials (RMFA, 2002) - was an example of the conciliatory and concessionary nature of relations early in the AKP's first term.

The decline of Ankara's pan-Turkic project also lessened the geopolitical competition between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia and facilitated a new era of regional cooperation. A "Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia" in 2002 proposed a new era of economic and political cooperation to "reach a new and higher level in bilateral relations" and to "bring about peaceful, just, and lasting political solutions to disputes" in the Caucasus and Central Asia (MFA, 2017b). Regional challenges in the form of unstable governments and protracted conflicts like that in Nagorno-Karabakh fuelled cooperation on security and stabilisation initiatives. In addition, the AKP's determination to assert its autonomy from Western foreign policy objectives signalled a closer convergence between the states' geopolitical agendas (if not necessarily the motivations behind those agendas). After both states opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Putin professed to being "impressed by Turkey's independent foreign policy" in Iraq, stating that countries' positions "share*[d]* a lot in common" (Putin, 2004b). The AKP's divergence from its traditional foreign policy alignment with the US early in its first term therefore played an important role in strengthening its relationship with Russia. In addition, the initiation of gas flows through the Blue Stream in 2003 cemented the development of economic interdependence between Turkey and Russia: bilateral trade increased from $5.1 billion (bn) in 2002 to $11bn in 2004 (World Bank, 2017a). An almost three-fold increase in Russian imports to Turkey from $3.9bn to $11bn accounted for the majority of that increase. Turkey became Russia's largest market for oil and gas combined, while Russia became by far Turkey's dominant energy supplier (EIA, 2015a; EIA, 2015b).

It would be an overstatement to argue that energy was the primary driver of rapprochement in this era. If regional powerhood was an aspiration of the early AKP administration, then recognition of Turkey's regional credentials by other major players in the region was essential. Adhering to US-sponsored energy initiatives like the fourth corridor project essentially pitted Turkey against competing powers like Russia, forcing it to forgo cooperation and recognition that would otherwise be beneficial to Turkey's own regional power strategy. In a region in which energy plays a significant role in influencing geopolitical delineation and patterns of amity and enmity, failure to interact with a leading energy state like Russia would be detrimental to Turkey's influence in regional energy systems. In this way, energy and foreign policy played a mutually reinforcing role in enhancing bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia in the AKP's first term. Given the

extent of self-interest involved in engaging with Russia, along with the emphasis on material - rather than ideational - cooperation, this chapter frames Turkey's engagement with Russia as part of a broader strategy to assert benevolent hegemony in the wider Caspian region.

5.3.2 Bilateral cooperation in the AKP era

Turkish-Russian relations between 2002 and 2014 were characterised by extensive levels of engagement between government and business elites that engendered a plethora of bilateral agreements on cooperation in economic, diplomatic, and regional affairs. The number of high-level meetings between Erdogan and Putin was a particularly distinguishing feature of Turkish-Russian relations in the period under examination. In 2004, Putin became the first Russian president to visit Ankara in the history of the states' bilateral relations. In the 18 months between January 2005 and June 2006, Putin held meetings with either Gul or Erdogan on six occasions (Erdogan and Putin, 2005; Joint Declaration, 2009). This section will look first at the measures implemented to enhance the political and strategic relationship between the sides and will briefly discuss the role played by the states' contrasting relationships with NATO in bilateral relations. It will then note the growth of cooperation in the economic sphere before moving on in the next section to examine the centrality of energy to bilateral economic and political engagement.

Chapter four argued that the relationship between Turkey and Iran between 2002 and 2014 was dominated by the triumph of rhetoric over tangible cooperation. Turkey's conciliatory Russia policy focused extensively on formalising relations through the institutionalisation of cooperative mechanisms, but as in the Iranian case rhetoric rarely translated into policy. During Putin's 2004 Ankara trip, the states signed both a second joint declaration on cooperation in Eurasia and a "Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership Diplomatic" (MFA, 2017b). Engagement reached what Erdogan termed a "climax" in terms of "purposeful cooperation in political, economic, and defensive spheres" (Russia Today, 2010a) towards the end of the AKP's second term. The formation of a High Level Cooperation Council in 2010 and Joint Strategic Planning Group in 2011 meant, according to Medvedev, that Russian-Turkish ties were reaching the level of a "full scale strategic partnership" (Medvedev, 2010). The purpose of the groups was to act as a "steering mechanism to further...multi-dimensional cooperation" on issues

ranging from energy investment to regional security and integration initiates to global nuclear disarmament (Joint Declaration, 2012; Koru, 2013). Two years after the formation of the Council, Putin declared that Turkey was Russia's "important strategic partner" (Erdogan and Putin, 2012).Yet there was no tangible evidence of cooperation between the states on security issues, and one major security issue had the potential to drive a wedge between the states: the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the region.

While Turkey and Russia participated in many of the same international organisations (the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation (BSEC) among them) and professed to have similar agendas and outlooks concerning regional and international systems, the former's NATO membership had the potential to drive a wedge between the states. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. In a 2004 interview Putin described how he had perceived Turkey during the Cold War years as being "above all a NATO country" and "an opponent" (Putin, 2004a). Russia had begun to develop ties with NATO in the post-Cold War years through participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative from 1991 and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997. The PJC was replaced with the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. In the early years of the AKP's first term, Russia was relatively restrained in its criticism of NATO's expansion eastwards to the Baltic states (Lavrov, 2004b). As NATO's Individualised Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) scheme spread to the former Soviet territories, Russian-NATO relations deteriorated. The NRC was temporarily suspended for the first time in the aftermath of the 2008 South Ossetian war between Russia and Georgia (Oakley, 2008). After the NRC was suspended for a second time in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea by Russian forces, Russia's permanent representative to NATO Alexander Grushko accused NATO of directing operations against Russia by conducting military activities on Russia's "frontiers" (Grushko, 2014). His suggestion that Russia would take NATO's measures into account in its own military planning was indicative of the extent of military tensions between NATO and Russia during the AKP's third term.

The antagonism between NATO and Russia had the potential to negatively influence the latter's relations with Turkey. Even when relations with Russia were at their peak in the AKP's third term, Davutoglu was unequivocal in declaring Turkey's NATO membership

"an integral part of *[Turkey's]* global identity" and a "fundamental pillar" of the state's foreign policy (Davutoglu, 2012). He also stated that Turkey wanted to have "full solidarity" with NATO (Davutoglu, 2010). However, that Turkey's membership seems not to have been a significant issue in bilateral relations can be attributed in part to the nature of Turkey-NATO relations in comparison to earlier decades. In 2006, Turkey joined Russia in rejecting a US-proposed NATO-led operation in the Black Sea. In 2014, Ankara also refused to join in the sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea despite NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg publicly urging Turkish support (Roth, 2014). At the same time, Russia appears to have considered Turkey's NATO membership entirely separate to its own relationship with Turkey. In 2008, Russia's minister for foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia felt "no restraining factors....within the framework of (Turkish-Russian) bilateral dialogue" on account of Turkey's NATO membership and argued that Turkey fulfilled its obligations to NATO "without placing those commitments above its other international obligations" (Lavrov and Babacan, 2008). This thesis does not argue that Turkey sought to detach itself from the NATO coalition. Rather, it suggests that the focus on regional solutions to regional problems in the AKP's foreign policy and the desire to demonstrate autonomy in policy formulation contributed to a Turkey's disinclination to act as NATO's base in the region in the same way as it had during the Cold War. Turkey's diminished interest in facilitating new NATO operations or policy in its region and the concurrent extension of the state's strategic relation with Russia mitigated potential conflict between Turkey's two alliances and effectively enabled the states to compartmentalise bilateral cooperation from Turkey's other alliances.

While political relations between Turkey and Russia solidified in the AKP era, the economic sphere bore the most tangible results of the intensive diplomacy between the states. Over the course of the AKP's three terms in office, bilateral trade increased rapidly from $4bn in 2002 to $31bn in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018). Trade declined from a high of $38bn in 2008 to $23bn in 2009 – in part because of the decline in oil prices that accompanied the global financial crisis, and in part on account of the crisis itself – but returned to growth the following year. Such was the confidence in continued trade growth that, in 2012, Erdogan announced that the countries intended to increase turnover to $100 billion per annum (Erdogan and Putin, 2012). Dominating bilateral trade was the export of Russian oil and gas to Turkey.

The primacy of energy in bilateral trade contributed to a significant trade imbalance in Russia's favour that was recognised by both states. Putin acknowledged the potential difficulties posed by the imbalance as early as 2004, and suggested the countries should diversify their relations (Putin, 2004a). Similarly, Gul suggested in 2011 that there was a necessity to ameliorate the trade imbalance though increased exports and services to Russia (Gul, 2011). Regardless of the focus on expanding relations beyond the energy sphere, Turkey's Russian trade deficit grew to just over 80% in 2014 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 201). Russia was Turkey's number one source of imports, with oil and gas fuels accounting for $16.5 billion of the $25 billion total (Turkish Exporters Assembly, 2016:103; 106). If the balance of power between states is inimical to determining regional power status, and economic status is a key feature determining regional hierarchy (particularly in terms of its contribution to the attainment of other material capabilities), then the asymmetry between Russia and Turkey in terms of bilateral trade positioned Russia as the region's dominant power. Though it falls outside the temporal parameters of this thesis, it is interesting to note that bilateral trade fell in 2015 at least in part due to the dispute over Turkey's shooting down of a Russian reconnaissance plane (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018) . However, that the decline in Turkish exports was much more extreme suggests that while energy prices are more sensitive to global market fluctuations, the long-term nature of energy trade means that non-energy trade is more likely to be affected by political disputes between energy producers and consumers.

Nonetheless, expanding trade in other, non-energy sectors was essential to redressing the trade imbalance between Turkey and Russia. Yet despite official rhetoric repeatedly urging new trade deals, energy remained at the heart of bilateral trade. The next section, therefore, will look briefly at the ways in which Russia integrated energy into its own regional power strategy before examining in depth how energy retained its dominance in Russian -Turkish relations.

5.4 Energy relations between Turkey and Russia, 2002-2014

5.4.1 Russia: an energy superpower

In contrast to the Iranian case, Russia's energy production levels and position in the global energy hierarchy reflect its substantial supplies. Russia holds eighty million barrels of

proven oil reserves - the eighth largest in the world - and at 11 million barrels per day (mbbl/d) is the second biggest oil producer after the US (BP, 2017c). At 32.9 trillion cubic meters (tcm), Russia has the world's largest gas reserves (BP, 2017c). It produced 280 million cubic meters (mcm) in 2014, making it the second biggest producer in the world (BP, 2017c). Until the 2000s oil accounted for the bulk of hydrocarbon exports, but by 2016 Russia had expanded its natural gas exports to 200 mcm per annum and become the world's primary exporter of natural gas (BP, 2017c). It remains the second largest exporter of liquid petroleum products, with Europe (including Turkey) accounting for 70% of Russian oil and 90% of Russian gas exports (EIA, 2016g). Germany and Turkey were the largest individual importers of Russian hydrocarbons (BP, 2017c). Turkey imports Russian gas through two pipelines and oil via Black Sea tankers.

After the economic turmoil and political instability that characterised the post-Soviet era, the implementation of a comprehensive energy strategy aimed at reasserting regional dominance and regaining great power status became a priority for the Putin administration. Energy was perceived as a tool to fund Russia's geopolitical enterprises. While increasing domestic production to encourage economic growth was a major strand of this strategy, significant focus was also placed on maintaining control over existing pipeline networks in the former Soviet space, ensuring preferential agreements for Russian energy companies in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and expanding Russia's European market. Encouraging energy dominance in the former Soviet states would ensure renewed Russian influence in its near abroad and limit the capacity of those states to export independently to Europe or the east. In short, it would cement Russia's regional hegemony. Increasing European dependence on Russian gas would not only constitute a means through which Russia could enhance its role in the region, but would contribute to the saturation of European energy markets and render the realisation of the fourth corridor unfeasible. Unlike Turkey - for whom energy was used as a cooperative tool in engendering benevolent hegemony - Russia proved willing to use energy as a coercive tool to ensure hegemony and, conversely, utilised coercive regional power strategies to achieve its energy agenda. If energy is a strategic tool for Turkey to increase its power in the Caspian based on its strategic position as an export route to Europe, then Russia's new energy strategy was detrimental to Turkey's hegemonic regional ambitions.

5.4.2 Teething problems: the Blue Stream pricing dispute

Section 5.2.1 of this chapter outlined the rationale behind the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline. It was noted that flows through the pipeline never reached capacity. Rather than imposing limitations on Turkish energy security, the pipeline's spare capacity enabled Russia to increase flows when Turkey experienced shortages due to increased demand or on account of interruptions to supplies from other states. Chapter four highlighted how Russia provided additional volumes of gas through the Blue Stream to compensate for shortfalls in Iranian supplies on several occasions between 2006 and 2014. Russia's willingness to increase gas supplies provided Turkey with the security necessary to maintain domestic economic activities essential to regional power. At the same time, however, it reinforced Turkey's reliance on a competing regional player in a way that skewed the balance of power towards Russia.

During the period under examination, there were no interruptions to supplies via the pipeline due to political disagreements. Indeed, Russian officials including Medvedev and Miller repeatedly highlighted the reliability of supplies when arguing in favour of increased energy trade between Russia and Turkey (Lavrov, 2007; Gazprom, 2014a). As in the Iranian case, economic factors proved more disruptive to energy trade than did political disputes. The financial costs of the Blue Stream translated into prices that were higher for Turkish consumers than through the trans-Balkan pipeline (Stratfor, 2003). Considering that the Blue Stream became operational after the AKP's 2001 election victory, concerns over the price of natural gas flowing through that pipeline proved to be one of the first tests to the new government's energy agenda. As chapter one noted, affordability of energy supplies is a key tenet of energy security; chapter three subsequently highlighted the prominence attached to a conceptualisation of energy security within the AKP's rhetoric that incorporated affordability. The 2003 price dispute therefore presented an early challenge to the AKP's commitment to maximising energy security for its electorate. It also presented an opportunity for the state to assert its position as an equal partner rather than a subordinate state to Russia in the countries' energy relations.

Only a month after the initiation of gas flows, on 12th March 2003, Turkey halted supplies through the Blue Stream. The Blue Stream had been commissioned at a time when Turkey's upwards economic trajectory was expected to continue, and energy demand was

therefore expected to increase. The economic slowdown in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis meant that Turkey had an oversupply of natural gas, and energy Minister Hilmi Guler suggested that Turkey had lost $196 million by buying the more expensive Blue Stream gas (Lelyveld, 2003). Gazprom officials reported that Turkey had requested a price decrease similar to that which Russia imposed on supplies through the trans-Balkan pipeline the previous year and had proposed a renegotiation of take-or-pay agreements. The appeal to renegotiate the financial particulars of the Blue Stream contract was therefore an attempt by the Turkish government to save money on gas it did not need. It should be recalled that Turkey had successfully forced a recalibration of energy pricing mechanisms with Iran the previous year in a move that chapter four suggested had endowed the AKP with confidence in its capacity to influence energy producers.

When assessed through a regional powers framework, the Blue Stream pricing dispute can be construed as an early attempt to affirm the AKP's assertiveness in dealing with major regional rivals; in essence, to position Turkey - an energy consumer - on equal par to Russia as an energy producer. Turkey's proposal in June 2003 to sell surplus Blue Stream supplies to Europe is therefore illustrative not only of an early indicator of the AKP's hub ambitions, but its desire to elevate the state's standing in regional power equations. As in the previous chapter, it can be framed as a hegemonic projection of power. However, Russia's insistence that Gazprom decide the final export market scuppered any potential re-exportation deal, and highlighted the extent to which Turkey's gas strategy - and, by extension, regional power strategy - was, at that stage, dependent on Russia. Russia's control over the majority of Turkey's natural gas flows and desire to utilise energy in its maximise regional hegemony – a key objective of the still relatively new Putin administration - therefore limited the effectiveness of energy as a tool in Turkey's regional power strategy in the early years of the AKP's first administration. Turkey had insufficient capacity to challenge Russia's regional hegemony when it was so dependent on Moscow for the provision of essential resources. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached in July that would see Turkey pay the same price as other European countries (RIA Novosti, 2003) and, in a minor victory for the AKP, Gazprom agreed to an easing of take-or-pay contracts. That Russia was willing to acquiesce to some of Turkey's demands is indicative of the success of an early projection of hegemonic regional power by Ankara. The contentions and competition that defined the relationship between Turkey and Russia in

the 1990s thus carried over into the AKP era. Yet despite the AKP's declaration in April 2003 that it desired to reduce Russia's share of Turkey's energy import market to no more than 30% (Lelyveld, 2003), energy relations between the two continued to flourish under the first AKP administration.

5.4.3 Increasing interdependence: Gazprom's role in Turkey's domestic energy markets

Soon after his election to the presidency in 2000, Putin began to roll back the energy privatisation scheme initiated under Bois Yeltsin in the 1990s. By 2014, the Russian state controlled roughly 50% of total oil production and state-controlled companies were responsible for 90% of natural gas production (EIA, 2016g). Gazprom alone accounted for around 75% of domestic gas production (EIA, 2015g). Gazprom also has exclusive export rights for natural gas and is responsible for Russia's external natural gas policies, making it central to the success of Russia's energy export - and therefore regional power - strategy. While it is technically a semi-state body,[62] Putin retains close ties to Gazprom. During the period under examination there was significant overlap between the senior positions in the company and Russian government. Dmitry Medvedev, for example, was Putin's aide and prime minister prior to his appointment as Chairman of Gazprom's board of directors; he remained in the position until his election to the Russian presidency in 2008 (CNN, 2017). Similarly, Viktor Zubkov - a political ally of Putin's since the early days of the Russian Federation - was appointed by Putin to the position of prime minister in 2007, was first deputy prime minister under the Medvedev presidency, and has been chairman of Gazprom's board of directors since 2008 (New York Times, 2008). Highlighting the extent to which Gazprom is embedded in Russia energy export policy, Zubkov was appointed Russian Special Presidential Representative for Cooperation with Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in 2014 (Gazprom, 2017*d*).

The close association between Gazprom and the Russian state reinforces the argument that the company is a vehicle for the realisation of Putin's energeopolitical vision for the region. It is also striking that Gazprom's own energy strategy is congruent with that of the

[62] Moscow has a 51% controlling stake in the company (Gazprom, 2017c)

Russian state. According to Eken (2013:465), Gazprom has three international energy goals:

1. To gain almost full control over Central Asian gas
2. To diversify routes to Europe, diminish the number of transit states between Russia and European consumers, and bypass all Russian alternatives
3. To facilitate joint ventures and stakes in developing foreign reserves and infrastructure

These goals serve to reassert Russian dominance over the former Soviet sphere and ensure influence in and leverage over European states. The third point also facilitates increased Russian influence over states - like Turkey - which have little expertise in developing energy infrastructure or reserves. All three can be considered part of a hegemonic regional powers strategy, and it is for this reason that this thesis considers the extent of relations between Turkey and Gazprom between 2002 and 2014 to be detrimental to Turkey's regional power ambitions.

Chapter three noted that the limited liberalisation of Turkey's natural gas market in 2003 had only a minimal impact on diluting the influence of the Turkish state in the natural gas sector. It did, however, contibute to Russia's growing presence in the domestic market at the same time as Turkey was attempting to dilute its dependence on Russian resources. In 2004, Gazprom Germania - a subsidiary of Gazprom - purchased a 40% stake in Bosphorus Gaz, a newly-founded gas private gas importer and distributor in Turkey. In 2009, Kardas (2009) reports, Gazprom Germania raised its shares in the company first to 51% and then to 71%.[63] The deal between Gazprom Germania was a result of Gazprom's pursuit of shares and joint ventures in the gas markets of other states. Gas market liberalisation, therefore, enabled Russia to gain a stronger foothold in Turkey's domestic markets at the same time as it was becoming marginally less influential as an importer.

Gazprom's advance into Turkey's domestic markets and the continuation of bilateral energy negotiations despite Turkey's diversification agenda can partly be attributed to the high volume of meetings between high level Turkish officials and Gazprom's major

[63] It should be noted that at the time of writing (6 June, 2017), a deal has been announced to sell Gazprom's shares in Bosphorus Gaz to Turkey's Sen Group, who already hold the company's remaining shares (Hurriyet, 2017)

players. Gazprom was quite proactive in seeking investment and trading opportunities with Turkey during the period under examination. While the high level of engagement between Turkish and Russian government officials has already been noted, successive Turkish energy ministers also repeatedly met with Gazprom representatives to discuss Russian-Turkish energy cooperation. Throughout the period, Gazprom repeatedly reiterated that Turkey was an "extremely important" partner for Russia (Gazprom, 2007). Turkish energy minister Hilmi Guler met with Alexey Miller - chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee - on several occasions during his tenure (Gazprom, 2009). Yildiz's meetings with Miller variously discussed the shared "long term strategic interests" and "mutually beneficial basis" of cooperation in the natural gas sector, the creation of ties between Gazprom and private Turkish businesses, Russia's role in Turkey's energy security, and the role of natural gas in the wider strategic relationship between the states (Gazprom, 2011, 2013, 2014*d*). Yildiz and Miller met on at least three occasions in the six months leading up to the cancellation of the South Stream and concurrent announcement of the TurkStream project (Gazprom, 2014*b*, 2014*c*, 2014*d*). Turkey was openly receptive to Gazprom's advances in a way that was simultaneously advantageous and detrimental to the regional power strategy. On one hand, investment was necessary if Turkey's domestic infrastructure was to reach the necessary capacity to fulfil the hub ambition. At the same time, increased energy cooperation with Russia directly contravened the energy strategies of both European and Caucasian states that were seeking to reduce Russia's influence in regional energy equations. If Turkey was seeking to enhance its reputation in those regions and to become - in MENR's terminology - a "leader" in regional energy flows, then extending energy cooperation with Russia was counterproductive. Nonetheless, the necessity to ensure energy supplies for its own domestic market and the desire to realise its hub ambitions drove successive AKP administrations to sign agreements with Russia to enhance energy cooperation.

The first of these was in 2004, when Gazprom and BOTAS signed a MoU with the aim of comprehensively enhancing cooperation in the gas sector. The agreement featured clauses on the provision of Russian gas to Turkey via both Gazprom and its subsidiaries, on supply and storage infrastructure, and permitted Turkey to re-export surplus gas supplies via a proposed pipeline to Syria and Israel (Gas and Oil Connections, 2004). It was therefore the only energy deal signed between Russia and Turkey in the period under consideration that

endowed Ankara with the export rights that chapter three suggested were essential to Turkey's hub agenda. Moscow's consent for the re-exportation of Turkey's surplus Russian supplies to Syria and Israel rather than to the EU can be framed as an attempt to secure preliminary access to energy systems in the Levant for Russian supplies and to enhance the likelihood of the construction of anew north-south pipeline.

Chapter three highlighted how the AKP repeatedly inferred during this period that its energy hub ambition and role as a transit state for non-Russian gas supplies was advantageous to Turkey's application to join the EU. Diverting surplus gas south and agreeing to enhance its energy relationship with Russia when the EU was seeking to reduce its dependence on Russian resources was detrimental to Turkey's attempt to position itself as a pivotal actor in EU energy equations: as chapters one and three pointed out, the AKP's policy was at odds with the EU's intension to limit its dependence on Russian supplies. It therefore highlights once again how Turkey's energy strategy was replete with contradictions. At the same time, an argument was made in chapter three that the relationship between Turkey and Europe endowed Turkey with ideational power among the former Soviet Caspian states. Based on that assessment, this thesis contends that enhancing relations with Russia in a way that was detrimental to Turkey's utility to the EU in energy terms had the potential to restrict the acceptance of regional states to Turkey's claims of regional power . In any case, the MOU did not evolve into a legally binding international agreement, and subsequent MoUs between the states on bilateral energy affairs failed to include a clause for the re-exportation of surplus supplies. This illustrates an increasing unwillingness on Russia's behalf to cede control of regional pipelines. The 2004 MoU was signed during a period of relative calm in regional energy and political relations. The escalation of energy tensions between Russia and Ukraine - and subsequently the EU - from 2006, regional instability in the aftermath of the 2008 South Ossetian war and, increasing political tensions between Russia and the West meant that Russia became increasingly assertive in utilising its energy policy to realise its geopolitical ambitions. In the face of coercive Russian hegemony (and occasionally regional imperialism), Turkey was simply incapable of exercising power over Russia in later years as it had in 2002 and 2004. If ensuring control over regional energy systems was central to Russia's regional power, then permitting Turkey re-exportation rights would have been

counter-productive to Russia's strategy. Subsequent energy deals therefore contained no re-exportation clauses.

Nevertheless, Turkey continued to pursue energy cooperation with Russia. That pursuit will be highlighted throughout the remainder of this chapter as an example of the inconsistencies inherent in Turkish energy policy: at once seeking to detangle itself for Russian energy dependency and simultaneously courting energy cooperation to strengthen bilateral relations. The AKP's willingness to conduct new energy relations with Russia regardless of the implications for Turkey's regional power strategy is most evident in the "grand energy bargain" of 2010. In a series of high level meetings between July 2009 and May 2010, Turkey and Russia announced a raft of new cooperative initiatives. The agreements made clear that bilateral cooperation would transcend merely economic objectives and contribute to strategic engagement in the diplomatic and security spheres (Medvedev, 2010; Koru, 2013). Both sides praised the deals roundly: Gul described the package as "clear proof of the advanced level of *[our]* relations", while Medvedev suggested that the deal meant that Turkey and Russia were "strategic partners, not just in words but in reality" (Gul and Medvedev, 2010). Energy lay at the heart of the agreement.

The states had made clear in 2009 that energy occupied "a strategically significant place in the Turkish-Russian relations", and that they supported "the development as well as diversification of current relations and cooperation through concrete projects among relevant authorities/institutions in every aspect of the energy sector" (Joint Declaration, MFA 2009). The May 2010 agreement outlined what Kardas (2012:94) refers to as the "grand energy bargain" concerning increased cooperation in the energy sector. Worth £30 billion, it incorporated wide-ranging collaborations in each of the oil, gas, and nuclear power sectors. The next section will examine provisions made for each of those sectors in the grand energy bargain and will consider their relationship to Turkey's regional power.

5.4.4 Energy as strategic engagement: the "Grand Energy Bargain"

5.4.4a The Samsun-Ceyhan Oil pipeline

Reflecting the primacy attached to natural gas in the AKP's energy strategy, the majority of energy negotiations between Russia and Turkey in the years leading up to the grand

energy bargain focused almost exclusively on cooperation in the natural gas sector. As part of the 2010 deal, however, the states agreed to construct a pipeline via Turkish territory through which Russian oil supplies that had traditionally transited the Turkish Strait to the Mediterranean could be transferred. The environmental and security impact of tanker traffic through the Bosporus had been of concern to the AKP from its election to government in 2002. Russia, too, expressed a desire to reduce tanker traffic through the Turkish Straits, acknowledging that a serious accident in the Straits would be detrimental to its own energy transport policy (Lavrov, 2004a). Despite Lavrov's (2004b) suggestion that he was "carefully studying other schemes for the transportation of energy carriers in the Black Sea region", Russia failed to produce any concrete plans for the construction of an oil pipeline through Turkey in the first decade of the 21st century. In the meantime, the AKP initiated negotiations with other actors on a Central Asia-Turkey-Europe pipeline. In 2003, ENI and Turkish company Calik Enerji signed an agreement to transport Caspian oil between the Black Sea and Turkey's Ceyhan port on the Mediterranean via a trans-Anatolian pipeline (ENI, 2007). The trans-Anatolian line was central to Turkey's intention to develop Ceyhan into an oil hub for the shipment of Caspian and Russian oil to Europe and, as such, would have contributed to Turkey's regional hegemony. Until 2009, it was anticipated that Indian Oil Company would be the project's tertiary partner (Times of India, 2006). That became less likely when, as part of the grand energy bargain, a MoU was signed that incorporated Transneft and Rosneft into the project and left little room for any additional partners to join. The trans-Anatolian pipeline became a Russian-Turkish project was renamed the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.

The pipeline had the potential to be beneficial in reducing transit traffic in the Turkish Straits. Erdogan went so far as to describe it as "an environmental project that will save the Straits" (Anadolu Agency, 2010). However, the decision not only to include Russian oil supplies in the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline but to make Russia a central partner in the construction and development of the project presented some problems for Turkey's energy and regional power agenda. Firstly, the agreement contravened Turkey's policy on diversifying its energy imports and instead heightened Turkey's reliance on Russia not just for fuel, but for the technical expertise and financial capital necessary to develop the state's domestic energy system. This dependence was exacerbated in 2013 after Ankara cut all ties with ENI over the company's plans to participate in gas exploration in Cypriot

waters (Lehane, 2013). Considering the Russian state's total ownership of Transneft and 50% stake in Rosneft, the pipeline therefore facilitated a new role for and increased influence by the Russian state in Turkey's energy strategy. Moreover, it is clear from Erdogan's statement that the pipeline would enable Turkey to "reach out to the world from Ceyhan" (Arsu, 2010) that Turkish officials believed the project would contribute to Turkey's energy hub agenda. Incorporating oil supplies from other Caspian states like Kazakhstan into the energy mix- something that was envisioned as part of the original trans-Anatolian pipeline line oil - would enable Turkey to simultaneously strengthen its relations with eastern states and aid both Turkey and Europe's energy diversification agendas. Chapter two, these outcomes would elevate Turkey's regional status and facilitate its regional hegemony. The Russian deal, however, made no mention of either incorporating Kazakh supplies into the pipeline or of the re-exportation rights for Turkey. This thesis therefore considers Samsun-Ceyhan to be detrimental to both the diversification agenda and Turkey's regional power agenda: in increasing reliance on Russia without benefits like the possibility of an oil hub, Turkey ensured Russia maintained a balance of power in bilateral energy relations.

5.4.4b Expanding natural gas cooperation

At the heart of the "grand energy bargain" was an agreement for the construction of a new natural gas pipeline. Blue Stream-2 had originally been proposed by Russia in 2005, but the project fell by the wayside as a result of disinterest from both parties. The 2010 agreement revived Blue Stream-2, with reports suggesting that it would run parallel to the original Blue Stream pipeline under the Black Sea and could carry gas through Turkey to Syria, Lebanon, and Israel (Russia Today, 2010a). The deal was perceived by Turkish sources as a means through which the state could utilise energy to amplify Turkey's geopolitical importance, with Erdogan stating the deal would enable Turkey to become a "transit base in natural gas", thus endowing it with a "more important location" (Anadolu Agency, 2010). While the use of the phrase "transit base" is evocative of an energy hub, Medvedev's suggestion that the Blue Stream-2 would open a new "energy corridor" (Strauss, 2010) suggests that Russia continued to view Turkey as a transit state rather than a potential hub. Similarly, Russian Energy Minister Sergi Shmatko said it was unclear whether Turkey would be a transit state on the route or would also have re-export rights

(Socor, 2009). The latter was essential for the realisation of the hub and for the position Turkey as a regional hegemon.

In any case, the likelihood of the project progressing beyond the initial proposal came into doubt soon after the agreement was signed. Putin's declaration that BOTAS and Gazprom would develop the project alone cast doubt on the technical viability of the project: section 5.2.2 of this chapter highlighted how ENI's technical expertise had contributed to the realisation of the original Blue Stream project. In addition, the discovery of significant quantities of primarily offshore natural gas from 2009 eradicated the necessity for Israel to import new gas streams (EIA, 2017a). Indeed, less than a month after the second deal was signed between Turkey and Russia in May 2010, Putin stated that the discovery of Israeli resources meant that Blue Stream-2 would be scaled back and only transport gas to Turkey and Syria (Russia Today, 2010b). However, the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent civil war in Syria cast doubt on the economic necessity and feasibility - as well as the security - of any new infrastructural projects in either state. Additionally, the control established by ISIS in northern Syria contributed to insecurity that limited the viability of an extension of a second Blue Stream south of the Turkish border. Since 2010, neither state has commented on Blue Stream-2 nor does it feature in either state's energy strategies. Despite, therefore, not having any impact on the balance of power between Russia and Turkey, the Blue Stream-2 example highlights the extent to which energy system development is predicated on regional security. For states like Turkey and Russia that incorporate energy into regional power strategies, securing regional stability is a necessary precursor to utilising energy as a power resource.

5.4.4c Expanding energy cooperation: nuclear power

The most tangible outcome of the 2010 deal regarded Russia's involvement in the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power plant. Chapter three pointed out that nuclear power had been part of Turkey's energy policy agenda since the mid-1960s, and under the AKP was a key element of the AKP's diversification. In 2007, Turkey passed a law concerning the construction and operation of nuclear power plants (NPP) in the country, and in 2008 a call for tenders for Turkey's first NPP at Akkuyu. The only bid - from Russian company Atomstroyexport - was first accepted and later rejected in 2009 following a legal appeal (World Nuclear Association, 2017). The Akkuyu tender was

subsequently awarded to Russia's Rosatom as part of the grand energy bargain. The cost of the project was estimated at $20billion, with the first reactor envisioned to come online in 2019[64] (Rostatom, 2014; Al-Jazeera, 2018). The NPP agreement was considered central to the development of a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, and was described in the 2009 Joint Declaration as standing "testament to the trust underlying [our] two nations' growing ties" and "an important component of [the parties'] commercial and economic relations" (Joint Declaration, 2009).

The NPP deal did fulfil some criteria of Turkey's energy strategy. As chapter one pointed out, nuclear fuel is both cheaper and cleaner than other finite resources. The Akkuyu agreement therefore made economic, environmental, and strategic sense for Turkey in terms of its energy policy. At the same, time, it is important to note that Rosatom was granted an unprecedented level of control over the plant. The NPP is located on Turkish soil, but is also the world's first build-own-operate nuclear plant. Russian companies agreed to fully finance the NPP, with Rosatom taking a 93% equity stake in the plant's construction (Nuclear Engineering International, 2012). The agreement stipulated that Rosatom would also operate the plant, would own a 100% stake in the plant for the first five years, and would retain a majority stake in the plant thereafter (Strauss, 2010). Considering that the Rosatom subsidy responsible for the Akkuyu project is owned and operated by the Russian state, the move suggests a renewed Turkish dependence on Russia in the energy sphere. The agreement contradicted Turkey's bid to diversify its energy producers. The project reaffirmed Turkey's reliance on Russia for energy provision, effectively replicating the dependence on Russian gas in a new, nuclear sector.

Indeed, the grand energy bargain as a whole contradicts the emphasis that the AKP had placed on diversification in its energy strategy. In its first eight years of governance, Turkey had emphasised the need to reduce energy dependency on imported hydrocarbon resources, and had pinpointed Russia as a state on which reliance was detrimental to energy security (see chapter three). Yet while diversification remained prominent in the AKP's energy rhetoric in the aftermath of the 2010 agreement, there was no acknowledgement by the AKP as to the potential costs of increased energy dependence.

[64] The plant's operational date has since been revised back to 2023 (Al-Jazeera, 2018)

The 2010 deal not only facilitated an increase in imports from Russia, but also increased Russia's influence in domestic markets. The limited liberalisation of Turkey's natural gas market in 2003 had enabled Russia - through Gazprom - to gain a foothold in Turkish gas production and infrastructural development; the 2010 deal expanded that role beyond the gas sector to incorporate oil and nuclear development and operations. More worryingly for Turkey's regional power ambitions, Erdogan and Gul's remarks (quoted above) suggest that they believed that the Samsun-Ceyhan and Blue Stream pipelines would contribute to the realisation of a Turkish energy hub. If, as chapter two argued, dependence by a regional power on a competing power for the provision of essential material resources skewers the balance of power in favour of the latter, then Turkey's reliance on Russia for energy supplies skewered the balance of power in favour of the latter and undermined Turkey's regional position. The failure of the grand energy bargain to incorporate mechanisms to guarantee Turkish rights for the re-exportation of surplus fuel from the new pipelines also undermined the AKP's hub agenda. Considering chapter three's contention that the hub was intrinsically linked to Turkey becoming a regional hegemon, this thesis argues that the grand energy bargain undermined Turkey's regional agenda. It contends that the grand energy bargain amounted to either a miscalculation by the AKP of the relative balance of power between Russia and Turkey or an abandonment of the diversification and hub policies. Considering that the examination of primary documentation in chapter three found considerable continuity in hub and diversification rhetoric through the period under examination, and research carried out in chapters three and four highlighted how Turkey tended to underestimate regional geopolitical equations in relation to energy, this thesis concludes that the first explanation is more likely. Regardless, there was a clear dissonance between Turkey's energy rhetoric and practice that undermined its capacity to implement a benevolent hegemonic regional power strategy. Completion of major pipeline projects during the AKP era demonstrated that Russia continuously pursued projects that undermined Turkey's regional power agenda. The next section will look at the three projects that dominated Turkish-Russian relations in this era.

5.4.5 Tangled pipelines: Nabucco, South Stream, and TurkStream

For much of the period under consideration, the Nabucco pipeline was both at the heart of EU-Russian energy relations and central to the realisation of Turkey's energy agenda. While the origins of Nabucco as part of the Southern Corridor were highlighted in chapter one, Moscow's role in determining the trajectory of the pipeline's progression is relevant to the discussion on the role of energy in regional power relations between Russia and Turkey. It is worth repeating that Nabucco was part of the fourth corridor project, and was therefore a countermeasure to Russian dominance of European energy markets. The project stalled several times in the early 2000s, and negotiations only began in earnest in 2006 Russia's suspension of natural gas supplies to Ukraine. The intensification of negotiations coincided with Russia's 2007 statement of intent to construct a southern "sister" pipeline to the Nord Stream to Europe via the Black Sea and Bulgaria. Moscow insisted that the project was not a political one, but rather made good business sense because it would provide a new, more secure passage through which Russian gas could reach Europe. Putin suggested that objections by the EU to the pipelines on competition grounds[65] were "against Europe's economic interests", with Lavrov insisting that the South Stream's sole purpose was to strengthen European energy security (Lavrov, 2010; Korsunskaya, 2014). The timing and route of the pipeline, however, suggest it was at least partially motivated by Russia's geopolitical agenda. Routing the pipeline through Bulgaria rather than Ukraine made little economic sense considering the relative technical complexities and associated financial burden of offshore pipeline construction. That the South Stream announcement came at a time of considerable tension in Russian-Ukrainian energy relations rather indicates that the project was an attempt to isolate Ukraine and reduce its transit leverage over Russia.

[65]Gazprom was to own, construct, and operate the pipeline in a move that conflicted with EU competition law

Figure 16: South Stream and Nabucco routes (IEA, 2009)

South Stream also dealt a blow to Turkey's energy conduit ambition, circumventing Turkish territory entirely until it was rerouted as part of the 2010 grand energy bargain. The exclusion of Turkey from the original project therefore demonstrates the relative power capacity of energy producing states over transit states when multiple energy routes are available for the exportation of resources to international markets. The previous chapter argued that a lack of viable alternative transit routes contributed to redressing the power imbalance between Iran as an energy producer and Turkey as an energy consumer. For Russia, however, Turkey was one state on a multitude of potential transit routes. As well as the Ukrainian option on east-west routes, Russia also had the potential to export energy east. It has exported oil to China since the 1980s (and replaced Saudi Arabia as China's single largest source of oil imports in 2016) and in 2014 signed two gas pipeline deals with Beijing. The first of these due to become operational in 2019 (EIA, 2017f). The leverage Turkey assumed as a key actor in Iranian energy export policy was more limited the Russian-Turkish relationship.

Events in 2014 contributed to a recalibration of trajectory of east-west energy flows between Russia and the EU that once again drew attention to Turkey's geostrategic location. The annexation of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula by Russia had all the indications of the imperial power strategy depicted in chapter two. Though it will be argued below that instability in Ukraine led Turkey to play a more prominent role in Russia's energy

strategy, the invasion itself posed an immediate threat to Turkey's energy security. The trans-Balkan pipeline that carries 12.5% of Turkey's gas supplies passes through Ukraine. Any conflict in the state therefore posed a risk to Turkey's energy security (EIA, 2017d). Turkish officials downplayed the potential risk to security of supply, with Yildiz stating that he did not foresee any cuts to natural gas supplies via the trans-Balkan line (Yackley, 2014). Nonetheless, the possibility of either Russia or Ukraine suspending transit contracts and the increased likelihood of damage to energy infrastructure by the conflict itself posed a threat to Turkish energy security. Bearing in mind the assertion in chapter one that energy supply suspension caused by conflict has negative economic consequences for producer states, Turkey's apprehension regarding energy security should have been mirrored by Russian concern over the economic costs of pipeline closure or damage. Yet the failure of that potential energy insecurity to deter Russia from military conflict highlights several points regarding the entanglement of Russian-Turkish relations, regional power, and energy. Firstly, it indicates that the trans-Balkan pipeline occupied a more important position in Turkey's energy security strategy than it did in Russia's. Despite attempts to elevate Turkey's position in regional power relations, the extent of the state's energy dependence rendered it more susceptible to fallout from regional conflict than did its trading partners. Secondly, it highlights how all regional states - including Turkey - were incapable of restraining a Russia willing to utilise an imperial regional power strategy. Consequently, this thesis argues that superior military capacity and the willingness to wield that power are central to the determination of hierarchies *between* regional powers. That is not to suggest that more cooperative relations with regional subordinates are not significant in conferring legitimacy on regional powers; but rather that, in cases like the Crimean annexation where regional states are insufficiently powerful to challenge the imperial regional power, the opportunities for resource-poor benevolent regional powers can be restricted.

The deterioration of the situation in Ukraine presented Turkey with an opportunity to market itself as a stable, reliable alternative to Ukraine in east-west energy transit systems. On one hand, it highlighted the necessity for energy routes that involved neither Russia nor Ukraine. On the other, Russian rhetoric in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation strengthened Turkey's position as a stable alternative for Russian resources. While Putin made it clear that Russia would not discontinue supplies through Ukraine as a result of the

conflict, he also stated that the “only problem” in the energy supply systems was that of transit countries (Putin, 2014a*;* Putin, 2014b). The annexation coincided with an proliferation of Russian rhetoric concerning the security of transit supplies through Ukraine, with Putin postulating that “the most dangerous part...[was] transit via Ukraine” because there was a risk of the “siphoning off [of] natural gas passing though Ukraine’s territory and heading to European consumers” (Putin, 2014b). This contributed to the perception that European energy supplies were at risk due to the geopolitical instability and deficit of pipeline security in Ukraine and, with the announcement of the TurkStream, effectively announced Turkey as Ukraine's successor as the primary east-west transit route for Russian energy hydrocarbons. Without access to non-Russian supplies, however, Turkey was unable to contribute to either its own or European energy diversification agendas.

The cancellation of the South Stream project in favour of the TurkStream - which included Turkey in Russia’s energy routing plans in a way the South Stream did not - in 2014 is often attributed to the escalation of Russian-European tensions in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation and Gazprom’s difficulties in raising funds for the project in the aftermath of the imposition of international sanctions (Korsunskaya, 2012). According to energy minister Alexander Novak, Putin made the decision to cancel the South Stream in 2014 on account of EU “intransigence” in November 2014 (Roth, 2014). Yet the first major sign that the South Stream was unlikely to progress had come a year earlier in December 2013, when Gazprom increased the projected price of the project by 50% to $22bn without explanation (Reed and Kanter, 2014). That the price increase coincided with the abandonment of Nabucco in 2013 adds credence to the argument that South Stream was effectively a counter-strategy to the EU’s energy diversification policy. In addition, the new figure was suggested at the same time as the EU intensified efforts to rein in Gazprom’s ownership of pipeline systems through new competition legislation that stipulated that energy pipelines had to be open to operational bids from all sources.

The simultaneous announcement of the TurkStream project once again positioned Turkey as Russia’s preferred energy transit partner. Like the Blue Stream, the pipeline will run under the Black Sea between Turkey and Russia and will deliver 15.75bcm of natural gas

to Turkey per annum (Gazprom, 2017b).[66] The project also made economic sense for both states considering that Turkey's energy needs - and particularly gas - were growing, while Europe's were stagnating. What is significant about the TurkStream is that the total capacity of the pipeline is 31.5bcm, more than twice the volume necessary to satisfy Turkish demand. Miller suggested that the new pipeline would be the same size as the South Stream with a fifth of the gas going to Turkey and the continuing to the border with Greece (Reed and Kanter, 2014). The project, therefore, effectively consists of three phases: the first to connect Russia and Turkey; the second to bring gas from Turkey to the Greek border; and the third to transport supplies west to Italy and north as far as Austria. Finally, Putin suggested that Turkey would receive a 6% discount on its gas imports from Russia for the following year and an additional 3bcm annually (Korsunskaya, 2012). Considering the heightened animosity between Russia and Ukraine at the time, it is likely the price discount was a means to signal to Ukraine that Turkey was now Russia's preferred transit and trading partner.

That all three pipelines were proposed by and either failed or manifested as a result of either EU or Russian influence illustrates Turkey's impotence in facilitating large-scale energy projects in its region. In essence, Turkey became a passive part of a political power play between Russia and Ukraine and, on a wider scale in terms of the new pipeline project, between Russia and the EU. The episode demonstrates the extent to which Turkey's energy strategy was reactive rather than demonstrating the regional energy "leadership" MENR's Strategic Plan (2009) professed to attain. In this regard, Russia's proactive and assertive regional hegemony and Turkey's willingness to facilitate Russia's energy agenda played a significant role in limiting Turkey's own capacity to influence regional energy flows.

[66] Unlike most of the other MoUs on energy cooperation signed by Russia and Turkey during the AKP's first three terms, the TurkStream project has progressed beyond the initial planning stages: intergovernmental agreements on the pipeline were signed in 2016, and construction of the Russian offshore phases of pipeline began in May 2017



Figure 17: TurkStream (Gazprom, 2017b)

If, as chapter three suggested, diversification of suppliers was a central tenet of Turkish energy policy (MENR, 2004, 2009, 2014), then both South Stream and TurkStream were detrimental to Turkish energy ambitions. The exclusion of Turkey from the South Stream notwithstanding, both projects saw Russia pursue natural gas supplies in Central Asia that Turkey had envisaged would be incorporated into either Nabucco or a future trans-Caspian pipeline. TurkStream, on the other hand, not only reinforced Turkish dependence on Russian gas, but will limit future opportunities to develop new energy relations with other gas-rich companies. The failure to invest in domestic energy infrastructure that was highlighted in chapter three was not only detrimental to energy security, but inimical to the hub ambitions in limiting the state's ability to store, transport, and re-export resources. Both the infrastructural and financial demands of TurkStream restrict the possibility of the construction of additional domestic capacity to transmit gas from Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

In terms of Turkey's regional power, therefore, TurkStream is far less beneficial than Nabucco. Previous chapters argued that Turkey sought to gain recognition as a facilitator of regional energy affairs. Complying with Europe's own energy agenda - particularly in terms of enhancing security of supply and reducing dependence on Russian resources - were crucial to this strategy. TurkStream not only reaffirms Russia's role as a primary supplier to both Turkey and southern Europe, but the limited capacity of Turkish energy systems highlighted in chapter two effectively curtails the possibility of future pipeline projects between Central Asia and Europe. In addition, energy analysts have expressed doubts as to whether the third phase of the project will have sufficient capacity to transfer natural gas from the Turkish-Greek section to Europe (Panin, 2015). The lack of certainty around phase three of the project means that, unless investment in LNG and reverse-flow technology increases, eastern Europe will remain dependent on gas flows through Ukraine.[67] Tense relations between Ukraine and Russia and a history of suspension of supplies suggest a potential negative impact on Europe's energy security and make it more likely Europe will focus on developing renewable resources and LNG trade, reducing demand for natural gas and Turkey's energy hub potential. When considered in conjunction with the cancellation of Nabucco and Turkey's limited domestic capacity, TurkStream can be framed as medium-term threat to Turkey's hub agenda.

Finally, it was argued early in this thesis that the successful integration of the Caspian region's resource-rich states into east-west energy systems would boost Turkey's status in a region dominated by energy affairs, enhance Turkey's reputation in international energy affairs, and create leverage for Turkey over and closer ties with states that have traditionally been part of the Russian sphere of influence. The final condition is instrumental to Turkey achieving its regional power agenda. Since he was first elected president of Russia in 2000, Putin's strategy for reasserting Russia as a global power has been tied to the control of energy supplies and infrastructure in its near abroad. That policy was also central to reasserting Russia's regional power status after the instability of the Yeltsin era though the expansion of Moscow's economic capacity and the pursuit of closer energy ties with former Soviet states. The failure in the 1990s of the pan-Turkic

[67] Northern and central Europe's reliance on energy flows through Ukraine has been somewhat reduced by the construction of the Nordstream pipeline in 2011, and will be further reduced on the completion of NordStream II in 2019/2020 (Nord-Stream.com, 2017; Financial Times, 2017)

experiment and Russia's superior material capacity meant that Turkey was unlikely to gain influence in the region and challenge Russia's dominance through ideological or economic initiatives. Offering the former Soviet states an alternative to reliance on Russian systems would simultaneously have lessened Russia's role in the region and constrained Russia's regional hegemony strategy to the benefit of Turkey's own regional power agenda. Consequently, this thesis argues that TurkStream places new limits on Turkey's capacity to enhance its significance in former Soviet states through energy cooperation and is therefore detrimental to Turkey's regional power ambitions. As the next section will demonstrate, competition for influence in Turkey and Russia's common region was, to a large extent, tied up in the states' energy strategies.

5.5 Turkey and Russia: competition for regional powerhood

5.5.1 Competition in the South Caucasus

The competition for influence in the South Caucasus that began in the imperial era continued to be a factor in Russian-Turkish relations under the first three AKP administrations. Unlike Iran - which chapter four suggested had limited integration in the region - Russia had maintained significant links with the FSU republics after the dissolution of the USSR. The three Caucasian states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - had been part of the Soviet Union until their independence in 1991. Russia continued to exert influence in the region in the aftermath of the USSR's dissolution by way of military alliances, economic agreements, and control over energy infrastructure. Not only were the South Caucasus crucial to Russia's regional power ambitions, but ensuring stability was critical to prevent unrest in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh spilling over into Russia's own unstable North Caucasus. Similarly, Turkey was proactive in applying its "zero problems with neighbours" (ZPWN) policy in the region in the hope that strong multidimensional links would enhance Turkey's regional presence and its own border security. Chapter three highlighted how those policies were also were necessary to ensure access to Caspian energy supplies and Central Asian energy reserves. It argued that pipeline politics were a primary driver of the AKP's Caucasian strategy, and the associated pipeline diplomacy and security cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia strengthened ties between three states to the detriment of Russian attempts to consolidate its status in the region. For

this reason, then, it can be argued that the South Caucasus were at the centre of the Russia and Turkey's competing regional power strategies.

Russia and Turkey's energy relations were complicated by the countries' respective alliances with Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan strengthened bilateral relations with Turkey in the post-Soviet era on the basis of cultural, historical, and economic connections and a desire to assert independence from Russia. Armenia, on the other hand, remained closely allied with Russia, and was the only Caucasian state to continue to maintain Russian military and airbases.[68] Russian troops have been responsible for patrolling Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran since 1995 on the basis of a collective security agreement (O' Rourke, 2010). As chapter four noted, Gazprom is responsible for a majority of Armenia's natural gas supplies and infrastructure. However, while Turkey has no relationship with Armenia, there is some cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia in terms of bilateral trade. In 2015, Russia and Turkey were Azerbaijan's joint highest trading partners, with each supplying 15% of Azerbaijan's imports (World Bank, 2016). The states supply small volumes of oil to each other, and Azerbaijan also exports oil via Russia to the Black Sea through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline (EIA, 2016h).

[68] It should be noted that the New York Times reports that Russia has also stationed troops in Georgian territory Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 (Higgins, 2016)



Figure 18: Energy infrastructure in the Caucasus (The Independent, 2008)

Russia's military alliance with Armenia is important for understanding the balance of power and continued instability in the South Caucasus during the AKP's first three administrations. Chapter three noted that Turkey has traditionally sided with Azerbaijan in the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia, on the other hand, has lent its political and military support to Armenia. If the resolution of regional conflicts is a condition of regional powerhood, then successful mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh would be a significant factor in elevating Turkey's regional status. However, continued animosity between Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan's suspicions concerning the Russian-Armenian military alliance militated against resolving the conflict during the AKP's first three terms. At the same time, Azerbaijan's willingness to trade with Russia proved problematic in terms of Turkey's regional power agenda, and particularly in terms of its energy policy, in terms of undermining Turkey's perception that it was the only viable energy partner for the states of the Caspian. The lack of consensus on Nagorno-Karabakh and the wider relationships between Turkey, Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan had played a role in determining the region's energy geopolitics in the pre-

AKP era: that the BTE and BTC pipelines transit Georgia rather than a shorter route through Armenia is on account of the hostilities between Armenia and each of Turkey and Azerbaijan. As chapter one pointed out, the political and economic situation in third-party transit states is also inimical to ensuring the viability of energy systems. For Turkey, ensuring stability in transit states was central to proving the viability of an energy hub, but political hostility between Turkey and Armenia prevented Turkey from having a facilitator role in mediating conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Regional alliances, protracted conflicts, and energy became increasingly intertwined during the second AKP administration. Chapter three highlighted how Turkey's attempted rapprochement with Armenia in 2009 had negative ramifications for both Turkey's energy agenda and its bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. Of particular relevance for this chapter is Ilham Aliyev's threat to "re-orientate" Azerbaijan's hydrocarbon trade to Russia (Aliyev, quoted in Abbasov, 2009). Capitalising on the discord between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Russia offered to sign a long-term contract to buy up Shah Deniz-2 gas. That Medvedev and Miller both travelled personally to Baku to negotiate the contract is indicative of the importance attached to the project by Russia; that they agreed to pay a higher than normal price of $350/tcm (RIA Novosti, 2009) implies that the agreement stemmed from political rather than economic factors. Buying up Azerbaijani gas would effectively invalidate the Nabucco project and reinforce European dependence on Russia. Abbasov (2009) suggests that Aliyev suspected the Turkish-rapprochement might lead to a deal on Nagorno-Karabakh, and saw increased cooperation in the natural gas sector as a means to convince Russia to encourage Armenia to make concessions or withdraw some of its troops from the region. Akdemir, however, argues that the negotiations were an attempt to play a "cat and mouse game" with Russia and the West to play one off against the other for the highest natural gas price (2011:75). In either case, Turkey was at a disadvantage.

Chapter three argued that the 2009 dispute highlighted Turkey's limitations with regards to the manipulation of regional energy trade and its capacity to assert leverage and hegemony over smaller regional energy producers. However, the dispute also reaffirmed Russia's intent to reassert its influence in the energy markets of the former Soviet Union. If engaging in regional energy trade was pivotal to Russia's regional power strategy, then the successful buy-up of Shah Deniz gas would be a major stepping stone to cementing

Russia's regional hegemony. That Russia was evidently willing to exploit tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan for geopolitical gain casts doubt on the strength of the relationship between the two, and illustrates again how bilateral relations were grounded primarily in rhetoric. The AKP was not unaware of the incongruity of its own energy strategy with those of other states: MENR had highlighted the danger posed by "the contradiction between the energy policies of other countries with the target of our country for becoming and *(sic)* energy hub" in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan (MENR, 2009:9). The purchase by Russia of Shah Deniz gas would be a major impediment to the realisation of each of Turkey's energy security, diversification, and hub agendas.

However, it should be recalled that Turkey had spent almost two decades pursuing energy trade with the former Soviet states. Through participation in the fourth corridor project, Turkey sought to take advantage of those states' desire to assert independence from Russian influence and to limit its own dependence on Russian supplies. This thesis considers the manipulation of regional energy geopolitics by Turkey and Russia for access to Azerbaijan's resources to be part of the "great game" (Gokay, 2001:23) for Caspian resources debated in chapter one. The 2009 episode is therefore illustrative of a continuing competition for access to regional resources between Turkey and Russia that transcended the otherwise amicable relationship between the states. It indicates that the centrality of energy to both counties' regional agendas contributed to a willingness to prioritise access to energy resources over bilateral relations. At the same time, the failure of either the competing pipeline projects or the 2009 Azerbaijani incident to negatively impact on Turkish-Russian relations suggests that the states effectively compartmentalised bilateral relations and regional energy equations.

Finally, Azerbaijan's role in facilitating or impeding Turkey and Russia's regional energy agendas should not be discounted. Azerbaijan's recommitment to Turkey despite Russia's promise of higher prices for Baku's natural gas lends credibility to the arguments in chapters one and two that strong bilateral relations and access to Europe provided Turkey with leverage over Russia in negotiating with energy producers in the former Soviet sphere. That Azerbaijan reaffirmed its commitment to energy trade with Turkey following the failure of the latter's rapprochement with Armenia demonstrates how subordinate states may manipulate the agendas of regional powers both large (Russia) and smaller

(Turkey) in specific contexts. In short, the episode indicates that producer states that are considered subordinate within the regional hierarchy may assert their own power in situations where transit state regional powers are unwilling or unable to utilise a coercive hegemonic strategy.

5.5.2 Georgia: stuck in the middle

Russia's motivations for maintaining influence in the South Caucuses after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were documented earlier in this chapter. It should be noted, however, that Russia's interest in Georgia was partially driven by irredentism on the Georgian-Russian border: Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggested in 2003 that Russia was concerned about instability in the semi-autonomous regions northern Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia spilling over into the already turbulent North Caucasus (Ivanov, 2003).

Figure 19: The semi-autonomous regions of Georgia (Antidze, 2015)

The "Rose Revolution" that replaced the relatively pro-Russian Eduard Shevardnadze as president of Georgia with the overtly pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili in 2004 proved a catalyst for a serious deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations. Saakashvili's decision to

extend Georgia's partnership with NATO to full membership threatened Russia's efforts to limit Western (and particularly US) influence in the South Caucasus. In order to counter Russian influence and increase its ties with the West, Georgia looked to its southern neighbour. Not only was Turkey the only regional member of NATO, but it also maintained strong links to the EU and US. Consequently, the period between Saakashvili's accession and the 2008 war was characterised by extensive growth in cooperation between Georgia and Turkey on military, economic, and political affairs. The abolition of visa controls for Georgian and Turkish citizens enabled Turkey to become the second largest provider of FDI to Georgia, with Turkish businesses investing in major construction and infrastructural projects (Goksel, 2013). Turkey became Georgia's primary trading partner in 2006, with total bilateral trade tripling from $240 million in 2002 to $750 million in 2006 (World Bank, 2017a). A Russian embargo on Georgian products and a subsequent FTA between Georgia and Turkey that same year cemented Turkey's place as Georgia's dominant regional partner.

Georgia was pivotal to Turkey's energy ambitions. Both the BTC and BTE pipelines transit Georgia. Throughout the AKP's tenure, all new pipeline proposals from the Caspian to Turkey - Nabucco, trans-Caspian, trans-Anatolian, and TANAP - had a transit stage through Georgia. The continuing hostilities between Armenia and Turkey and Azerbaijan amplified Georgia's strategic significance in regional energy equations. As chapter three explained, the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh exempts the shorter, more economic pipeline transit route through Armenia from east-west energy corridor equations. With no alternative routes through which to transport plentiful supplies of Azerbaijani oil and gas, Georgia became strategically significant for the realisation of Turkey's energy security, diversification, and hub agendas. Chapter one argued that the success of security, diversification, and hub agendas was contingent on stability in all states in the energy chain. Consequently, ensuring Georgian stability and territorial integrity was pivotal to Turkey's own strategic energy agenda.

Figure 20: Major pipelines in the South Caucasus (Socar Romania, 2017)

Both the AKP and its predecessors took a number of measures to ensure stability in Georgia and the protection of essential energy infrastructure. Turkey signed a series of bilateral defence and military cooperation agreements in 1999 shortly after the BTC deal was signed. These committed Ankara to providing financial and technical assistance to the Georgian military over a five year period (Fuller, 1999). Under the AKP, Georgian soldiers continued to receive training in Turkish military schools, and Turkey supplied Georgia with military hardware (Saivetz, 2009). Turkey also participated in joint exercises with Georgia through NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In all, the extent of military assistance loaned by Turkey to Georgia outweighed that of military and defence cooperation with any other state in the region.

Chapters two and three contended that the former Soviet states in the Caspian region actively sought to limit reliance on Russia. Turkey's preponderance of military and economic power relative to Georgia meant that it possessed the capacity to assist Georgia's disentanglement from Russia dependency. Based on the arguments made in chapter two, Turkey's commitment to NATO and relations with the West can also be perceived as a form of ideational power in the relationship with the increasingly westward-gazing

Georgia. Chapter three also argued that participation in the east-west energy corridor was a means through which independence could be achieved. For energy producers, the corridor meant new routes and pipeline systems through which energy could be exported to international markets; for Georgia, a diversification of energy imports, income from energy transit tariffs, and stronger security relations with other states within the energy system. This thesis argues that by supporting regional pipeline initiatives and actively promoting stronger economic interdependency between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, Turkey effectively facilitated a minor reorientation of the regional status quo by reducing Georgia's reliance on Russia. If strong multilateral relations with regional states and the propagation of and support for common values are, as chapter two proposed, inimical to regional powerhood, then Turkey's Georgia strategy was congruous with a leadership form of regional power that was facilitated by regional energy equations.

However, the extent to which self-interest prompted Turkish involvement in Georgian stability is more indicative of a benevolent hegemonic style of regional powerhood. Georgia was pivotal to Turkey's energy agenda. Instability that threatened the closure of BTC or BTE constituted a major risk to Turkey's own energy security: shortages would not only impact Turkey's economic productivity, but would force the state to seek additional oil and gas from other sources. Aside from the added expense of paying spot prices for oil and LNG - which chapter one argued placed a significant economic burden on importing states - the only way for Turkey to replace Azerbaijani natural gas would be with supplies through existing Russian and Iranian pipelines. This, chapter three argued, would be harmful to Turkey's position in the regional hierarchy. In addition, instability in Georgia would discourage investment in the new trans-Caspian pipelines that were integral to Turkey's hub agenda. Consequently, this thesis argues that Turkey's cooperation with Georgia on security and economic matters was facilitated by existing energy relations between the states and was in part a means to further advance energy ties within the context of east-west energy projects. Military conflict between Georgia and Russia therefore posed a serious threat to Turkey's ambitions.

5.5.2a The South Ossetian war: implications for Turkey's energy strategy and regional power

The war that broke out between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia in August 2008 represented a major crisis for Turkey. Both Russia and Georgia had strategic significance for Turkey in terms of its energy ambitions, and both were major trade partners. The war undermined Turkey's "zero-problems with neighbours" policies, and in seeking to reassert the regional status quo during and after the war, the AKP appears to have inadvertently lent its support to Georgia rather than Russia. Throughout the war, Turkey provided humanitarian aid to both Georgians and South Osesstians (MFA, 2008a; MFA, 2008b). At the same time, it risked Russian ire by repeatedly reiterating support for Georgia' s territorial integrity and allowing the passage of two US warships through the Turkish straits to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Georgian coast (MFA, 2008c; BBC Monitoring, 2008d). In response, Russian customs officials began delaying Turkish trucks at the Georgian-Russian border and significantly increased its searches of Turkish cargo vessels at Novorossiysk (BBC Monitoring, 2008d). After a tense period in Russian-Turkish relations, the matter was resolved at the end of September with a renewed commitment by both states to simplifying export procedures (AFP, 2008b; AFP, 2008c). Nonetheless, the episode cost Turkey $1bn in export revenue (BMI Research, 2008) and demonstrated Russia's willingness to use coercive measures congruent with coercive hegemony or imperialism in its relations with regional allies.

The uncertainty and instability that arose during the South Ossetian war presented several conundrums for Turkey's energy policy. Stability in Georgia, a pivotal player in the fourth corridor project, was essential for the realisation of Turkey's energy hub agenda. Chapter one argued that interstate or civil war deterred IOCs and international financial institutions from investing in energy projects. Considering that the fourth corridor was contingent on support from IOCS (see chapter three), any large scale conflict had the potential to derail the east-west energy projects that were at the heart of Turkey's hub strategy. Georgia's part in diluting Russia's influence over regional energy supplies - and, consequently, in elevating Turkey's position in regional energy equations - should not be discounted. By participating in the BTC and BTE projects, Georgia had played in a role in restricting Russia's access to Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves and contributed to diluting

Russia's monopoly over supply routes between Asia and Europe. When war broke out in South Ossetia, negotiations on Nabucco were advancing after several years of minimal development and looked set to further diminish Russia's influence over regional energy routes and, concurrently, Russia's geopolitical influence. There was little doubt from the Georgian perspective that energy was a motivation for Russia's actions: Saakashvili argued that Russia "need(ed)" to control energy routes from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, and that Georgia's position as a transit state threatened Russia's monopoly over regional export routes (Barnard, 2008; Parfitt et al, 2008). To an extent, then, the South Ossetian conflict can be conceptualised in terms of the competition for energy influence in the Caspian region that was outlined in chapter three. Of more immediate concern to Turkey was the risk Russia's military campaigns in Georgia posed to its energy security. Despite claims to the contrary by Georgian officials (The Sunday Times, 2008), there is no evidence that essential energy infrastructure was targeted by Russia's air force during the campaign in South Ossetia (AFP, 2008a; Morningstar, 2008; Barnard, 2008). Nonetheless, the discussion on energy security and warfare in chapter one argued that even if energy infrastructure is not directly targeted during a military campaign, conflict can still have a major impact on energy security. The bombardment by Russian air forces of road and rail networks restricted non-pipeline oil deliveries from Russia to Turkey and Armenia; similarly, the blockade of Georgian ports by the Russian navy restricted the transit of oil supplies across the Black Sea. Reuters also notes that the BTC and BTE pipelines were closed for the duration of the conflict (Fineren, 2008).[69] War in Georgia also ran the risk of destabilising the entire region by spilling over and reigniting other protracted conflicts in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. The insecurity arising from the conflict therefore threatened the entire region's energy security.

From a Turkish perspective, the conflict was detrimental to domestic energy security. The closure of the BTC and BTE pipelines and restrictions to oil tanker transport through Georgia forced Turkey to seek alternative sources that contributed to Turkey's energy bill. The conflict also posed a more long term threat to Turkey's energy hub ambitions. As chapter one pointed out, conflict creates an unfavourable environment for investment and energy trade. The uncertainties surrounding the Georgia's viability as a transit route had

[69] Though it should be noted that the BTC had been closed for a week prior to the commencement of the war because of a fire on the pipeline (Fineran, 2008)

the potential to undermine investment in new east-west projects, which in turn would cast doubt on Turkey's energy agenda. Turkish officials were evidently aware of the consequences of prolonged conflict on Turkey's energy agenda. It is worth repeating here Gul's statement on Turkey's role in the Caucasus quoted in chapter three:

> .... if you have stability in the Caucasus.... then you have the right climate for economic cooperation. And the Caucasus are key as far as energy resources and the safe transportation of energy from the east to the west. That transportation goes through Turkey. That is why we are trying to achieve an atmosphere of dialogue, so there is the right climate to resolve the problems. If there is instability in the Caucasus, it would be sort of like a wall between the East and West; if you have stability in the region, it could be a gate (Gul, in an interview with Newsweek, 2008).

Limiting the impact and duration of a war on Turkish borders between two of the country's major partners was, therefore, in Turkey's best interest both in terms of its domestic and economic security and in ensuring a continuation on energy trade though its territory. To this end, Turkey embarked on a proactive diplomatic campaign to encourage stability in the Caucasus in a strategy reminiscent with benevolent regional hegemony. It proposed the formation of a Stability and Cooperation Platform in the Caucasus (SCPC) that could "assume crisis management and seek solution (sic) in case of a problem of the region" and to "lead to cooperation on regional peace and security" (BBC Monitoring, 2008a). Such an organisation would also contribute to the security of energy supplies transiting the Caucasus. Despite proactivity on the behalf of the AKP hierarchy in promoting the organisation (Gul, 2008c) and claims as to the reciprocity of other regional states to the project (Gul, 2008b), it failed to get off the ground. Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Arag Azimov's statement in 2009 that the project could not be implemented without a resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates the centrality of that conflict to Azerbaijan's regional vision and was, as chapter three suggested, something that the AKP constantly underestimated. While there is little Turkey could - or was willing to - do in the face of Russian aggression in Georgia given the latter's superior material assets and the unwillingness of regional subordinates to challenge Russia, the foundation of a security-based institution had the potential to cement Turkey's position as a benevolent regional

hegemon. Throughout this thesis, it has been argued the implementation of a benevolent hegemonic strategy by Turkey was restricted by constraints to its regional influence and the role other powers played in the Caspian. In this instance, the AKP failed to accurately assess the region's geopolitical environment and overestimated the reciprocity of other states to Turkish-led regional initiatives. In short, the SCPC was representative of the overconfidence in its regional power that this thesis suggests was prevalent in the AKP from the second administration on.

The war therefore demonstrated that Russia was the primary driver of the regional security agenda. Russia's Georgian campaign bore a close resemblance to the imperial style of regional power strategy outlined in chapter two, and illustrated Moscow's willingness to utilise military power against subordinate states within the regional hierarchy. The failure of the SCPC and Russia's economic retribution in the face of Turkey's repeated affirmation of Ankara's support for Georgia's territorial integrity are illustrative of a regional system in which Turkey remained a secondary player to Russia. The discussion on regional power in chapter two suggested that ensuring security for the region contributed to an acceptance by others of the state's regional power credentials. In this case, Turkey's inability to act in the face of Russian regional imperialism in Georgia - a major ally and trading partner - demonstrated the limitations to its regional power in contrast to that of Russia. Significantly for this thesis, the suspension of energy flows through the BTC and BTE justified the AKP's position on the relationship between regional security and domestic energy security but yet again undermined Turkey's regional position. Turkey suffered an economic cost from supplementing suspended supplies and a geopolitical cost of purchasing those supplies from Russia. In the latter case, the South Ossetian war reaffirmed not only that Russia maintained an irreplaceable presence in Turkey's energy equations, but that Turkey was dependent on Russia for ensuring Turkish energy security when security failed in other areas.

The war over South Ossetia illuminated problems in the AKP's approach to regional security issues and its assessment of the geopolitical risks to domestic energy security. Despite extensive military cooperation with Georgia in the years leading up to the conflict, despite a particular focus on securing energy infrastructure in that state, and despite the tensions that had been simmering between Georgia and Russia since the Rose Revolution,

Turkey was entirely unprepared for any serious escalation of tension. It had no recourse for the issues that affected the secure flow of energy through Georgia, and that the shortfall in energy imports that transited Georgia was compensated for through increased supplies though the Blue Stream merely reinforced Turkey's dependence on Russian imports. That those supplies in turn increased Turkey's reliance on Russian resources limited the AKP's response to the crisis. If defining and influencing regional security issues and systems is a key criterion of regional power and - as this thesis argues - the AKP sought to utilise energy to achieve that status, then ensuring a stable environment conducive to secure regional energy flows was essential to Turkey's agenda. The failure to pre-empt or influence conflict in a key transit state not only signalled a failure of Turkey's ZPWN foreign policy strategy, but raised a series of questions over the effectiveness of its energy security/regional powers strategy.

It is doubtful in any case that Turkey had the capacity and opportunity to affect regional affairs in its favour during this period. Both statements from relevant parties at the time and the application of the regional powers framework to the events of 2008 indicate that the energy-based power imbalance between Turkey and Russia restricted Turkey's capacity to assert a more forceful hegemonic regional strategy. It is evident that Turkey's limited restrained response to Russian aggression in its backyard was a product of the country's dependency on Russian resources. In the aftermath of the war, Erdogan referred to the link between Russian energy imports and Turkey's approach with varying degrees of ambiguity. On 31st August, he stated that Russia was "an important neighbour" and Turkey's "number one trade partner" (BBC Monitoring, 2008b). More specifically, he pointed out that Turkey would be "left in the dark" if a new cold war began between Russia and the US on account of the Georgian war because of Turkey's dependence on Russian energy supplies (BBC Monitoring Euope, 2008b). A day later, he said that he could not "ignore" the extent of energy dependence on Russia, reiterating several days later that no external country could expect Turkey to ignore that Russia was Turkey's "strategic neighbour" emphasising, once again, that it depended on Russian energy imports (AFP, 2008c; BBC Monitoring Europe, 2008e). Continued instability in Georgia and the unreliability of Iranian supplies during the previous winter meant that the AKP could not risk confronting Russia; to do so would have been detrimental to its own energy security. In short, then, the conflict created a predicament for Turkey. It forced Turkey to confront

its precarious balance between NATO membership and the Russian alliance and the tensions between energy relations with Russia as a major supplier, and Georgia as a central transit state in circumventing reliance on Russia. Consequently, it cast doubt on Turkey's capacity to utilise energy as a means of achieving its regional power ambitions.

Chapter two argued that the AKP's proactive foreign policy was a product of a desire to strengthen ties with regional states and generate goodwill that would be advantageous to Turkey's regional power agenda. However, on several occasions between 2002 and 2014, Turkey demonstrated an inability to utilise that leverage to its benefit in competing with Russia for regional influence. Conversely, Russia has proved not only willing and capable of wielding that leverage, but other states in the region - even those with close ties to Turkey - demonstrated reciprocity to Russia's advances. This was, perhaps, most clearly highlighted in the South Caucasus. Turkey's inability to capitalise on Russia's relative regional isolation by strengthening relations with the South Caucasian states or implementing the SCPC after the South Ossetian war compares unfavourably to Russia's successful exploitation of geopolitical tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan a year later. Considering the instrumental role both Georgia and Azerbaijan played in Turkey's energy strategy in terms of diversifying resources, the hub agenda, and accessing energy markets in Central Asia, it can be argued that the failure to utilise the goodwill earned through multidimensional engagement in the face of successful Russian power projection was damaging to both Ankara's energy ambitions and the perception of Turkey as a benevolent regional hegemon.

5.6 Conclusion

In an era characterised by strong bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Russia, energy proved both a facilitator and detriment to the realisation of Turkey's regional power strategy. On the plus side, increased energy flows from Russia to Turkey contributed to continued economic growth in Turkey, which, chapter one suggested was a key objective of the regional power agenda. Similarly, Russian investment in Turkey's domestic energy systems was essential to the modernisation of the gas industry, and instrumental to the development of the nuclear sector. As a result, it contributed to Turkey's energy security and fuel type diversification agendas. At the same time, closer ties between the states in the energy sphere came at the expense of Turkey's capacity to strengthen relations with

states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The centrality of energy to Russia's own regional agenda meant it was reluctant to make concessions to Turkey on oil and gas issues if they were likely to enhance Turkey's regional status. The continued dependence on Russia to fulfil Turkish energy needs was also an effective constraint on Turkey's response to Russian foreign policy in the Caspian region. In addition, that rhetorical commitment to bilateral relations was unmatched by tangible policies undermined the supposed strength of those relations in a way that repeatedly undermined Turkey's regional agenda.

Moreover, increasing reliance on Russian resources was counterproductive to attempts to portray Turkey as an autonomous actor which, as chapter two argued, was a necessary precondition to the acceptance of Turkey's regional power status by other states. It highlighted the inconsistencies inherent in Turkey's energy agenda and illustrated the disconnect between Turkey's energy rhetoric and the policies it actively pursued or implemented. Chapter two highlighted how Turkey's location between east and west has been portrayed as key to its significance in the international system since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. However, Turkey has consistently lacked the capacity to utilise its preferential geographic location to realise its broader geopolitical agenda independently of major powers. During the Cold War, Turkey's geostrategic relevance was predicated on its usefulness to the West as a NATO ally and buffer between the West and the Soviet Union. The failure of the state to develop a geopolitical strategy to utilise its location of its own accord was highlighted by Turkey's diminished strategic significance after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey was forced to reassess the means through which it could best exploit its geostrategic location for its own gain, and with the advent of the fourth corridor project energy became Turkey's preferred route to augment its status. As the AKP ascended to power, energy not only became a means through which Turkey could reassert its strategic significance to the West, but through which it could enhance its regional power. The limitations of the fourth corridor saw Turkey turn to Russia to realise its ambitions but, as in the Cold War era, the realisation of those ambitions is dependent on Russia's own energy and geopolitical strategies. To that extent, rather than asserting Turkish autonomy from major powers, the AKP appeared to swap reliance on the US and West to facilitate Turkey's geostrategic importance for a similar reliance on Russia. If, therefore, Turkey's geostrategic significance in inimical to its regional power strategy, and energy is central to the augmentation of that geopolitical significance, then reliance on

Russia to fulfil the material requirements (i.e. hydrocarbons, infrastructure, , finance) for energy projects through Turkey undermines Turkey's regional power agenda. In this regard, this thesis contends that the AKP underestimated the constraints imposed by its position in regional hierarchy relative to Russia: it could not overcome the imbalance in bilateral relations brought on by Russia's superior material capacity and its willingness to adopt an imperial regional power strategy. As a result, its capacity to assert a benevolent hegemonic regional power strategy - one free from the constraints imposed by other states, and that would enhance its status among subordinate states - was limited.

This chapter demonstrated that reliance on a competing regional power for energy plays a constraining role in the execution of regional power strategies for producer states. Consumer states may rely on producers for the necessary material resources to realise regional power strategies like the hub agenda. When the producer has a preponderance of energy reserves relative to the consumer, this can undermine the capacity of the state to act independently which undermines the regional power strategy. The effects of that dependence may be alleviated if there is relative parity between the states' capacities in other policies areas or if an attempt is made to redress the balance of power through cooperation in other areas. In the Turkish-Russian example, however, energy proved the dominant factor defining bilateral relations. Russia's assertiveness in carrying out its regional strategy and its willingness to wield its military power to achieve its geopolitical agenda was central to an imbalance between the states within the region. As a result, it should be noted that both the energy dependence and the form of the states' respective regional power policies played a central role in determining Turkey's capacity and willingness to respond to regional developments in the energy and political spheres in a way that could have been beneficial to its regional power agenda.

Conclusion

Since Jim O' Neill coined the term "BRICs" to describe the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China in 2001, advanced developing states have become increasingly prominent in international relations (IR). Vast bodies of IR literature on rising, emerging, and middle powers have been generated in order to research the role these states play in international politics. Among these new sub-schools of IR is that on regional power. Though regional power literature can incorporate states at every stage of economic development, advanced developing states dominate both empirical and theoretical research. Special attention is granted to the regional context in these studies: to the advanced developing state's relative preponderance of power within the regional system; to the state's regional ambitions; and to the opportunities offered and constraints placed by regional dynamics (Nolte, 2010). Yet despite emphasising the role played by material factors in determining and exercising regional power, this thesis noted that the literature failed to consider the way in which energy affected regional power

During the same period, energy scholars pointed to a reconfiguration of global energy geopolitics based on the increasing activism of advanced developing states in the field of international energy politics (Hayes et al, 2006; Gjelten, 2012). Nonetheless - and in contrast to the IR literature more broadly - examinations of advanced developing states in the international energy system are restricted by their limited scope and the dominance of the Western-focused narratives. To redress these limitations, this thesis sought to research the role of energy *between* advanced developing states. This thesis merged the regional power perspective of IR scholars to this new energy-geopolitical paradigm in researching advanced developing states. Consequently, this thesis' central research question asked

"what is the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states?".

After highlighting the major issues in the literature on energy and regional powers in IR, the thesis adopted an empirical approach to understanding how energy politics are conducted in the non-Western world. It denoted a wider Caspian region consisting of the Caspian littorals, the states of the South Caucasus, and Turkey. A case study approach was applied to understanding the relationship between energy and regional power for Turkey in

the wider Caspian region. In-depth profiles of the nature of Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Russian energy relations were conducted in order to broaden the scope through which the research question could be addressed.

In assessing the relationship between energy and regional powers in the Turkish context, this thesis contributes to an emerging research agenda on the power dynamics of emerging actors in international relations. Further studies on this particular region utilising a different set of material in Turkish, Russian, or Persian may generate alternative understandings of the role energy and regional power plays in the relationship between the three actors. Similarly, examining different regions where external great powers play a more dominant role (such as the Middle East) or where pipeline politics are limited by regions with significantly different geographical compositions (such as the more oceanic South East Asia) may contribute to further understandings of the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states. Nonetheless, this thesis has made clear that in the Caspian region, energy and regional power are inherently interrelated for advanced developing states.

The first section of this conclusion will summarise the empirical aspects of this thesis and highlight the ways in which energy and regional power are related for Turkey. The second section proposes four major arguments pertinent to answering the central research question. These proposals do not assume that all advanced developing states are - or aspire to be - regional powers, or that the energy relations of these states take place only within the regional context. Rather, it addresses the central research question in considering the ways in which energy affects the regional power of advanced developing states and, conversely, how regional power affects the way in which advanced developing states understand energy. The final part of this conclusion outlines the contribution of this thesis to IR literature and proposes areas of further study.

Energy and regional powers in advanced developing states: Turkey and the wider Caspian region

This thesis characterised Turkey as a benevolent hegemonic regional power. It positioned Turkey in a wider Caspian region comprised of two other regional powers (Russia and Iran) and five subordinates (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and

Kazakhstan). It argued that Turkey's limited domestic hydrocarbon reserves placed it at a strategic disadvantage in a region dominated by energy producers. Nonetheless, the necessity to ensure domestic energy security and Ankara's geostrategic location contributed to the AKP's belief that the state could become a regional energy "leader". At the heart of the state's energy agenda was the desire to construct an energy hub that would elevate Turkey's strategic significance to other regional states and in global energy systems. Regional integration, an emphasis on Turkey's strategic (and geographical) links with Europe, and the propagation of a common regional security agenda were among the methods applied to realise these ambitions. This energy agenda was pivotal to enhancing Turkey's legitimacy as a regional power in the wider Caspian region. An examination of AKP discourse demonstrated that the party believed that it could use its energy "leader" status to encourage cooperation and integration in a manner that would contribute to its regional power. Oil and gas took on an additional dimension as a tool for foreign policy in this era: not just as something essential for the economic and social functions of the state, but as a means to forge interdependencies, enhance regional integration, and accrue regional power.

Chapters four and five looked in more detail at Turkey's ever-closer relationships with Iran and Russia. The latter was characterised as detrimental to Turkey's energy and regional power ambitions, while the former was considered more beneficial. The differences between the cases was attributed to the states' relative positions in and power projection in the regional system, as well as to the relationship of those states with external powers.

Chapter four contended that energy was the predominant focus of bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran. It was argued that while Turkey's status as an advanced developing state and regional power facilitated Ankara's participation in the 2010 UNSC negotiations on Iran's nuclear agenda, Turkey's willingness to participate was motivated by the necessity to mitigate international action that would limit its energy security and hub agendas. The Iranian study also highlighted the extent to which the AKP not only recognised Iran's regional power limitations and the constraints imposed on Tehran by its relationship with external actors like the UN and EU, but sought to manipulate those relations to augment Turkey's regional power. However, the AKP's failure to account for how the geopolitical motivations of those actors affected regional energy equations limited

the extent to which Turkey could use its energy relations with Iran to the benefit of its regional agenda. Attempts to incorporate Iranian gas supplies into the fourth corridor despite such a policy contravening the US and EU's energeopolitical agendas is a clear example of these limitations. Overall, chapter four argued that Turkey's relationship with Iran generated only limited benefits in energy terms, but had the potential to augment Ankara's regional status. It demonstrated to other states Turkey's willingness to integrate all states into regional pipeline systems and to represent the region in international forums. Consequently, it enhanced Turkey's regional legitimacy and contributed to Turkey's regional power credentials.

Energy also played a significant role in Turkey's relationship with Russia. Despite articulating a desire to reduce dependence on Russian gas, Turkey facilitated the expansion of Russian influence in the Turkish energy system by awarding domestic energy contracts to Gazprom and giving Rosatom unprecedented control in constructing and operating Turkey's first nuclear power plant. That these contracts were concluded despite interest from other actors in investing in Turkey's domestic energy development indicates that the AKP attached greater prominence to closer bilateral affairs with Russia than it did to reducing energy dependency on Moscow. These actions contributed to further skewering the balance of power between the states in Russia's favour. Beyond elevating Russia above Turkey in the regional hierarchy, it also limited Turkey's capacity to respond assertively to regional aggressions by Russia in a manner that would have augmented Ankara's legitimacy among regional subordinates. This chapter therefore indicated that Turkey failed to accurately assess the regional balance of power or to take advantage of regional conditions in a way that would elevate its own regional status. Finally, it was argued that the pursuit of Russian natural gas was counterproductive to attempts to integrate Caspian and Central Asian supplies in the regional system and inimical to both Turkey's energy agenda and its regional power status.

Neither Turkey's Iranian nor Russian energy strategies contributed in any meaningful way to the AKP's energy agenda. The failure to develop new energy trade with Iran and the expansion of energy cooperation with Russia both contradicted the diversification agenda, while the lack of re-exportation clauses in natural gas contracts with the latter undermined the hub agenda. Where the cases diverge is with regards to their contribution to Turkey's

regional power. Russia's growing control over Turkey's energy system consolidated the regional balance of power in Moscow's favour. The willingness to compromise key elements of the national energy strategy in favour of stronger Russian ties highlighted Turkey's material limitations in a regional dominated by energy producers. Conversely, broader Iranian policies that sought to incorporate Tehran into regional energy systems and to mediate the nuclear crisis augmented Turkey's regional power credentials. These strategies had the potential to facilitate Ankara's diversification, hub, and energy security agendas. Even in their failure they contributed to AKP's ideational capacity as a regional integrator, a representative of regional interests in multilateral forums, and a proponent of the right of developing states to nuclear energy. Despite a lack of tangible material returns, this thesis therefore considers Turkey's energy strategy towards Iran to be more beneficial to the state's regional power.

The form of regional power adopted by each of Turkey, Russia, and Iran oscillated throughout the period under examination and were subject to different opportunities and constraints. Of the three, Iran adopted the least assertive form of regional power - one predominantly correspondent to leadership. As a state for which oil and gas dominated the national economy and international trade, energy should have formed the basis of regional engagement. Yet that Iran's economy competed with - rather than was complementary to - those of the Caspian littorals limited Iran's integration into regional trade systems. The compliance of those states with international sanctions against Iran further limited opportunities for Iran to engage with its neighbours. Finally, Iran's dependence on Russia for nuclear power and arms and on Turkey for access to natural markets forced the state to adopt policies that did not undermine its regional rivals' own strategies. Iran undoubtedly had the necessary material capacity and historical and cultural connections to be considered a regional power, but its limited capacity to influence regional security affairs or the geopolitical delineation of the region or to gain acceptance by other regional states by virtue of regional integration indicates that it should be conceptualised as an aspiring rather than actual regional power in the wider Caspian region.

Russia was by far the most assertive of the three states. Its military superiority (and willingness to utilise its military power to achieve its regional agenda) and strong historical ties to the region facilitated a coercive hegemonic regional strategy that occasionally

veered into regional imperialism. At the same time, Moscow's bid to enhance its regional power - and eventually regain the USSR's great power status - through the control of Caspian energy systems was stymied by the opposition of almost all regional actors to Russia's energy strategy. The hostility of subordinate states like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Russia's regional energy policies limited the success of this agenda, and the only meaningful example of energy negotiations between Russia and another Caspian littoral during this period manifested during the 2009 pricing dispute between Turkey and Azerbaijan - an occasion where, this thesis argues, Azerbaijan effectively used the spectre of negotiations with Russia to gain leverage over Turkey in Azerbaijani-Turkish energy affairs. Turkmen and Azerbaijani intransigence aside, interference by external regional states in regional energy affairs strengthened the capacity of other regional states to reject Russian advantages: China's financial investments in Turkmenistan and the promotion of the fourth (and later Southern) corridor by the EU and US provided support to regional subordinates in rejecting Russia's advantages. Despite being a competing regional power, Turkey was the only state (other than Armenia) to actively and consistently support Russia's energy initiatives.

As a regional power, Turkey falls somewhere between Russia and Iran: neither as assertive as the former nor as restrained as the latter in regional affairs, it projected a form of benevolent hegemony that was strongly rooted in self-interest. It also occasionally ventured into more coercive territory when it came to renegotiating energy contracts. This thesis demonstrated, however, that the success of coercive hegemony for Turkey was limited to Russian and Iranian price adjustments early in the AKP's first term; similar concessions were unforthcoming in later years. Energy was a potential strategic tool for the accumulation of hegemonic Turkish regional power. Turkey's geostrategic significance, rising power status, and proactive regional policies all had the the potential to be advantageous to Turkey's energy strategy in a way that could strengthen its regional power. However, three major constraints limited both the employment of energy for the accumulation of regional power and the use of regional power to realise Turkey's energy agenda.

Firstly, despite rhetoric that stressed Turkey's autonomous foreign policy and geostrategic location to its energy rich neighbours, Turkey's lack of energy resources remained a major

disadvantage. Dependence on regional energy resources limited Turkey's capacity to enact a more assertive and proactive regional agenda that could strengthen its regional power. Turkey needed a secure, constant supply of energy to maintain the economic growth that had been a significant feature of its regional power in the first place; it simply could not afford to antagonise its neighbours. The dangers of doing so were highlighted in chapters three and five, where relations with key energy suppliers like Azerbaijan and Russia were Turkey's threatened by attempted rapprochement with Armenia and support for Georgia during the South Ossetian war. Those incidences pointed not only to the risks of energy dependency, but to the incompatibilities between Turkey's (regional) foreign policies and its energy requirements. Similar inconsistencies were apparent within the energy strategy itself. This thesis repeatedly pointed to contradictions within the AKP's energy policy that undermined the potential to utilise energy for Turkey's regional power. The diversification agenda with MENR's Strategic Plans and rhetoric concerning Turkey's necessity to reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas was at odds with the continued pursuit of and participation in Russian led energy projects. Russian collaborations were also incompatible with the AKP's desire to contribute to Europe's energy security - another key feature of the AKP's energy discourse.

These contradictions were part of the second key issue that this thesis contends constrained the AKP's ambitions: Turkey's failure to acknowledge how other states assessed the geopolitical motivations behind and ramifications of specific energy projects. Concurrent pursuit of Russian and fourth corridor projects was emblematic of this issue, but the same problem was also evident in attempts to incorporate Iran into east-west energy projects despite opposition from proponents of the project in the US and EU. This thesis therefore argues that ignoring the geopolitical implications of energy projects for other states limited the effectiveness of Turkey's energy agenda and restricted its attempts to utilise energy as a tool for regional power.

Finally, it is clear that the AKP overestimated Turkey's power in regional energy and geopolitical equations to the detriment of both its energy agenda and regional power. The energy "leadership" and hub agendas were predicated on a power over regional subordinates that it simply did not posses. It lacked power to gain concessions over some subordinate states (particularly Azerbaijan), possessed insufficient financial resources to

compete for access to resources in others (see Turkmenistan), was incapable of ensuring regional stability (South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia), and could not challenge Russia's superior position in the regional hierarchy. Ankara proved similarly incapable of gaining concessions congruent with the hub agenda (such as re-export rights) in energy negotiations with other regional powers. In attempting to manipulate regional geopolitics to its advantage, Turkey often overplayed its hand in a manner that threatened its energy security and sabotaged its regional power. Further undermining the solidification of Turkey's benevolent regional hegemony was the AKP's reactive position on most major regional energy projects: it had a tendency to bandwagon with energy initiatives announced and implemented by other actors rather than play any leading role itself. TANAP provides an exception to this rule, but all other major projects announced between 2002 and 2014 - Blue Stream-2, South Stream, Nabucco, TurkStream among them - were initiated and facilitated by other actors.

The realisation of TANAP and Iran's continued eagerness to cooperate on energy projects with Turkey indicate that the intersection between energy and regional power was not entirely unsuccessful. The extent of Turkey's regional integration, economic growth, and proactive foreign policy in line with the characteristics of regional powerhood contributed to increased energy dialogue with regional states between 2002 and 2014 that had the potential to contribute to Ankara's energy agenda. Overall, however, this thesis contends that the constraints outlined above limited the successful execution of an energy agenda that could contribute to regional power. Consequently, it argues that while Turkey attempted to adopt a benevolent hegemonic regional power strategy to affect change in regional energy systems to its advantage, overconfidence on the behalf of the ruling party, coupled with a failure to properly understand the geopolitical motivations of other actors and the continued dependence on other regional states for the provision of essential energy requirements, confined the development of any effective relationship between energy and regional power in the AKP era. The next section of this conclusion will draw on some of the points raised in this section in outlining four key arguments for understanding the relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states.

Key arguments: energy and regional power in advanced developing states

1. Advanced developing states can use energy as a strategic resource to establish and maintain regional power

Chapter one highlighted how IR literature framed energy as a strategic asset for developed states. However, it was argued that scholars were limited in assessing energy's potential as a tool for generating power and manipulating geostrategic relations in advanced developing states. Similarly, chapter two noted that energy was not incorporated into assessments of the material power capacity of regional powers; nor was it included in debates on regional power strategies either in its own right or as part of a wider economic power strategy. In portraying energy as a strategic asset through which advanced developing states can develop or consolidate regional power, this thesis has demonstrated energy's importance as a material power resource similar to the economic or military power discussed elsewhere in the regional powers literature. Energy is a means through which the state can develop and consolidate its status in the regional system. If successfully integrated into a broader regional powers strategy, it can be a tool of foreign policy or statecraft: one to be manipulated by advanced developing states to engender advantage over regional subordinates. The previous section of this conclusion illustrated the limitations to Turkey's capacity to use energy as a strategic regional powers tool.

The way in which regional powers utilise energy as a material resource depends on the typology to which the regional power adheres. It can be used in both a cooperative or coercive manner to ensure a favourable position for the state in the regional hierarchy. Financing, facilitating, or leading cooperative energy initiatives like pipeline projects can create interdependencies that enhance the legitimacy of regional *leaders* or *benevolent regional hegemons* among subordinates. *Coercive hegemons* can manipulate energy relations to gain economic and strategic advantages in regional affairs - as a tool to either augment legitimacy or induce control over subordinates. For *imperial regional powers*, military attacks on essential energy infrastructure can be used to enforce power.

The integrated nature of regional energy networks and the transnational nature of energy security threats enable regional powers to provide leadership in framing energy security as a common goal and promoting regional energy governance. By expressing a common

energy agenda, the state can influence regional norms in a way that is reflective of the characteristics of regional leadership or benevolent hegemonic regional power outlined in chapter two. This engenders cooperation advantageous to regional stability and, as chapter three highlighted, was a major objective of Turkey's energy agenda. By propagating common energy norms, Turkey was utilising its ideational capacity to overcome limitations in its material (energy) capacity. Finally, this thesis contends that technical knowledge regarding energy development can be an asset for advanced developing states. It was pointed out at several junctures that the desire of advanced developed states to develop nuclear power capabilities was restricted by those states' limited technical knowledge on nuclear proliferation. Russia's expertise in the area therefore endows it with an asset it can export globally to advanced developing and developing states. Within the Caspian region, it is notable that Russia constructed - and provided expertise for both Iran and Turkey's first nuclear plants during the 2002-2014 period.

However, the debate on the resource curse in chapter two offers a caveat as to potential constraints of energy as a tool for regional powers. Over-dependence on energy as both a means to generate income and to forge independences with and assume power over regional subordinates means that disruptions to energy productions or flows can threaten the position of the regional power within the regional hierarchy. This thesis contends that this is particularly the case for those states that pursue regional dominance through natural gas or oil pipelines. For states like Russia and Iran that are both major producers and regional powers, ensuring regional stability, limiting the influence of external powers in regional affairs, and ensuring a diversified domestic economy and is pivotal to successfully obtaining and maintaining regional powerhood. In other words, the capacity of the regional power to delineate regional geopolitics - a key characteristic of regional powerhood according to chapter two - is essential to ensuring the successful application of energy as a strategic tool.

A further constraint stems from the geographic limitations of pipeline projects. It should be noted that the more adaptable nature of oil trade means that it is less limited by geographic factors than natural gas. Equally, the relative ease with which states can replace oil supplies in the 21st century in comparison to previous decades means it is less likely to be used in a coercive manner in regional geopolitics. Natural gas' utility as a power resource

for producer states is determined by two factors highlighted in chapter one: firstly, the asymmetrical distribution of global resources, and secondly, the material necessity of energy for states at all levels of the economic spectrum. For natural gas rich states, transport to energy markets may require engagement with third party transit countries. The necessity to guarantee the security of these supplies may constrain the capacity of regional powers to affect a more coercive regional strategy depending on the *form* of regional power applied by the producer to the transit or consumer. This, in turn, is determined by the form of bilateral relations between the producer and transit and consumer. This thesis highlighted Russia's strategies towards Ukraine and Turkey as diverging approaches to energy engagement with actors occupying relative similar positions in the energy chain. Both states are consumers of Russian gas and are potentially key states for the transit of Russian natural gas to European markets. Yet Russia adopted a significantly more coercive strategy towards Ukraine than Turkey primarily, this thesis argued, because of the disparate historical and bilateral relations and relative balance of power between Russia and the each of the two states. Assessments of the extent to which geography limits the capacity of the state to utilise energy as a strategic asset - or analysis of the *form* that utilisation adopts - must therefore take into account the bilateral relations between the energy producer and individual states in the energy chain.

The dependence by some landlocked advanced developing producer states on energy for income and power projection offers an opportunity for strategically located consumer states to manipulate energy relations to their advantage. This thesis proposes energy hub development as a means through which energy poor but geostrategically significant states can accumulate and employ energy as a strategic tool. It has argued that energy hubs endow energy poor states with benefits in the energy system more commonly associated with producer states. However, the necessity for the hub to ensure security of supply restricts the implementation of a coercive or imperial energy policy towards regional producer and transit states. That the AKP was unable to successfully manipulate regional geopolitical and energy relations undermined the potential for Turkey the use its geostrategically significant location to create an energy hub.

Finally, the receptiveness of other regional states to the regional power's agenda must also be considered when assessing the capacity of the state to utilise energy as a power

resource. The geographical limitations of pipeline trade and the geopolitical risks associated with energy trade in specific regions require a level of cooperation between producers, transit states, and consumers. It is for this reason that cooperative rather than coercive forms of regional power - those congruent with leadership or benevolent hegemony - are more likely to be conducive to the successful utilisation of energy as a tool to accumulate regional power.

2. Energy can contribute to the balance of power between regional powers

The notion that energy contributes to the balance of power between states is not, as chapter one demonstrated, a new one. However, the limitations in the energy literature on advanced developing states and energy relations between states in the global South, and in the regional powers literature on energy as a geostrategic resource, restrict debate on the role energy plays in power relations *between* advanced developing states in the regional context. This thesis therefore provides insight into the significant role that energy can play in determining the balance of power between regional powers in a geopolitical system. It proposes that the way in which energy contributes to the balance of power between states is predicated on the producer-consumer relationship outlined in the first chapter. A key assumption within this argument is that the bifurcation of energy nations into producers and consumers is replicated amongst regional powers. Consumer states are dependent on producer states for the provision of energy, a key strategic good for economic and social development. Dependence generates leverage for the producer state. The greater the dependence - or the more limited the diversification by the consumer of its resources - the greater the leverage assumed by the producer. If the producer demonstrates a willingness to contribute additional supplies to the consumer during shortages or the suspension of imports from alternative producers, then the producer's s dominant position in bilateral relations is reinforced.

That this thesis is specifically concerned with advanced developing states has ramifications for understanding the contribution of energy to the balance of power between regional powers. While a major contention of this thesis is that IR literature understates the extent to which energy is a geostrategic resource for advanced developing states, it accepts that the political economic focus of most studies of energy in those states is not totally unmerited. Given energy's primacy in the export strategies of advanced developing

producer states and import requirements of advanced developing producer states, it is unsurprising that the examination of the relationship between specific states in the Caspian highlighted energy's preeminent position in bilateral trade between energy rich and poor states. Similarly, energy is essential to the continued economic and industrial development of advanced developing states. Considering this thesis' contention that economic affairs dominate relations between advanced developing states, then the predominance afforded to energy within those bilateral affairs demonstrates the centrality of energy to bilateral relations between powers within the regional context.

The predominance attached to energy in bilateral relations can contribute to an asymmetry between producer and consumer states that further elevates the former above the latter in the regional hierarchy. In regional power terms, that leverage can constrain the capacity of the consumer state to advance a more assertive regional power strategy that contradicts the agenda of the producer. In the case of the wider Caspian region, this thesis argued that Turkey's capacity to represent regional interests in multilateral institutions, its attempts to integrate Iran into the regional system, and its geostrategic significance relative to Iran's natural gas strategy contributed to a recalibration of the economic imbalance generated by bilateral energy trade. Conversely, Turkey's failure to assert regional power in the aftermath of the 2008 war in South Ossetia was portrayed by chapter five as the clearest example of the restrictive consequences of Ankara's dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. However, this thesis also noted that this asymmetry can be somewhat alleviated if the consumer states possess a preponderance of resources in another sector relative to the producer state or offers to the state a service that cannot be obtained elsewhere.

3. Engagement with other states in a manner congruent with the characteristics of regional power is advantageous to the energy agenda of the state

Chapter two outlined nine conditions that determine regional power. Three of those were highlighted in this thesis as beneficial to the energy agendas of the state: delineation of the regional security complex, regional integration, and participation in multilateral institutions. In each of these instances, regional power strategies become conflated with energy diplomacy, a process that encourages political, economic, and security cooperation to facilitate a state's energy agenda (Uludag et al, 2013).

The first condition pertains to the capacity of the state to influence regional security in a way that facilitates the energy agenda of the state. Chapter one highlighted how energy security was a significant concern for states at all stages of the supply system. Regional power producer states cannot utilise energy as a strategic asset unless it has access to energy markets; the security of supply of consumer states is predicated on ensuring stable transit from producers; and the capacity of transit states to develop energy hubs is dependent on stability in energy producers, markets, and other transit routes. Ensuring regional security was therefor imperative to energy security. The necessity to maintain regional stability to guarantee energy security may act as a constraint on more coercive security initiatives, particularly in regions where tangible connections are constructed through pipeline integration.

However, manipulating regional security is also important to those states seeking to influence the development of regional energy systems. In contrast to the view propagated in the regional power literature (Nolte and Flemes, 2010), this thesis argued that there should be no assumption that the role of the regional power in determining regional security should be benevolent. Rather, this thesis postulated that states may influence regional stability either positively or negatively in order to engineer advantages in the regional energy sector. On one hand, encouraging and committing resources to cooperative security initiatives contributed to Turkey's own energy security and enhanced the viability of the energy hub agenda. On the other, instability-inducing and aggressive Russian agendas in some states (like Georgia) had the potential to derail fourth corridor energy projects that had the potential to undermine Turkey's regional energy agenda.

Regional powers, chapter two argued, are states that are economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region. This thesis proposes that both the integration of the state in its region and the facilitation of integrative processes can benefit the energy agendas of advanced developing states. The security initiatives mentioned above are one form of integration; economic initiatives like Turkey's foreign direct investment in Caspian energy producing states, cultural initiatives like the Turkish-Iranian year of culture, and multilateral efforts through forums like the Economic Cooperation Organisation and the Turkic Council further contribute to integration. Integration and interdependence engenders legitimacy and goodwill that, in turn, endows the state with leverage in regional

energy negotiations. Turkey's interdependence with most of the Caspian states was highlighted as an example of this integration throughout the period under examination. In contrast, chapter four indicated that Iran's failure to integrate into the wider Caspian region limited its capacity to manipulate regional energy equations.

Finally, the capacity and willingness of the state to represent regional interests in international forums was presented as a means through which states could elevate their regional legitimacy among subordinates and engender goodwill conducive to energy trade. Chapter four argued that this was a motivation behind Turkey's willingness to participate in UNSC negotiations. The relationship between regional powers and external states will be discussed in more depth in the next section.

4. The relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states cannot be considered in isolation from the international context

In adopting a regional powers framework and emphasising relations between states in specific geopolitical regions, this thesis focused predominately on relations *between* advanced developing states. It was intended that this approach would contribute to literature on the nature of energy and power relations between states in the global South and counteract the Western-focused imbalance in IR literature. However, just as chapter two considered the recognition by external states to be a defining characteristic of regional power, so this thesis argues that the impact of external powers on the regional system cannot be excluded from examinations of the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states. Even in highly regionalised context - such as pipeline projects - the relationship between energy and regional power cannot be studied in isolation from the international context.

There are two factors to consider in assessing the contribution of extra-regional powers to the way in which we analyse the relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states. The first is the reciprocity of regional subordinates to advances from extra-regional powers. This thesis has highlighted several examples of how the acceptance by subordinates to energy-related overtures by external states affected the energy agendas of regional powers and, consequently, their regional status. Chapter three highlighted how Turkey's energy "leadership" agenda was, to a large extent, tied to the

US- and EU-led fourth corridor programme. The willingness of key producer and transit states like Azerbaijan and Georgia to participate in the fourth corridor was a prerequisite for the implementation of the programme. Both states' compliance was predicated in part on Western-focused foreign policies in Baku and Tbilisi, and in part on a desire to restrict Russian influence in the states' respective energy sectors. Consequently, the reciprocity of Azerbaijan and Georgia to Western-sponsored initiatives simultaneously facilitated Turkey's energy agenda to the benefit of its regional power and obstructed Russia's energy strategy to the detriment of its regional power accumulation. Similarly, Turkmenistan's openness to engaging in energy trade with China was construed as detrimental to the regional energy and power strategies of each of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In both cases, the capacity of developed states (and China as an emerging great power) to invest in the energy sectors of regional subordinates highlighted the economic and political constraints of advanced developing states relative to their more developed counterparts.

The political relationship between one regional power and external states can also affect the energy agenda of a second regional power. The US' desire to restrain the influence of Iran and Russia in the Caspian by means of the fourth corridor project was characterised in this thesis as beneficial to Turkey's energy agenda. Conversely, the relationship between Iran and the West was an impediment to Turkey's energy strategy. Successive US sanctions restricted the development of the Iranian energy market, thus limiting the capacity of Turkey and Iran to extend bilateral energy trade. It was argued in chapter four that Turkey's mediatory efforts during the 2010 UNSC negotiations were spurred by the threat posed by potential sanctions to Turkey's energy agenda. That Turkey is an advanced developing state bears some relevance in this issue: it is notable that two advanced developing states (Brazil being the second) were selected to conduct the 2010 negotiations, and that the consequent Tehran declaration was rejected by the P5+1. The states had sufficient political capital to be considered viable mediators by the international status quo, yet were unable to convince the same actors that they had negotiated a viable solution to the crisis. Consequently, the rejection of the Tehran Declaration both undermined Turkey's status as a regional representative and its capacity to extend its regional power through energy initiatives. The episode therefore highlights the opportunities and constraints available to advanced developing states in intervening between external and regional powers for energy benefits.

In acknowledging the impact external states have on a regional power's regional energy ambitions and status, concession should also be made to the way in which regional powers engage with the international system in general. The introduction to this thesis noted that advanced developing states could be reformist, revisionist, or support the global status quo. Turkey's relationship with the West and willingness to participate in established multilateral institutions was portrayed as something that would engender legitimacy among smaller states in the Caspian for Turkey and generate leverage for the AKP in regional energy negotiations. Conversely, Iran's revisionist international agenda and increasing divergence from the status quo at the height of the nuclear crisis was a significant impediment to its energy agenda.

On a related theme, this thesis stresses the necessity not to underestimate the geopolitical motivations behind and repercussions for external intervention in regional energy systems. The empirical chapters of this project repeatedly emphasised how the AKP's tendency to support competing pipeline projects - like Nabucco and the South Stream - undermined both its own energy strategy and its regional power ambitions. The tendency by advanced developing states to compartmentalise energy from political issues or geopolitical competition in bilateral relations was also stressed throughout this thesis. In part, this thesis contends that this compartmentalisation stems from the economic necessity of energy trade for both producer and consumer advanced developing states.

Contributions

This thesis has demonstrated a connection between energy and regional powers for advanced developing states. In considering the relationship between Turkey's energy strategy and its approach to regional powers in the wider Caspian region, it highlighted how the two concepts can be mutually reinforcing: energy strategy can shape and facilitate regional power ambitions, and regional power can contribute to the success of an energy agenda. Turkey's status as an advanced developing state - as a country economically ascendant, with substantial resources relative to other states in the global South, and eager to play a more influential role in regional and global affairs - conferred it with the confidence and desire to augment its position in regional affairs. Its reliance on other regional actors for essential supplies of energy limited Turkey's capacity to adopt a coercive hegemonic approach towards regional power. Rather, Turkey was framed as a

benevolent regional hegemon that presented policies grounded in self-interest as common regional objectives. This approach proved limited in dealing with a Russia that was increasingly coercive and which held a balance of power over Turkey. That that power imbalance was founded, to a large extent, on Ankara's dependence on Russian energy supplies, highlights the importance of incorporating energy into assessments of the relationship between regional powers. Yet the same benevolent hegemonic approach proved advantageous in Ankara's relations with Iran and with subordinate regional states like Azerbaijan and Georgia - all of which were pivotal to the realisation of the AKP's energy agenda, and which were at least partly reliant on Turkey for the realisation of their own energy objectives. This thesis therefore demonstrated that for Turkey, regional power cannot be understood without understanding the role energy plays in both the regional strategy of the state and in regional politics more broadly. It consequently argues for the importance of incorporating energy as a material resource into explorations of regional power.

This thesis therefore contributes to two fields of IR literature. To that on regional powers, it offers a new understanding of the relationship between a key strategic resource - energy - and regional power. Chapter two contended that energy's exclusion from assessments of power capacity limited a more nuanced understanding of the resources available to regional powers and the ways in which they might integrate them into regional statecraft. Arguments one and two above highlight the ways in which energy, as a strategic resource, both facilitates and constrains regional power. That it can be employed as either a material or ideational resource highlights how the two forms of resources overlap. It was also argued in chapter two that the failure of most empirical regional powers literature to differentiate between different forms of regional power and the focus in the literature on cooperative regional power strategies further limits the scope for understanding how or why different forms of power manifest. By highlighting how different policies, strategies, and reactions correspond to various regional power typologies, this thesis has contributed an empirical account of the heterogeneous nature of regional power to the literature.

The second field this thesis contributes to is that of energy in IR. Chapter one pointed to a dichotomy in the energy literature between developed and developing states that failed to account for the unique agendas and opportunities of advanced developing states. It argued

that the literature that did discuss energy in advanced developing states tended to adopt an IPE approach similar to that applied to developing states that limited understandings of how energy and geopolitical agendas were related for these states. In conceptualising energy as not just an economic necessity, but as a geostrategic asset for advanced developing states, this thesis contributes to a broader understanding of how energy was framed and utilised by states that are neither developed nor developing. In addition, the review of energy literature pointed to the significance of new, rapidly industrialising states within the global energy sector. Yet studies of the relations between these new actors are limited: most scholars focus on the implications of this new trade for developed or Western states. The focus on energy relations between advanced developed states in this thesis contributes to the study of South-South energy relations that the first chapter suggested was missing from contemporary studies of energy in IR and, by extension, to IR research on international politics within the global South. Given the proliferation of natural gas deals in the 21st century and the reconfiguration of energy geopolitics in recent decades, the focus on energy relations within a specific geopolitical space contributes to studies on the recalibration of the geopolitical nature of energy politics. That it does so specifically via a regional powers framework adds to the originality of the research. The exploration of the motivations and objectives of advanced developing states in this thesis therefore adds depth to the ways in which IR understands how energy and international politics are related. At the same time, it expands both our knowledge of the advanced developing states themselves and the ways in which they influence international energy trends.

Finally, this thesis was eager to contribute to scholarly literature on advanced developing states. In drawing attention to the relationships between advanced developing states like Turkey, Iran, and Russia - as well as between those countries and developing states like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan - it contributes to the study of both rising powers and between states in the global South more broadly. This thesis demonstrates the way in which these states interact within the regional system, and the way in which they incorporate energy into power and geopolitical strategies. In doing so, it provides insights into the opportunities advanced developing states have in comparison to developing states - particularly in terms of engendering access to essential resources and in engaging with developed states and multilateral institutions - and the economic and political constraints

that face them in comparison to developed states. By positioning energy as a tool through which advanced developing states can obtain, consolidate, and utilising energy in the regional context, and in demonstrating how regional power facilitates the acquisition of essential energy supplies, this thesis has provided insight into the ways in which advanced developing states affect and effect power. Turkey faced significant challenges in its attempts demonstrate energy "leadership" and regional hegemony in the Caspian. Yet as the empirical chapters demonstrated, even particularly energy-rich states like Iran and Russia failed to maintain consistent hegemony in a region dominated by energy politics: the former was limited to regional leadership, while the latter was limited in its application of coercive hegemony in states like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, this thesis demonstrated how factors associated with regional power - particularly regional integration - were essential for all three states to realise their energy agendas, and that energy was important to determining their roles in the regional hierarchy. Consequently, it concludes that energy and regional power are intrinsically related for the advanced developing states of the Caspian - including for energy poor states like Turkey.

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